United States warns of forthcoming bombing operations - Feb 18, 1965 - HISTORY.com

So much for secrecy- cause none of them would say anything....

SMSgt Lawrence McCarter SrA Christopher Wright Sgt Randy Wilber SGT Gregory Lawritson Cpl (Join to see) Lt Col Scott Shuttleworth LTC (Join to see) MSG Frederick Otero SFC Pete Kain SSG David Andrews LCDR (Join to see) PO1 Tony Holland SCPO Morris Ramsey SPC Margaret Higgins SGT Jim Arnold SFC William H. PO1 William "Chip" Nagel SGT Charles H. Hawes CPL Dave Hoover TSgt Joe C.

That was like a city in Iraq not to long ago.
In 4 months were comin.
3 months,we're on our way.
2 months, almost there.
1 month away.
We gave them so much warning that they had time to dig a 16 k long tunnel to the next nearest city.
And I'm sitting here thinking, I cld make a better General than this idiot. I was in aweeee....

Thanks for reminding us SP5 Mark Kuzinski that back on February 18, 1965 the U.S. State Department sent classified cables to U.S. ambassadors in nine friendly nations advising of forthcoming bombing operations over North Vietnam, and instructed them to inform their host governments “in strictest confidence” and to report reactions.
President Lyndon Johnson wanted these governments to be aware of what he was planning to do in the upcoming bombing campaign.
"A NODIS cable of that date informed nine American posts in the Far East of the decisions in the following words:

Policy on Viet-Nam adopted today calls for following:

1. Joint program with GVN of continuing air and naval action against North Viet-Nam whenever and wherever necessary. Such action to be against selected military targets and to be limited and fitting and adequate as response to continuous aggression in South Viet-Nam directed in Hanoi. Air strikes will be jointly planned and agreed with GVN and carried out on joint basis.

2. Intensification by all available means of pacification program within South Viet-Nam, including every possible step to find and attack VC concentrations and headquarters within SVN by all conventional means available to GVN and US.

3. Early detailed presentation to nations of world and to public of documented case against DRV as aggressor. Forum and form this presentation not yet decided, but we do not repeat not expect to touch upon readiness for talks or negotiations at this time. We are considering reaffirmation our objectives in some form in near future.

4. Careful public statements of USG, combined with fact of continuing air action, are expected to make it clear that military action will continue while aggression continues. But focus of public attention will be kept as far as possible on DRV aggression; not on joint GVN/US military operations. There will be no comment of any sort on future actions except that all such actions will be adequate and measured and fitting to aggression. (You will have noted President's statement of yesterday, which we will probably allow to stand.)

Addressees should inform head of government or State (as appropriate) of above in strictest confidence and report reactions. . .

You may indicate that we will seek to keep governments informed, subject to security considerations, of each operation as it occurs; as we did with respect to operations of February 7 and 11."

"As late as February 8, in a cable to US Ambassador to South Vietnam Maxwell Taylor, Johnson stressed that the paramount goal of a bombing campaign would be to boost Saigon's morale, not to influence Hanoi, expressing hope "that the building of a minimum government will benefit by ... assurances from us to the highest levels [of the South Vietnamese government] that we ... intend to take continuing action."
On 13 February a new plan, merging targets and priorities from the lists produced by the Bundys and the JSC, was approved and given the name Rolling Thunder. This campaign was not aimed at specific actions on the part of the North Vietnamese, but was intended as a larger response to the growing hostilities as a whole. Although some within the administration believed that the campaign would be costly, and that it might not work, they reasoned that it was "an acceptable risk, especially when considered against the alternative of introducing American combat troops." Rolling Thunder called for an eight-week air campaign consistent with the restrictions that Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had imposed upon it. If the insurgency continued "with DRV support, strikes against the DRV would be extended with intensified efforts against targets north of the 19th parallel."
It was believed that selective pressure, controlled by Washington, combined with diplomatic overtures, would prevail and compel Hanoi to end its aggression. The military was still not satisfied, since, for the time being, the bombing campaign was to be limited to targets below the 19th parallel, each of which would have to be cleared individually by the President and McNamara."
Thanks for mentioning me Maj Marty Hogan
FYI COL Mikel J. Burroughs LTC Stephen C. LTC Orlando Illi LTC (Join to see) LTC Ivan Raiklin, Esq. Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D. Capt Seid Waddell Capt Jeff S. CPT Jack Durish MSgt Robert C Aldi SFC Stephen King MSgt Danny Hope SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL SGT Gregory Lawritson Cpl Craig Marton SGT (Join to see) Maj Marty Hogan