Changes to grueling Special Forces course draw scrutiny, there’s ‘balancing act’

Training may have to be adjusted to meet new tactics and/or environments but fitness both physical and mental should not be compromised.

I'm always concerned about responding on topics that exceed my experience level...but I do have "gut feelings" on this I'll risk sharing.

When I first joined the Military, my sense of it was that anyone who was going to try to be a SEAL, SF, etc. was already way ahead of the pack, and would be drawn from a very small pool I had no expectation of swimming in (the joke then was that it would be "easier" to join the NFL). One of my friends at USNA made it...and frankly, there wasn't anyone who expected anything less; he was just that far ahead of the rest of us in those abilities from Day 1. I never felt "less", or somehow a part of the "second string"...I was simply the "average" among a group that had already proven themselves "above average" when compared to everyone in my generation who wasn't wearing a uniform. They did their thing...we did ours.

I soon learned that's a pretty common "peacetime" mentality, or by exponent...one that evolves in conventional warfare.

Twenty years later, there about; I see it a bit differently. We've been fighting a "special operations" war since 2001. The people who do the heavy lifting (combat related, that is) are, for the most part, all ground combatants. The Taliban doesn't have an air force, and ISIS doesn't have a Navy. Sure, there's always air support tasking, maritime interdiction operations (not to mention Iran and North Korea), personnel indirectly attached, etc., and the risks involved...but let's be brutally honest: the "infantryman" is the base on which a pyramid of progressively more challenging direct strategies and tactics have been developing of late.

In that sense, I think the "base" has to be significantly large enough to support the weight of those continued operations. As you go up these "tiers", from Infantry, to "elite" Airborne, Ranger qualified, Ranger Regiment, SF, Delta...the numbers shrink to a point that the pinnacle of that pyramid-i.e. your most capable and qualified, are by necessity, a rare commodity. Sometimes, it sounds like what's wanted is to invert the pyramid, and create enough of these truly elite warriors to carry more of the load that would logically be carried by larger "tiers"...so what gives?

My sense of it is that what we're really talking about is public and international perception of just what exactly a "just war" is. I have little doubt that an Infantry division, supported by combined arms and the rest of the branches, could lay waste to a ground enemy of any pedigree. Our training, equipment, funding, and mindset are superior in many measurable ways to anyone else on the table. Trouble is...we can't fight a "total war" any longer. An "operator" possesses skill sets that permit "surgical" interventions, "limited" war, and counter-insurgency.

To my mind, the real problem is that political and even strategic and tactical leadership are over-tasking, and perhaps misusing these elite of the elite forces in an effort to reduce collateral damage, high casualties, etc. This creates a need that cannot be filled under the current model (operational problem), which leads to the temptation to adjust the pipeline to meet the need (a cultural problem).

At the end of the day, I think the solution is glaringly obvious, infinitely more practical, economical, and even acceptable to all involved...increase the standards for the lower, larger tiers of the pyramid. SF's stock in trade is building fighting forces from the ground up. Why can't these truly elite warriors be selectively placed in leadership roles at all levels to instill a higher level of competency within the Infantry? If that standard is increased even slightly, could we not then find ways of swelling the ranks of conventional forces under more difficult...but noticeably "less" challenging standards than those expected of special operations personnel? Wouldn't this only serve to increase the pride of conventional units while preserving the status of those in the top tiers of operations?

From my own humble experiences, it is possible to harden a weaker link in a chain...it's unwise to start building a chain comprised of weaker links. Just my $.02.

TSgt Joe C. PO3 Steven Sherrill CW3 Kevin Storm SSG (Join to see) SGM Steve Wettstein SMSgt Thor Merich MSG (Join to see) PO1 John Johnson MAJ Ken Landgren LTC Greg Henning PVT Mark Zehner MSG Tom Earley Alan K. SPC Mark Huddleston PO1 H Gene Lawrence SGT Elizabeth Scheck Sgt Deborah Cornatzer SSgt Boyd Herrst SPC Diana D. SPC Nancy Greene