Bringing North Korea into the World By Acknowledging Their Nuclear Weapons and Strike Capabilities

I recently read a great position article by Victor Cha from the Center for Strategic and International studies on how to play the China card in regards to handling the events we are seeing out of North Korea. For the most part, the general consensus to dealing with North Korea will be through their closest friend, China. To this point, I completely agree. It is likely that we will (and are) attempting to pressure China to, in turn, pressure North Korea. However, as Victor points out, this pressure is not likely to lead to our best envisioned end state of a regime change and diminished focus on weapons of mass destruction. Why? Multiple factors of competition, mistrust, history, regime collapse and more lead to a litany of variables that China just doesn’t want to be responsible for or tied to. As Victor argues, it’s time to consider a change in diplomacy; I argue that it also is a time to consider a change in end state expectations and how we get there. [1]

Multiple presidential administrations have attempted to curb North Korean weapons development and engage the hermit country in a way that would stabilize the peninsula and tone down the rhetoric. From the “preventive defense” attempts of the 1994 U.S.- North Korea Framework to curb nuclear power ambitions to the crippling sanctions of today, all attempts to change the regime’s trajectory towards nuclear weapons have been some sort of a failure.[2] However, I believe the actions themselves aren’t the failure, but the underlying assumptions with a focus on the stabilization of the country rather than the stabilization of the Kim Regime itself is the underlying issue.

Although I am by no means an expert on the Kim Jong-un regime or the Kim Dynasty as a whole, from the discussions I have had to the research I have conducted, I am thoroughly convinced every action conducted by the leader is for the security of his Regime, not the country. So, as initiatives have consistently worked to deter action and stabilize a country, I argue it is time we work to stabilize the regime and, in turn, help manage its actions. Now, before we talk about this, let’s acknowledge that working with a regime like this goes against our moralistic nature, as the regime of North Korea is brutish and just down right horrible to its population. However, to that point, its brutal practices are likely actions driven by a regime who consistently is working to secure itself and thereby, has the potential to diminish as the regime’s future is secured.

So, where would we begin to stabilize what seems to be a regime of non-rational actors? First, I believe we need to start by treating them as rational actors. Although their actions may not seem rational to us, as former Joint Chief of Staff General Dempsey once pointed out to a poor reporter, that doesn’t mean they aren’t rational actors. I do believe the regime has an envisioned future and understands where they want to sit in the world. What is that position? Likely, a mid-level country like their cousins to the South. A regime who holds an array of respect and positions in the international system. A position that can influence trade, maritime operations, or weigh in on regional and international issues. Essentially, a position that projects the regimes divinity and strength from within. What is important to remember is that we are talking about the regime, not the country, and thereby we have to acknowledge that this will look vastly different than the free and connected society in the south, but with all the basic tenants of holding a position in the world. This fundamental change in an underlying assumption and focus is a strong facet to seeing that the regime has the potential to stabilize as their envisioned future comes to fruition.

Operating off this assumption, I believe to bring a regime like Kim’s to that point of stability, we have to employ a preventative style of strategy that integrates North Korea into the world system. This would be very familiar to post-Cold War strategies for integrating a fledgling Russian federation back into the world. We’d utilize methods like inviting the Russians into peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Kosovo, which developed communication frameworks and enabled Russia to find their prideful place in the world structure. Similar activities like investment and repurposing of military personnel in the Ukraine, post Soviet collapse, helped to secure the region and denuclearize a once heavily nuclear country. Many of these strategies of preventative defense, outlined by former Secretaries of Defense Carter and Perry in their book, “Preventative Defense” could yield positive results, as long as their strategies are employed with a focus on the Kim Jong-un regime, rather than the country itself.

To put these ideas into perspective a little more, let’s expand on a few things. To date, the regime is clearly not deterred from developing their weapons of mass destruction and I believe that is because the regime believes it is their most effective and most feasible entry to the international community. To support this, we have to understand that the hermit nation really has no place in modern society. They are not a world player in exports or imports. They do not possess advanced technology which they can offer to the world, and they do not carry any cultural or historic envy in the world. So, what do they have? What do they have to offer? From the regime’s eyes, I believe its only option is their military capability or threat. Basically, “a pay attention to us by force” motto.

Beyond attention-seeking, let’s talk about the potential personal ambitions of Kim Jong-un and his Regime. Kim is a leader, a divinity to some, and one of the privileged few that gets to look beyond the gates of the Regime. Enter the mind of a man in that position, looking out and knowing his influence has significant limits and that those limits actually threaten the life span of his regime, and thereby, his influence. Wouldn’t that drive you to build a mechanism to gain more, or to at least secure your regime’s future both within the country and the international community? I believe it would. This goes back to the understanding that the regime’s survival is priority number one and, therefore, any and all mechanisms to strengthen it must be pursued, no matter the cost.

Moving on to the next piece of bringing North Korea into the world; allowing their sustained nuclear strike capability. Before we talk about nuclear weapons as a means of communication vs. a threat, let's first acknowledge a few other issues that are likely to come up with a reliable nuclear strike platform. With an increased capability like this, the conventional military threat could be emboldened as well, and the regional stability could be threatened. Additionally, we could see increased rhetoric and open threats as North Korean leaders learned how to negotiate and communicate on the world stage - threats would likely be their default response. Further, we could see an intrepid nuclear-capable regime backtrack or cheat on negotiated deals, which could deteriorate security worldwide. These, and many more, are all risks we must acknowledge and account for. We must be heavily involved in the management of regime actions as they move forward as a nuclear power.

Now, with all that we have outlined here - the changes in the assumptions and the changes in focus from country to the regime - we can talk about nuclear capability in North Korea as a potential conduit of communication rather than strictly a threat. Acknowledging their nuclear capability and immediately bringing them into established frameworks for nuclear capable countries could potentially open lines of communication that have not yet been achieved. With a strong deterrence in his pocket from “western interdiction”, Kim could possibly be more willing to establish norms and predictability in their military exercises and actions as they attempt to garner an image of a world player. To circle back to Victor Cha’s article, these lines of communication will likely never be directly with the U.S. or “West” due to the regime’s lack of trust, but would more likely be directed through China. However, the closer the regime gets to established frameworks, the closer those lines of communication can become.

Years of attempting to deter a nuclear North Korea have seem to have little effect, and the time for acknowledging their capability may be presenting itself. So, there are interesting questions that need to be asked. If Kim Jong-un has his desired nuclear program with strike capabilities around the world, could that actually be the missing piece that brings him within the international framework? Will it actually be the conduit that brings stability to the regime and, thereby, the entire region of North Korea? Or are we actually sitting at the brink of a mad-man ready to destroy the world? Either way, these are two extremely interesting and important questions.

What do you think?


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Luke Jenkins is an Active Duty Army officer and founder of OweYaa.com, a veteran service organization. He is a passionate student of strategy and matters relating to national defense strategy. This article reflects his personal analysis and thoughts and does not reflect an official stance of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or any organization related to national defense framework.

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[1] https://www.csis.org/analysis/right-way-play-china-card-north-korea
[2] https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework
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