Posted on Nov 18, 2016
What was the most significant event on September 16 during the U.S. Civil War?
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In 1861, The US Committee of Naval Constructors recommended three plans for building ironclads: Galena, Ironsides, and Monitor. Because the USS Monitor ended up battle what was once the USS Merrimack but had been renamed the CSS Virginia that vessel design became the most famous.
In 1864 CSA Maj Gen Nathan Bedford Forrest left Verona, Mississippi to begin a cavalry raid into Northern Alabama and Middle Tennessee to cut the supply and communication lines of Major General William T. Sherman.
In 1861, Maj Gen John C. Fremont neglected to tell Maj Gen John Pope about Lexington, Kentucky. “Events in Missouri had been careening wildly out of control for weeks. General John C. Fremont, commander of the Union Western Department, was almost trying his best to keep it together. While General Ulysses S. Grant commanded troops along the Mississippi River at Cairo, Illinois and Paducah, Kentucky and southeast Missouri, General John Pope was in command of the forces in northern Missouri.
Pope, however, had been out of the loop for a few days as he chased a band of Missouri secessionists through the northcentral counties. He missed the news that General Sterling Price and 10,000 Missouri State Guards had approached and were beginning to surround the Union troops at Lexington, on the Missouri River. General Fremont had spent the past few days ordering units here and there, mostly neglecting Lexington and completely neglecting General Pope. While Pope’s force, was spread out, it had been near Glasgow, only 60 miles from Lexington.
Having driven the Missouri secessionists to the Missouri River, General Pope, upon Fremont’s orders issued several days prior, boarded a train to Iowa to raise more regiments for his command. While waiting out a layover, Pope decided to bide his time by reading the dispatches in the telegraph office. There, he found Fremont’s message of the 14th ordering to General Sturgis to Lexington.
Angered at being left out of the loop, but not exactly sure how dire the situation at Lexington was, Pope first ordered two of his regiments to Lexington, under Col. Robert Smith “as soon as they completed the object of his expedition,” which, as Pope related, would be “very soon.” He then wired Fremont: “Presuming from General Sturgis’ dispatches that there is imminent want of troops in Lexington,” he had sent two regiments that would be nearby shortly.
Pope also mentioned that his trip to Iowa was “imperative” and that he “must be there as soon as possible.” His train took him to Palmyra, along the Mississippi, where he learned the full breadth of the troubles in Lexington. He again wired Fremont, this time telling him that, in addition to the two regiments he originally ordered out, two more were also en route and should be there in a day or two. In all, 4,000 of Pope’s troops, plus a battery of artillery were marching to break up the siege.
Even though his trip to Iowa was “imperative,” Pope understood that the situation in Lexington was even more so, asking Fremont if he wanted him “to come down to St. Louis.”
Soon, Pope received his answer. Fremont ordered him to push on to Iowa. Greatly angered, he did so.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/fremont-neglected-to-tell-pope-about-lexington/
In 1862, Maj Gen George B. McClellan’s chance slipped away. “As the sun rose behind him, illuminating the thick fog of morning, George McClellan had no real idea what was across the small Antietam Creek near the crossroads of Sharpsburg, Maryland. By his calculations, perhaps as many as 120,000 Rebels were arrayed against the 60,000 troops he had at hand. He knew that Harpers Ferry had fallen, and that Stonewall Jackson’s men had probably reunited with General Lee’s main force.
McClellan had known other things, as well. Four days prior, he had known the Confederate plan of operation from the recovered Special Orders No. 191. He knew that Lee had split his army into four separate columns and that they was a gulf of twenty miles separating the wings.
While the battles of South Mountain on the 14th showed him the Rebels were willing to fight, they also showed his enemy to still be scattered. McClellan, as he did so often, waited. As an entire day slipped by, he pursued the retreating Confederates, but kept a respectful distance.
General Lee needed no ruse, no trickery to convince McClellan not to attack. The Union general did that all on his own. The afternoon and evening of the 15th found McClellan’s 60,000 (20,000 or so were still en route) squared off against 15,000 under Lee. McClellan’s original plan was to find the divided Rebels and destroy each column in detail. This was his chance. But he decided to wait until the next day.
Morning brought the same. Though Stonewall Jackson’s men were closer to Sharpsburg, they had not yet joined the main body. After rising, McClellan, full of confidence and gusto, wrote to his wife that he had “no doubt delivered Penna & Maryland.” And yet, there was no battle.
At the same time that he wrote his wife, he also wrote General-in-Chief Henry Halleck. He could “ascertain that some of the enemy are still there,” but he couldn’t tell how many. As soon as he found out, he assured Halleck, he would attack.
To General William Franklin, commanding the Sixth Corps guarding his left, he divulged even more: “I think the enemy has abandoned the position in front of us, but the fog is so dense that I have not yet been able to determine.” Reports had come in that after the fall of Harpers Ferry, Rebel troops on the Maryland side had crossed to the Virginia side. This was, assumed McClellan, proof that Lee’s entire army was retreating back to Virginia.
Halleck agreed. “I think,” he replied to McClellan, “you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the [Potomac] river. I fear now more than ever that they will recross at Harper’s Ferry or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington.”
That was certainly possible. “Feigned retreats are secesh tactics,” Halleck had warned in the past. McClellan would probably have been fine with the Rebel army retreating back into Virginia. He might have been seen as the savior of Pennsylvania and Maryland – throwing back the huge Rebel army with only a few minor scrapes at South Mountain. But to be cut off from Washington, that was another story.
As the morning slid by, McClellan learned that the Rebels, or at least their artillery, were still there. As the fog burned away, the gray lines of infantry he saw so plainly the previous evening were gone. He couldn’t send his army against a hidden enemy, and so more reconnoitering was needed. No attack could be made – he needed to examine the ground, clear the roads and approaches, bring up more supplies and ammunition, and find fords to cross the Antietam.
Antietam Creek was not very wide, nor was it very deep. It was, however, wide and deep enough that artillery couldn’t be driven across it. Soldiers may lift up their muskets and hoist their cartridge boxes over their heads to cross water up to their chests, but artillery could not. Fortunately for McClellan, Sharpsburg was served by several roads leading into it and so there were four stone bridges spanning the creek.
Scouts had reported that Rebels controlled the crossings to the south. But the North Bridge was open. And there, if he was going to strike at all, was where he would cross.
By noon, as Stonewall Jackson’s men began to file into the Confederate lines, McClellan divined a plan. Joe Hooker, commanding the First Corps, was to cross the North Bridge and be prepared to strike the left flank of the Rebels. Jacob Cox, now commanding the Ninth Corps, was to force a crossing at the southern-most Rohrbach Bridge simultaneous with Hooker’s attack. In the middle, McClellan would support the vice-like assaults. No orders were written to either Hooker or Cox.
General Ambrose Burnside, commanding the left wing of the army, believed he had been slighted. During the battles at South Mountain, he had command over both the First and Ninth Corps. Now, believed Burnside, Hooker had swindled his way into an independent command, which left Burnside without a corps of his own. Cox, commanding the Ninth Corps, offered to step down and return to his division, handing Burnside the reigns, but the bewhiskered general refused.
Hooker crossed the North Bridge and advanced a mile before any reaching any resistance. The Confederates clearly saw the crossing and two brigades under John Bell Hood were moved to give battle. But there was hardly a fight. Artillery boomed and Hooker’s men skirmished with Hood’s, but no more.
McClellan’s plan was for Burnside, commanding the left, to make some sort of demonstration to make the Rebels believe that the Union right (Hooker) was silent. As Hooker advanced, however, McClellan was doing little more than showing Lee his hand. Whatever element of surprise McClellan had folded into this plan was gone.
As night crept over the fields north of Sharpsburg, Lee shifted troops to meet the obvious Union threat. Hooker, who had been trying to turn Lee’s flank, would be faced with the main Confederate line.The dark had replaced the fog of morning, obscuring lines and men, while covering the ground, the woods and valleys in uncertainty. Here and there, nervous pickets would let loose volleys, or artillery would crush the anxious stillness hovering thick. Troops were moved, though slightly, and positions abandoned. Each army was as near to exhaustion as it was to battle. The sleep, so desperately needed, was lost in anticipation of what the next shrouded dawn would bring.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/mcclellans-chance-slips-away/
Pictures: 1864-09 The Great Cattle Raid at Harrison's Landing; USS Galena watercolor; 1862-09-16 Battle of Antietam Situation Map; USS Conestoga
A. 1861: The USS Conestoga was traveling on the Cumberland River in Kentucky. It spotted a couple of Confederate ships nearby and proceeded to engage them. USS Conestoga first combat action was when she engaged the CSS Jackson and another CSS ship near Lucas Bend, Kentucky. After a very brief skirmish, the Confederate ships were captured, along with the crews.
B. 1862: Antietam Campaign. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and his Union Army of the Potomac confronted CSA Gen Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia at Sharpsburg, Maryland. Lee faced two serious problems. First, he only had 18,000 men with him against 75,000 Union troops. Second, behind where his men were gathered was the Potomac River.
By noon, as Stonewall Jackson’s men began to file into the Confederate lines, McClellan divined a plan. Joe Hooker, commanding the First Corps, was to cross the North Bridge and be prepared to strike the left flank of the Rebels. Jacob Cox, now commanding the Ninth Corps, was to force a crossing at the southern-most Rohrbach Bridge simultaneous with Hooker’s attack. In the middle, McClellan would support the vice-like assaults. No orders were written to either Hooker or Cox.
General Ambrose Burnside, commanding the left wing of the army, believed he had been slighted. During the battles at South Mountain, he had command over both the First and Ninth Corps. Now, believed Burnside, Hooker had swindled his way into an independent command, which left Burnside without a corps of his own. Cox, commanding the Ninth Corps, offered to step down and return to his division, handing Burnside the reigns, but the bewhiskered general refused.
Hooker crossed the North Bridge and advanced a mile before any reaching any resistance. The Confederates clearly saw the crossing and two brigades under John Bell Hood were moved to give battle. But there was hardly a fight. Artillery boomed and Hooker’s men skirmished with Hood’s, but no more.
C. 1863: Chickamauga Campaign. General William Rosecrans (US) army had taken Chattanooga four days ago, but Braxton Bragg’s Confederate army was nowhere close to defeated. The Southern forces were strung out on a roughly north-south line on the east side of a ridge called Lookout Mountain. Rosecrans’ army was scattered and vulnerable, especially the men with Major General George H. Thomas (US) to the south near LeMoyne Cove. Thomas could have easily been isolated and defeated, but the orders to do so never got delivered to General Thomas C. Hindman (CSA). Thomas Crittenden [US] reaches Lee and Gordon Mill on the Chickamauga River. Rosecrans [US] orders the rest of his men, spread out along 50 miles of Georgia's backwoods, to concentrate at this landmark.
D. 1864: Petersburg Siege. Successful cattle rustling by CSA Cavalrymen in what will be called the “Beefsteak Raid.” At 5 a.m., CSA Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton’s force arrived at Sycamore Church to raid the Union cattle area. The Confederates made a dismounted assault on the Union cavalry force. Hampton had arrived to assist the 7th Virginia Cavalry. The Federals decided to not let the Confederates take the cattle, so they broke down the corral fences and stampeded the cattle. On what will be called the “Beefsteak Raid,” and captured more than 2,400 cattle, along with 11 wagons and 304 prisoners. They head back toward friendly territory.
FYI SGT Mark Anderson PO3 Edward Riddle Maj William W. 'Bill' Price COL (Join to see) SSgt David M.] SPC Maurice Evans SPC Jon O. SGT Jim ArnoldAmn Dale PreisachCW4 (Join to see) Sgt Jerry GenesioSSG (Join to see)LTC John Griscom LTC Thomas Tennant LTC David Brown LTC (Join to see) CWO3 (Join to see) SGT John " Mac " McConnell SFC (Join to see) CPL Ronald Keyes Jr
In 1864 CSA Maj Gen Nathan Bedford Forrest left Verona, Mississippi to begin a cavalry raid into Northern Alabama and Middle Tennessee to cut the supply and communication lines of Major General William T. Sherman.
In 1861, Maj Gen John C. Fremont neglected to tell Maj Gen John Pope about Lexington, Kentucky. “Events in Missouri had been careening wildly out of control for weeks. General John C. Fremont, commander of the Union Western Department, was almost trying his best to keep it together. While General Ulysses S. Grant commanded troops along the Mississippi River at Cairo, Illinois and Paducah, Kentucky and southeast Missouri, General John Pope was in command of the forces in northern Missouri.
Pope, however, had been out of the loop for a few days as he chased a band of Missouri secessionists through the northcentral counties. He missed the news that General Sterling Price and 10,000 Missouri State Guards had approached and were beginning to surround the Union troops at Lexington, on the Missouri River. General Fremont had spent the past few days ordering units here and there, mostly neglecting Lexington and completely neglecting General Pope. While Pope’s force, was spread out, it had been near Glasgow, only 60 miles from Lexington.
Having driven the Missouri secessionists to the Missouri River, General Pope, upon Fremont’s orders issued several days prior, boarded a train to Iowa to raise more regiments for his command. While waiting out a layover, Pope decided to bide his time by reading the dispatches in the telegraph office. There, he found Fremont’s message of the 14th ordering to General Sturgis to Lexington.
Angered at being left out of the loop, but not exactly sure how dire the situation at Lexington was, Pope first ordered two of his regiments to Lexington, under Col. Robert Smith “as soon as they completed the object of his expedition,” which, as Pope related, would be “very soon.” He then wired Fremont: “Presuming from General Sturgis’ dispatches that there is imminent want of troops in Lexington,” he had sent two regiments that would be nearby shortly.
Pope also mentioned that his trip to Iowa was “imperative” and that he “must be there as soon as possible.” His train took him to Palmyra, along the Mississippi, where he learned the full breadth of the troubles in Lexington. He again wired Fremont, this time telling him that, in addition to the two regiments he originally ordered out, two more were also en route and should be there in a day or two. In all, 4,000 of Pope’s troops, plus a battery of artillery were marching to break up the siege.
Even though his trip to Iowa was “imperative,” Pope understood that the situation in Lexington was even more so, asking Fremont if he wanted him “to come down to St. Louis.”
Soon, Pope received his answer. Fremont ordered him to push on to Iowa. Greatly angered, he did so.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/fremont-neglected-to-tell-pope-about-lexington/
In 1862, Maj Gen George B. McClellan’s chance slipped away. “As the sun rose behind him, illuminating the thick fog of morning, George McClellan had no real idea what was across the small Antietam Creek near the crossroads of Sharpsburg, Maryland. By his calculations, perhaps as many as 120,000 Rebels were arrayed against the 60,000 troops he had at hand. He knew that Harpers Ferry had fallen, and that Stonewall Jackson’s men had probably reunited with General Lee’s main force.
McClellan had known other things, as well. Four days prior, he had known the Confederate plan of operation from the recovered Special Orders No. 191. He knew that Lee had split his army into four separate columns and that they was a gulf of twenty miles separating the wings.
While the battles of South Mountain on the 14th showed him the Rebels were willing to fight, they also showed his enemy to still be scattered. McClellan, as he did so often, waited. As an entire day slipped by, he pursued the retreating Confederates, but kept a respectful distance.
General Lee needed no ruse, no trickery to convince McClellan not to attack. The Union general did that all on his own. The afternoon and evening of the 15th found McClellan’s 60,000 (20,000 or so were still en route) squared off against 15,000 under Lee. McClellan’s original plan was to find the divided Rebels and destroy each column in detail. This was his chance. But he decided to wait until the next day.
Morning brought the same. Though Stonewall Jackson’s men were closer to Sharpsburg, they had not yet joined the main body. After rising, McClellan, full of confidence and gusto, wrote to his wife that he had “no doubt delivered Penna & Maryland.” And yet, there was no battle.
At the same time that he wrote his wife, he also wrote General-in-Chief Henry Halleck. He could “ascertain that some of the enemy are still there,” but he couldn’t tell how many. As soon as he found out, he assured Halleck, he would attack.
To General William Franklin, commanding the Sixth Corps guarding his left, he divulged even more: “I think the enemy has abandoned the position in front of us, but the fog is so dense that I have not yet been able to determine.” Reports had come in that after the fall of Harpers Ferry, Rebel troops on the Maryland side had crossed to the Virginia side. This was, assumed McClellan, proof that Lee’s entire army was retreating back to Virginia.
Halleck agreed. “I think,” he replied to McClellan, “you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the [Potomac] river. I fear now more than ever that they will recross at Harper’s Ferry or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington.”
That was certainly possible. “Feigned retreats are secesh tactics,” Halleck had warned in the past. McClellan would probably have been fine with the Rebel army retreating back into Virginia. He might have been seen as the savior of Pennsylvania and Maryland – throwing back the huge Rebel army with only a few minor scrapes at South Mountain. But to be cut off from Washington, that was another story.
As the morning slid by, McClellan learned that the Rebels, or at least their artillery, were still there. As the fog burned away, the gray lines of infantry he saw so plainly the previous evening were gone. He couldn’t send his army against a hidden enemy, and so more reconnoitering was needed. No attack could be made – he needed to examine the ground, clear the roads and approaches, bring up more supplies and ammunition, and find fords to cross the Antietam.
Antietam Creek was not very wide, nor was it very deep. It was, however, wide and deep enough that artillery couldn’t be driven across it. Soldiers may lift up their muskets and hoist their cartridge boxes over their heads to cross water up to their chests, but artillery could not. Fortunately for McClellan, Sharpsburg was served by several roads leading into it and so there were four stone bridges spanning the creek.
Scouts had reported that Rebels controlled the crossings to the south. But the North Bridge was open. And there, if he was going to strike at all, was where he would cross.
By noon, as Stonewall Jackson’s men began to file into the Confederate lines, McClellan divined a plan. Joe Hooker, commanding the First Corps, was to cross the North Bridge and be prepared to strike the left flank of the Rebels. Jacob Cox, now commanding the Ninth Corps, was to force a crossing at the southern-most Rohrbach Bridge simultaneous with Hooker’s attack. In the middle, McClellan would support the vice-like assaults. No orders were written to either Hooker or Cox.
General Ambrose Burnside, commanding the left wing of the army, believed he had been slighted. During the battles at South Mountain, he had command over both the First and Ninth Corps. Now, believed Burnside, Hooker had swindled his way into an independent command, which left Burnside without a corps of his own. Cox, commanding the Ninth Corps, offered to step down and return to his division, handing Burnside the reigns, but the bewhiskered general refused.
Hooker crossed the North Bridge and advanced a mile before any reaching any resistance. The Confederates clearly saw the crossing and two brigades under John Bell Hood were moved to give battle. But there was hardly a fight. Artillery boomed and Hooker’s men skirmished with Hood’s, but no more.
McClellan’s plan was for Burnside, commanding the left, to make some sort of demonstration to make the Rebels believe that the Union right (Hooker) was silent. As Hooker advanced, however, McClellan was doing little more than showing Lee his hand. Whatever element of surprise McClellan had folded into this plan was gone.
As night crept over the fields north of Sharpsburg, Lee shifted troops to meet the obvious Union threat. Hooker, who had been trying to turn Lee’s flank, would be faced with the main Confederate line.The dark had replaced the fog of morning, obscuring lines and men, while covering the ground, the woods and valleys in uncertainty. Here and there, nervous pickets would let loose volleys, or artillery would crush the anxious stillness hovering thick. Troops were moved, though slightly, and positions abandoned. Each army was as near to exhaustion as it was to battle. The sleep, so desperately needed, was lost in anticipation of what the next shrouded dawn would bring.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/mcclellans-chance-slips-away/
Pictures: 1864-09 The Great Cattle Raid at Harrison's Landing; USS Galena watercolor; 1862-09-16 Battle of Antietam Situation Map; USS Conestoga
A. 1861: The USS Conestoga was traveling on the Cumberland River in Kentucky. It spotted a couple of Confederate ships nearby and proceeded to engage them. USS Conestoga first combat action was when she engaged the CSS Jackson and another CSS ship near Lucas Bend, Kentucky. After a very brief skirmish, the Confederate ships were captured, along with the crews.
B. 1862: Antietam Campaign. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and his Union Army of the Potomac confronted CSA Gen Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia at Sharpsburg, Maryland. Lee faced two serious problems. First, he only had 18,000 men with him against 75,000 Union troops. Second, behind where his men were gathered was the Potomac River.
By noon, as Stonewall Jackson’s men began to file into the Confederate lines, McClellan divined a plan. Joe Hooker, commanding the First Corps, was to cross the North Bridge and be prepared to strike the left flank of the Rebels. Jacob Cox, now commanding the Ninth Corps, was to force a crossing at the southern-most Rohrbach Bridge simultaneous with Hooker’s attack. In the middle, McClellan would support the vice-like assaults. No orders were written to either Hooker or Cox.
General Ambrose Burnside, commanding the left wing of the army, believed he had been slighted. During the battles at South Mountain, he had command over both the First and Ninth Corps. Now, believed Burnside, Hooker had swindled his way into an independent command, which left Burnside without a corps of his own. Cox, commanding the Ninth Corps, offered to step down and return to his division, handing Burnside the reigns, but the bewhiskered general refused.
Hooker crossed the North Bridge and advanced a mile before any reaching any resistance. The Confederates clearly saw the crossing and two brigades under John Bell Hood were moved to give battle. But there was hardly a fight. Artillery boomed and Hooker’s men skirmished with Hood’s, but no more.
C. 1863: Chickamauga Campaign. General William Rosecrans (US) army had taken Chattanooga four days ago, but Braxton Bragg’s Confederate army was nowhere close to defeated. The Southern forces were strung out on a roughly north-south line on the east side of a ridge called Lookout Mountain. Rosecrans’ army was scattered and vulnerable, especially the men with Major General George H. Thomas (US) to the south near LeMoyne Cove. Thomas could have easily been isolated and defeated, but the orders to do so never got delivered to General Thomas C. Hindman (CSA). Thomas Crittenden [US] reaches Lee and Gordon Mill on the Chickamauga River. Rosecrans [US] orders the rest of his men, spread out along 50 miles of Georgia's backwoods, to concentrate at this landmark.
D. 1864: Petersburg Siege. Successful cattle rustling by CSA Cavalrymen in what will be called the “Beefsteak Raid.” At 5 a.m., CSA Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton’s force arrived at Sycamore Church to raid the Union cattle area. The Confederates made a dismounted assault on the Union cavalry force. Hampton had arrived to assist the 7th Virginia Cavalry. The Federals decided to not let the Confederates take the cattle, so they broke down the corral fences and stampeded the cattle. On what will be called the “Beefsteak Raid,” and captured more than 2,400 cattle, along with 11 wagons and 304 prisoners. They head back toward friendly territory.
FYI SGT Mark Anderson PO3 Edward Riddle Maj William W. 'Bill' Price COL (Join to see) SSgt David M.] SPC Maurice Evans SPC Jon O. SGT Jim ArnoldAmn Dale PreisachCW4 (Join to see) Sgt Jerry GenesioSSG (Join to see)LTC John Griscom LTC Thomas Tennant LTC David Brown LTC (Join to see) CWO3 (Join to see) SGT John " Mac " McConnell SFC (Join to see) CPL Ronald Keyes Jr
Edited 2 y ago
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Intercepted orders and plans, chance confrontations and cavalry raids helped to swing the local balance from potential victory to inglorious defeat. Brave soldiers and sailors often were able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.
In 1863, there was surprisingly little happening along the Chickamauga Creek as CSA Gen Braxton Bragg and Maj Gen William Rosecrans sought an advantage. “The previous day, General Gordon Granger, heading the reserve corps in Chattanooga, informed him that at least two Confederate divisions had marched through the town of Ringgold, fifteen miles southeast. From all previous information, Rosecrans was fairly certain that the bulk of Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Tennessee was at La Fayette, twenty-five miles south. Any enemy troops around Ringgold, he surmised, were probably stragglers still poking around from the Rebel retreat from Chattanooga. When, upon this date, the Federal cavalry reported what seemed to be infantry massing on the army’s left, General Thomas Crittenden flatly refused to believe it, and failed for forward the information upwards.”Still, Rosecrans was doing his best to concentrate his spread out army along Chickamauga Creek. He had made his headquarters near Lee & Gordon’s Mill, the current left flank. Crittenden’s XXI Corps was already there, but George Thomas’ XIV Corps, which was holding the center, was unmoved from its position. Thomas was waiting for Alexander McCook’s XX Corps to fall in on his right. McCook had taken a very round about path from his line at Alpine to Thomas’ at McLemore’s Cove. He was ordered to move on this date, but decided to wait until the following day to move out.
In the meantime, Braxton Bragg was planning. On the 15th, he called a rather fruitless council of war. He and his four corps commanders (D.H. Hill, Leonidas Polk, Simon Buckner, and W.H.T. Walker) batted around ideas, finally deciding that they should try to get between Rosecrans and Chattanooga. They understood that the Federal Army’s supply line went through the city, and but cutting them off from it would force either a fight or an unceremonious retreat.
To cut Rosecrans off from Chattanooga, a crossing of Chickamauga Creek was essential. They discussed exactly where to cross, and precisely which towns to hold so they could get around Rosecrans’ left and attack him on the flank. By the time the meeting was adjourned, everyone seemed certain of what they were to do and that success would soon follow.
But instead, Bragg did nothing. No orders were issued on the 15th at all. It wasn’t until this date, a full twenty-four hours later, that Bragg acted. He wrote out a set of strange and sort of pointless orders, commanding only portions of his army to move. Bragg ordered no crossing at all of Chickamauga Creek, and placed his entire force on the defensive. Those who were to move were to do so the following morning.
Both Rosecrans and Bragg seemed to be forgetting a fairly important detail. Two divisions from James Longstreet’s Corps of General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, had bordered trains the previous week and were now drawing closer to Chattanooga. On this date, one brigade was moving towards Ringgold, while two others had reached Atlanta. In the council called by Bragg on the 15th, the Virginian reinforcements were folded into the makeshift plan. But when Bragg issued the orders, he mentioned them not at all. Perhaps he was merely not counting chickens before they were hatched, but he wasn’t doing much else, either.
Word had gone through the Federal camps that as many as three divisions from Longstreet’s Corps would soon be arriving from Virginia. General-in-Chief Henry Halleck had wired Rosecrans, corroborating the information gleaned by the Federal cavalry. Though Rosecrans seemed to have believed it well enough, he did little about it.
He wired Ambrose Burnside, who, with his Army of the Ohio, was in the vicinity of Knoxville, telling him that “the enemy, reinforced by Johnston and Longstreet from Virginia, doubtless intend us all the mischief in their power.” Burnside was to come as soon as he could, but Rosecrans seemed much more worried about covering his flank against Nathan Bedford Forrest’s cavalry than against a reinforced Bragg gathering upon his left flank near Lee & Gordon’s Mill.
Though it may seem fairly strange, both armies had tried to concentrate and both had failed, holding nearly the same positions as they did two days previous. Rosecrans came the closest to doing something by ordering his entire army to focus upon Lee & Gordon’s Mill, but that hardly seemed to matter since McCook was on a long walkabout and Thomas decided to wait for him. Bragg’s original plan was a pretty good one, but the actual orders he issued were severely lacking, and at the end of the day, nobody moved anyway.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/surprisingly-little-happening-along-the-chickamauga/
Below are several journal entries from 1861 and 1863 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly.
Monday, September 16, 1861: Today, Hardeman County plantation owner/ planter, merchant, and civic leader, John Houston Bills (The Pillars) wrote in his dairy: “The remains of Monroe Hardeman who died in Knoxville arrived & is buried in the Polk Cemetery beside his Mother this day. His servant says he died of Typhoid Diaries. He lived in Caldwell County, Texas & was the oldest son of Thomas Jones Hardeman, Esq. formally of this County & first Cousin of Mrs. Bills the first. This day is excessively hot.” (Thomas Hardeman – our first county court clerk for whom the county is named, his desk is in The Little Courthouse Museum).
Wednesday, September 16, 1863: In Washington, Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, writes in his journal of his frustration at the reports he is getting---or not getting---from his commanders down at Charleston: “September 16, Wednesday. Dispatches and also a private letter from Dahlgren speak of the assault and repulse at Sumter. Neither is clear and explicit. I should judge it had been a hasty and not very thoroughly matured movement.”
Pictures: 1862 Line Engraving of ironclads and other US Navy Warships; 1862-09 Burnside Bridge; 1862-09-16 93rd New York Infantry at Antietam - Union troops gather near Sharpsburg, Maryland; 1862-09 Antietam-Md.-A-cavalry-orderly
A. Monday, September 16, 1861: on the Cumberland River, Kentucky - On September 16, the USS Conestoga was traveling on the Cumberland River. It spotted a couple of Confederate ships nearby and proceeded to engage them. After a very brief skirmish, the Confederate ships were captured, along with the crews.
USS Conestoga first combat action took place in September 1861 when she engaged CSS Jackson near Lucas Bend, Kentucky.
B. Tuesday, September 16, 1862: Tuesday, September 16, 1862: Lee’s army was at Sharpsburg – as was McClellan’s. Lee faced two serious problems. First, he only had 18,000 men with him against 75,000 Union troops. Second, behind where his men were gathered was the Potomac River. So if Lee needed to withdraw, he would have to cross the river. In Washington, Congress levies the first Federal tax on tobacco.
McClellan’s chance slips away. As the sun rose behind him, illuminating the thick fog of morning, George McClellan had no real idea what was across the small Antietam Creek near the crossroads of Sharpsburg, Maryland. By his calculations, perhaps as many as 120,000 Rebels were arrayed against the 60,000 troops he had at hand. He knew that Harpers Ferry had fallen, and that Stonewall Jackson’s men had probably reunited with General Lee’s main force.
McClellan had known other things, as well. Four days prior, he had known the Confederate plan of operation from the recovered Special Orders No. 191. He knew that Lee had split his army into four separate columns and that they was a gulf of twenty miles separating the wings.
While the battles of South Mountain on the 14th showed him the Rebels were willing to fight, they also showed his enemy to still be scattered. McClellan, as he did so often, waited. As an entire day slipped by, he pursued the retreating Confederates, but kept a respectful distance.
General Lee needed no ruse, no trickery to convince McClellan not to attack. The Union general did that all on his own. The afternoon and evening of the 15th found McClellan’s 60,000 (20,000 or so were still en route) squared off against 15,000 under Lee. McClellan’s original plan was to find the divided Rebels and destroy each column in detail. This was his chance. But he decided to wait until the next day.
Morning brought the same. Though Stonewall Jackson’s men were closer to Sharpsburg, they had not yet joined the main body. After rising, McClellan, full of confidence and gusto, wrote to his wife that he had “no doubt delivered Penna & Maryland.” And yet, there was no battle.
At the same time that he wrote his wife, he also wrote General-in-Chief Henry Halleck. He could “ascertain that some of the enemy are still there,” but he couldn’t tell how many. As soon as he found out, he assured Halleck, he would attack.
To General William Franklin, commanding the Sixth Corps guarding his left, he divulged even more: “I think the enemy has abandoned the position in front of us, but the fog is so dense that I have not yet been able to determine.” Reports had come in that after the fall of Harpers Ferry, Rebel troops on the Maryland side had crossed to the Virginia side. This was, assumed McClellan, proof that Lee’s entire army was retreating back to Virginia.
Halleck agreed. “I think,” he replied to McClellan, “you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the [Potomac] river. I fear now more than ever that they will recross at Harper’s Ferry or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington.”
That was certainly possible. “Feigned retreats are secesh tactics,” Halleck had warned in the past. McClellan would probably have been fine with the Rebel army retreating back into Virginia. He might have been seen as the savior of Pennsylvania and Maryland – throwing back the huge Rebel army with only a few minor scrapes at South Mountain. But to be cut off from Washington, that was another story.
As the morning slid by, McClellan learned that the Rebels, or at least their artillery, were still there. As the fog burned away, the gray lines of infantry he saw so plainly the previous evening were gone. He couldn’t send his army against a hidden enemy, and so more reconnoitering was needed. No attack could be made – he needed to examine the ground, clear the roads and approaches, bring up more supplies and ammunition, and find fords to cross the Antietam.
Antietam Creek was not very wide, nor was it very deep. It was, however, wide and deep enough that artillery couldn’t be driven across it. Soldiers may lift up their muskets and hoist their cartridge boxes over their heads to cross water up to their chests, but artillery could not. Fortunately for McClellan, Sharpsburg was served by several roads leading into it and so there were four stone bridges spanning the creek.
Scouts had reported that Rebels controlled the crossings to the south. But the North Bridge was open. And there, if he was going to strike at all, was where he would cross.
By noon, as Stonewall Jackson’s men began to file into the Confederate lines, McClellan divined a plan. Joe Hooker, commanding the First Corps, was to cross the North Bridge and be prepared to strike the left flank of the Rebels. Jacob Cox, now commanding the Ninth Corps, was to force a crossing at the southern-most Rohrbach Bridge simultaneous with Hooker’s attack. In the middle, McClellan would support the vice-like assaults. No orders were written to either Hooker or Cox.
General Ambrose Burnside, commanding the left wing of the army, believed he had been slighted. During the battles at South Mountain, he had command over both the First and Ninth Corps. Now, believed Burnside, Hooker had swindled his way into an independent command, which left Burnside without a corps of his own. Cox, commanding the Ninth Corps, offered to step down and return to his division, handing Burnside the reigns, but the bewhiskered general refused.
Hooker crossed the North Bridge and advanced a mile before any reaching any resistance. The Confederates clearly saw the crossing and two brigades under John Bell Hood were moved to give battle. But there was hardly a fight. Artillery boomed and Hooker’s men skirmished with Hood’s, but no more.
McClellan’s plan was for Burnside, commanding the left, to make some sort of demonstration to make the Rebels believe that the Union right (Hooker) was silent. As Hooker advanced, however, McClellan was doing little more than showing Lee his hand. Whatever element of surprise McClellan had folded into this plan was gone.
As night crept over the fields north of Sharpsburg, Lee shifted troops to meet the obvious Union threat. Hooker, who had been trying to turn Lee’s flank, would be faced with the main Confederate line.The dark had replaced the fog of morning, obscuring lines and men, while covering the ground, the woods and valleys in uncertainty. Here and there, nervous pickets would let loose volleys, or artillery would crush the anxious stillness hovering thick. Troops were moved, though slightly, and positions abandoned. Each army was as near to exhaustion as it was to battle. The sleep, so desperately needed, was lost in anticipation of what the next shrouded dawn would bring.
C. Wednesday, September 16, 1863: Thomas Crittenden [US] reaches Lee and Gordon Mill on the Chickamauga River. Rosecrans [US] orders the rest of his men, spread out along 50 miles of Georgia's backwoods, to concentrate at this landmark.
General William Rosecrans (US) army had taken Chattanooga four days ago, but Braxton Bragg’s Confederate army was nowhere close to defeated. The Southern forces were strung out on a roughly north-south line on the east side of a ridge called Lookout Mountain. Rosecrans’ army was scattered and vulnerable, especially the men with Major General George H. Thomas (US) to the south near LeMoyne Cove. Thomas could have easily been isolated and defeated, but the orders to do so never got delivered to General Thomas C. Hindman (CSA). The man carrying the orders, a French soldier-of-fortune known as Major Nocquot, was not available to testify at the court-martial of Hindman, as he had disappeared. Some $150,000 in Army funds went missing around the same time, but in all the confusion no connection was ever proved.
D. Friday, September 16, 1864: Successful cattle rustling by CSA Cavalrymen during the Petersburg Campaign. On what will be called the “Beefsteak Raid,” at 5 a.m., CSA General Wade Hampton’s force attacks and captured more than 2,400 cattle, along with 11 wagons and 304 prisoners. They head back toward friendly territory.
A force of the 7th Virginia Cavalry arrived at Sycamore Church to raid the Union cattle area. The Confederates made a dismounted assault on the Union cavalry force. Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton arrived to lend assistance to the Virginia cavalry. The Federals decided to not let the Confederates take the cattle, so they broke down the corral fences and stampeded the cattle.
The Confederates managed to collect 2,486 of the cattle and took them back to the Petersburg lines. They also managed to capture 300 Union prisoners.
1. Monday, September 16, 1861: Committee of Naval Constructors recommends three plans for building ironclads, Galena, Ironsides, and Monitor.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186109
2. Monday, September 16, 1861: In Missouri, Union reinforcements sent to Lexington were captured en route by the Confederates who knew their movements beforehand. Confederate forces evacuate Ship Island, Mississippi at Gulfport leaving the Island open to occupation by Union troops.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-23
3. Monday, September 16, 1861: Look who’s retreating now! While Pope and Fremont exchanged notes of a passive aggressive nature, two Confederate Generals, Floyd and Wise, in Western Virginia had been outwardly belligerent towards each other. In fact, a correspondent to President Davis wrote that each of them would be highly gratified to see the other annihilated.”
After the retreat from Carnifex Ferry, the Confederate Army of the Kanawha took up camp at Big Sewell Mountain, forty miles west of Lewisburg. Unable to get along, General Floyd’s camp was a mile and a half west of General Wise’s.
Towards evening, Floyd, who commanded the Army, requested Wise come to his headquarters for a consultation. With him, Wise brought along several officers, all arriving around 5pm. General Floyd was rightly concerned that two columns of Union troops were converging before them. General Rosecrans, from Carnifex Ferry, and General Cox, from Gauley Bridge, had both crossed the Gauley River. It wouldn’t be long before they were arrayed for battle before them.
Wise, who was familiar with Floyd’s line of defense, thought it “indefensible,” adding that his camp, a mile and a half to the rear, was “almost impregnable.” He detailed a plan of defense that would keep his Legion where it was, while having Floyd’s wing fall back to an adjacent position, its left flank anchored on the New River.
Floyd said that he would think about it, review the situation for himself and get back to Wise the next morning. The two hour long meeting adjourned and Wise, with his staff, left Floyd’s headquarters.
On their way out of camp, a Major commented to Wise that it appeared as if Floyd’s troops were preparing to move out. It wasn’t long after he got to his camp that Wise saw Floyd’s wagons rumbling to the rear, heading east. Soon after, Floyd’s troops marched through, following the wagons.
As Floyd’s men passed Wise’s ranks, a courier delivered a message from the commanding General that “it has been determined to fall back to the most defensible point between Meadow Bluff [twenty five miles east] and Lewisburg [forty miles east].” While Floyd would “put his column in motion at once,” Wise was to hold his “command in readiness to bring up the rear.”
General Floyd had been very critical of Wise’s retreat from the Kanawha Valley. Now, it was Wise’s turn. Wise mounted his horse and rode before his men, standing up in the stirrups and with his face bright red, he called out, “men, look who is retreating now? John B. Floyd, Goddamn him, the bullet-hit son of a bitch, he is retreating now!”
Floyd could fall back all he wanted. Wise was staying put.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/fremont-neglected-to-tell-pope-about-lexington/
4. Monday, September 16, 1861: Today, Hardeman County plantation owner/ planter, merchant, and civic leader, John Houston Bills (The Pillars) wrote in his dairy: “The remains of Monroe Hardeman who died in Knoxville arrived & is buried in the Polk Cemetery beside his Mother this day. His servant says he died of Typhoid Diaries. He lived in Caldwell County, Texas & was the oldest son of Thomas Jones Hardeman, Esq. formally of this County & first Cousin of Mrs. Bills the first. This day is excessively hot.” (Thomas Hardeman – our first county court clerk for whom the county is named, his desk is in The Little Courthouse Museum).
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-23
5. Wednesday, September 16, 1863: In Washington, Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, writes in his journal of his frustration at the reports he is getting---or not getting---from his commanders down at Charleston: “September 16, Wednesday. Dispatches and also a private letter from Dahlgren speak of the assault and repulse at Sumter. Neither is clear and explicit. I should judge it had been a hasty and not very thoroughly matured movement.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+16%2C+1863
6. Wednesday, September 16, 1863: Gen. Quincy Gillmore, in command of Federal forces near Charleston, calls off the attacks on Fort Sumter (after an abortive landing) and other Rebel strong points. He congratulates his troops on capturing Morris Island, finally.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+16%2C+1863
7. Wednesday, September 16, 1863: Fayetteville, Virginia - On September 16, Lt. William T. Turner and 30 Confederate raiders entered the town of Fayetteville. There, they discovered a group of Union sutler wagons filled with supplies. Inside the house next to the wagons, they discovered a group of the sutlers and a Union guard detachment. Turner knocked on the door and when the guards answered it, the Confederates forced their way inside. They disarmed the soldiers and captured the entire group.
With the prisoners rounded up, the Confederates took a bunch of supplies, loaded them up on their horses, and rode away into the night.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1863s.html
8. Friday, September 16, 1864: Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest (CSA) leaves Verona, Mississippi to begin a cavalry raid into Northern Alabama and Middle Tennessee to cut the supply and communication lines of Major General William T. Sherman (US).
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-179
9. Friday, September 16, 1864: Meeting in Charles Town, Ulysses S. Grant and Phil Sheridan discuss the problems in the Shenandoah Valley with Jubal Early's [CS] Corps.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186409
10. Friday, September 16, 1864: Generals Grant and Sheridan meet in Charles Town to discuss the problems in the Shenandoah Valley and a Union offensive against Jubal Early’s (CSA) Corps.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-179
11. Friday, September 16, 1864: Coggin's Point, Virginia - On September 16, the Union force that had retreated from the Confederate attacks at the Battle of Sycamore Church were once again attacked by the Confederates. They had followed the Federals here and was trying to destroy them before they could link back up with Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's force. The Confederates managed to push the Federals back even further.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1864s.html
A Monday, September 16, 1861: on the Cumberland River, Kentucky - On September 16, the USS Conestoga was traveling on the Cumberland River. It spotted a couple of Confederate ships nearby and proceeded to engage them. After a very brief skirmish, the Confederate ships were captured, along with the crews.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1861s.html
A+ Monday, September 16, 1861: USS Conestoga first combat action took place in September 1861 when she engaged CSS Jackson near Lucas Bend, Kentucky.
B Tuesday, September 16, 1862: Lee’s army was at Sharpsburg – as was McClellan’s. Lee faced two serious problems. First, he only had 18,000 men with him against 75,000 Union troops. Second, behind where his men were gathered was the Potomac River. So if Lee needed to withdraw, he would have to cross the river. In Washington, Congress levies the first Federal tax on tobacco.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-seventy-five
B+ Tuesday, September 16, 1862: Gen. McClellan, believing that Lee has nearly 120,000 facing him, is reluctant to move. His troops are arriving along the eastern bank of Antietam creek, just across from the new Confederate lines around Sharpsburg. Somehow, Little Mac gets a notion that Lee is retreating, and trying to get back south into Virginia, even though he simultaneously is preparing to attack Lee. McClellan has 60,000 of his army ready on this date, but does not attack Lee, who has not more than 18,000 troops to oppose the Federals. The intelligence plainly shows that the crossings of Antietam Creek are not difficult or guarded heavily. Yet still he hesitates to move. What McClellan does do is to order Hooker’s I Corps to cross Antietam Creek and to line up for an assault on the Rebel left tomorrow, and thus reveal his hand. Lee shifts troops to his left flank to counter Hooker’s move.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+16%2C+1862
C Wednesday, September 16, 1863: General William Rosecrans (US) army had taken Chattanooga four days ago, but Braxton Bragg’s Confederate army was nowhere close to defeated. The Southern forces were strung out on a roughly north-south line on the east side of a ridge called Lookout Mountain. Rosecrans’ army was scattered and vulnerable, especially the men with Major General George H. Thomas (US) to the south near LeMoyne Cove. Thomas could have easily been isolated and defeated, but the orders to do so never got delivered to General Thomas C. Hindman (CSA). The man carrying the orders, a French soldier-of-fortune known as Major Nocquot, was not available to testify at the court-martial of Hindman, as he had disappeared. Some $150,000 in Army funds went missing around the same time, but in all the confusion no connection was ever proved.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-127
C+ Wednesday, September 16, 1863: Thomas Crittenden [US] reaches Lee and Gordon Mill on the Chickamauga River. Rosecrans [US] orders the rest of his men, spread out along 50 miles of Georgia's backwoods, to concentrate at this landmark.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186309
D Friday, September 16, 1864: Sycamore Church, Virginia - On September 16, a force of the 7th Virginia Cavalry arrived at Sycamore Church to raid the Union cattle area. The Confederates made a dismounted assault on the Union cavalry force. Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton arrived to lend assistance to the Virginia cavalry. The Federals decided to not let the Confederates take the cattle, so they broke down the corral fences and stampeded the cattle.
The Confederates managed to collect 2,486 of the cattle and took them back to the Petersburg lines. They also managed to capture 300 Union prisoners.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1864s.html
D+ Friday, September 16, 1864: On what will be called the “Beefsteak Raid,” at 5 a.m., General Hampton’s (CSA) force attacks and captures more than 2,400 cattle, along with 11 wagons and 304 prisoners. They head back toward friendly territory.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-179
FYI GySgt Jack Wallace CWO4 Terrence Clark SMSgt Lawrence McCarter LTC Trent Klug SFC Bernard WalkoSSG Franklin Briant SSG Byron Howard Sr CPL Ronald Keyes Jr SFC William Farrell CMDCM John F. "Doc" Bradshaw SPC Lyle MontgomeryPO2 Marco MonsalveSPC Woody Bullard SSG Michael Noll SSG Bill McCoy SFC David Reid, M.S, PHR, SHRM-CP, DTMSgt Christopher Collins SPC (Join to see) SPC Gary C. PO3 Lynn Spalding
In 1863, there was surprisingly little happening along the Chickamauga Creek as CSA Gen Braxton Bragg and Maj Gen William Rosecrans sought an advantage. “The previous day, General Gordon Granger, heading the reserve corps in Chattanooga, informed him that at least two Confederate divisions had marched through the town of Ringgold, fifteen miles southeast. From all previous information, Rosecrans was fairly certain that the bulk of Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Tennessee was at La Fayette, twenty-five miles south. Any enemy troops around Ringgold, he surmised, were probably stragglers still poking around from the Rebel retreat from Chattanooga. When, upon this date, the Federal cavalry reported what seemed to be infantry massing on the army’s left, General Thomas Crittenden flatly refused to believe it, and failed for forward the information upwards.”Still, Rosecrans was doing his best to concentrate his spread out army along Chickamauga Creek. He had made his headquarters near Lee & Gordon’s Mill, the current left flank. Crittenden’s XXI Corps was already there, but George Thomas’ XIV Corps, which was holding the center, was unmoved from its position. Thomas was waiting for Alexander McCook’s XX Corps to fall in on his right. McCook had taken a very round about path from his line at Alpine to Thomas’ at McLemore’s Cove. He was ordered to move on this date, but decided to wait until the following day to move out.
In the meantime, Braxton Bragg was planning. On the 15th, he called a rather fruitless council of war. He and his four corps commanders (D.H. Hill, Leonidas Polk, Simon Buckner, and W.H.T. Walker) batted around ideas, finally deciding that they should try to get between Rosecrans and Chattanooga. They understood that the Federal Army’s supply line went through the city, and but cutting them off from it would force either a fight or an unceremonious retreat.
To cut Rosecrans off from Chattanooga, a crossing of Chickamauga Creek was essential. They discussed exactly where to cross, and precisely which towns to hold so they could get around Rosecrans’ left and attack him on the flank. By the time the meeting was adjourned, everyone seemed certain of what they were to do and that success would soon follow.
But instead, Bragg did nothing. No orders were issued on the 15th at all. It wasn’t until this date, a full twenty-four hours later, that Bragg acted. He wrote out a set of strange and sort of pointless orders, commanding only portions of his army to move. Bragg ordered no crossing at all of Chickamauga Creek, and placed his entire force on the defensive. Those who were to move were to do so the following morning.
Both Rosecrans and Bragg seemed to be forgetting a fairly important detail. Two divisions from James Longstreet’s Corps of General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, had bordered trains the previous week and were now drawing closer to Chattanooga. On this date, one brigade was moving towards Ringgold, while two others had reached Atlanta. In the council called by Bragg on the 15th, the Virginian reinforcements were folded into the makeshift plan. But when Bragg issued the orders, he mentioned them not at all. Perhaps he was merely not counting chickens before they were hatched, but he wasn’t doing much else, either.
Word had gone through the Federal camps that as many as three divisions from Longstreet’s Corps would soon be arriving from Virginia. General-in-Chief Henry Halleck had wired Rosecrans, corroborating the information gleaned by the Federal cavalry. Though Rosecrans seemed to have believed it well enough, he did little about it.
He wired Ambrose Burnside, who, with his Army of the Ohio, was in the vicinity of Knoxville, telling him that “the enemy, reinforced by Johnston and Longstreet from Virginia, doubtless intend us all the mischief in their power.” Burnside was to come as soon as he could, but Rosecrans seemed much more worried about covering his flank against Nathan Bedford Forrest’s cavalry than against a reinforced Bragg gathering upon his left flank near Lee & Gordon’s Mill.
Though it may seem fairly strange, both armies had tried to concentrate and both had failed, holding nearly the same positions as they did two days previous. Rosecrans came the closest to doing something by ordering his entire army to focus upon Lee & Gordon’s Mill, but that hardly seemed to matter since McCook was on a long walkabout and Thomas decided to wait for him. Bragg’s original plan was a pretty good one, but the actual orders he issued were severely lacking, and at the end of the day, nobody moved anyway.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/surprisingly-little-happening-along-the-chickamauga/
Below are several journal entries from 1861 and 1863 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly.
Monday, September 16, 1861: Today, Hardeman County plantation owner/ planter, merchant, and civic leader, John Houston Bills (The Pillars) wrote in his dairy: “The remains of Monroe Hardeman who died in Knoxville arrived & is buried in the Polk Cemetery beside his Mother this day. His servant says he died of Typhoid Diaries. He lived in Caldwell County, Texas & was the oldest son of Thomas Jones Hardeman, Esq. formally of this County & first Cousin of Mrs. Bills the first. This day is excessively hot.” (Thomas Hardeman – our first county court clerk for whom the county is named, his desk is in The Little Courthouse Museum).
Wednesday, September 16, 1863: In Washington, Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, writes in his journal of his frustration at the reports he is getting---or not getting---from his commanders down at Charleston: “September 16, Wednesday. Dispatches and also a private letter from Dahlgren speak of the assault and repulse at Sumter. Neither is clear and explicit. I should judge it had been a hasty and not very thoroughly matured movement.”
Pictures: 1862 Line Engraving of ironclads and other US Navy Warships; 1862-09 Burnside Bridge; 1862-09-16 93rd New York Infantry at Antietam - Union troops gather near Sharpsburg, Maryland; 1862-09 Antietam-Md.-A-cavalry-orderly
A. Monday, September 16, 1861: on the Cumberland River, Kentucky - On September 16, the USS Conestoga was traveling on the Cumberland River. It spotted a couple of Confederate ships nearby and proceeded to engage them. After a very brief skirmish, the Confederate ships were captured, along with the crews.
USS Conestoga first combat action took place in September 1861 when she engaged CSS Jackson near Lucas Bend, Kentucky.
B. Tuesday, September 16, 1862: Tuesday, September 16, 1862: Lee’s army was at Sharpsburg – as was McClellan’s. Lee faced two serious problems. First, he only had 18,000 men with him against 75,000 Union troops. Second, behind where his men were gathered was the Potomac River. So if Lee needed to withdraw, he would have to cross the river. In Washington, Congress levies the first Federal tax on tobacco.
McClellan’s chance slips away. As the sun rose behind him, illuminating the thick fog of morning, George McClellan had no real idea what was across the small Antietam Creek near the crossroads of Sharpsburg, Maryland. By his calculations, perhaps as many as 120,000 Rebels were arrayed against the 60,000 troops he had at hand. He knew that Harpers Ferry had fallen, and that Stonewall Jackson’s men had probably reunited with General Lee’s main force.
McClellan had known other things, as well. Four days prior, he had known the Confederate plan of operation from the recovered Special Orders No. 191. He knew that Lee had split his army into four separate columns and that they was a gulf of twenty miles separating the wings.
While the battles of South Mountain on the 14th showed him the Rebels were willing to fight, they also showed his enemy to still be scattered. McClellan, as he did so often, waited. As an entire day slipped by, he pursued the retreating Confederates, but kept a respectful distance.
General Lee needed no ruse, no trickery to convince McClellan not to attack. The Union general did that all on his own. The afternoon and evening of the 15th found McClellan’s 60,000 (20,000 or so were still en route) squared off against 15,000 under Lee. McClellan’s original plan was to find the divided Rebels and destroy each column in detail. This was his chance. But he decided to wait until the next day.
Morning brought the same. Though Stonewall Jackson’s men were closer to Sharpsburg, they had not yet joined the main body. After rising, McClellan, full of confidence and gusto, wrote to his wife that he had “no doubt delivered Penna & Maryland.” And yet, there was no battle.
At the same time that he wrote his wife, he also wrote General-in-Chief Henry Halleck. He could “ascertain that some of the enemy are still there,” but he couldn’t tell how many. As soon as he found out, he assured Halleck, he would attack.
To General William Franklin, commanding the Sixth Corps guarding his left, he divulged even more: “I think the enemy has abandoned the position in front of us, but the fog is so dense that I have not yet been able to determine.” Reports had come in that after the fall of Harpers Ferry, Rebel troops on the Maryland side had crossed to the Virginia side. This was, assumed McClellan, proof that Lee’s entire army was retreating back to Virginia.
Halleck agreed. “I think,” he replied to McClellan, “you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the [Potomac] river. I fear now more than ever that they will recross at Harper’s Ferry or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington.”
That was certainly possible. “Feigned retreats are secesh tactics,” Halleck had warned in the past. McClellan would probably have been fine with the Rebel army retreating back into Virginia. He might have been seen as the savior of Pennsylvania and Maryland – throwing back the huge Rebel army with only a few minor scrapes at South Mountain. But to be cut off from Washington, that was another story.
As the morning slid by, McClellan learned that the Rebels, or at least their artillery, were still there. As the fog burned away, the gray lines of infantry he saw so plainly the previous evening were gone. He couldn’t send his army against a hidden enemy, and so more reconnoitering was needed. No attack could be made – he needed to examine the ground, clear the roads and approaches, bring up more supplies and ammunition, and find fords to cross the Antietam.
Antietam Creek was not very wide, nor was it very deep. It was, however, wide and deep enough that artillery couldn’t be driven across it. Soldiers may lift up their muskets and hoist their cartridge boxes over their heads to cross water up to their chests, but artillery could not. Fortunately for McClellan, Sharpsburg was served by several roads leading into it and so there were four stone bridges spanning the creek.
Scouts had reported that Rebels controlled the crossings to the south. But the North Bridge was open. And there, if he was going to strike at all, was where he would cross.
By noon, as Stonewall Jackson’s men began to file into the Confederate lines, McClellan divined a plan. Joe Hooker, commanding the First Corps, was to cross the North Bridge and be prepared to strike the left flank of the Rebels. Jacob Cox, now commanding the Ninth Corps, was to force a crossing at the southern-most Rohrbach Bridge simultaneous with Hooker’s attack. In the middle, McClellan would support the vice-like assaults. No orders were written to either Hooker or Cox.
General Ambrose Burnside, commanding the left wing of the army, believed he had been slighted. During the battles at South Mountain, he had command over both the First and Ninth Corps. Now, believed Burnside, Hooker had swindled his way into an independent command, which left Burnside without a corps of his own. Cox, commanding the Ninth Corps, offered to step down and return to his division, handing Burnside the reigns, but the bewhiskered general refused.
Hooker crossed the North Bridge and advanced a mile before any reaching any resistance. The Confederates clearly saw the crossing and two brigades under John Bell Hood were moved to give battle. But there was hardly a fight. Artillery boomed and Hooker’s men skirmished with Hood’s, but no more.
McClellan’s plan was for Burnside, commanding the left, to make some sort of demonstration to make the Rebels believe that the Union right (Hooker) was silent. As Hooker advanced, however, McClellan was doing little more than showing Lee his hand. Whatever element of surprise McClellan had folded into this plan was gone.
As night crept over the fields north of Sharpsburg, Lee shifted troops to meet the obvious Union threat. Hooker, who had been trying to turn Lee’s flank, would be faced with the main Confederate line.The dark had replaced the fog of morning, obscuring lines and men, while covering the ground, the woods and valleys in uncertainty. Here and there, nervous pickets would let loose volleys, or artillery would crush the anxious stillness hovering thick. Troops were moved, though slightly, and positions abandoned. Each army was as near to exhaustion as it was to battle. The sleep, so desperately needed, was lost in anticipation of what the next shrouded dawn would bring.
C. Wednesday, September 16, 1863: Thomas Crittenden [US] reaches Lee and Gordon Mill on the Chickamauga River. Rosecrans [US] orders the rest of his men, spread out along 50 miles of Georgia's backwoods, to concentrate at this landmark.
General William Rosecrans (US) army had taken Chattanooga four days ago, but Braxton Bragg’s Confederate army was nowhere close to defeated. The Southern forces were strung out on a roughly north-south line on the east side of a ridge called Lookout Mountain. Rosecrans’ army was scattered and vulnerable, especially the men with Major General George H. Thomas (US) to the south near LeMoyne Cove. Thomas could have easily been isolated and defeated, but the orders to do so never got delivered to General Thomas C. Hindman (CSA). The man carrying the orders, a French soldier-of-fortune known as Major Nocquot, was not available to testify at the court-martial of Hindman, as he had disappeared. Some $150,000 in Army funds went missing around the same time, but in all the confusion no connection was ever proved.
D. Friday, September 16, 1864: Successful cattle rustling by CSA Cavalrymen during the Petersburg Campaign. On what will be called the “Beefsteak Raid,” at 5 a.m., CSA General Wade Hampton’s force attacks and captured more than 2,400 cattle, along with 11 wagons and 304 prisoners. They head back toward friendly territory.
A force of the 7th Virginia Cavalry arrived at Sycamore Church to raid the Union cattle area. The Confederates made a dismounted assault on the Union cavalry force. Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton arrived to lend assistance to the Virginia cavalry. The Federals decided to not let the Confederates take the cattle, so they broke down the corral fences and stampeded the cattle.
The Confederates managed to collect 2,486 of the cattle and took them back to the Petersburg lines. They also managed to capture 300 Union prisoners.
1. Monday, September 16, 1861: Committee of Naval Constructors recommends three plans for building ironclads, Galena, Ironsides, and Monitor.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186109
2. Monday, September 16, 1861: In Missouri, Union reinforcements sent to Lexington were captured en route by the Confederates who knew their movements beforehand. Confederate forces evacuate Ship Island, Mississippi at Gulfport leaving the Island open to occupation by Union troops.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-23
3. Monday, September 16, 1861: Look who’s retreating now! While Pope and Fremont exchanged notes of a passive aggressive nature, two Confederate Generals, Floyd and Wise, in Western Virginia had been outwardly belligerent towards each other. In fact, a correspondent to President Davis wrote that each of them would be highly gratified to see the other annihilated.”
After the retreat from Carnifex Ferry, the Confederate Army of the Kanawha took up camp at Big Sewell Mountain, forty miles west of Lewisburg. Unable to get along, General Floyd’s camp was a mile and a half west of General Wise’s.
Towards evening, Floyd, who commanded the Army, requested Wise come to his headquarters for a consultation. With him, Wise brought along several officers, all arriving around 5pm. General Floyd was rightly concerned that two columns of Union troops were converging before them. General Rosecrans, from Carnifex Ferry, and General Cox, from Gauley Bridge, had both crossed the Gauley River. It wouldn’t be long before they were arrayed for battle before them.
Wise, who was familiar with Floyd’s line of defense, thought it “indefensible,” adding that his camp, a mile and a half to the rear, was “almost impregnable.” He detailed a plan of defense that would keep his Legion where it was, while having Floyd’s wing fall back to an adjacent position, its left flank anchored on the New River.
Floyd said that he would think about it, review the situation for himself and get back to Wise the next morning. The two hour long meeting adjourned and Wise, with his staff, left Floyd’s headquarters.
On their way out of camp, a Major commented to Wise that it appeared as if Floyd’s troops were preparing to move out. It wasn’t long after he got to his camp that Wise saw Floyd’s wagons rumbling to the rear, heading east. Soon after, Floyd’s troops marched through, following the wagons.
As Floyd’s men passed Wise’s ranks, a courier delivered a message from the commanding General that “it has been determined to fall back to the most defensible point between Meadow Bluff [twenty five miles east] and Lewisburg [forty miles east].” While Floyd would “put his column in motion at once,” Wise was to hold his “command in readiness to bring up the rear.”
General Floyd had been very critical of Wise’s retreat from the Kanawha Valley. Now, it was Wise’s turn. Wise mounted his horse and rode before his men, standing up in the stirrups and with his face bright red, he called out, “men, look who is retreating now? John B. Floyd, Goddamn him, the bullet-hit son of a bitch, he is retreating now!”
Floyd could fall back all he wanted. Wise was staying put.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/fremont-neglected-to-tell-pope-about-lexington/
4. Monday, September 16, 1861: Today, Hardeman County plantation owner/ planter, merchant, and civic leader, John Houston Bills (The Pillars) wrote in his dairy: “The remains of Monroe Hardeman who died in Knoxville arrived & is buried in the Polk Cemetery beside his Mother this day. His servant says he died of Typhoid Diaries. He lived in Caldwell County, Texas & was the oldest son of Thomas Jones Hardeman, Esq. formally of this County & first Cousin of Mrs. Bills the first. This day is excessively hot.” (Thomas Hardeman – our first county court clerk for whom the county is named, his desk is in The Little Courthouse Museum).
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-23
5. Wednesday, September 16, 1863: In Washington, Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, writes in his journal of his frustration at the reports he is getting---or not getting---from his commanders down at Charleston: “September 16, Wednesday. Dispatches and also a private letter from Dahlgren speak of the assault and repulse at Sumter. Neither is clear and explicit. I should judge it had been a hasty and not very thoroughly matured movement.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+16%2C+1863
6. Wednesday, September 16, 1863: Gen. Quincy Gillmore, in command of Federal forces near Charleston, calls off the attacks on Fort Sumter (after an abortive landing) and other Rebel strong points. He congratulates his troops on capturing Morris Island, finally.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+16%2C+1863
7. Wednesday, September 16, 1863: Fayetteville, Virginia - On September 16, Lt. William T. Turner and 30 Confederate raiders entered the town of Fayetteville. There, they discovered a group of Union sutler wagons filled with supplies. Inside the house next to the wagons, they discovered a group of the sutlers and a Union guard detachment. Turner knocked on the door and when the guards answered it, the Confederates forced their way inside. They disarmed the soldiers and captured the entire group.
With the prisoners rounded up, the Confederates took a bunch of supplies, loaded them up on their horses, and rode away into the night.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1863s.html
8. Friday, September 16, 1864: Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest (CSA) leaves Verona, Mississippi to begin a cavalry raid into Northern Alabama and Middle Tennessee to cut the supply and communication lines of Major General William T. Sherman (US).
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-179
9. Friday, September 16, 1864: Meeting in Charles Town, Ulysses S. Grant and Phil Sheridan discuss the problems in the Shenandoah Valley with Jubal Early's [CS] Corps.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186409
10. Friday, September 16, 1864: Generals Grant and Sheridan meet in Charles Town to discuss the problems in the Shenandoah Valley and a Union offensive against Jubal Early’s (CSA) Corps.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-179
11. Friday, September 16, 1864: Coggin's Point, Virginia - On September 16, the Union force that had retreated from the Confederate attacks at the Battle of Sycamore Church were once again attacked by the Confederates. They had followed the Federals here and was trying to destroy them before they could link back up with Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's force. The Confederates managed to push the Federals back even further.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1864s.html
A Monday, September 16, 1861: on the Cumberland River, Kentucky - On September 16, the USS Conestoga was traveling on the Cumberland River. It spotted a couple of Confederate ships nearby and proceeded to engage them. After a very brief skirmish, the Confederate ships were captured, along with the crews.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1861s.html
A+ Monday, September 16, 1861: USS Conestoga first combat action took place in September 1861 when she engaged CSS Jackson near Lucas Bend, Kentucky.
B Tuesday, September 16, 1862: Lee’s army was at Sharpsburg – as was McClellan’s. Lee faced two serious problems. First, he only had 18,000 men with him against 75,000 Union troops. Second, behind where his men were gathered was the Potomac River. So if Lee needed to withdraw, he would have to cross the river. In Washington, Congress levies the first Federal tax on tobacco.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-seventy-five
B+ Tuesday, September 16, 1862: Gen. McClellan, believing that Lee has nearly 120,000 facing him, is reluctant to move. His troops are arriving along the eastern bank of Antietam creek, just across from the new Confederate lines around Sharpsburg. Somehow, Little Mac gets a notion that Lee is retreating, and trying to get back south into Virginia, even though he simultaneously is preparing to attack Lee. McClellan has 60,000 of his army ready on this date, but does not attack Lee, who has not more than 18,000 troops to oppose the Federals. The intelligence plainly shows that the crossings of Antietam Creek are not difficult or guarded heavily. Yet still he hesitates to move. What McClellan does do is to order Hooker’s I Corps to cross Antietam Creek and to line up for an assault on the Rebel left tomorrow, and thus reveal his hand. Lee shifts troops to his left flank to counter Hooker’s move.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+16%2C+1862
C Wednesday, September 16, 1863: General William Rosecrans (US) army had taken Chattanooga four days ago, but Braxton Bragg’s Confederate army was nowhere close to defeated. The Southern forces were strung out on a roughly north-south line on the east side of a ridge called Lookout Mountain. Rosecrans’ army was scattered and vulnerable, especially the men with Major General George H. Thomas (US) to the south near LeMoyne Cove. Thomas could have easily been isolated and defeated, but the orders to do so never got delivered to General Thomas C. Hindman (CSA). The man carrying the orders, a French soldier-of-fortune known as Major Nocquot, was not available to testify at the court-martial of Hindman, as he had disappeared. Some $150,000 in Army funds went missing around the same time, but in all the confusion no connection was ever proved.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-127
C+ Wednesday, September 16, 1863: Thomas Crittenden [US] reaches Lee and Gordon Mill on the Chickamauga River. Rosecrans [US] orders the rest of his men, spread out along 50 miles of Georgia's backwoods, to concentrate at this landmark.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186309
D Friday, September 16, 1864: Sycamore Church, Virginia - On September 16, a force of the 7th Virginia Cavalry arrived at Sycamore Church to raid the Union cattle area. The Confederates made a dismounted assault on the Union cavalry force. Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton arrived to lend assistance to the Virginia cavalry. The Federals decided to not let the Confederates take the cattle, so they broke down the corral fences and stampeded the cattle.
The Confederates managed to collect 2,486 of the cattle and took them back to the Petersburg lines. They also managed to capture 300 Union prisoners.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1864s.html
D+ Friday, September 16, 1864: On what will be called the “Beefsteak Raid,” at 5 a.m., General Hampton’s (CSA) force attacks and captures more than 2,400 cattle, along with 11 wagons and 304 prisoners. They head back toward friendly territory.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-179
FYI GySgt Jack Wallace CWO4 Terrence Clark SMSgt Lawrence McCarter LTC Trent Klug SFC Bernard WalkoSSG Franklin Briant SSG Byron Howard Sr CPL Ronald Keyes Jr SFC William Farrell CMDCM John F. "Doc" Bradshaw SPC Lyle MontgomeryPO2 Marco MonsalveSPC Woody Bullard SSG Michael Noll SSG Bill McCoy SFC David Reid, M.S, PHR, SHRM-CP, DTMSgt Christopher Collins SPC (Join to see) SPC Gary C. PO3 Lynn Spalding
Surprisingly Little Happening Along the Chickamauga
September 16, 1863 (Wednesday) Federal commander, William Rosecrans, had been warned. The previous day, General Gordon Granger, heading the reserve corps in Chattanooga, informed him that at least …
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LTC Stephen F.
SFC William Farrell - Yes Burnside Bridge still exists over Antietam Creek in Antietam Battlefield. Here is a modern picture.
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SFC William Farrell
LTC Stephen F. - Thanks Sir. Ill have to check it out if Im ever down there. I love stuff that stands the test of time!
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@ltc Stephen ford I chose: 1862: Antietam Campaign. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and his Union Army of the Potomac confronted CSA Gen Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia at Sharpsburg, Maryland. Lee faced two serious problems. First, he only had 18,000 men with him against
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LTC Stephen F.
Thank you my friend and brother-in-Christ SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL for letting us know that you consider September 16, 1862 "Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and his Union Army of the Potomac confronted CSA Gen Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia at Sharpsburg, Maryland. Lee faced two serious problems. First, he only had 18,000 men with him against 75,000 Union troops. Second, behind where his men were gathered was the Potomac River. By noon, as Stonewall Jackson’s men began to file into the Confederate lines, McClellan divined a plan. Joe Hooker, commanding the First Corps, was to cross the North Bridge and be prepared to strike the left flank of the Rebels. Jacob Cox, now commanding the Ninth Corps, was to force a crossing at the southern-most Rohrbach Bridge simultaneous with Hooker’s attack. In the middle, McClellan would support the vice-like assaults. No orders were written to either Hooker or Cox.' to be the most significant event for September 16 during the US Civil War.
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LTC Stephen F.
Thank you my friend and brother-in-Christ TSgt Joe C. for letting us know that you consider all of the events i listed as significant for SEptember 16, during the US Civil War.
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I believe that our Victory at the Battle of Saratoga 19 SEP 1777, was far more important than these Civil War Battles. However, if a gun was placed to my head I would have to pick Chickamauga Campaign.
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LTC Stephen F.
Thank you my friend CPT (Join to see) for responding and sharing your thoughts. Yes the September 18, 1977 battle at Saratoga was certainly important.
The losses in the Chickamauga Campaign dwarfed the losses during the revolutionary war primarily because of advances in weaponry and the devastating effects the rounds had on combatants and hapless civilians as well.
The losses in the Chickamauga Campaign dwarfed the losses during the revolutionary war primarily because of advances in weaponry and the devastating effects the rounds had on combatants and hapless civilians as well.
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LTC Stephen F.
You are very welcome my deceased friend and brother-in-Christ SP5 Mark Kuzinski I am thankful that you are joyfully resting in peace in the presence of our LORD God. I lift your grieving widowm Diana Kuzinski to the LORD as HE prompts me.
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LTC Stephen F.
You are very welcome my friend and brother-in-Christ SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth I am glad to learn that you consider that you always enjoy reading my Civil War Posts.
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