Posted on Jul 30, 2016
What was the most significant event on July 21 during the U.S. Civil War?
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Bull Run to the Federal Forces or Manassas to the Confederates. In 1861 the first battle of Bull Run/Manassas occurred as many of the gentry from Washington, D.C. rode in horse-drawn carriages to watch a battle. Who knows what they were expecting. Perhaps they had read too many fairytales. In any event once the cannons began firing and the Minié balls zipped past the picnickers and the gentry tried to high tail it out of the area.
1864: Thursday, July 21, 1864: Atlanta campaign: Per General Sherman: “During the night [of July 20-21], I had full reports from all parts of our line, most of which was partially intrenched as against a sally, and finding that McPherson [no relation to the author of source 2] was stretching out too much on his left flank, I wrote him a note early in the morning not to extend so much by his left; for we had not troops enough to completely invest the place, and I intended to destroy utterly all parts of the Augusta Railroad to the east of Atlanta, then to withdraw from the left flank and add to the right. In that letter I ordered McPherson not to extend any farther to the left, but to employ General Dodge’s corps (Sixteenth), then forced out of position, to destroy every rail and tie of the railroad, from Decatur up to his skirmish-line, and I wanted him (McPherson) to be ready, as soon as General Garrard returned from Covington (whither I had sent him), to move to the extreme right of Thomas, so as to reach if possible the railroad below Atlanta, viz., the Macon road. In the morning we found the strong line of parapet, “Peach-Tree line,” to the front of Schofield and Thomas, abandoned, and our lines were advanced rapidly close up to Atlanta. For some moments I supposed the enemy intended to evacuate, and in person was on horseback at the head of Schofield’s troops, who had advanced in front of the Howard House to some open ground, from which we could plainly see the whole rebel line of parapets, and I saw their men dragging up from the intervening valley, by the distillery, trees and saplings for abatis. Our skirmishers found the enemy down in this valley, and we could see the rebel main line strongly manned, with guns in position at intervals. Schofield was dressing forward his lines, and I could hear Thomas farther to the right engaged, when General McPherson and his staff rode up. We went back to the Howard House, a double frame-building with a porch, and sat on the steps, discussing the chances of battle, and of Hood’s general character. McPherson had also been of the same class at West Point with Hood, Schofield, and Sheridan. We agreed that we ought to be unusually cautious and prepared at all times for sallies and for hard fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, and rash man; and the change of commanders at that particular crisis argued the displeasure of the Confederate Government with the cautious but prudent conduct of General Jos. Johnston.
McPherson was in excellent spirits, well pleased at the progress of events so far, and had come over purposely to see me about the order I had given him to use Dodge’s corps to break up the railroad, saying that the night before he had gained a position on Leggett’s Hill from which he could look over the rebel parapet, and see the high smoke-stack of a large foundery in Atlanta; that before receiving my order he had diverted Dodge’s two divisions (then in motion) from the main road, along a diagonal one that led to his extreme left flank, then held by Giles A. Smith’s division (Seventeenth Corps), for the purpose of strengthening that flank; and that he had sent some intrenching-tools there, to erect some batteries from which he intended to knock down that foundery, and otherwise to damage the buildings inside of Atlanta. He said he could put all his pioneers to work, and do with them in the time indicated all I had proposed to do with General Dodge’s two divisions. Of course I assented at once, and we walked down the road a short distance, sat down by the foot of a tree where I had my map, and on it pointed out to him Thomas’s position and his own. I then explained minutely that, after we had sufficiently broken up the Augusta road, I wanted to shift his whole army around by the rear to Thomas’s extreme right, and hoped thus to reach the other railroad at East Point. While we sat there we could hear lively skirmishing going on near us (down about the distillery), and occasionally round-shot from twelve or twenty-four pound guns came through the trees in reply to those of Schofield, and we could hear similar sounds all along down the lines of Thomas to our right, and his own to the left; but presently the firing appeared a little more brisk (especially over about Giles G. Smith’s division), and then we heard an occasional gun back toward Decatur. I asked him what it meant. We took my pocket-compass (which I always carried), and by noting the direction of the sound, we became satisfied that the firing was too far to our left rear to be explained by known facts, and he hastily called for his horse, his staff, and his orderlies.
McPherson was then in his prime (about thirty-four years old), over six feet high, and a very handsome man in every way, was universally liked, and had many noble qualities. He had on his boots outside his pantaloons, gauntlets on his hands, had on his major-general’s uniform, and wore a sword-belt, but no sword. He hastily gathered his papers (save one, which I now possess) into a pocket-book, put it in his breast-pocket, and jumped on his horse, saying he would hurry down his line and send me back word what these sounds meant. His adjutant-general, Clark, Inspector-General Strong, and his aides, Captains Steele and Gile, were with him. Although the sound of musketry on our left grew in volume, I was not so much disturbed by it as by the sound of artillery back toward Decatur. I ordered Schofield at once to send a brigade back to Decatur (some five miles) and was walking up and down the porch of the Howard House, listening, when one of McPherson’s staff, with his horse covered with sweat, dashed up to the porch, and reported that General McPherson was either “killed or a prisoner.” He explained that when they had left me a few minutes before, they had ridden rapidly across to the railroad, the sounds of battle increasing as they neared the position occupied by General Giles A. Smith’s division, and that McPherson had sent first one, then another of his staff to bring some of the reserve brigades of the Fifteenth Corps over to the exposed left flank; that he had reached the head of Dodge’s corps (marching by the flank on the diagonal road as described), and had ordered it to hurry forward to the same point; that then, almost if not entirely alone, he had followed this road leading across the wooded valley behind the Seventeenth Corps, and had disappeared in these woods, doubtless with a sense of absolute security. The sound of musketry was there heard, and McPherson’s horse came back, bleeding, wounded, and riderless. I ordered the staff-officer who brought this message to return at once, to find General Logan (the senior officer present with the Army of the Tennessee), to report the same facts to him, and to instruct him to drive back this supposed small force, which had evidently got around the Seventeenth Corps through the blind woods in rear of our left flank. I soon dispatched one of my own staff (McCoy, I think) to General Logan with similar orders, telling him to refuse his left flank, and to fight the battle (holding fast to Leggett’s Hill) with the Army of the Tennessee; that I would personally look to Decatur and to the safety of his rear, and would reenforce him if he needed it. I dispatched orders to General Thomas on our right, telling him of this strong sally, and my inference that the lines in his front had evidently been weakened by reason thereof, and that he ought to take advantage of the opportunity to make a lodgment in Atlanta, if possible.
Meantime the sounds of the battle rose on our extreme left more and more furious, extending to the place where I stood, at the Howard House. Within an hour an ambulance came in (attended by Colonels Clark and Strong, and Captains Steele and Gile), bearing McPherson’s body. I had it carried inside of the Howard House, and laid on a door wrenched from its hinges. Dr. Hewitt, of the army, was there, and I asked him to examine the wound. He opened the coat and shirt, saw where the ball had entered and where it came out, or rather lodged under the skin, and he reported that McPherson must have died in a few seconds after being hit; that the ball had ranged upward across his body, and passed near the heart. He was dressed just as he left me, with gauntlets and boots on, but his pocket-book was gone. On further inquiry I learned that his body must have been in possession of the enemy some minutes, during which time it was rifled of the pocket-book, and I was much concerned lest the letter I had written him that morning should have fallen into the hands of some one who could read and understand its meaning. Fortunately the spot in the woods where McPherson was shot was regained by our troops in a few minutes, and the pocket-book found in the haversack of a prisoner of war captured at the time, and it and its contents were secured by one of McPherson’s staff.
While we were examining the body inside the house, the battle was progressing outside, and many shots struck the building, which I feared would take fire; so I ordered Captains Steele and Gile to carry the body to Marietta. They reached that place the same night, and, on application, I ordered his personal staff to go on and escort the body to his home, in Clyde, Ohio, where it was received with great honor, and it is now buried in a small cemetery, close by his mother’s house, which cemetery is composed in part of the family orchard, in which he used to play when a boy. The foundation is ready laid for the equestrian monument now in progress, under the auspices of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee.
The reports that came to me from all parts of the field revealed clearly what was the game of my antagonist, and the ground somewhat favored him. The railroad and wagon-road from Decatur to Atlanta lie along the summit, from which the waters flow, by short, steep valleys, into the “Peach-Tree” and Chattahoochee, to the west, and by other valleys, of gentler declivity, toward the east (Ocmulgee). The ridges and level ground were mostly cleared, and had been cultivated as corn or cotton fields; but where the valleys were broken, they were left in a state of nature—wooded, and full of undergrowth. McPherson’s line of battle was across this railroad, along a general ridge, with a gentle but cleared valley to his front, between him and the defenses of Atlanta; and another valley, behind him, was clear of timber in part, but to his left rear the country was heavily wooded.”
Pictures: 1861-07-21 First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas); 1861-07-21 US Marines at First Manassas; 1861-07-21 first battle of bull run Map; 1861-07-21 Stonewall Jackson at Bull Run
A. 1861: First Battle of Bull Run. About 25 miles southwest of Washington the first major battle of the Civil War pits Maj Gen Irvin McDowell against CSA Gen P. G. T. Beauregard and CSA Gen Joe Johnston. The battle saw a Confederate victory and overwhelming evidence that the Union forces were not as well-disciplined as was thought. Panic and non-ordered withdrawals became contagious and the Union army retreated en masse when it became clear that Confederate forces were not willing to run. Men from Thomas Jackson’s brigade stood “like a stone wall” to ensure that the Union forces could not advance and Jackson ended up with the nickname ‘Stonewall’ Jackson. The Union troops suffered 2,896 (460 killed) casualties against the Confederates' 1,897 (400 killed), shocking numbers at the time. First Manassas was the bloodiest battle in American history to date; yet it would not compare to the bloodletting still to come. The Confederate victory made Washington DC even more exposed while the government there realized that what they thought would be an easy victory was actually the start of what would be a much longer war than anyone could have previously predicted. In the Confederacy, the opposite occurred. The leaders of the Confederates believed that the war would be short especially after the poor performance of the Union army witnessed at Bull Run.
B. 1863: Report of Brig Gen Quincy A. Gillmore had lost so many men in the fighting on Morris Island, he felt compelled to ask for reinforcements. The Confederates admit a loss of 300, including 16 commissioned officers, on the 19th, and their losses since then will swell the aggregate several hundred men. “I renew the application for re-enforcements made in my first communication of this date, herewith inclosed. General Saxton, commanding at Beaufort, reports the enemy very active in his front yesterday. A large force from James Island would be available for an attack on Hilton Head, where all my stores are. I feel quite weak there, and must re-enforce the place from here, even at the expense of operations in this quarter.
C. 1864: During the siege of Petersburg, VA the Confederates hear digging as the Federal forces are digging tunnels towards their reinforced earthworks. "Digging, apparently at some depth, was heard . . .Major General Bushrod Johnson, C.S. Army.” Bushrod Johnson included a disturbing detail is his daily report from his division's section of the Confederate lines at Petersburg, Virginia. Johnson's men thought they could hear digging deep underground near their positions and Johnson asked for and engineer officer to be sent to investigate.
D. 1864: Bald Hill outside of Atlanta. Sherman’s three armies were still more or less separated. Better yet, Wheeler reported that as McPherson’s army marched in on Atlanta from the east, it had its left flank “in the air” (Sherman had sent Kenner Garrard’s cavalry east to wreck the Georgia Railroad). This situation presented Hood with an opportunity to launch a flank attack, like the one made famous by Jackson at Chancellorsville. Hood planned for his forces to drop back from their outer lines north of the city into the main fortified perimeter around the city on the night of July 21-22; Stewart and Cheatham would hold the works.
FYI MSG Roy Cheever Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D. PO3 Edward Riddle SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL Maj William W. 'Bill' Price COL (Join to see) COL Lisandro MurphySSgt David M. MAJ Dale E. Wilson, Ph.D. SPC Maurice Evans SPC Jon O. SGT David A. 'Cowboy' GrothSSG Trevor S. 1SG Steven Imerman SSgt Charles AnknerSGT Jim ArnoldRyan CallahanAmn Dale Preisach[~1757912"LTC Keith L Jackson]
1864: Thursday, July 21, 1864: Atlanta campaign: Per General Sherman: “During the night [of July 20-21], I had full reports from all parts of our line, most of which was partially intrenched as against a sally, and finding that McPherson [no relation to the author of source 2] was stretching out too much on his left flank, I wrote him a note early in the morning not to extend so much by his left; for we had not troops enough to completely invest the place, and I intended to destroy utterly all parts of the Augusta Railroad to the east of Atlanta, then to withdraw from the left flank and add to the right. In that letter I ordered McPherson not to extend any farther to the left, but to employ General Dodge’s corps (Sixteenth), then forced out of position, to destroy every rail and tie of the railroad, from Decatur up to his skirmish-line, and I wanted him (McPherson) to be ready, as soon as General Garrard returned from Covington (whither I had sent him), to move to the extreme right of Thomas, so as to reach if possible the railroad below Atlanta, viz., the Macon road. In the morning we found the strong line of parapet, “Peach-Tree line,” to the front of Schofield and Thomas, abandoned, and our lines were advanced rapidly close up to Atlanta. For some moments I supposed the enemy intended to evacuate, and in person was on horseback at the head of Schofield’s troops, who had advanced in front of the Howard House to some open ground, from which we could plainly see the whole rebel line of parapets, and I saw their men dragging up from the intervening valley, by the distillery, trees and saplings for abatis. Our skirmishers found the enemy down in this valley, and we could see the rebel main line strongly manned, with guns in position at intervals. Schofield was dressing forward his lines, and I could hear Thomas farther to the right engaged, when General McPherson and his staff rode up. We went back to the Howard House, a double frame-building with a porch, and sat on the steps, discussing the chances of battle, and of Hood’s general character. McPherson had also been of the same class at West Point with Hood, Schofield, and Sheridan. We agreed that we ought to be unusually cautious and prepared at all times for sallies and for hard fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, and rash man; and the change of commanders at that particular crisis argued the displeasure of the Confederate Government with the cautious but prudent conduct of General Jos. Johnston.
McPherson was in excellent spirits, well pleased at the progress of events so far, and had come over purposely to see me about the order I had given him to use Dodge’s corps to break up the railroad, saying that the night before he had gained a position on Leggett’s Hill from which he could look over the rebel parapet, and see the high smoke-stack of a large foundery in Atlanta; that before receiving my order he had diverted Dodge’s two divisions (then in motion) from the main road, along a diagonal one that led to his extreme left flank, then held by Giles A. Smith’s division (Seventeenth Corps), for the purpose of strengthening that flank; and that he had sent some intrenching-tools there, to erect some batteries from which he intended to knock down that foundery, and otherwise to damage the buildings inside of Atlanta. He said he could put all his pioneers to work, and do with them in the time indicated all I had proposed to do with General Dodge’s two divisions. Of course I assented at once, and we walked down the road a short distance, sat down by the foot of a tree where I had my map, and on it pointed out to him Thomas’s position and his own. I then explained minutely that, after we had sufficiently broken up the Augusta road, I wanted to shift his whole army around by the rear to Thomas’s extreme right, and hoped thus to reach the other railroad at East Point. While we sat there we could hear lively skirmishing going on near us (down about the distillery), and occasionally round-shot from twelve or twenty-four pound guns came through the trees in reply to those of Schofield, and we could hear similar sounds all along down the lines of Thomas to our right, and his own to the left; but presently the firing appeared a little more brisk (especially over about Giles G. Smith’s division), and then we heard an occasional gun back toward Decatur. I asked him what it meant. We took my pocket-compass (which I always carried), and by noting the direction of the sound, we became satisfied that the firing was too far to our left rear to be explained by known facts, and he hastily called for his horse, his staff, and his orderlies.
McPherson was then in his prime (about thirty-four years old), over six feet high, and a very handsome man in every way, was universally liked, and had many noble qualities. He had on his boots outside his pantaloons, gauntlets on his hands, had on his major-general’s uniform, and wore a sword-belt, but no sword. He hastily gathered his papers (save one, which I now possess) into a pocket-book, put it in his breast-pocket, and jumped on his horse, saying he would hurry down his line and send me back word what these sounds meant. His adjutant-general, Clark, Inspector-General Strong, and his aides, Captains Steele and Gile, were with him. Although the sound of musketry on our left grew in volume, I was not so much disturbed by it as by the sound of artillery back toward Decatur. I ordered Schofield at once to send a brigade back to Decatur (some five miles) and was walking up and down the porch of the Howard House, listening, when one of McPherson’s staff, with his horse covered with sweat, dashed up to the porch, and reported that General McPherson was either “killed or a prisoner.” He explained that when they had left me a few minutes before, they had ridden rapidly across to the railroad, the sounds of battle increasing as they neared the position occupied by General Giles A. Smith’s division, and that McPherson had sent first one, then another of his staff to bring some of the reserve brigades of the Fifteenth Corps over to the exposed left flank; that he had reached the head of Dodge’s corps (marching by the flank on the diagonal road as described), and had ordered it to hurry forward to the same point; that then, almost if not entirely alone, he had followed this road leading across the wooded valley behind the Seventeenth Corps, and had disappeared in these woods, doubtless with a sense of absolute security. The sound of musketry was there heard, and McPherson’s horse came back, bleeding, wounded, and riderless. I ordered the staff-officer who brought this message to return at once, to find General Logan (the senior officer present with the Army of the Tennessee), to report the same facts to him, and to instruct him to drive back this supposed small force, which had evidently got around the Seventeenth Corps through the blind woods in rear of our left flank. I soon dispatched one of my own staff (McCoy, I think) to General Logan with similar orders, telling him to refuse his left flank, and to fight the battle (holding fast to Leggett’s Hill) with the Army of the Tennessee; that I would personally look to Decatur and to the safety of his rear, and would reenforce him if he needed it. I dispatched orders to General Thomas on our right, telling him of this strong sally, and my inference that the lines in his front had evidently been weakened by reason thereof, and that he ought to take advantage of the opportunity to make a lodgment in Atlanta, if possible.
Meantime the sounds of the battle rose on our extreme left more and more furious, extending to the place where I stood, at the Howard House. Within an hour an ambulance came in (attended by Colonels Clark and Strong, and Captains Steele and Gile), bearing McPherson’s body. I had it carried inside of the Howard House, and laid on a door wrenched from its hinges. Dr. Hewitt, of the army, was there, and I asked him to examine the wound. He opened the coat and shirt, saw where the ball had entered and where it came out, or rather lodged under the skin, and he reported that McPherson must have died in a few seconds after being hit; that the ball had ranged upward across his body, and passed near the heart. He was dressed just as he left me, with gauntlets and boots on, but his pocket-book was gone. On further inquiry I learned that his body must have been in possession of the enemy some minutes, during which time it was rifled of the pocket-book, and I was much concerned lest the letter I had written him that morning should have fallen into the hands of some one who could read and understand its meaning. Fortunately the spot in the woods where McPherson was shot was regained by our troops in a few minutes, and the pocket-book found in the haversack of a prisoner of war captured at the time, and it and its contents were secured by one of McPherson’s staff.
While we were examining the body inside the house, the battle was progressing outside, and many shots struck the building, which I feared would take fire; so I ordered Captains Steele and Gile to carry the body to Marietta. They reached that place the same night, and, on application, I ordered his personal staff to go on and escort the body to his home, in Clyde, Ohio, where it was received with great honor, and it is now buried in a small cemetery, close by his mother’s house, which cemetery is composed in part of the family orchard, in which he used to play when a boy. The foundation is ready laid for the equestrian monument now in progress, under the auspices of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee.
The reports that came to me from all parts of the field revealed clearly what was the game of my antagonist, and the ground somewhat favored him. The railroad and wagon-road from Decatur to Atlanta lie along the summit, from which the waters flow, by short, steep valleys, into the “Peach-Tree” and Chattahoochee, to the west, and by other valleys, of gentler declivity, toward the east (Ocmulgee). The ridges and level ground were mostly cleared, and had been cultivated as corn or cotton fields; but where the valleys were broken, they were left in a state of nature—wooded, and full of undergrowth. McPherson’s line of battle was across this railroad, along a general ridge, with a gentle but cleared valley to his front, between him and the defenses of Atlanta; and another valley, behind him, was clear of timber in part, but to his left rear the country was heavily wooded.”
Pictures: 1861-07-21 First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas); 1861-07-21 US Marines at First Manassas; 1861-07-21 first battle of bull run Map; 1861-07-21 Stonewall Jackson at Bull Run
A. 1861: First Battle of Bull Run. About 25 miles southwest of Washington the first major battle of the Civil War pits Maj Gen Irvin McDowell against CSA Gen P. G. T. Beauregard and CSA Gen Joe Johnston. The battle saw a Confederate victory and overwhelming evidence that the Union forces were not as well-disciplined as was thought. Panic and non-ordered withdrawals became contagious and the Union army retreated en masse when it became clear that Confederate forces were not willing to run. Men from Thomas Jackson’s brigade stood “like a stone wall” to ensure that the Union forces could not advance and Jackson ended up with the nickname ‘Stonewall’ Jackson. The Union troops suffered 2,896 (460 killed) casualties against the Confederates' 1,897 (400 killed), shocking numbers at the time. First Manassas was the bloodiest battle in American history to date; yet it would not compare to the bloodletting still to come. The Confederate victory made Washington DC even more exposed while the government there realized that what they thought would be an easy victory was actually the start of what would be a much longer war than anyone could have previously predicted. In the Confederacy, the opposite occurred. The leaders of the Confederates believed that the war would be short especially after the poor performance of the Union army witnessed at Bull Run.
B. 1863: Report of Brig Gen Quincy A. Gillmore had lost so many men in the fighting on Morris Island, he felt compelled to ask for reinforcements. The Confederates admit a loss of 300, including 16 commissioned officers, on the 19th, and their losses since then will swell the aggregate several hundred men. “I renew the application for re-enforcements made in my first communication of this date, herewith inclosed. General Saxton, commanding at Beaufort, reports the enemy very active in his front yesterday. A large force from James Island would be available for an attack on Hilton Head, where all my stores are. I feel quite weak there, and must re-enforce the place from here, even at the expense of operations in this quarter.
C. 1864: During the siege of Petersburg, VA the Confederates hear digging as the Federal forces are digging tunnels towards their reinforced earthworks. "Digging, apparently at some depth, was heard . . .Major General Bushrod Johnson, C.S. Army.” Bushrod Johnson included a disturbing detail is his daily report from his division's section of the Confederate lines at Petersburg, Virginia. Johnson's men thought they could hear digging deep underground near their positions and Johnson asked for and engineer officer to be sent to investigate.
D. 1864: Bald Hill outside of Atlanta. Sherman’s three armies were still more or less separated. Better yet, Wheeler reported that as McPherson’s army marched in on Atlanta from the east, it had its left flank “in the air” (Sherman had sent Kenner Garrard’s cavalry east to wreck the Georgia Railroad). This situation presented Hood with an opportunity to launch a flank attack, like the one made famous by Jackson at Chancellorsville. Hood planned for his forces to drop back from their outer lines north of the city into the main fortified perimeter around the city on the night of July 21-22; Stewart and Cheatham would hold the works.
FYI MSG Roy Cheever Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D. PO3 Edward Riddle SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL Maj William W. 'Bill' Price COL (Join to see) COL Lisandro MurphySSgt David M. MAJ Dale E. Wilson, Ph.D. SPC Maurice Evans SPC Jon O. SGT David A. 'Cowboy' GrothSSG Trevor S. 1SG Steven Imerman SSgt Charles AnknerSGT Jim ArnoldRyan CallahanAmn Dale Preisach[~1757912"LTC Keith L Jackson]
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The first battle of Bull Run included the 1st Regiment of NY Zouave’s, US Marines, and officers who would more famous later in the war such as James Longstreet, Jubal Early, P.G.T. Beauregard, Col J. E. B. Stuart and Col Thomas J. Jackson on the Confederates. On the Federal side Maj Gen McDowell, Col William T. Sherman, Col Ambrose E. Burnside
Below are a number of journal entries from 1862 and 1863 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly.
Monday, July 21, 1862: --- William Lyon, an officer in the Union army in northern Mississippi, writes home to his wife, with comical awareness of the flies and poignant longing for his wife. To Mrs. Lyon. From Camp Clear Creek, Miss., Monday, July 21, 1862. “Yesterday I was Field Officer of the Day (the officer who has charge of the pickets and outside posts), and I was in the saddle nearly all day and tramping a good deal of the night, so I feel stupid today.
I keep your picture hanging in my tent, where I can lie on my bed, that is, on the ground, and gaze at it and get sentimental, and fight flies. Speaking of flies, the Egyptian plagues, although they had locusts, and lice, and frogs, I believe, were a failure, because they did not have flies. Such swarms of them as infest our camps, drawn here by the debris of a great army, you can not conceive of. They are the common house fly and, like everything else here, are dull and stupid— don’t know enough to go when you tell them to. So much for flies.”
Tuesday, July 21, 1863: Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles writes in his journal about the use of the Navy in the Vicksburg and Yazoo campaigns, rightly identifying the Navy as a key element in these operations: “July 21, Tuesday. A dispatch from General Grant makes mention of large captures of cattle coming east from Texas, and of munitions going south to Kirby Smith. General Sherman is following up Joe Johnston. A dispatch from Admiral Porter says that he, in concert with General Grant, sent an expedition up the Yazoo and that it was a complete success. Grant in his dispatch makes no mention of, or allusion to, the Navy in this expedition, nor of any consultation with Admiral Porter, although without the naval force and naval cooperation nothing could have been accomplished.”
Tuesday, July 21, 1863:Kate Cumming, a nurse in the Confederate army hospital in Chattanooga, writes in her journal about the mood of restlessness there, and rumors that Bragg is about to abandon the city: “Yesterday Mrs. W. and I visited the soldiers’ grave-yard. That hallowed spot! There reposes the dust of men from every state in the South. There is naught to mark the places where these heroes sleep, save slight mounds of earth; at the head of each is a small piece of wood, numbered. . . . We returned by way of the river. The scenery on its banks is really enchanting.
“Not Katrine, in her mirror blue,
Gives back the shaggy bonks more true,”
than does the Tennessee the lofty and rugged hills that look down upon its placid waters.
We saw many of our men at work on the fortifications; they looked well, and were cheerful. They seemed to have little faith that their work would amount to any thing, and said they would not be at all surprised if by to-morrow they were ordered to evacuate Chattanooga, and that they were only given the work to do for fear they might forget how it was done.”
Pictures: 1861-07-21 First battle of Bull Run by ricketts; 1861-07-21 1st Regt NY Zouaves at Bull Run; 1864-07 bald-hill-map; 1864-07-21 Before-Petersburg-tunnel
A. Sunday, July 21, 1861: First Battle of Bull Run. About 25 miles southwest of Washington the first major battle of the Civil War pits Maj Gen Irvin McDowell against CSA Gen P. G. T. Beauregard and CSA Gen Joe Johnston. The battle saw a Confederate victory and overwhelming evidence that the Union forces were not as well-disciplined as was thought. Panic and non-ordered withdrawals became contagious and the Union army retreated en masse when it became clear that Confederate forces were not willing to run. Men from Thomas Jackson’s brigade stood “like a stone wall” to ensure that the Union forces could not advance and Jackson ended up with the nickname ‘Stonewall’ Jackson. The Union troops suffered 2,896 (460 killed) casualties against the Confederates' 1,897 (400 killed), shocking numbers at the time. First Manassas was the bloodiest battle in American history to date; yet it would not compare to the bloodletting still to come. The Confederate victory made Washington DC even more exposed while the government there realized that what they thought would be an easy victory was actually the start of what would be a much longer war than anyone could have previously predicted. In the Confederacy, the opposite occurred. The leaders of the Confederates believed that the war would be short especially after the poor performance of the Union army witnessed at Bull Run.
Details: Thus, early on July 21, Johnston decided that the Confederates needed to shore up their left and center, and he moved the brigades of Virginian Thomas J. Jackson and South Carolinian Barnard Bee toward the left.
At the same time on July 21, Union troops began marching to their positions. At six o'clock, Tyler's men began their demonstration at the Stone Bridge to attract Confederate attention. Meanwhile, the flanking column started toward Sudley Ford.
Colonel Nathan "Shanks" Evans and his Confederate troops were positioned at the Stone Bridge to meet Tyler's possible attack. Evans had acquired the nickname at West Point as a mocking reference to his spindly legs (spindle shanks). Infamous for having an orderly carry around a keg of whiskey he had nicknamed "barrelito," Shanks and his brigade remained impassive in the face of the Union troops who seemed content to remain on their side of Bull Run. Evans kept his men largely concealed, only allowing his pickets to trade fire with Tyler's men as he awaited a more serious advance.
At nine o'clock in the morning, Confederate signal officer E. Porter Alexander caught sight of the flanking column just making its way across Sudley Ford and immediately informed both headquarters and Evans—"Look to your left, you are turned"—the first use of wigwag signaling in combat. Grasping the gravity of the situation, Evans moved the bulk of his men to block its advance, leaving only a few to hold Tyler. As he took position on the slopes of Matthews Hill, it appeared as though Evans, with a lone brigade, would confront a full two Union divisions.
Bee, meanwhile, had heard the firing earlier in the morning and moved his brigade, along with the brigade of Francis Bartow, from its position in the center to a location farther left. They initially marched up Henry House Hill, a prominence to the east of Matthews Hill. As they did this, the lead troops of the Union flanking column, under Rhode Islander Ambrose E. Burnside, encountered Evans's line. The battle had begun in earnest. For nearly an hour, Evans and his Confederates held. As they began to buckle under the pressure of the Union advance, help arrived in the form of Bee's and Bartow's brigades, which had moved from Henry House Hill to Matthews Hill.
As fighting seesawed between Burnside and Bartow, Bee, and Evans, another Union commander took steps that would unravel the Confederate line on Matthews Hill. Colonel William T. Sherman, with a Union brigade, crossed Bull Run at Poplar (or Farm) Ford, which lay behind the Confederate lines on Matthews Hill. His brigade entered the fray, prompting a Confederate retreat.
Momentarily, it looked as if McDowell had put the Confederates to flight, as the battered remnants of the three brigades on Matthews Hill streamed eastward. Yet hope remained for Johnston and Beauregard, who during the morning's fighting had set aside any offensive plans and started more troops toward their left. McDowell, unaccountably, paused and failed to closely pursue the Confederates. This proved a fatal error, as a brigade of Virginians under Colonel Thomas J. Jackson began to form a new defensive line along Henry House Hill. It was here that Bee purportedly implored his men to rally on Jackson "standing like a stone wall."
Until midafternoon, fighting swirled along Henry House Hill as both sides fed more troops into the fight. In the confusion, both Confederate and Union troops fell victim to friendly fire. At this early date in the war, uniforms had not been standardized and both armies carried similar-looking flags. (In part, the Confederate battle flag was born out of this confusion.) More than once, troops fired on their comrades, convinced that they were the enemy. Bartow and Bee lost their lives, and the widow Henry, who had refused to leave her house, also perished during the fighting. By three o'clock, the Confederates had gained the upper hand at Henry House Hill.
McDowell, in midafternoon, attempted to salvage the situation. He ordered an advance on Chinn Ridge, which lay to the southwest of Henry House Hill. From there, he could potentially flank the Confederate position. Unfortunately for McDowell, the Confederates anticipated this maneuver. Brigades under Arnold Elzey and Jubal A. Early stymied the Union advance toward Chinn Ridge.
McDowell, with nothing left to gain on the south side of Bull Run, ordered a withdrawal. Covered by United States Regulars, the retreat began in an orderly fashion. Yet as the Union troops got farther from the battlefield, panic mounted. Cries went up that the Confederate cavalry was closing in on the retreating troops. In reality, Beauregard and Johnston possessed only a small force of horsemen under J. E. B. Stuart. Although they attempted a pursuit, little came of it. Instead, as the Union troops proceeded they became more disorganized. By the time they reached Centreville, McDowell decided that further withdrawal was needed in order to reorganize and calm his men.
B. Tuesday, July 21, 1863: Report of Brig Gen Quincy A. Gillmore from Morris Island, South Carolina. Quincy A. Gillmore had lost so many men in the fighting on Morris Island, he felt compelled to ask for reinforcements.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, In the Field, Morris Island, S. C., July 21, 1863. “SIR: I have the honor to report no material change in the condition of affairs here since my brief dispatch announcing the capture of two-thirds of this island on the 10th instant and the assault of Fort Wagner on the morning of the 11th. My project for inaugurating offensive operations here comprised: “First. A real attack of Morris Island, to be made by a force landing from small boats, preceded by unmasking and opening our batteries from Folly Island, should it be deemed best to do so.
Second. A strong demonstration up the Stono against James Island, to occupy the attention of the enemy there.
Third. The cutting of the Savannah Railroad by ascending the South Edisto and burning the bridge.
The first and second of these operations were successful. the third was not. It resulted in the loss of two field guns and a small steamer of little value, formerly captured from the enemy. The steamer was burned, with the guns on board. The force operating on James Island, about 3,500 men, was under the command of Brigadier-General Terry, and was aided by three gunboats. On the 16th instant, General Terry was attacked by the enemy in force, comprising infantry, and cavalry. General Terry's report of the action is herewith inclosed. He estimates the enemy's strength on James Island at 5,000 to 6,000. I evacuated James Island on the 17th, as I required more men here, and did not consider General Terry's position longer tenable.
On the 18th, an attack on Fort Wagner was made by the land and naval forces, commencing about noon in a combined cannonade and bombardment, and terminating in an assault of the army about sunset. We gained and held for more than one hour the southeast salient or half bastion of the work, but finding it isolated from and commanded by the main body of the work, we were obliged to abandon it.
During the bombardment, the enemy served but two guns, and scarcely a man showed himself. Deserters say the work contains bomb-proof shelter for from 1,200 to 1,800 men. It is a strong work.
Three of its guns were dismounted during the action. My losses in the three actions of the 10th, 11th, and 18th are not yet accurately reported, but have been very heavy. My sick list, on account of the enervating climate and heavy fatigue duty, is also enormous.
The enemy admit a loss of 300, including 16 commissioned officers, on the 19th, and their losses since then will swell the aggregate several hundred men.
I renew the application for re-enforcements made in my first communication of this date, herewith inclosed.
General Saxton, commanding at Beaufort, reports the enemy very active in his front yesterday. A large force from James Island would be available for an attack on Hilton Head, where all my stores are. I feel quite weak there, and must re-enforce the place from here, even at the expense of operations in this quarter.
I notice in the Washington papers of the 11th a communication, bearing the stamp of genuineness, prescribing the manner of obtaining drafted men for the old regiments. The exigencies of the case induce me to act upon this information in advance of the official order. I have, therefore, detailed men to proceed to the rendezvous designated, obtain recruits, and return to their regiments at the earliest possible moment.
I trust I have not acted too hastily. I would like some instructions given to the commanders of the several rendezvous to give the preference to my requisitions, unless there are strong reasons to the contrary.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Q. A. GILLMORE, Brigadier-General, Commanding.” To Major General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief, U. S. Army.
P. S.-- A report from my chief medical [officer] gives 625 killed and wounded that have fallen into our hands up to this date. The enemy probably have 300 more.
C. Thursday, July 20, 1864: During the siege of Petersburg, VA the Confederates hear digging as the Federal forces are digging tunnels towards their reinforced earthworks. "Digging, apparently at some depth, was heard . . .Major General Bushrod Johnson, C.S. Army.” Bushrod Johnson included a disturbing detail is his daily report from his division's section of the Confederate lines at Petersburg, Virginia. Johnson's men thought they could hear digging deep underground near their positions and Johnson asked for and engineer officer to be sent to investigate.
D. Thursday, July 21, 1864: Bald Hill outside of Atlanta. Sherman’s three armies were still more or less separated. Better yet, Wheeler reported that as McPherson’s army marched in on Atlanta from the east, it had its left flank “in the air” (Sherman had sent Kenner Garrard’s cavalry east to wreck the Georgia Railroad). This situation presented Hood with an opportunity to launch a flank attack, like the one made famous by Jackson at Chancellorsville. Hood planned for his forces to drop back from their outer lines north of the city into the main fortified perimeter around the city on the night of July 21-22; Stewart and Cheatham would hold the works. Hardee’s corps would march through and out of the city, southeast then northeast toward Decatur, guided by Wheeler’s cavalry and jump into McPherson’s left-rear, while Wheeler attacked McPherson’s wagon trains. It was an ambitious plan, calling for a 15-mile night march by Hardee’s troops and a dawn attack on the 22nd. But a late start, exhaustion of the men, a hot night, dusty roads and poor service from the cavalry combined to bring the four assault divisions not nearly far enough into McPherson’s rear when Hardee, well behind schedule, decided to deploy. Then rough terrain added further delay—Confederate Maj. Gen. W. H. T. Walker was shot and killed getting his division into place. Hardee’s surprise attack did not begin till shortly after noon.
1. Sunday, July 21, 1861: (First) Manassas (Confederate); (First) Bull Run (Union) About 25 miles southwest of Washington the first major battle of the Civil War pits Irvin McDowell [US] against P. G. T. Beauregard [CS] and Joe Johnston [CS].
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186107
2. Monday, July 21, 1862: William Lyon, an officer in the Union army in northern Mississippi, writes home to his wife, with comical awareness of the flies and poignant longing for his wife. To Mrs. Lyon. From Camp Clear Creek, Miss., Monday, July 21, 1862. “Yesterday I was Field Officer of the Day (the officer who has charge of the pickets and outside posts), and I was in the saddle nearly all day and tramping a good deal of the night, so I feel stupid today.
I keep your picture hanging in my tent, where I can lie on my bed, that is, on the ground, and gaze at it and get sentimental, and fight flies. Speaking of flies, the Egyptian plagues, although they had locusts, and lice, and frogs, I believe, were a failure, because they did not have flies. Such swarms of them as infest our camps, drawn here by the debris of a great army, you can not conceive of. They are the common house fly and, like everything else here, are dull and stupid— don’t know enough to go when you tell them to. So much for flies.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1862
3. Monday, July 21, 1862: Nashville, Tennessee - On July 21, a Confederate force captured Federal pickets 5 miles from Nashville. They then went to the Chattanooga road and burned several bridges.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1862s.html
4. Monday, July 21, 1862: In a tersely worded telegram, Braxton Bragg informs Jefferson Davis that he will move his army in force from Tupelo, Mississippi to Chattanooga, Tennessee.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186207
5. Monday, July 21, 1862 --- Union cavalry under Brig. Gen. Green Clay Smith pursues Morgan south toward Richmond, Kentucky. As the Rebels arrived in Somerset, Kentucky, they find and capture a 150-wagon train of supplies for the Union army: Morgan’s men take all that they can carry and burn the rest. Morgan decides to end his raid and heads his riders south toward Tennessee.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1862
6. Monday, July 21, 1862 --- Gen. Don Carlos Buell of the Army of the Ohio sends a frustrated dispatch to Secretary Stanton about the Rebel cavalry raids in his rear areas: Forrest in Tennessee and Morgan in Kentucky. Operations toward Chattanooga have been suspended. Buell points out that small garrisons cannot withstand the Rebel raids, and posting larger guards would have the effect of scattering his main force. Buell asks for more troops and then makes this strange political evaluation: “I am compelled to ascribe the greater part of our annoyance from guerrilla bands to the spirit of hate and revenge which has been inspired in this quarter by an unwise policy and personal wrongs.” To what he refers is unclear, although it is known that Buell, like McClellan, is pro-Union and pro-slavery, and looks askance on elements in the government who want to make the war into a crusade for human liberty.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1862
7. Monday, July 21, 1862: Forrest’s cavalry skirmishes around Nashville and other places.
https://bjdeming.com/2012/07/20/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-july-16-22-1862/
8. Monday, July 21, 1862: General Bragg telegraphs President Davis that he will move his army in force from Tupelo, Mississippi to Chattanooga, Tennessee.
https://bjdeming.com/2012/07/20/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-july-16-22-1862/
9. Tuesday, July 21, 1863: Abraham Lincoln to Oliver O. Howard. On this day 150 years ago, Abraham Lincoln down on criticism of Meade's pursuit of Lee after Gettysburg. Executive Mansion, My dear General Howard Washington, July 21. 1863. “Your letter of the 18th. is received. I was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee across the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his army would have ended the war, and because I believed, such destruction was perfectly easy---believed that Gen. Meade and his noble army had expended all the skill, and toil, and blood, up to the ripe harvest, and then let the crop go to waste. Perhaps my mortification was heightened because I had always believed---making my belief a hobby possibly---that the main rebel army going North of the Potomac, could never return, if well attended to; and because I was so greatly flattered in this belief, by the operations at Gettysburg. A few days having passed, I am now profoundly grateful for what was done, without criticism for what was not done. Gen. Meade has my confidence as a brave and skillful officer, and a true man. Yours very truly, A. LINCOLN
http://www.civilwar-online.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1863
10. Tuesday, July 21, 1863 --- Pres. Abraham Lincoln writes to Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, commander of the XI Corps on his disappointment with Meade’s pursuit of Lee: “ Executive Mansion, My dear General Howard Washington, July 21. 1863. Your letter of the 18th. is received. I was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee across the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his army would have ended the war, and because I believed, such destruction was perfectly easy---believed that Gen. Meade and his noble army had expended all the skill, and toil, and blood, up to the ripe harvest, and then let the crop go to waste. Perhaps my mortification was heightened because I had always believed---making my belief a hobby possibly---that the main rebel army going North of the Potomac, could never return, if well attended to; and because I was so greatly flattered in this belief, by the operations at Gettysburg. A few days having passed, I am now profoundly grateful for what was done, without criticism for what was not done. Gen. Meade has my confidence as a brave and skillful officer, and a true man. Yours very truly A. LINCOLN”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1863
11. Tuesday, July 21, 1863 --- Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles writes in his journal about the use of the Navy in the Vicksburg and Yazoo campaigns, rightly identifying the Navy as a key element in these operations: “July 21, Tuesday. A dispatch from General Grant makes mention of large captures of cattle coming east from Texas, and of munitions going south to Kirby Smith. General Sherman is following up Joe Johnston. A dispatch from Admiral Porter says that he, in concert with General Grant, sent an expedition up the Yazoo and that it was a complete success. Grant in his dispatch makes no mention of, or allusion to, the Navy in this expedition, nor of any consultation with Admiral Porter, although without the naval force and naval cooperation nothing could have been accomplished.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1863
12. Tuesday, July 21, 1863 --- Kate Cumming, a nurse in the Confederate army hospital in Chattanooga, writes in her journal about the mood of restlessness there, and rumors that Bragg is about to abandon the city: “Yesterday Mrs. W. and I visited the soldiers’ grave-yard. That hallowed spot! There reposes the dust of men from every state in the South. There is naught to mark the places where these heroes sleep, save slight mounds of earth; at the head of each is a small piece of wood, numbered. . . . We returned by way of the river. The scenery on its banks is really enchanting.
“Not Katrine, in her mirror blue,
Gives back the shaggy bonks more true,”
than does the Tennessee the lofty and rugged hills that look down upon its placid waters.
We saw many of our men at work on the fortifications; they looked well, and were cheerful. They seemed to have little faith that their work would amount to any thing, and said they would not be at all surprised if by to-morrow they were ordered to evacuate Chattanooga, and that they were only given the work to do for fear they might forget how it was done.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1863
13. Thursday, July 21, 1864: Thursday, July 20, 1864: Atlanta campaign: Per General Sherman: “During the night [of July 20-21], I had full reports from all parts of our line, most of which was partially intrenched as against a sally, and finding that McPherson [no relation to the author of source 2] was stretching out too much on his left flank, I wrote him a note early in the morning not to extend so much by his left; for we had not troops enough to completely invest the place, and I intended to destroy utterly all parts of the Augusta Railroad to the east of Atlanta, then to withdraw from the left flank and add to the right. In that letter I ordered McPherson not to extend any farther to the left, but to employ General Dodge’s corps (Sixteenth), then forced out of position, to destroy every rail and tie of the railroad, from Decatur up to his skirmish-line, and I wanted him (McPherson) to be ready, as soon as General Garrard returned from Covington (whither I had sent him), to move to the extreme right of Thomas, so as to reach if possible the railroad below Atlanta, viz., the Macon road. In the morning we found the strong line of parapet, “Peach-Tree line,” to the front of Schofield and Thomas, abandoned, and our lines were advanced rapidly close up to Atlanta. For some moments I supposed the enemy intended to evacuate, and in person was on horseback at the head of Schofield’s troops, who had advanced in front of the Howard House to some open ground, from which we could plainly see the whole rebel line of parapets, and I saw their men dragging up from the intervening valley, by the distillery, trees and saplings for abatis. Our skirmishers found the enemy down in this valley, and we could see the rebel main line strongly manned, with guns in position at intervals. Schofield was dressing forward his lines, and I could hear Thomas farther to the right engaged, when General McPherson and his staff rode up. We went back to the Howard House, a double frame-building with a porch, and sat on the steps, discussing the chances of battle, and of Hood’s general character. McPherson had also been of the same class at West Point with Hood, Schofield, and Sheridan. We agreed that we ought to be unusually cautious and prepared at all times for sallies and for hard fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, and rash man; and the change of commanders at that particular crisis argued the displeasure of the Confederate Government with the cautious but prudent conduct of General Jos. Johnston.
McPherson was in excellent spirits, well pleased at the progress of events so far, and had come over purposely to see me about the order I had given him to use Dodge’s corps to break up the railroad, saying that the night before he had gained a position on Leggett’s Hill from which he could look over the rebel parapet, and see the high smoke-stack of a large foundery in Atlanta; that before receiving my order he had diverted Dodge’s two divisions (then in motion) from the main road, along a diagonal one that led to his extreme left flank, then held by Giles A. Smith’s division (Seventeenth Corps), for the purpose of strengthening that flank; and that he had sent some intrenching-tools there, to erect some batteries from which he intended to knock down that foundery, and otherwise to damage the buildings inside of Atlanta. He said he could put all his pioneers to work, and do with them in the time indicated all I had proposed to do with General Dodge’s two divisions. Of course I assented at once, and we walked down the road a short distance, sat down by the foot of a tree where I had my map, and on it pointed out to him Thomas’s position and his own. I then explained minutely that, after we had sufficiently broken up the Augusta road, I wanted to shift his whole army around by the rear to Thomas’s extreme right, and hoped thus to reach the other railroad at East Point. While we sat there we could hear lively skirmishing going on near us (down about the distillery), and occasionally round-shot from twelve or twenty-four pound guns came through the trees in reply to those of Schofield, and we could hear similar sounds all along down the lines of Thomas to our right, and his own to the left; but presently the firing appeared a little more brisk (especially over about Giles G. Smith’s division), and then we heard an occasional gun back toward Decatur. I asked him what it meant. We took my pocket-compass (which I always carried), and by noting the direction of the sound, we became satisfied that the firing was too far to our left rear to be explained by known facts, and he hastily called for his horse, his staff, and his orderlies.
McPherson was then in his prime (about thirty-four years old), over six feet high, and a very handsome man in every way, was universally liked, and had many noble qualities. He had on his boots outside his pantaloons, gauntlets on his hands, had on his major-general’s uniform, and wore a sword-belt, but no sword. He hastily gathered his papers (save one, which I now possess) into a pocket-book, put it in his breast-pocket, and jumped on his horse, saying he would hurry down his line and send me back word what these sounds meant. His adjutant-general, Clark, Inspector-General Strong, and his aides, Captains Steele and Gile, were with him. Although the sound of musketry on our left grew in volume, I was not so much disturbed by it as by the sound of artillery back toward Decatur. I ordered Schofield at once to send a brigade back to Decatur (some five miles) and was walking up and down the porch of the Howard House, listening, when one of McPherson’s staff, with his horse covered with sweat, dashed up to the porch, and reported that General McPherson was either “killed or a prisoner.” He explained that when they had left me a few minutes before, they had ridden rapidly across to the railroad, the sounds of battle increasing as they neared the position occupied by General Giles A. Smith’s division, and that McPherson had sent first one, then another of his staff to bring some of the reserve brigades of the Fifteenth Corps over to the exposed left flank; that he had reached the head of Dodge’s corps (marching by the flank on the diagonal road as described), and had ordered it to hurry forward to the same point; that then, almost if not entirely alone, he had followed this road leading across the wooded valley behind the Seventeenth Corps, and had disappeared in these woods, doubtless with a sense of absolute security. The sound of musketry was there heard, and McPherson’s horse came back, bleeding, wounded, and riderless. I ordered the staff-officer who brought this message to return at once, to find General Logan (the senior officer present with the Army of the Tennessee), to report the same facts to him, and to instruct him to drive back this supposed small force, which had evidently got around the Seventeenth Corps through the blind woods in rear of our left flank. I soon dispatched one of my own staff (McCoy, I think) to General Logan with similar orders, telling him to refuse his left flank, and to fight the battle (holding fast to Leggett’s Hill) with the Army of the Tennessee; that I would personally look to Decatur and to the safety of his rear, and would reenforce him if he needed it. I dispatched orders to General Thomas on our right, telling him of this strong sally, and my inference that the lines in his front had evidently been weakened by reason thereof, and that he ought to take advantage of the opportunity to make a lodgment in Atlanta, if possible.
Meantime the sounds of the battle rose on our extreme left more and more furious, extending to the place where I stood, at the Howard House. Within an hour an ambulance came in (attended by Colonels Clark and Strong, and Captains Steele and Gile), bearing McPherson’s body. I had it carried inside of the Howard House, and laid on a door wrenched from its hinges. Dr. Hewitt, of the army, was there, and I asked him to examine the wound. He opened the coat and shirt, saw where the ball had entered and where it came out, or rather lodged under the skin, and he reported that McPherson must have died in a few seconds after being hit; that the ball had ranged upward across his body, and passed near the heart. He was dressed just as he left me, with gauntlets and boots on, but his pocket-book was gone. On further inquiry I learned that his body must have been in possession of the enemy some minutes, during which time it was rifled of the pocket-book, and I was much concerned lest the letter I had written him that morning should have fallen into the hands of some one who could read and understand its meaning. Fortunately the spot in the woods where McPherson was shot was regained by our troops in a few minutes, and the pocket-book found in the haversack of a prisoner of war captured at the time, and it and its contents were secured by one of McPherson’s staff.
While we were examining the body inside the house, the battle was progressing outside, and many shots struck the building, which I feared would take fire; so I ordered Captains Steele and Gile to carry the body to Marietta. They reached that place the same night, and, on application, I ordered his personal staff to go on and escort the body to his home, in Clyde, Ohio, where it was received with great honor, and it is now buried in a small cemetery, close by his mother’s house, which cemetery is composed in part of the family orchard, in which he used to play when a boy. The foundation is ready laid for the equestrian monument now in progress, under the auspices of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee.
The reports that came to me from all parts of the field revealed clearly what was the game of my antagonist, and the ground somewhat favored him. The railroad and wagon-road from Decatur to Atlanta lie along the summit, from which the waters flow, by short, steep valleys, into the “Peach-Tree” and Chattahoochee, to the west, and by other valleys, of gentler declivity, toward the east (Ocmulgee). The ridges and level ground were mostly cleared, and had been cultivated as corn or cotton fields; but where the valleys were broken, they were left in a state of nature—wooded, and full of undergrowth. McPherson’s line of battle was across this railroad, along a general ridge, with a gentle but cleared valley to his front, between him and the defenses of Atlanta; and another valley, behind him, was clear of timber in part, but to his left rear the country was heavily wooded.”
https://bjdeming.com/2014/07/20/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-july-21-27-1864/
14. Thursday, July 20, 1864: Virginia operations, Early’s raid: General Grant decides to leave the 6th and 19th corps in the Shenandoah Valley for offensive operations.
https://bjdeming.com/2014/07/20/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-july-21-27-1864/
A Sunday, July 21, 1861: First Battle of Bull Run (Manassas), Virginia – In the first major battle of the war, Gen. McDowell takes two divisions and marches north to move around the Confederate left flank. McDowell has about 32,000 with him, but is only using 20,000 for the flank movement. He is facing Beauregard who, unbeknownst to the Yankees, now has 31,000, as Johnston’s men from the Shenandoah begin disembarking from the trains in the dark hours of the morning, and moving into position. The Union troops in the flanking force cross the Sudley Ford on the Bull Run River, and as they advance, encounter only one under-strength C.S. brigade under "Shanks" Evans. Evans resists the Union advance, but finally breaks. Beauregard sends the brigades of Bee and Bartow to the left to relieve Evans; these troops take up position on Henry House Hill just as the Union attack rolls up to hit them. This line crumbles as Thomas J. Jackson’s brigade advances to the hill, and holds it against determined Federal attacks. Gen. Bee points to Jackson, and yells to his men, "There stands Jackson like a stone wall! Rally behind the Virginians!" Bee’s South Carolinians do rally, although
Bee is killed minutes later. More Confederate reinforcements arrive, and Jackson’s line holds. As Hampton’s Legion moves up to support Jackson, and Stuart’s cavalry too, the Union artillery places a battery so that it can enfilade (fire on the flank) the Rebel line. The 33rd Virginia Inf. Reg. rushes to capture the battery. Wearing blue uniforms, the Virginians are mistaken for friends; the Union guns do not fire on them and are therefore captured. About this time, Stuart leads his 1st Virginia Cavalry in a charge, and the Union line begins to dissolve. The Confederate line, now strongly reinforced by brigades under Cocke, Early, and Kirby-Smith, moves forward, and the Federal troops begin to retreat, which later turns into a rout, men dropping their rifles and losing touch with their regiments. A crowd of picknickers from Washington on a hill across the river also take alarm, and their carriages clog the Cub Run bridge, the only safe retreat rout. The retreat then turns into a panic, and the Federal soldiers retreat steadily all night, 30 miles back to Washington. Back at Manassas, Jackson urges Gen. Beauregard and Johnston to pursue and occupy Washington, but both commanders err on the side of caution. Confederate victory. Losses:
U.S.– 460 killed, 1,124 wounded, 1,312 missing or captured total of 2,896.
C.S.– 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, 13 missing total of 1,982.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1861
A Sunday, July 21, 1861: The Battle of Bull Run was fought. The battle saw a Confederate victory and overwhelming evidence that the Union forces were not as well disciplined as was thought. Panic and non-ordered withdrawals became contagious and the Union army retreated en masse when it became clear that Confederate forces were not willing to run. Men from Thomas Jackson’s brigade stood “like a stone wall” to ensure that the Union forces could not advance and Jackson ended up with the nickname ‘Stonewall’ Jackson. Union casualties totalled 2,896 men – with 460 killed. Confederate casualties totalled 1,982 with 400 killed. The Confederate victory made Washington DC even more exposed while the government there realised that what they thought would be an easy victory was actually the start of what would be a much longer war than anyone could have previously predicted. In the Confederacy, the opposite occurred. The leaders of the Confederates believed that the war would be short especially after the poor performance of the Union army witnessed at Bull Run.
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/the-american-civil-war/american-civil-war-july-1861/
A+ Sunday, July 21, 1861: The Battle of Bull Run.
Background: In the summer of 1861, President Lincoln faced pressure to make a move against the Confederates in Virginia. Politicians and newspaper editors clamored for action. Furthermore, in the wake of Fort Sumter, Lincoln had issued a proclamation on April 15 for 75,000 men to serve for three months. As the expiration of their term of service approached, pressure mounted to employ the men. To do nothing with these men would squander their patriotism and result in demoralization.
The elderly general-in-chief of the army, Winfield Scott, advised caution. Scott had been skeptical of the abilities of militia and volunteer troops since his service in the War of 1812. He feared that the men in service lacked the skills necessary to perform well. Scott instead suggested that the United States bide its time, train troops to proficiency, and institute a blockade of the Confederacy. Although the United States would eventually adopt Scott's so-called Anaconda Plan, Lincoln decided to order an advance.
The Union forces held the advantage in manpower in the Virginia theaters. Irvin McDowell, a Regular Army officer favored by Scott, held command of 35,000 Union troops in northern Virginia. At the head of the Shenandoah Valley stood general Robert Patterson, an aging veteran of the War of 1812 with nearly 18,000 men under his command. The Union enjoyed the advantage of superior numbers on both fronts, but only if they could prevent Confederate forces from uniting.
In eastern Virginia, Confederate general P. G. T. Beauregard and his Army of the Potomac with approximately 21,000 men protected Manassas Junction, where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and the Manassas Gap Railroad met. Most important, the Manassas Gap Railroad gave the Confederates an advantage because it connected Beauregard with the 11,000 Confederates of the Army of the Shenandoah under General Joseph E. Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley. In the event of a Union advance against either force, the Confederate generals could utilize the railroad to concentrate their men to meet it.
Under orders from Lincoln, McDowell began his advance south on July 16, intending to move to Centreville and then to Manassas Junction, where he would sever the Confederate rail line connecting the Shenandoah Valley and the east. He depended on Patterson to occupy Johnston, however, and Patterson proved utterly inept at the task. Confederate forces in the Valley expected they could slip away undetected.
Indeed, on July 17, in the face of the Union advance, Beauregard informed Confederate president Jefferson Davis that "the enemy have assailed my outposts in heavy force" and that he had "fallen back on the line of Bull Run." Word went out by telegraph to Johnston that the anticipated Union advance had begun. Johnston, confident that Patterson would stay put, immediately agreed to shift his forces to Manassas.
A sharp skirmish on July 18 set the stage for the Battle of Manassas. As Union general Daniel Tyler advanced through Centreville, he exceeded his orders and decided to test the Confederate forces at Blackburn's Ford. There, Confederate general James Longstreet lay in wait. He stopped Tyler's advance, and although casualties on both sides were light, the action shaped both McDowell and Beauregard's plans.
McDowell, although displeased with Tyler's overenthusiastic advance, determined to avoid the obviously strong force at Blackburn's Ford. Proceeding west from Blackburn's Ford, crossings of Bull Run lay at Mitchell's Ford, Island Ford, Ball's Ford, Lewis Ford, Stone Bridge, Poplar (or Farm) Ford, and Sudley Ford. Confederate detachments protected all of the crossings up to the Stone Bridge. Accordingly, McDowell planned to flank the Confederate line by crossing far beyond the Confederate left at Sudley Ford and then wheeling behind the Confederate line. While the flanking column worked its way into position, other detachments would demonstrate at both Blackburn's Ford and the Stone Bridge in order to distract the Confederates.
Beauregard, meanwhile, receiving news that Johnston would be arriving by rail, initially planned to pin McDowell in place at Blackburn's Ford while Johnston worked his way around the Union right. Confederates from the Valley began arriving on July 19—the first time in history that troops had been transported to the battlefield by train—with Johnston himself arriving on July 20. With the Confederate forces united, an assault on their part became imperative. Both generals believed that once it became clear that Johnston had slipped away, Patterson would join with McDowell's men, creating a force too large to confront. After consultation with Beauregard, Johnston judged his plan too risky, and the pair decided that they would concentrate forces at Blackburn's Ford. They would receive the Union attack, destroy it, and then rush their fresh troops across Bull Run and push to Centreville, cutting McDowell's line of retreat of.
Battle: Thus, early on July 21, Johnston decided that the Confederates needed to shore up their left and center, and he moved the brigades of Virginian Thomas J. Jackson and South Carolinian Barnard Bee toward the left.
At the same time on July 21, Union troops began marching to their positions. At six o'clock, Tyler's men began their demonstration at the Stone Bridge to attract Confederate attention. Meanwhile, the flanking column started toward Sudley Ford.
Colonel Nathan "Shanks" Evans and his Confederate troops were positioned at the Stone Bridge to meet Tyler's possible attack. Evans had acquired the nickname at West Point as a mocking reference to his spindly legs (spindle shanks). Infamous for having an orderly carry around a keg of whiskey he had nicknamed "barrelito," Shanks and his brigade remained impassive in the face of the Union troops who seemed content to remain on their side of Bull Run. Evans kept his men largely concealed, only allowing his pickets to trade fire with Tyler's men as he awaited a more serious advance.
At nine o'clock in the morning, Confederate signal officer E. Porter Alexander caught sight of the flanking column just making its way across Sudley Ford and immediately informed both headquarters and Evans—"Look to your left, you are turned"—the first use of wigwag signaling in combat. Grasping the gravity of the situation, Evans moved the bulk of his men to block its advance, leaving only a few to hold Tyler. As he took position on the slopes of Matthews Hill, it appeared as though Evans, with a lone brigade, would confront a full two Union divisions.
Bee, meanwhile, had heard the firing earlier in the morning and moved his brigade, along with the brigade of Francis Bartow, from its position in the center to a location farther left. They initially marched up Henry House Hill, a prominence to the east of Matthews Hill. As they did this, the lead troops of the Union flanking column, under Rhode Islander Ambrose E. Burnside, encountered Evans's line. The battle had begun in earnest. For nearly an hour, Evans and his Confederates held. As they began to buckle under the pressure of the Union advance, help arrived in the form of Bee's and Bartow's brigades, which had moved from Henry House Hill to Matthews Hill.
As fighting seesawed between Burnside and Bartow, Bee, and Evans, another Union commander took steps that would unravel the Confederate line on Matthews Hill. Colonel William T. Sherman, with a Union brigade, crossed Bull Run at Poplar (or Farm) Ford, which lay behind the Confederate lines on Matthews Hill. His brigade entered the fray, prompting a Confederate retreat.
Momentarily, it looked as if McDowell had put the Confederates to flight, as the battered remnants of the three brigades on Matthews Hill streamed eastward. Yet hope remained for Johnston and Beauregard, who during the morning's fighting had set aside any offensive plans and started more troops toward their left. McDowell, unaccountably, paused and failed to closely pursue the Confederates. This proved a fatal error, as a brigade of Virginians under Colonel Thomas J. Jackson began to form a new defensive line along Henry House Hill. It was here that Bee purportedly implored his men to rally on Jackson "standing like a stone wall."
Until midafternoon, fighting swirled along Henry House Hill as both sides fed more troops into the fight. In the confusion, both Confederate and Union troops fell victim to friendly fire. At this early date in the war, uniforms had not been standardized and both armies carried similar-looking flags. (In part, the Confederate battle flag was born out of this confusion.) More than once, troops fired on their comrades, convinced that they were the enemy. Bartow and Bee lost their lives, and the widow Henry, who had refused to leave her house, also perished during the fighting. By three o'clock, the Confederates had gained the upper hand at Henry House Hill.
McDowell, in midafternoon, attempted to salvage the situation. He ordered an advance on Chinn Ridge, which lay to the southwest of Henry House Hill. From there, he could potentially flank the Confederate position. Unfortunately for McDowell, the Confederates anticipated this maneuver. Brigades under Arnold Elzey and Jubal A. Early stymied the Union advance toward Chinn Ridge.
McDowell, with nothing left to gain on the south side of Bull Run, ordered a withdrawal. Covered by United States Regulars, the retreat began in an orderly fashion. Yet as the Union troops got farther from the battlefield, panic mounted. Cries went up that the Confederate cavalry was closing in on the retreating troops. In reality, Beauregard and Johnston possessed only a small force of horsemen under J. E. B. Stuart. Although they attempted a pursuit, little came of it. Instead, as the Union troops proceeded they became more disorganized. By the time they reached Centreville, McDowell decided that further withdrawal was needed in order to reorganize and calm his men.
Aftermath: McDowell's men retreated through Centreville and on to Washington, D.C. Although some units certainly fled in a panic, enough Union troops maintained their composure to hold the Confederates at bay. The Confederates, for their part, exhausted after the fighting of the day and badly disorganized themselves, were in no shape to mount a sustained pursuit of the fleeing army.
The Union troops suffered 2,896 casualties against the Confederates' 1,897, shocking numbers at the time. First Manassas was the bloodiest battle in American history to date; yet it would not compare to the bloodletting still to come. In fact, the historian Ethan Rafuse has argued that the most important effect of the battle was to convince numerous persons, North and South, that the Civil War would last longer and would exact a toll much greater in both blood and treasure than many had expected. Prior to First Manassas, many believed that a single battle would decide the war. Afterward, it became clear that much more than one victory would be needed to win the war. And while the Confederates had defeated McDowell, on July 26, a new leader, George B. McClellan, fresh from his successes in western Virginia, reported to Washington, D.C., to organize and train the new recruits arriving.
http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Manassas_First_Battle_of#start_entry
B Tuesday, July 21, 1863: Report of Quincy A. Gillmore from Morris Island, South Carolina. Quincy A. Gillmore had lost so many men in the fighting on Morris Island, he felt compelled to ask for reinforcements.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, In the Field, Morris Island, S. C., July 21, 1863. “SIR: I have the honor to report no material change in the condition of affairs here since my brief dispatch announcing the capture of two-thirds of this island on the 10th instant and the assault of Fort Wagner on the morning of the 11th. My project for inaugurating offensive operations here comprised: “First. A real attack of Morris Island, to be made by a force landing from small boats, preceded by unmasking and opening our batteries from Folly Island, should it be deemed best to do so.
Second. A strong demonstration up the Stono against James Island, to occupy the attention of the enemy there.
Third. The cutting of the Savannah Railroad by ascending the South Edisto and burning the bridge.
The first and second of these operations were successful. the third was not. It resulted in the loss of two field guns and a small steamer of little value, formerly captured from the enemy. The steamer was burned, with the guns on board. The force operating on James Island, about 3,500 men, was under the command of Brigadier-General Terry, and was aided by three gunboats. On the 16th instant, General Terry was attacked by the enemy in force, comprising infantry, and cavalry. General Terry's report of the action is herewith inclosed. He estimates the enemy's strength on James Island at 5,000 to 6,000. I evacuated James Island on the 17th, as I required more men here, and did not consider General Terry's position longer tenable.
On the 18th, an attack on Fort Wagner was made by the land and naval forces, commencing about noon in a combined cannonade and bombardment, and terminating in an assault of the army about sunset. We gained and held for more than one hour the southeast salient or half bastion of the work, but finding it isolated from and commanded by the main body of the work, we were obliged to abandon it.
During the bombardment, the enemy served but two guns, and scarcely a man showed himself. Deserters say the work contains bomb-proof shelter for from 1,200 to 1,800 men. It is a strong work.
Three of its guns were dismounted during the action. My losses in the three actions of the 10th, 11th, and 18th are not yet accurately reported, but have been very heavy. My sick list, on account of the enervating climate and heavy fatigue duty, is also enormous.
The enemy admit a loss of 300, including 16 commissioned officers, on the 19th, and their losses since then will swell the aggregate several hundred men.
I renew the application for re-enforcements made in my first communication of this date, herewith inclosed.
General Saxton, commanding at Beaufort, reports the enemy very active in his front yesterday. A large force from James Island would be available for an attack on Hilton Head, where all my stores are. I feel quite weak there, and must re-enforce the place from here, even at the expense of operations in this quarter.
I notice in the Washington papers of the 11th a communication, bearing the stamp of genuineness, prescribing the manner of obtaining drafted men for the old regiments. The exigencies of the case induce me to act upon this information in advance of the official order. I have, therefore, detailed men to proceed to the rendezvous designated, obtain recruits, and return to their regiments at the earliest possible moment.
I trust I have not acted too hastily. I would like some instructions given to the commanders of the several rendezvous to give the preference to my requisitions, unless there are strong reasons to the contrary.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Q. A. GILLMORE, Brigadier-General, Commanding.” To Major General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief, U. S. Army.
P. S.-- A report from my chief medical [officer] gives 625 killed and wounded that have fallen into our hands up to this date. The enemy probably have 300 more.
http://www.civilwar-online.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1863
C Thursday, July 21, 1864: "Digging, apparently at some depth, was heard . . .Major General Bushrod Johnson, C.S. Army. On this day 150 years ago, Bushrod Johnson included a disturbing detail is his daily report from his division's section of the Confederate lines at Petersburg, Virginia. Johnson's men thought they could hear digging deep underground near their positions and Johnson asked for and engineer officer to be sent to investigate.
HEADQUARTERS JOHNSON'S DIVISION, July 21, 1864. “COLONEL: No change has been observed on the part of the enemy since last report; the sharpshooting slackened yesterday, but toward night became as brisk as usual. General Gracie requests that the engineer be sent to his line to sink a mine, as digging, apparently at some depth, was heard in his front yesterday.
The following casualties are respectfully submitted: Elliott's brigade, wounded, 2. Ransom's brigade, killed, 1. Wise's brigade, killed, 1 (carelessly); wounded, 1. Gracie's brigade, wounded, 5 (2 carelessly). Total, 2 killed and 8 wounded.
The following is a statement of the amount of shells and lead picked up on yesterday: Wise's brigade, 10 shells and 5,300 balls. Elliott's brigade, 10 fuses, 2,300 bullets, 14 solid shot, 100 fragments shells, 5 Wiard shells, 5 shrapnel, and 9 Parrott shells. Ransom's brigade, 15 Hotchkiss shells and some lead.
I am, colonel, respectfully, your obedient servant, B. R. JOHNSON, Major-General.”
http://www.civilwar-online.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1864
D Thursday, July 21, 1864: Union troops took a Confederate redoubt at Bald Hill, outside of Atlanta.
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/the-american-civil-war/american-civil-war-july-1864/
D+ Thursday, July 21, 1864: Bald Hill outside of Atlanta. Sherman’s three armies were still more or less separated. Better yet, Wheeler reported that as McPherson’s army marched in on Atlanta from the east, it had its left flank “in the air” (Sherman had sent Kenner Garrard’s cavalry east to wreck the Georgia Railroad). This situation presented Hood with an opportunity to launch a flank attack, like the one made famous by Jackson at Chancellorsville. Hood planned for his forces to drop back from their outer lines north of the city into the main fortified perimeter around the city on the night of July 21-22; Stewart and Cheatham would hold the works. Hardee’s corps would march through and out of the city, southeast then northeast toward Decatur, guided by Wheeler’s cavalry and jump into McPherson’s left-rear, while Wheeler attacked McPherson’s wagon trains. It was an ambitious plan, calling for a 15-mile night march by Hardee’s troops and a dawn attack on the 22nd. But a late start, exhaustion of the men, a hot night, dusty roads and poor service from the cavalry combined to bring the four assault divisions not nearly far enough into McPherson’s rear when Hardee, well behind schedule, decided to deploy. Then rough terrain added further delay—Confederate Maj. Gen. W. H. T. Walker was shot and killed getting his division into place. Hardee’s surprise attack did not begin till shortly after noon.
http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/atlanta.html?tab=facts
FYI SPC Deb Root-WhiteLt Col Charlie Brown GySgt Jack Wallace CWO4 Terrence Clark SPC Michael Oles SR SPC Michael Terrell TSgt David L. PO1 John Johnson SPC (Join to see) SMSgt Lawrence McCarter SGT Paul RussoA1C Pamela G RussellLTC Trent KlugMSG Roy CheeverPO2 Russell "Russ" Lincoln SFC William Farrell SFC Bernard Walko SFC Stephen King SFC Ralph E Kelley SSG Franklin Briant
Below are a number of journal entries from 1862 and 1863 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly.
Monday, July 21, 1862: --- William Lyon, an officer in the Union army in northern Mississippi, writes home to his wife, with comical awareness of the flies and poignant longing for his wife. To Mrs. Lyon. From Camp Clear Creek, Miss., Monday, July 21, 1862. “Yesterday I was Field Officer of the Day (the officer who has charge of the pickets and outside posts), and I was in the saddle nearly all day and tramping a good deal of the night, so I feel stupid today.
I keep your picture hanging in my tent, where I can lie on my bed, that is, on the ground, and gaze at it and get sentimental, and fight flies. Speaking of flies, the Egyptian plagues, although they had locusts, and lice, and frogs, I believe, were a failure, because they did not have flies. Such swarms of them as infest our camps, drawn here by the debris of a great army, you can not conceive of. They are the common house fly and, like everything else here, are dull and stupid— don’t know enough to go when you tell them to. So much for flies.”
Tuesday, July 21, 1863: Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles writes in his journal about the use of the Navy in the Vicksburg and Yazoo campaigns, rightly identifying the Navy as a key element in these operations: “July 21, Tuesday. A dispatch from General Grant makes mention of large captures of cattle coming east from Texas, and of munitions going south to Kirby Smith. General Sherman is following up Joe Johnston. A dispatch from Admiral Porter says that he, in concert with General Grant, sent an expedition up the Yazoo and that it was a complete success. Grant in his dispatch makes no mention of, or allusion to, the Navy in this expedition, nor of any consultation with Admiral Porter, although without the naval force and naval cooperation nothing could have been accomplished.”
Tuesday, July 21, 1863:Kate Cumming, a nurse in the Confederate army hospital in Chattanooga, writes in her journal about the mood of restlessness there, and rumors that Bragg is about to abandon the city: “Yesterday Mrs. W. and I visited the soldiers’ grave-yard. That hallowed spot! There reposes the dust of men from every state in the South. There is naught to mark the places where these heroes sleep, save slight mounds of earth; at the head of each is a small piece of wood, numbered. . . . We returned by way of the river. The scenery on its banks is really enchanting.
“Not Katrine, in her mirror blue,
Gives back the shaggy bonks more true,”
than does the Tennessee the lofty and rugged hills that look down upon its placid waters.
We saw many of our men at work on the fortifications; they looked well, and were cheerful. They seemed to have little faith that their work would amount to any thing, and said they would not be at all surprised if by to-morrow they were ordered to evacuate Chattanooga, and that they were only given the work to do for fear they might forget how it was done.”
Pictures: 1861-07-21 First battle of Bull Run by ricketts; 1861-07-21 1st Regt NY Zouaves at Bull Run; 1864-07 bald-hill-map; 1864-07-21 Before-Petersburg-tunnel
A. Sunday, July 21, 1861: First Battle of Bull Run. About 25 miles southwest of Washington the first major battle of the Civil War pits Maj Gen Irvin McDowell against CSA Gen P. G. T. Beauregard and CSA Gen Joe Johnston. The battle saw a Confederate victory and overwhelming evidence that the Union forces were not as well-disciplined as was thought. Panic and non-ordered withdrawals became contagious and the Union army retreated en masse when it became clear that Confederate forces were not willing to run. Men from Thomas Jackson’s brigade stood “like a stone wall” to ensure that the Union forces could not advance and Jackson ended up with the nickname ‘Stonewall’ Jackson. The Union troops suffered 2,896 (460 killed) casualties against the Confederates' 1,897 (400 killed), shocking numbers at the time. First Manassas was the bloodiest battle in American history to date; yet it would not compare to the bloodletting still to come. The Confederate victory made Washington DC even more exposed while the government there realized that what they thought would be an easy victory was actually the start of what would be a much longer war than anyone could have previously predicted. In the Confederacy, the opposite occurred. The leaders of the Confederates believed that the war would be short especially after the poor performance of the Union army witnessed at Bull Run.
Details: Thus, early on July 21, Johnston decided that the Confederates needed to shore up their left and center, and he moved the brigades of Virginian Thomas J. Jackson and South Carolinian Barnard Bee toward the left.
At the same time on July 21, Union troops began marching to their positions. At six o'clock, Tyler's men began their demonstration at the Stone Bridge to attract Confederate attention. Meanwhile, the flanking column started toward Sudley Ford.
Colonel Nathan "Shanks" Evans and his Confederate troops were positioned at the Stone Bridge to meet Tyler's possible attack. Evans had acquired the nickname at West Point as a mocking reference to his spindly legs (spindle shanks). Infamous for having an orderly carry around a keg of whiskey he had nicknamed "barrelito," Shanks and his brigade remained impassive in the face of the Union troops who seemed content to remain on their side of Bull Run. Evans kept his men largely concealed, only allowing his pickets to trade fire with Tyler's men as he awaited a more serious advance.
At nine o'clock in the morning, Confederate signal officer E. Porter Alexander caught sight of the flanking column just making its way across Sudley Ford and immediately informed both headquarters and Evans—"Look to your left, you are turned"—the first use of wigwag signaling in combat. Grasping the gravity of the situation, Evans moved the bulk of his men to block its advance, leaving only a few to hold Tyler. As he took position on the slopes of Matthews Hill, it appeared as though Evans, with a lone brigade, would confront a full two Union divisions.
Bee, meanwhile, had heard the firing earlier in the morning and moved his brigade, along with the brigade of Francis Bartow, from its position in the center to a location farther left. They initially marched up Henry House Hill, a prominence to the east of Matthews Hill. As they did this, the lead troops of the Union flanking column, under Rhode Islander Ambrose E. Burnside, encountered Evans's line. The battle had begun in earnest. For nearly an hour, Evans and his Confederates held. As they began to buckle under the pressure of the Union advance, help arrived in the form of Bee's and Bartow's brigades, which had moved from Henry House Hill to Matthews Hill.
As fighting seesawed between Burnside and Bartow, Bee, and Evans, another Union commander took steps that would unravel the Confederate line on Matthews Hill. Colonel William T. Sherman, with a Union brigade, crossed Bull Run at Poplar (or Farm) Ford, which lay behind the Confederate lines on Matthews Hill. His brigade entered the fray, prompting a Confederate retreat.
Momentarily, it looked as if McDowell had put the Confederates to flight, as the battered remnants of the three brigades on Matthews Hill streamed eastward. Yet hope remained for Johnston and Beauregard, who during the morning's fighting had set aside any offensive plans and started more troops toward their left. McDowell, unaccountably, paused and failed to closely pursue the Confederates. This proved a fatal error, as a brigade of Virginians under Colonel Thomas J. Jackson began to form a new defensive line along Henry House Hill. It was here that Bee purportedly implored his men to rally on Jackson "standing like a stone wall."
Until midafternoon, fighting swirled along Henry House Hill as both sides fed more troops into the fight. In the confusion, both Confederate and Union troops fell victim to friendly fire. At this early date in the war, uniforms had not been standardized and both armies carried similar-looking flags. (In part, the Confederate battle flag was born out of this confusion.) More than once, troops fired on their comrades, convinced that they were the enemy. Bartow and Bee lost their lives, and the widow Henry, who had refused to leave her house, also perished during the fighting. By three o'clock, the Confederates had gained the upper hand at Henry House Hill.
McDowell, in midafternoon, attempted to salvage the situation. He ordered an advance on Chinn Ridge, which lay to the southwest of Henry House Hill. From there, he could potentially flank the Confederate position. Unfortunately for McDowell, the Confederates anticipated this maneuver. Brigades under Arnold Elzey and Jubal A. Early stymied the Union advance toward Chinn Ridge.
McDowell, with nothing left to gain on the south side of Bull Run, ordered a withdrawal. Covered by United States Regulars, the retreat began in an orderly fashion. Yet as the Union troops got farther from the battlefield, panic mounted. Cries went up that the Confederate cavalry was closing in on the retreating troops. In reality, Beauregard and Johnston possessed only a small force of horsemen under J. E. B. Stuart. Although they attempted a pursuit, little came of it. Instead, as the Union troops proceeded they became more disorganized. By the time they reached Centreville, McDowell decided that further withdrawal was needed in order to reorganize and calm his men.
B. Tuesday, July 21, 1863: Report of Brig Gen Quincy A. Gillmore from Morris Island, South Carolina. Quincy A. Gillmore had lost so many men in the fighting on Morris Island, he felt compelled to ask for reinforcements.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, In the Field, Morris Island, S. C., July 21, 1863. “SIR: I have the honor to report no material change in the condition of affairs here since my brief dispatch announcing the capture of two-thirds of this island on the 10th instant and the assault of Fort Wagner on the morning of the 11th. My project for inaugurating offensive operations here comprised: “First. A real attack of Morris Island, to be made by a force landing from small boats, preceded by unmasking and opening our batteries from Folly Island, should it be deemed best to do so.
Second. A strong demonstration up the Stono against James Island, to occupy the attention of the enemy there.
Third. The cutting of the Savannah Railroad by ascending the South Edisto and burning the bridge.
The first and second of these operations were successful. the third was not. It resulted in the loss of two field guns and a small steamer of little value, formerly captured from the enemy. The steamer was burned, with the guns on board. The force operating on James Island, about 3,500 men, was under the command of Brigadier-General Terry, and was aided by three gunboats. On the 16th instant, General Terry was attacked by the enemy in force, comprising infantry, and cavalry. General Terry's report of the action is herewith inclosed. He estimates the enemy's strength on James Island at 5,000 to 6,000. I evacuated James Island on the 17th, as I required more men here, and did not consider General Terry's position longer tenable.
On the 18th, an attack on Fort Wagner was made by the land and naval forces, commencing about noon in a combined cannonade and bombardment, and terminating in an assault of the army about sunset. We gained and held for more than one hour the southeast salient or half bastion of the work, but finding it isolated from and commanded by the main body of the work, we were obliged to abandon it.
During the bombardment, the enemy served but two guns, and scarcely a man showed himself. Deserters say the work contains bomb-proof shelter for from 1,200 to 1,800 men. It is a strong work.
Three of its guns were dismounted during the action. My losses in the three actions of the 10th, 11th, and 18th are not yet accurately reported, but have been very heavy. My sick list, on account of the enervating climate and heavy fatigue duty, is also enormous.
The enemy admit a loss of 300, including 16 commissioned officers, on the 19th, and their losses since then will swell the aggregate several hundred men.
I renew the application for re-enforcements made in my first communication of this date, herewith inclosed.
General Saxton, commanding at Beaufort, reports the enemy very active in his front yesterday. A large force from James Island would be available for an attack on Hilton Head, where all my stores are. I feel quite weak there, and must re-enforce the place from here, even at the expense of operations in this quarter.
I notice in the Washington papers of the 11th a communication, bearing the stamp of genuineness, prescribing the manner of obtaining drafted men for the old regiments. The exigencies of the case induce me to act upon this information in advance of the official order. I have, therefore, detailed men to proceed to the rendezvous designated, obtain recruits, and return to their regiments at the earliest possible moment.
I trust I have not acted too hastily. I would like some instructions given to the commanders of the several rendezvous to give the preference to my requisitions, unless there are strong reasons to the contrary.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Q. A. GILLMORE, Brigadier-General, Commanding.” To Major General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief, U. S. Army.
P. S.-- A report from my chief medical [officer] gives 625 killed and wounded that have fallen into our hands up to this date. The enemy probably have 300 more.
C. Thursday, July 20, 1864: During the siege of Petersburg, VA the Confederates hear digging as the Federal forces are digging tunnels towards their reinforced earthworks. "Digging, apparently at some depth, was heard . . .Major General Bushrod Johnson, C.S. Army.” Bushrod Johnson included a disturbing detail is his daily report from his division's section of the Confederate lines at Petersburg, Virginia. Johnson's men thought they could hear digging deep underground near their positions and Johnson asked for and engineer officer to be sent to investigate.
D. Thursday, July 21, 1864: Bald Hill outside of Atlanta. Sherman’s three armies were still more or less separated. Better yet, Wheeler reported that as McPherson’s army marched in on Atlanta from the east, it had its left flank “in the air” (Sherman had sent Kenner Garrard’s cavalry east to wreck the Georgia Railroad). This situation presented Hood with an opportunity to launch a flank attack, like the one made famous by Jackson at Chancellorsville. Hood planned for his forces to drop back from their outer lines north of the city into the main fortified perimeter around the city on the night of July 21-22; Stewart and Cheatham would hold the works. Hardee’s corps would march through and out of the city, southeast then northeast toward Decatur, guided by Wheeler’s cavalry and jump into McPherson’s left-rear, while Wheeler attacked McPherson’s wagon trains. It was an ambitious plan, calling for a 15-mile night march by Hardee’s troops and a dawn attack on the 22nd. But a late start, exhaustion of the men, a hot night, dusty roads and poor service from the cavalry combined to bring the four assault divisions not nearly far enough into McPherson’s rear when Hardee, well behind schedule, decided to deploy. Then rough terrain added further delay—Confederate Maj. Gen. W. H. T. Walker was shot and killed getting his division into place. Hardee’s surprise attack did not begin till shortly after noon.
1. Sunday, July 21, 1861: (First) Manassas (Confederate); (First) Bull Run (Union) About 25 miles southwest of Washington the first major battle of the Civil War pits Irvin McDowell [US] against P. G. T. Beauregard [CS] and Joe Johnston [CS].
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186107
2. Monday, July 21, 1862: William Lyon, an officer in the Union army in northern Mississippi, writes home to his wife, with comical awareness of the flies and poignant longing for his wife. To Mrs. Lyon. From Camp Clear Creek, Miss., Monday, July 21, 1862. “Yesterday I was Field Officer of the Day (the officer who has charge of the pickets and outside posts), and I was in the saddle nearly all day and tramping a good deal of the night, so I feel stupid today.
I keep your picture hanging in my tent, where I can lie on my bed, that is, on the ground, and gaze at it and get sentimental, and fight flies. Speaking of flies, the Egyptian plagues, although they had locusts, and lice, and frogs, I believe, were a failure, because they did not have flies. Such swarms of them as infest our camps, drawn here by the debris of a great army, you can not conceive of. They are the common house fly and, like everything else here, are dull and stupid— don’t know enough to go when you tell them to. So much for flies.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1862
3. Monday, July 21, 1862: Nashville, Tennessee - On July 21, a Confederate force captured Federal pickets 5 miles from Nashville. They then went to the Chattanooga road and burned several bridges.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1862s.html
4. Monday, July 21, 1862: In a tersely worded telegram, Braxton Bragg informs Jefferson Davis that he will move his army in force from Tupelo, Mississippi to Chattanooga, Tennessee.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186207
5. Monday, July 21, 1862 --- Union cavalry under Brig. Gen. Green Clay Smith pursues Morgan south toward Richmond, Kentucky. As the Rebels arrived in Somerset, Kentucky, they find and capture a 150-wagon train of supplies for the Union army: Morgan’s men take all that they can carry and burn the rest. Morgan decides to end his raid and heads his riders south toward Tennessee.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1862
6. Monday, July 21, 1862 --- Gen. Don Carlos Buell of the Army of the Ohio sends a frustrated dispatch to Secretary Stanton about the Rebel cavalry raids in his rear areas: Forrest in Tennessee and Morgan in Kentucky. Operations toward Chattanooga have been suspended. Buell points out that small garrisons cannot withstand the Rebel raids, and posting larger guards would have the effect of scattering his main force. Buell asks for more troops and then makes this strange political evaluation: “I am compelled to ascribe the greater part of our annoyance from guerrilla bands to the spirit of hate and revenge which has been inspired in this quarter by an unwise policy and personal wrongs.” To what he refers is unclear, although it is known that Buell, like McClellan, is pro-Union and pro-slavery, and looks askance on elements in the government who want to make the war into a crusade for human liberty.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1862
7. Monday, July 21, 1862: Forrest’s cavalry skirmishes around Nashville and other places.
https://bjdeming.com/2012/07/20/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-july-16-22-1862/
8. Monday, July 21, 1862: General Bragg telegraphs President Davis that he will move his army in force from Tupelo, Mississippi to Chattanooga, Tennessee.
https://bjdeming.com/2012/07/20/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-july-16-22-1862/
9. Tuesday, July 21, 1863: Abraham Lincoln to Oliver O. Howard. On this day 150 years ago, Abraham Lincoln down on criticism of Meade's pursuit of Lee after Gettysburg. Executive Mansion, My dear General Howard Washington, July 21. 1863. “Your letter of the 18th. is received. I was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee across the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his army would have ended the war, and because I believed, such destruction was perfectly easy---believed that Gen. Meade and his noble army had expended all the skill, and toil, and blood, up to the ripe harvest, and then let the crop go to waste. Perhaps my mortification was heightened because I had always believed---making my belief a hobby possibly---that the main rebel army going North of the Potomac, could never return, if well attended to; and because I was so greatly flattered in this belief, by the operations at Gettysburg. A few days having passed, I am now profoundly grateful for what was done, without criticism for what was not done. Gen. Meade has my confidence as a brave and skillful officer, and a true man. Yours very truly, A. LINCOLN
http://www.civilwar-online.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1863
10. Tuesday, July 21, 1863 --- Pres. Abraham Lincoln writes to Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, commander of the XI Corps on his disappointment with Meade’s pursuit of Lee: “ Executive Mansion, My dear General Howard Washington, July 21. 1863. Your letter of the 18th. is received. I was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee across the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his army would have ended the war, and because I believed, such destruction was perfectly easy---believed that Gen. Meade and his noble army had expended all the skill, and toil, and blood, up to the ripe harvest, and then let the crop go to waste. Perhaps my mortification was heightened because I had always believed---making my belief a hobby possibly---that the main rebel army going North of the Potomac, could never return, if well attended to; and because I was so greatly flattered in this belief, by the operations at Gettysburg. A few days having passed, I am now profoundly grateful for what was done, without criticism for what was not done. Gen. Meade has my confidence as a brave and skillful officer, and a true man. Yours very truly A. LINCOLN”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1863
11. Tuesday, July 21, 1863 --- Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles writes in his journal about the use of the Navy in the Vicksburg and Yazoo campaigns, rightly identifying the Navy as a key element in these operations: “July 21, Tuesday. A dispatch from General Grant makes mention of large captures of cattle coming east from Texas, and of munitions going south to Kirby Smith. General Sherman is following up Joe Johnston. A dispatch from Admiral Porter says that he, in concert with General Grant, sent an expedition up the Yazoo and that it was a complete success. Grant in his dispatch makes no mention of, or allusion to, the Navy in this expedition, nor of any consultation with Admiral Porter, although without the naval force and naval cooperation nothing could have been accomplished.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1863
12. Tuesday, July 21, 1863 --- Kate Cumming, a nurse in the Confederate army hospital in Chattanooga, writes in her journal about the mood of restlessness there, and rumors that Bragg is about to abandon the city: “Yesterday Mrs. W. and I visited the soldiers’ grave-yard. That hallowed spot! There reposes the dust of men from every state in the South. There is naught to mark the places where these heroes sleep, save slight mounds of earth; at the head of each is a small piece of wood, numbered. . . . We returned by way of the river. The scenery on its banks is really enchanting.
“Not Katrine, in her mirror blue,
Gives back the shaggy bonks more true,”
than does the Tennessee the lofty and rugged hills that look down upon its placid waters.
We saw many of our men at work on the fortifications; they looked well, and were cheerful. They seemed to have little faith that their work would amount to any thing, and said they would not be at all surprised if by to-morrow they were ordered to evacuate Chattanooga, and that they were only given the work to do for fear they might forget how it was done.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1863
13. Thursday, July 21, 1864: Thursday, July 20, 1864: Atlanta campaign: Per General Sherman: “During the night [of July 20-21], I had full reports from all parts of our line, most of which was partially intrenched as against a sally, and finding that McPherson [no relation to the author of source 2] was stretching out too much on his left flank, I wrote him a note early in the morning not to extend so much by his left; for we had not troops enough to completely invest the place, and I intended to destroy utterly all parts of the Augusta Railroad to the east of Atlanta, then to withdraw from the left flank and add to the right. In that letter I ordered McPherson not to extend any farther to the left, but to employ General Dodge’s corps (Sixteenth), then forced out of position, to destroy every rail and tie of the railroad, from Decatur up to his skirmish-line, and I wanted him (McPherson) to be ready, as soon as General Garrard returned from Covington (whither I had sent him), to move to the extreme right of Thomas, so as to reach if possible the railroad below Atlanta, viz., the Macon road. In the morning we found the strong line of parapet, “Peach-Tree line,” to the front of Schofield and Thomas, abandoned, and our lines were advanced rapidly close up to Atlanta. For some moments I supposed the enemy intended to evacuate, and in person was on horseback at the head of Schofield’s troops, who had advanced in front of the Howard House to some open ground, from which we could plainly see the whole rebel line of parapets, and I saw their men dragging up from the intervening valley, by the distillery, trees and saplings for abatis. Our skirmishers found the enemy down in this valley, and we could see the rebel main line strongly manned, with guns in position at intervals. Schofield was dressing forward his lines, and I could hear Thomas farther to the right engaged, when General McPherson and his staff rode up. We went back to the Howard House, a double frame-building with a porch, and sat on the steps, discussing the chances of battle, and of Hood’s general character. McPherson had also been of the same class at West Point with Hood, Schofield, and Sheridan. We agreed that we ought to be unusually cautious and prepared at all times for sallies and for hard fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, and rash man; and the change of commanders at that particular crisis argued the displeasure of the Confederate Government with the cautious but prudent conduct of General Jos. Johnston.
McPherson was in excellent spirits, well pleased at the progress of events so far, and had come over purposely to see me about the order I had given him to use Dodge’s corps to break up the railroad, saying that the night before he had gained a position on Leggett’s Hill from which he could look over the rebel parapet, and see the high smoke-stack of a large foundery in Atlanta; that before receiving my order he had diverted Dodge’s two divisions (then in motion) from the main road, along a diagonal one that led to his extreme left flank, then held by Giles A. Smith’s division (Seventeenth Corps), for the purpose of strengthening that flank; and that he had sent some intrenching-tools there, to erect some batteries from which he intended to knock down that foundery, and otherwise to damage the buildings inside of Atlanta. He said he could put all his pioneers to work, and do with them in the time indicated all I had proposed to do with General Dodge’s two divisions. Of course I assented at once, and we walked down the road a short distance, sat down by the foot of a tree where I had my map, and on it pointed out to him Thomas’s position and his own. I then explained minutely that, after we had sufficiently broken up the Augusta road, I wanted to shift his whole army around by the rear to Thomas’s extreme right, and hoped thus to reach the other railroad at East Point. While we sat there we could hear lively skirmishing going on near us (down about the distillery), and occasionally round-shot from twelve or twenty-four pound guns came through the trees in reply to those of Schofield, and we could hear similar sounds all along down the lines of Thomas to our right, and his own to the left; but presently the firing appeared a little more brisk (especially over about Giles G. Smith’s division), and then we heard an occasional gun back toward Decatur. I asked him what it meant. We took my pocket-compass (which I always carried), and by noting the direction of the sound, we became satisfied that the firing was too far to our left rear to be explained by known facts, and he hastily called for his horse, his staff, and his orderlies.
McPherson was then in his prime (about thirty-four years old), over six feet high, and a very handsome man in every way, was universally liked, and had many noble qualities. He had on his boots outside his pantaloons, gauntlets on his hands, had on his major-general’s uniform, and wore a sword-belt, but no sword. He hastily gathered his papers (save one, which I now possess) into a pocket-book, put it in his breast-pocket, and jumped on his horse, saying he would hurry down his line and send me back word what these sounds meant. His adjutant-general, Clark, Inspector-General Strong, and his aides, Captains Steele and Gile, were with him. Although the sound of musketry on our left grew in volume, I was not so much disturbed by it as by the sound of artillery back toward Decatur. I ordered Schofield at once to send a brigade back to Decatur (some five miles) and was walking up and down the porch of the Howard House, listening, when one of McPherson’s staff, with his horse covered with sweat, dashed up to the porch, and reported that General McPherson was either “killed or a prisoner.” He explained that when they had left me a few minutes before, they had ridden rapidly across to the railroad, the sounds of battle increasing as they neared the position occupied by General Giles A. Smith’s division, and that McPherson had sent first one, then another of his staff to bring some of the reserve brigades of the Fifteenth Corps over to the exposed left flank; that he had reached the head of Dodge’s corps (marching by the flank on the diagonal road as described), and had ordered it to hurry forward to the same point; that then, almost if not entirely alone, he had followed this road leading across the wooded valley behind the Seventeenth Corps, and had disappeared in these woods, doubtless with a sense of absolute security. The sound of musketry was there heard, and McPherson’s horse came back, bleeding, wounded, and riderless. I ordered the staff-officer who brought this message to return at once, to find General Logan (the senior officer present with the Army of the Tennessee), to report the same facts to him, and to instruct him to drive back this supposed small force, which had evidently got around the Seventeenth Corps through the blind woods in rear of our left flank. I soon dispatched one of my own staff (McCoy, I think) to General Logan with similar orders, telling him to refuse his left flank, and to fight the battle (holding fast to Leggett’s Hill) with the Army of the Tennessee; that I would personally look to Decatur and to the safety of his rear, and would reenforce him if he needed it. I dispatched orders to General Thomas on our right, telling him of this strong sally, and my inference that the lines in his front had evidently been weakened by reason thereof, and that he ought to take advantage of the opportunity to make a lodgment in Atlanta, if possible.
Meantime the sounds of the battle rose on our extreme left more and more furious, extending to the place where I stood, at the Howard House. Within an hour an ambulance came in (attended by Colonels Clark and Strong, and Captains Steele and Gile), bearing McPherson’s body. I had it carried inside of the Howard House, and laid on a door wrenched from its hinges. Dr. Hewitt, of the army, was there, and I asked him to examine the wound. He opened the coat and shirt, saw where the ball had entered and where it came out, or rather lodged under the skin, and he reported that McPherson must have died in a few seconds after being hit; that the ball had ranged upward across his body, and passed near the heart. He was dressed just as he left me, with gauntlets and boots on, but his pocket-book was gone. On further inquiry I learned that his body must have been in possession of the enemy some minutes, during which time it was rifled of the pocket-book, and I was much concerned lest the letter I had written him that morning should have fallen into the hands of some one who could read and understand its meaning. Fortunately the spot in the woods where McPherson was shot was regained by our troops in a few minutes, and the pocket-book found in the haversack of a prisoner of war captured at the time, and it and its contents were secured by one of McPherson’s staff.
While we were examining the body inside the house, the battle was progressing outside, and many shots struck the building, which I feared would take fire; so I ordered Captains Steele and Gile to carry the body to Marietta. They reached that place the same night, and, on application, I ordered his personal staff to go on and escort the body to his home, in Clyde, Ohio, where it was received with great honor, and it is now buried in a small cemetery, close by his mother’s house, which cemetery is composed in part of the family orchard, in which he used to play when a boy. The foundation is ready laid for the equestrian monument now in progress, under the auspices of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee.
The reports that came to me from all parts of the field revealed clearly what was the game of my antagonist, and the ground somewhat favored him. The railroad and wagon-road from Decatur to Atlanta lie along the summit, from which the waters flow, by short, steep valleys, into the “Peach-Tree” and Chattahoochee, to the west, and by other valleys, of gentler declivity, toward the east (Ocmulgee). The ridges and level ground were mostly cleared, and had been cultivated as corn or cotton fields; but where the valleys were broken, they were left in a state of nature—wooded, and full of undergrowth. McPherson’s line of battle was across this railroad, along a general ridge, with a gentle but cleared valley to his front, between him and the defenses of Atlanta; and another valley, behind him, was clear of timber in part, but to his left rear the country was heavily wooded.”
https://bjdeming.com/2014/07/20/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-july-21-27-1864/
14. Thursday, July 20, 1864: Virginia operations, Early’s raid: General Grant decides to leave the 6th and 19th corps in the Shenandoah Valley for offensive operations.
https://bjdeming.com/2014/07/20/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-july-21-27-1864/
A Sunday, July 21, 1861: First Battle of Bull Run (Manassas), Virginia – In the first major battle of the war, Gen. McDowell takes two divisions and marches north to move around the Confederate left flank. McDowell has about 32,000 with him, but is only using 20,000 for the flank movement. He is facing Beauregard who, unbeknownst to the Yankees, now has 31,000, as Johnston’s men from the Shenandoah begin disembarking from the trains in the dark hours of the morning, and moving into position. The Union troops in the flanking force cross the Sudley Ford on the Bull Run River, and as they advance, encounter only one under-strength C.S. brigade under "Shanks" Evans. Evans resists the Union advance, but finally breaks. Beauregard sends the brigades of Bee and Bartow to the left to relieve Evans; these troops take up position on Henry House Hill just as the Union attack rolls up to hit them. This line crumbles as Thomas J. Jackson’s brigade advances to the hill, and holds it against determined Federal attacks. Gen. Bee points to Jackson, and yells to his men, "There stands Jackson like a stone wall! Rally behind the Virginians!" Bee’s South Carolinians do rally, although
Bee is killed minutes later. More Confederate reinforcements arrive, and Jackson’s line holds. As Hampton’s Legion moves up to support Jackson, and Stuart’s cavalry too, the Union artillery places a battery so that it can enfilade (fire on the flank) the Rebel line. The 33rd Virginia Inf. Reg. rushes to capture the battery. Wearing blue uniforms, the Virginians are mistaken for friends; the Union guns do not fire on them and are therefore captured. About this time, Stuart leads his 1st Virginia Cavalry in a charge, and the Union line begins to dissolve. The Confederate line, now strongly reinforced by brigades under Cocke, Early, and Kirby-Smith, moves forward, and the Federal troops begin to retreat, which later turns into a rout, men dropping their rifles and losing touch with their regiments. A crowd of picknickers from Washington on a hill across the river also take alarm, and their carriages clog the Cub Run bridge, the only safe retreat rout. The retreat then turns into a panic, and the Federal soldiers retreat steadily all night, 30 miles back to Washington. Back at Manassas, Jackson urges Gen. Beauregard and Johnston to pursue and occupy Washington, but both commanders err on the side of caution. Confederate victory. Losses:
U.S.– 460 killed, 1,124 wounded, 1,312 missing or captured total of 2,896.
C.S.– 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, 13 missing total of 1,982.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1861
A Sunday, July 21, 1861: The Battle of Bull Run was fought. The battle saw a Confederate victory and overwhelming evidence that the Union forces were not as well disciplined as was thought. Panic and non-ordered withdrawals became contagious and the Union army retreated en masse when it became clear that Confederate forces were not willing to run. Men from Thomas Jackson’s brigade stood “like a stone wall” to ensure that the Union forces could not advance and Jackson ended up with the nickname ‘Stonewall’ Jackson. Union casualties totalled 2,896 men – with 460 killed. Confederate casualties totalled 1,982 with 400 killed. The Confederate victory made Washington DC even more exposed while the government there realised that what they thought would be an easy victory was actually the start of what would be a much longer war than anyone could have previously predicted. In the Confederacy, the opposite occurred. The leaders of the Confederates believed that the war would be short especially after the poor performance of the Union army witnessed at Bull Run.
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/the-american-civil-war/american-civil-war-july-1861/
A+ Sunday, July 21, 1861: The Battle of Bull Run.
Background: In the summer of 1861, President Lincoln faced pressure to make a move against the Confederates in Virginia. Politicians and newspaper editors clamored for action. Furthermore, in the wake of Fort Sumter, Lincoln had issued a proclamation on April 15 for 75,000 men to serve for three months. As the expiration of their term of service approached, pressure mounted to employ the men. To do nothing with these men would squander their patriotism and result in demoralization.
The elderly general-in-chief of the army, Winfield Scott, advised caution. Scott had been skeptical of the abilities of militia and volunteer troops since his service in the War of 1812. He feared that the men in service lacked the skills necessary to perform well. Scott instead suggested that the United States bide its time, train troops to proficiency, and institute a blockade of the Confederacy. Although the United States would eventually adopt Scott's so-called Anaconda Plan, Lincoln decided to order an advance.
The Union forces held the advantage in manpower in the Virginia theaters. Irvin McDowell, a Regular Army officer favored by Scott, held command of 35,000 Union troops in northern Virginia. At the head of the Shenandoah Valley stood general Robert Patterson, an aging veteran of the War of 1812 with nearly 18,000 men under his command. The Union enjoyed the advantage of superior numbers on both fronts, but only if they could prevent Confederate forces from uniting.
In eastern Virginia, Confederate general P. G. T. Beauregard and his Army of the Potomac with approximately 21,000 men protected Manassas Junction, where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and the Manassas Gap Railroad met. Most important, the Manassas Gap Railroad gave the Confederates an advantage because it connected Beauregard with the 11,000 Confederates of the Army of the Shenandoah under General Joseph E. Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley. In the event of a Union advance against either force, the Confederate generals could utilize the railroad to concentrate their men to meet it.
Under orders from Lincoln, McDowell began his advance south on July 16, intending to move to Centreville and then to Manassas Junction, where he would sever the Confederate rail line connecting the Shenandoah Valley and the east. He depended on Patterson to occupy Johnston, however, and Patterson proved utterly inept at the task. Confederate forces in the Valley expected they could slip away undetected.
Indeed, on July 17, in the face of the Union advance, Beauregard informed Confederate president Jefferson Davis that "the enemy have assailed my outposts in heavy force" and that he had "fallen back on the line of Bull Run." Word went out by telegraph to Johnston that the anticipated Union advance had begun. Johnston, confident that Patterson would stay put, immediately agreed to shift his forces to Manassas.
A sharp skirmish on July 18 set the stage for the Battle of Manassas. As Union general Daniel Tyler advanced through Centreville, he exceeded his orders and decided to test the Confederate forces at Blackburn's Ford. There, Confederate general James Longstreet lay in wait. He stopped Tyler's advance, and although casualties on both sides were light, the action shaped both McDowell and Beauregard's plans.
McDowell, although displeased with Tyler's overenthusiastic advance, determined to avoid the obviously strong force at Blackburn's Ford. Proceeding west from Blackburn's Ford, crossings of Bull Run lay at Mitchell's Ford, Island Ford, Ball's Ford, Lewis Ford, Stone Bridge, Poplar (or Farm) Ford, and Sudley Ford. Confederate detachments protected all of the crossings up to the Stone Bridge. Accordingly, McDowell planned to flank the Confederate line by crossing far beyond the Confederate left at Sudley Ford and then wheeling behind the Confederate line. While the flanking column worked its way into position, other detachments would demonstrate at both Blackburn's Ford and the Stone Bridge in order to distract the Confederates.
Beauregard, meanwhile, receiving news that Johnston would be arriving by rail, initially planned to pin McDowell in place at Blackburn's Ford while Johnston worked his way around the Union right. Confederates from the Valley began arriving on July 19—the first time in history that troops had been transported to the battlefield by train—with Johnston himself arriving on July 20. With the Confederate forces united, an assault on their part became imperative. Both generals believed that once it became clear that Johnston had slipped away, Patterson would join with McDowell's men, creating a force too large to confront. After consultation with Beauregard, Johnston judged his plan too risky, and the pair decided that they would concentrate forces at Blackburn's Ford. They would receive the Union attack, destroy it, and then rush their fresh troops across Bull Run and push to Centreville, cutting McDowell's line of retreat of.
Battle: Thus, early on July 21, Johnston decided that the Confederates needed to shore up their left and center, and he moved the brigades of Virginian Thomas J. Jackson and South Carolinian Barnard Bee toward the left.
At the same time on July 21, Union troops began marching to their positions. At six o'clock, Tyler's men began their demonstration at the Stone Bridge to attract Confederate attention. Meanwhile, the flanking column started toward Sudley Ford.
Colonel Nathan "Shanks" Evans and his Confederate troops were positioned at the Stone Bridge to meet Tyler's possible attack. Evans had acquired the nickname at West Point as a mocking reference to his spindly legs (spindle shanks). Infamous for having an orderly carry around a keg of whiskey he had nicknamed "barrelito," Shanks and his brigade remained impassive in the face of the Union troops who seemed content to remain on their side of Bull Run. Evans kept his men largely concealed, only allowing his pickets to trade fire with Tyler's men as he awaited a more serious advance.
At nine o'clock in the morning, Confederate signal officer E. Porter Alexander caught sight of the flanking column just making its way across Sudley Ford and immediately informed both headquarters and Evans—"Look to your left, you are turned"—the first use of wigwag signaling in combat. Grasping the gravity of the situation, Evans moved the bulk of his men to block its advance, leaving only a few to hold Tyler. As he took position on the slopes of Matthews Hill, it appeared as though Evans, with a lone brigade, would confront a full two Union divisions.
Bee, meanwhile, had heard the firing earlier in the morning and moved his brigade, along with the brigade of Francis Bartow, from its position in the center to a location farther left. They initially marched up Henry House Hill, a prominence to the east of Matthews Hill. As they did this, the lead troops of the Union flanking column, under Rhode Islander Ambrose E. Burnside, encountered Evans's line. The battle had begun in earnest. For nearly an hour, Evans and his Confederates held. As they began to buckle under the pressure of the Union advance, help arrived in the form of Bee's and Bartow's brigades, which had moved from Henry House Hill to Matthews Hill.
As fighting seesawed between Burnside and Bartow, Bee, and Evans, another Union commander took steps that would unravel the Confederate line on Matthews Hill. Colonel William T. Sherman, with a Union brigade, crossed Bull Run at Poplar (or Farm) Ford, which lay behind the Confederate lines on Matthews Hill. His brigade entered the fray, prompting a Confederate retreat.
Momentarily, it looked as if McDowell had put the Confederates to flight, as the battered remnants of the three brigades on Matthews Hill streamed eastward. Yet hope remained for Johnston and Beauregard, who during the morning's fighting had set aside any offensive plans and started more troops toward their left. McDowell, unaccountably, paused and failed to closely pursue the Confederates. This proved a fatal error, as a brigade of Virginians under Colonel Thomas J. Jackson began to form a new defensive line along Henry House Hill. It was here that Bee purportedly implored his men to rally on Jackson "standing like a stone wall."
Until midafternoon, fighting swirled along Henry House Hill as both sides fed more troops into the fight. In the confusion, both Confederate and Union troops fell victim to friendly fire. At this early date in the war, uniforms had not been standardized and both armies carried similar-looking flags. (In part, the Confederate battle flag was born out of this confusion.) More than once, troops fired on their comrades, convinced that they were the enemy. Bartow and Bee lost their lives, and the widow Henry, who had refused to leave her house, also perished during the fighting. By three o'clock, the Confederates had gained the upper hand at Henry House Hill.
McDowell, in midafternoon, attempted to salvage the situation. He ordered an advance on Chinn Ridge, which lay to the southwest of Henry House Hill. From there, he could potentially flank the Confederate position. Unfortunately for McDowell, the Confederates anticipated this maneuver. Brigades under Arnold Elzey and Jubal A. Early stymied the Union advance toward Chinn Ridge.
McDowell, with nothing left to gain on the south side of Bull Run, ordered a withdrawal. Covered by United States Regulars, the retreat began in an orderly fashion. Yet as the Union troops got farther from the battlefield, panic mounted. Cries went up that the Confederate cavalry was closing in on the retreating troops. In reality, Beauregard and Johnston possessed only a small force of horsemen under J. E. B. Stuart. Although they attempted a pursuit, little came of it. Instead, as the Union troops proceeded they became more disorganized. By the time they reached Centreville, McDowell decided that further withdrawal was needed in order to reorganize and calm his men.
Aftermath: McDowell's men retreated through Centreville and on to Washington, D.C. Although some units certainly fled in a panic, enough Union troops maintained their composure to hold the Confederates at bay. The Confederates, for their part, exhausted after the fighting of the day and badly disorganized themselves, were in no shape to mount a sustained pursuit of the fleeing army.
The Union troops suffered 2,896 casualties against the Confederates' 1,897, shocking numbers at the time. First Manassas was the bloodiest battle in American history to date; yet it would not compare to the bloodletting still to come. In fact, the historian Ethan Rafuse has argued that the most important effect of the battle was to convince numerous persons, North and South, that the Civil War would last longer and would exact a toll much greater in both blood and treasure than many had expected. Prior to First Manassas, many believed that a single battle would decide the war. Afterward, it became clear that much more than one victory would be needed to win the war. And while the Confederates had defeated McDowell, on July 26, a new leader, George B. McClellan, fresh from his successes in western Virginia, reported to Washington, D.C., to organize and train the new recruits arriving.
http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Manassas_First_Battle_of#start_entry
B Tuesday, July 21, 1863: Report of Quincy A. Gillmore from Morris Island, South Carolina. Quincy A. Gillmore had lost so many men in the fighting on Morris Island, he felt compelled to ask for reinforcements.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, In the Field, Morris Island, S. C., July 21, 1863. “SIR: I have the honor to report no material change in the condition of affairs here since my brief dispatch announcing the capture of two-thirds of this island on the 10th instant and the assault of Fort Wagner on the morning of the 11th. My project for inaugurating offensive operations here comprised: “First. A real attack of Morris Island, to be made by a force landing from small boats, preceded by unmasking and opening our batteries from Folly Island, should it be deemed best to do so.
Second. A strong demonstration up the Stono against James Island, to occupy the attention of the enemy there.
Third. The cutting of the Savannah Railroad by ascending the South Edisto and burning the bridge.
The first and second of these operations were successful. the third was not. It resulted in the loss of two field guns and a small steamer of little value, formerly captured from the enemy. The steamer was burned, with the guns on board. The force operating on James Island, about 3,500 men, was under the command of Brigadier-General Terry, and was aided by three gunboats. On the 16th instant, General Terry was attacked by the enemy in force, comprising infantry, and cavalry. General Terry's report of the action is herewith inclosed. He estimates the enemy's strength on James Island at 5,000 to 6,000. I evacuated James Island on the 17th, as I required more men here, and did not consider General Terry's position longer tenable.
On the 18th, an attack on Fort Wagner was made by the land and naval forces, commencing about noon in a combined cannonade and bombardment, and terminating in an assault of the army about sunset. We gained and held for more than one hour the southeast salient or half bastion of the work, but finding it isolated from and commanded by the main body of the work, we were obliged to abandon it.
During the bombardment, the enemy served but two guns, and scarcely a man showed himself. Deserters say the work contains bomb-proof shelter for from 1,200 to 1,800 men. It is a strong work.
Three of its guns were dismounted during the action. My losses in the three actions of the 10th, 11th, and 18th are not yet accurately reported, but have been very heavy. My sick list, on account of the enervating climate and heavy fatigue duty, is also enormous.
The enemy admit a loss of 300, including 16 commissioned officers, on the 19th, and their losses since then will swell the aggregate several hundred men.
I renew the application for re-enforcements made in my first communication of this date, herewith inclosed.
General Saxton, commanding at Beaufort, reports the enemy very active in his front yesterday. A large force from James Island would be available for an attack on Hilton Head, where all my stores are. I feel quite weak there, and must re-enforce the place from here, even at the expense of operations in this quarter.
I notice in the Washington papers of the 11th a communication, bearing the stamp of genuineness, prescribing the manner of obtaining drafted men for the old regiments. The exigencies of the case induce me to act upon this information in advance of the official order. I have, therefore, detailed men to proceed to the rendezvous designated, obtain recruits, and return to their regiments at the earliest possible moment.
I trust I have not acted too hastily. I would like some instructions given to the commanders of the several rendezvous to give the preference to my requisitions, unless there are strong reasons to the contrary.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Q. A. GILLMORE, Brigadier-General, Commanding.” To Major General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief, U. S. Army.
P. S.-- A report from my chief medical [officer] gives 625 killed and wounded that have fallen into our hands up to this date. The enemy probably have 300 more.
http://www.civilwar-online.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1863
C Thursday, July 21, 1864: "Digging, apparently at some depth, was heard . . .Major General Bushrod Johnson, C.S. Army. On this day 150 years ago, Bushrod Johnson included a disturbing detail is his daily report from his division's section of the Confederate lines at Petersburg, Virginia. Johnson's men thought they could hear digging deep underground near their positions and Johnson asked for and engineer officer to be sent to investigate.
HEADQUARTERS JOHNSON'S DIVISION, July 21, 1864. “COLONEL: No change has been observed on the part of the enemy since last report; the sharpshooting slackened yesterday, but toward night became as brisk as usual. General Gracie requests that the engineer be sent to his line to sink a mine, as digging, apparently at some depth, was heard in his front yesterday.
The following casualties are respectfully submitted: Elliott's brigade, wounded, 2. Ransom's brigade, killed, 1. Wise's brigade, killed, 1 (carelessly); wounded, 1. Gracie's brigade, wounded, 5 (2 carelessly). Total, 2 killed and 8 wounded.
The following is a statement of the amount of shells and lead picked up on yesterday: Wise's brigade, 10 shells and 5,300 balls. Elliott's brigade, 10 fuses, 2,300 bullets, 14 solid shot, 100 fragments shells, 5 Wiard shells, 5 shrapnel, and 9 Parrott shells. Ransom's brigade, 15 Hotchkiss shells and some lead.
I am, colonel, respectfully, your obedient servant, B. R. JOHNSON, Major-General.”
http://www.civilwar-online.com/search?q=July+21%2C+1864
D Thursday, July 21, 1864: Union troops took a Confederate redoubt at Bald Hill, outside of Atlanta.
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/the-american-civil-war/american-civil-war-july-1864/
D+ Thursday, July 21, 1864: Bald Hill outside of Atlanta. Sherman’s three armies were still more or less separated. Better yet, Wheeler reported that as McPherson’s army marched in on Atlanta from the east, it had its left flank “in the air” (Sherman had sent Kenner Garrard’s cavalry east to wreck the Georgia Railroad). This situation presented Hood with an opportunity to launch a flank attack, like the one made famous by Jackson at Chancellorsville. Hood planned for his forces to drop back from their outer lines north of the city into the main fortified perimeter around the city on the night of July 21-22; Stewart and Cheatham would hold the works. Hardee’s corps would march through and out of the city, southeast then northeast toward Decatur, guided by Wheeler’s cavalry and jump into McPherson’s left-rear, while Wheeler attacked McPherson’s wagon trains. It was an ambitious plan, calling for a 15-mile night march by Hardee’s troops and a dawn attack on the 22nd. But a late start, exhaustion of the men, a hot night, dusty roads and poor service from the cavalry combined to bring the four assault divisions not nearly far enough into McPherson’s rear when Hardee, well behind schedule, decided to deploy. Then rough terrain added further delay—Confederate Maj. Gen. W. H. T. Walker was shot and killed getting his division into place. Hardee’s surprise attack did not begin till shortly after noon.
http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/atlanta.html?tab=facts
FYI SPC Deb Root-WhiteLt Col Charlie Brown GySgt Jack Wallace CWO4 Terrence Clark SPC Michael Oles SR SPC Michael Terrell TSgt David L. PO1 John Johnson SPC (Join to see) SMSgt Lawrence McCarter SGT Paul RussoA1C Pamela G RussellLTC Trent KlugMSG Roy CheeverPO2 Russell "Russ" Lincoln SFC William Farrell SFC Bernard Walko SFC Stephen King SFC Ralph E Kelley SSG Franklin Briant
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LTC Stephen F.
Thank you my friend Capt Tom Brown for making us aware that you visited the battlefield of the First Battle of Bull Run, Manassas, Virginia. I live less than 20 miles away from that battlefield.
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LTC Stephen F. good read and share, as accustomed. I am going with:
1861: First Battle of Bull Run. About 25 miles southwest of Washington the first major battle of the Civil War pits Maj Gen Irvin McDowell against CSA Gen P. G. T. Beauregard and CSA Gen Joe Johnston. The battle saw a Confederate victory and overwhelming
1861: First Battle of Bull Run. About 25 miles southwest of Washington the first major battle of the Civil War pits Maj Gen Irvin McDowell against CSA Gen P. G. T. Beauregard and CSA Gen Joe Johnston. The battle saw a Confederate victory and overwhelming
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LTC Stephen F.
Thank you my friend and brother-in-Christ SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL that you consider the First Battle of Bull Run to be most significant event of July 21, during the Civil War
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A terrific read and share on this day in Civil War history LTC Stephen F., U appreciate the read and share. I chose all events today.
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...and to think that US General Irvine McDowell is my 5th cousin 4X removed: McDowell-Eagan-Vester-Owens-Anderson, maternal line. But I've read that his plan wasn't all that bad - it was too complex in the main for inexperienced , raw recruits.
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LTC Stephen F.
Thank you my friend SGT Mark Anderson for making us aware that USA General Irvin McDowell [USMA, West Point graduate #963 of the class of 1838, Artillery-AG] is your '5th cousin 4X removed: McDowell-Eagan-Vester-Owens-Anderson, maternal line'
He was a USMA Adjutant [1841-1845]; and he had a brevet rank in the Mexican War.
He was a USMA Adjutant [1841-1845]; and he had a brevet rank in the Mexican War.
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