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Here's the Poop and nothing but the Poop !
The Dropping of the TURDSID in Vietnam.
Electronic warfare and surveillance are increasingly becoming topics of discussion. The nature of that type of warfare (and indeed combat itself) calls for a certain amount of creativity. To see, but not be recognized or seen oneself, begs for innovation and novel solutions to life-threatening problems. But even the most brilliant plans can be rendered moot if one builds an idea on a false assumption.
Such is the nature of the ingenious yet flawed TURDSID.
The short-lived TURDSID and other systems were developed in response to the critical but elusive nature of targets along the Ho Chi Minh trail during the Vietnam War. The difficulty prompted U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) officials to explore the application of new technology to the interdiction problem.
The systems they would explore and implement, the TURDSID among them, emerged from an earlier DoD effort to create an electronic anti-infiltration system across the width of the demilitarized zone in South Vietnam and into Laos. The effort became known as operation Igloo White. The purpose of operation Igloo White was to interdict the infiltration of supplies and personnel occurring in Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Igloo White was designed to accomplish electronically what had been previously planned for with the McNamara Line.
While the barriers of the McNamara Line would have required physical construction and troops on the ground, Igloo White had its own air force and depended upon thousands of sensors on the ground. The operation lasted from late 1969 to the end of 1972 and was considered one of the most secretive, expensive and successful operations of the Vietnam War. The method of the operation was to air deliver sensors from high-speed, specially-modified Navy OP-2E Neptune antisubmarine aircraft traveling as fast as 600 miles per hour. Missions were conducted first by the joint Navy/CIA operation Muddy Hill, and later by elements of Squadron VO-67, nicknamed the "Ghost Squadron" for its clandestine activities, and more ironically for their participation in a secret war that neither the U.S. nor the North Vietnamese wanted to acknowledge was being waged next door to Vietnam.
The sensors were dropped in strings along trails, roads and suspected routes of enemy infiltration. A string was the word used to describe the sequential emplacement by air of sensors in a line. As a vehicle or group of soldiers would pass by the sensors, they would sequentially report "hits," which would show the location and rate of movement of the enemy as well as differentiate between vehicles and personnel. The data would then be transmitted to EC-121R aircraft, and, later in the life of the program, to unmanned QU-22B Pave Eagle planes continuously circling overhead. These aircraft, in turn, relayed the data to the Infiltration Surveillance Center (ISC) at the U.S. Air Force Base at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, at that time the largest single structure in that country.
Inside the 200,000-sq-ft ISC building, IBM 360-65 computers — at the time, the world’s most powerful — recorded, stored and processed the information received from the sensors. Intelligence analysts searched for patterns in the processed data, and sought to determine the speed, location, and direction in which the trucks or enemy personnel were moving. Once this was achieved, FACs in Laos conveyed the target information they received to attack aircraft pilots. According to one estimate, the time between target acquisition and the delivery of ordnance was on average a mere five minutes, and in some cases, as short as two minutes.
The critical sensors at the heart of the operation had to remain unseen and camouflaged in order for the advanced network to function.
Thus, enter the TURDSID.
It is a small, battery-operated Seismic Intrusion Device (SID) consisting of a seismic detector (vibration sensor), a transmitter, an internal antenna, and a battery pack, all fit into a small rubber case disguised to look like the excrement of a dog. Because of their small size, battery life was no more than a few days. Its function was to cue a larger sensor nearby.
The outer casing was a specially-designed plastic polymer designed to disguise the sensor as dog droppings. It takes no large amount of imagination then to figure out where the "TURD" prefix originated. The sensor seen here was a technical prototype examined by engineers (including the author's grandfather, from whom he inherited the device) at the Burroughs Corporation’s Paoli, Pennsylvania Labs. It has had both its plastic excrement disguise and its battery pack removed, revealing the copper shielding protecting the epoxy-encased electronics package.
The sensors worked as designed and were quite effective, with one major flaw: there were in fact no dogs running wild along the Ho Chi Minh trail.
Upon learning this critical, overlooked, information, the sensor was hastily redesigned (at great expense) to look like a piece of wood.
The story of the TURDSID reveals at least one very important lesson: there is no idea, however ingenious, nor any effort too expansive, to be undone by a small but overlooked reality.
https://www.usni.org/naval-history-blog/10568
http://www.psywarrior.com/TrailLeaflets.html
@ col mikel COL Mikel J. Burroughs @ ltc stephen LTC Stephen C. @ ltc stephen LTC Stephen F. @ ltc frank LTC (Join to see) @ ltc john LTC John Mohor @ maj william Maj William W. "Bill" Price @ maj ivan LTC Ivan Raiklin, Esq. @ capt tom Capt Tom Brown @ capt marty Maj Marty Hogan @ smsgt doc SMSgt Minister Gerald A. "Doc" Thomas @ tsgt joe TSgt Joe C. @ sra christopher SrA Christopher Wright @ msg andrew MSG Andrew White @ sfc joe SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL @ sgt david SGT (Join to see) @ sgt david SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth @ sp5 mark SP5 Mark Kuzinski @ sp5 robert SP5 Robert Ruck SCPO Morris Ramsey @ po1 chip PO1 William "Chip" Nagel
The Dropping of the TURDSID in Vietnam.
Electronic warfare and surveillance are increasingly becoming topics of discussion. The nature of that type of warfare (and indeed combat itself) calls for a certain amount of creativity. To see, but not be recognized or seen oneself, begs for innovation and novel solutions to life-threatening problems. But even the most brilliant plans can be rendered moot if one builds an idea on a false assumption.
Such is the nature of the ingenious yet flawed TURDSID.
The short-lived TURDSID and other systems were developed in response to the critical but elusive nature of targets along the Ho Chi Minh trail during the Vietnam War. The difficulty prompted U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) officials to explore the application of new technology to the interdiction problem.
The systems they would explore and implement, the TURDSID among them, emerged from an earlier DoD effort to create an electronic anti-infiltration system across the width of the demilitarized zone in South Vietnam and into Laos. The effort became known as operation Igloo White. The purpose of operation Igloo White was to interdict the infiltration of supplies and personnel occurring in Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Igloo White was designed to accomplish electronically what had been previously planned for with the McNamara Line.
While the barriers of the McNamara Line would have required physical construction and troops on the ground, Igloo White had its own air force and depended upon thousands of sensors on the ground. The operation lasted from late 1969 to the end of 1972 and was considered one of the most secretive, expensive and successful operations of the Vietnam War. The method of the operation was to air deliver sensors from high-speed, specially-modified Navy OP-2E Neptune antisubmarine aircraft traveling as fast as 600 miles per hour. Missions were conducted first by the joint Navy/CIA operation Muddy Hill, and later by elements of Squadron VO-67, nicknamed the "Ghost Squadron" for its clandestine activities, and more ironically for their participation in a secret war that neither the U.S. nor the North Vietnamese wanted to acknowledge was being waged next door to Vietnam.
The sensors were dropped in strings along trails, roads and suspected routes of enemy infiltration. A string was the word used to describe the sequential emplacement by air of sensors in a line. As a vehicle or group of soldiers would pass by the sensors, they would sequentially report "hits," which would show the location and rate of movement of the enemy as well as differentiate between vehicles and personnel. The data would then be transmitted to EC-121R aircraft, and, later in the life of the program, to unmanned QU-22B Pave Eagle planes continuously circling overhead. These aircraft, in turn, relayed the data to the Infiltration Surveillance Center (ISC) at the U.S. Air Force Base at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, at that time the largest single structure in that country.
Inside the 200,000-sq-ft ISC building, IBM 360-65 computers — at the time, the world’s most powerful — recorded, stored and processed the information received from the sensors. Intelligence analysts searched for patterns in the processed data, and sought to determine the speed, location, and direction in which the trucks or enemy personnel were moving. Once this was achieved, FACs in Laos conveyed the target information they received to attack aircraft pilots. According to one estimate, the time between target acquisition and the delivery of ordnance was on average a mere five minutes, and in some cases, as short as two minutes.
The critical sensors at the heart of the operation had to remain unseen and camouflaged in order for the advanced network to function.
Thus, enter the TURDSID.
It is a small, battery-operated Seismic Intrusion Device (SID) consisting of a seismic detector (vibration sensor), a transmitter, an internal antenna, and a battery pack, all fit into a small rubber case disguised to look like the excrement of a dog. Because of their small size, battery life was no more than a few days. Its function was to cue a larger sensor nearby.
The outer casing was a specially-designed plastic polymer designed to disguise the sensor as dog droppings. It takes no large amount of imagination then to figure out where the "TURD" prefix originated. The sensor seen here was a technical prototype examined by engineers (including the author's grandfather, from whom he inherited the device) at the Burroughs Corporation’s Paoli, Pennsylvania Labs. It has had both its plastic excrement disguise and its battery pack removed, revealing the copper shielding protecting the epoxy-encased electronics package.
The sensors worked as designed and were quite effective, with one major flaw: there were in fact no dogs running wild along the Ho Chi Minh trail.
Upon learning this critical, overlooked, information, the sensor was hastily redesigned (at great expense) to look like a piece of wood.
The story of the TURDSID reveals at least one very important lesson: there is no idea, however ingenious, nor any effort too expansive, to be undone by a small but overlooked reality.
https://www.usni.org/naval-history-blog/10568
http://www.psywarrior.com/TrailLeaflets.html
@ col mikel COL Mikel J. Burroughs @ ltc stephen LTC Stephen C. @ ltc stephen LTC Stephen F. @ ltc frank LTC (Join to see) @ ltc john LTC John Mohor @ maj william Maj William W. "Bill" Price @ maj ivan LTC Ivan Raiklin, Esq. @ capt tom Capt Tom Brown @ capt marty Maj Marty Hogan @ smsgt doc SMSgt Minister Gerald A. "Doc" Thomas @ tsgt joe TSgt Joe C. @ sra christopher SrA Christopher Wright @ msg andrew MSG Andrew White @ sfc joe SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL @ sgt david SGT (Join to see) @ sgt david SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth @ sp5 mark SP5 Mark Kuzinski @ sp5 robert SP5 Robert Ruck SCPO Morris Ramsey @ po1 chip PO1 William "Chip" Nagel
Posted in these groups: 
Vietnam
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29E: Electronic Warfare Specialist
Intelligence
Vietnam Vietnam War Military History 29E: Electronic Warfare Specialist Intelligence
Posted >1 y ago
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Thanks SGT John " Mac " McConnell for reminding us about the somewhat tongue-in-cheek operational name Igloo White which was in a hot and humid are of Vietnam.
TURDSID is also an interesting name which I am sure service members made fun of at times :-).
The after action review summary the: "story of the TURDSID reveals at least one very important lesson: there is no idea, however ingenious, nor any effort too expansive, to be undone by a small but overlooked reality."
That seems to be a corollary to Murphy's law IMHO.
Image" TURDSID; A parked OP-2E Neptune patrol aircraft of Squadron VO-67 somewhere in Vietnam. A Practice Multiple Bomb Rack (PMBR) is indicated under the port wing.jpg
Background:
"The Dropping of the TURDSID in Vietnam
Monday, August 10, 2015 7:00 AM
By Jon Hoppe
TURDSID
A TURDSID with most of its plastic camouflage covering and battery pack removed, showing the electronics package and copper shielding. Courtesy of Jonathan L. Hoppe.
Electronic warfare and surveillance are increasingly becoming topics of discussion. The nature of that type of warfare (and indeed combat itself) calls for a certain amount of creativity. To see, but not be recognized or seen oneself, begs for innovation and novel solutions to life-threatening problems. But even the most brilliant plans can be rendered moot if one builds an idea on a false assumption.
Such is the nature of the ingenious yet flawed TURDSID.
The short-lived TURDSID and other systems were developed in response to the critical but elusive nature of targets along the Ho Chi Minh trail during the Vietnam War. The difficulty prompted U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) officials to explore the application of new technology to the interdiction problem.
The systems they would explore and implement, the TURDSID among them, emerged from an earlier DoD effort to create an electronic anti-infiltration system across the width of the demilitarized zone in South Vietnam and into Laos. The effort became known as operation Igloo White. The purpose of operation Igloo White was to interdict the infiltration of supplies and personnel occurring in Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Igloo White was designed to accomplish electronically what had been previously planned for with the McNamara Line.
While the barriers of the McNamara Line would have required physical construction and troops on the ground, Igloo White had its own air force and depended upon thousands of sensors on the ground. The operation lasted from late 1969 to the end of 1972 and was considered one of the most secretive, expensive and successful operations of the Vietnam War. The method of the operation was to air deliver sensors from high-speed, specially-modified Navy OP-2E Neptune antisubmarine aircraft traveling as fast as 600 miles per hour. Missions were conducted first by the joint Navy/CIA operation Muddy Hill, and later by elements of Squadron VO-67, nicknamed the “Ghost Squadron” for its clandestine activities, and more ironically for their participation in a secret war that neither the U.S. nor the North Vietnamese wanted to acknowledge was being waged next door to Vietnam.
OP-2E Neptune
A parked OP-2E Neptune patrol aircraft of Squadron VO-67 somewhere in Vietnam. A Practice Multiple Bomb Rack (PMBR) is indicated under the port wing. Date unknown. Collection of the United States Naval Institute.
The sensors were dropped in strings along trails, roads and suspected routes of enemy infiltration. A string was the word used to describe the sequential emplacement by air of sensors in a line. As a vehicle or group of soldiers would pass by the sensors, they would sequentially report “hits,” which would show the location and rate of movement of the enemy as well as differentiate between vehicles and personnel. The data would then be transmitted to EC-121R aircraft, and, later in the life of the program, to unmanned QU-22B Pave Eagle planes continuously circling overhead. These aircraft, in turn, relayed the data to the Infiltration Surveillance Center (ISC) at the U.S. Air Force Base at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, at that time the largest single structure in that country.
Inside the 200,000-sq-ft ISC building, IBM 360-65 computers — at the time, the world’s most powerful — recorded, stored and processed the information received from the sensors. Intelligence analysts searched for patterns in the processed data, and sought to determine the speed, location, and direction in which the trucks or enemy personnel were moving. Once this was achieved, FACs in Laos conveyed the target information they received to attack aircraft pilots. According to one estimate, the time between target acquisition and the delivery of ordnance was on average a mere five minutes, and in some cases, as short as two minutes.
The critical sensors at the heart of the operation had to remain unseen and camouflaged in order for the advanced network to function.
Thus, enter the TURDSID.
It is a small, battery-operated Seismic Intrusion Device (SID) consisting of a seismic detector (vibration sensor), a transmitter, an internal antenna, and a battery pack, all fit into a small rubber case disguised to look like the excrement of a dog. Because of their small size, battery life was no more than a few days. Its function was to cue a larger sensor nearby.
The outer casing was a specially-designed plastic polymer designed to disguise the sensor as dog droppings. It takes no large amount of imagination then to figure out where the “TURD” prefix originated. The sensor seen here was a technical prototype examined by engineers (including the author’s grandfather, from whom he inherited the device) at the Burroughs Corporation’s Paoli, Pennsylvania Labs. It has had both its plastic excrement disguise and its battery pack removed, revealing the copper shielding protecting the epoxy-encased electronics package.
The sensors worked as designed and were quite effective, with one major flaw: there were in fact no dogs running wild along the Ho Chi Minh trail.
Upon learning this critical, overlooked, information, the sensor was hastily redesigned (at great expense) to look like a piece of wood.
The story of the TURDSID reveals at least one very important lesson: there is no idea, however ingenious, nor any effort too expansive, to be undone by a small but overlooked reality.'
https://www.navalhistory.org/2015/08/10/the-dropping-of-the-turdsid-in-vietnam
LTC Stephen C. LTC Greg Henning LTC Ivan Raiklin, Esq. Capt Seid Waddell Capt Tom Brown CW5 (Join to see) SGM David W. Carr LOM, DMSM MP SGT MSG Andrew White SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL SFC William Farrell SSgt Robert Marx SSgt (Join to see) TSgt Joe C. SP5 Mark Kuzinski SPC (Join to see) SrA Christopher Wright Cpl Joshua Caldwell
TURDSID is also an interesting name which I am sure service members made fun of at times :-).
The after action review summary the: "story of the TURDSID reveals at least one very important lesson: there is no idea, however ingenious, nor any effort too expansive, to be undone by a small but overlooked reality."
That seems to be a corollary to Murphy's law IMHO.
Image" TURDSID; A parked OP-2E Neptune patrol aircraft of Squadron VO-67 somewhere in Vietnam. A Practice Multiple Bomb Rack (PMBR) is indicated under the port wing.jpg
Background:
"The Dropping of the TURDSID in Vietnam
Monday, August 10, 2015 7:00 AM
By Jon Hoppe
TURDSID
A TURDSID with most of its plastic camouflage covering and battery pack removed, showing the electronics package and copper shielding. Courtesy of Jonathan L. Hoppe.
Electronic warfare and surveillance are increasingly becoming topics of discussion. The nature of that type of warfare (and indeed combat itself) calls for a certain amount of creativity. To see, but not be recognized or seen oneself, begs for innovation and novel solutions to life-threatening problems. But even the most brilliant plans can be rendered moot if one builds an idea on a false assumption.
Such is the nature of the ingenious yet flawed TURDSID.
The short-lived TURDSID and other systems were developed in response to the critical but elusive nature of targets along the Ho Chi Minh trail during the Vietnam War. The difficulty prompted U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) officials to explore the application of new technology to the interdiction problem.
The systems they would explore and implement, the TURDSID among them, emerged from an earlier DoD effort to create an electronic anti-infiltration system across the width of the demilitarized zone in South Vietnam and into Laos. The effort became known as operation Igloo White. The purpose of operation Igloo White was to interdict the infiltration of supplies and personnel occurring in Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Igloo White was designed to accomplish electronically what had been previously planned for with the McNamara Line.
While the barriers of the McNamara Line would have required physical construction and troops on the ground, Igloo White had its own air force and depended upon thousands of sensors on the ground. The operation lasted from late 1969 to the end of 1972 and was considered one of the most secretive, expensive and successful operations of the Vietnam War. The method of the operation was to air deliver sensors from high-speed, specially-modified Navy OP-2E Neptune antisubmarine aircraft traveling as fast as 600 miles per hour. Missions were conducted first by the joint Navy/CIA operation Muddy Hill, and later by elements of Squadron VO-67, nicknamed the “Ghost Squadron” for its clandestine activities, and more ironically for their participation in a secret war that neither the U.S. nor the North Vietnamese wanted to acknowledge was being waged next door to Vietnam.
OP-2E Neptune
A parked OP-2E Neptune patrol aircraft of Squadron VO-67 somewhere in Vietnam. A Practice Multiple Bomb Rack (PMBR) is indicated under the port wing. Date unknown. Collection of the United States Naval Institute.
The sensors were dropped in strings along trails, roads and suspected routes of enemy infiltration. A string was the word used to describe the sequential emplacement by air of sensors in a line. As a vehicle or group of soldiers would pass by the sensors, they would sequentially report “hits,” which would show the location and rate of movement of the enemy as well as differentiate between vehicles and personnel. The data would then be transmitted to EC-121R aircraft, and, later in the life of the program, to unmanned QU-22B Pave Eagle planes continuously circling overhead. These aircraft, in turn, relayed the data to the Infiltration Surveillance Center (ISC) at the U.S. Air Force Base at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, at that time the largest single structure in that country.
Inside the 200,000-sq-ft ISC building, IBM 360-65 computers — at the time, the world’s most powerful — recorded, stored and processed the information received from the sensors. Intelligence analysts searched for patterns in the processed data, and sought to determine the speed, location, and direction in which the trucks or enemy personnel were moving. Once this was achieved, FACs in Laos conveyed the target information they received to attack aircraft pilots. According to one estimate, the time between target acquisition and the delivery of ordnance was on average a mere five minutes, and in some cases, as short as two minutes.
The critical sensors at the heart of the operation had to remain unseen and camouflaged in order for the advanced network to function.
Thus, enter the TURDSID.
It is a small, battery-operated Seismic Intrusion Device (SID) consisting of a seismic detector (vibration sensor), a transmitter, an internal antenna, and a battery pack, all fit into a small rubber case disguised to look like the excrement of a dog. Because of their small size, battery life was no more than a few days. Its function was to cue a larger sensor nearby.
The outer casing was a specially-designed plastic polymer designed to disguise the sensor as dog droppings. It takes no large amount of imagination then to figure out where the “TURD” prefix originated. The sensor seen here was a technical prototype examined by engineers (including the author’s grandfather, from whom he inherited the device) at the Burroughs Corporation’s Paoli, Pennsylvania Labs. It has had both its plastic excrement disguise and its battery pack removed, revealing the copper shielding protecting the epoxy-encased electronics package.
The sensors worked as designed and were quite effective, with one major flaw: there were in fact no dogs running wild along the Ho Chi Minh trail.
Upon learning this critical, overlooked, information, the sensor was hastily redesigned (at great expense) to look like a piece of wood.
The story of the TURDSID reveals at least one very important lesson: there is no idea, however ingenious, nor any effort too expansive, to be undone by a small but overlooked reality.'
https://www.navalhistory.org/2015/08/10/the-dropping-of-the-turdsid-in-vietnam
LTC Stephen C. LTC Greg Henning LTC Ivan Raiklin, Esq. Capt Seid Waddell Capt Tom Brown CW5 (Join to see) SGM David W. Carr LOM, DMSM MP SGT MSG Andrew White SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL SFC William Farrell SSgt Robert Marx SSgt (Join to see) TSgt Joe C. SP5 Mark Kuzinski SPC (Join to see) SrA Christopher Wright Cpl Joshua Caldwell
The Dropping of the TURDSID in Vietnam
Electronic warfare and surveillance are increasingly becoming topics of discussion. The nature of that type of warfare (and indeed combat itself) calls for a certain amount of creativity. To see, but not be recognized or seen oneself, begs for innovation and novel solutions to life-threatening...
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SGT John " Mac " McConnell
Well this post seems to be working out ok.. At least I can answer with no problems.. Thanks LTC Stephen F. .
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I've read and heard some interesting stories of weird sensors that were supposibly used during the Vietnam war ,one was a system based on bed bugs inserted in small containers dropped on the Ho. Chi Minh trail, the bugs were alarmed be the passing heat sources triggering the device ,another were small rubber Palm trees with sensors attached, don't know for sure if they were ever employed but as was Vietnam a very strange place and time.
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This system was developed/tested at Eglin AFB when I was there, and there was great consternation when Senator J. William Fulbright (D Arkansas) was briefed on the project in-country and returned to read into the Congressional Record the code name, how it operated, and how the enemy could defeat it. The political divisions in this country were as bad then as they are now.
"The acoustic sensors could hear both voices and vehicles. The seismic sensors sensed earth motion to detect people and vehicles. The difficulty in using the sensors was in separating the false alarms generated by wind, thunder, rain, earth tremors, and animals—especially frogs. Other kinds of sensors were used as well, including the ‘people sniffer,’ which chemically sensed sweat and urine. Besides picking up the sensors—some of which are now on display at the history museum in Hanoi—to render them inoperative, the North Vietnamese took other countermeasures, such as destroying the sensors or inducing false signals by driving animals up the trail and hanging buckets of urine in the trees."
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/corporate_pubs/2010/RAND_CP564.pdf
"The acoustic sensors could hear both voices and vehicles. The seismic sensors sensed earth motion to detect people and vehicles. The difficulty in using the sensors was in separating the false alarms generated by wind, thunder, rain, earth tremors, and animals—especially frogs. Other kinds of sensors were used as well, including the ‘people sniffer,’ which chemically sensed sweat and urine. Besides picking up the sensors—some of which are now on display at the history museum in Hanoi—to render them inoperative, the North Vietnamese took other countermeasures, such as destroying the sensors or inducing false signals by driving animals up the trail and hanging buckets of urine in the trees."
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/corporate_pubs/2010/RAND_CP564.pdf
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