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29 Aug. 1862: 2d Battle of Bull Run (Manassas) - Day 2.
Shortly after Day 2 dawned, Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson met with General Lee to discuss how he planned to delay Maj. Gen. John Pope’s Army of Virginia until Maj. Gen. James Longstreet was able to tie in his corps arriving from Thoroughfare Gap on Jackson’s right flank.
Jackson said he would respond to Union attacks with quick, violent counterattacks intended to keep Pope’s units bottled up until Longstreet could launch an attack on Pope’s left flank and roll it up.
The only hitch was the typical “fog of war” that tends to cause plans to quickly change. On the Union side, Pope labored under the misapprehension that Jackson’s retreat from Brawner’s Farm the night before meant he was intent on withdrawing and that the fact Longstreet’s corps was not present meant that it was nowhere near. On the Confederate side, Longstreet could not be convinced of the need to start offensive action before he was able to displace his units on favorable terrain and then assault the next day. Longstreet was clearly operating with a clear head as the lateness of his corps’ arrival would have forced him to rush into action with too little daylight left. It was a point he successfully sold to General Lee.
Pope, on the other hand, did not have a clear picture of the enemy’s intent or dispositions. Moreover, this uncertainty crept into his communications with subordinate commanders who were granted too much leeway as to the actions they should take.
The net result was that the day ended with Union units battered and exhausted after suffering heavy casualties and the Confederates in high spirits and ready to go on the offensive when 30 Aug. dawned, albeit they were down three more brigade commanders who had been wounded in Jackson’s corps: Brig. Gens. Charles Field and Isaac Trimble, and Col. Henry Forno.
For more details, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Bull_Run#August_29:_Jackson_defends_Stony_Ridge
ILLUSTRATIONS: (1) Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson receives word that General Lee is coming to meet with him while checking his units along Stony Ridge. (2) Jackson describes his plan for defending Stony Ridge until Longstreet’s corps arrives to Lee and Longstreet on the morning of 29 Aug. (3) Stonewall Jackson watches as Brig. Gen. Jubal Early’s brigade moves forward to defend against Maj. Gen. Philip Kearny’s assault in the late afternoon. (4) Union sharpshooters prepare to take a “good shot” from the woods on the front slope of Mathews Hill facing Stony Ridge. (5) 2d Bull Run, 29 Aug. 1862, Sigel's Attack at 1000 hrs. (6) 2d Bull Run, 29 Aug. 1862, Longstreet's Corps Arrives as Porter;s Corps Stalls, 1200 hrs. (7) 2d Bull Run, 29 Aug. 1862, Grover's Attack at 1500 hrs. (8) 2d Bull Run, 29 Aug. 1862, Kearny's Attack & Hood vs, Hatch, 1700-1900 hrs.
Shortly after Day 2 dawned, Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson met with General Lee to discuss how he planned to delay Maj. Gen. John Pope’s Army of Virginia until Maj. Gen. James Longstreet was able to tie in his corps arriving from Thoroughfare Gap on Jackson’s right flank.
Jackson said he would respond to Union attacks with quick, violent counterattacks intended to keep Pope’s units bottled up until Longstreet could launch an attack on Pope’s left flank and roll it up.
The only hitch was the typical “fog of war” that tends to cause plans to quickly change. On the Union side, Pope labored under the misapprehension that Jackson’s retreat from Brawner’s Farm the night before meant he was intent on withdrawing and that the fact Longstreet’s corps was not present meant that it was nowhere near. On the Confederate side, Longstreet could not be convinced of the need to start offensive action before he was able to displace his units on favorable terrain and then assault the next day. Longstreet was clearly operating with a clear head as the lateness of his corps’ arrival would have forced him to rush into action with too little daylight left. It was a point he successfully sold to General Lee.
Pope, on the other hand, did not have a clear picture of the enemy’s intent or dispositions. Moreover, this uncertainty crept into his communications with subordinate commanders who were granted too much leeway as to the actions they should take.
The net result was that the day ended with Union units battered and exhausted after suffering heavy casualties and the Confederates in high spirits and ready to go on the offensive when 30 Aug. dawned, albeit they were down three more brigade commanders who had been wounded in Jackson’s corps: Brig. Gens. Charles Field and Isaac Trimble, and Col. Henry Forno.
For more details, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Bull_Run#August_29:_Jackson_defends_Stony_Ridge
ILLUSTRATIONS: (1) Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson receives word that General Lee is coming to meet with him while checking his units along Stony Ridge. (2) Jackson describes his plan for defending Stony Ridge until Longstreet’s corps arrives to Lee and Longstreet on the morning of 29 Aug. (3) Stonewall Jackson watches as Brig. Gen. Jubal Early’s brigade moves forward to defend against Maj. Gen. Philip Kearny’s assault in the late afternoon. (4) Union sharpshooters prepare to take a “good shot” from the woods on the front slope of Mathews Hill facing Stony Ridge. (5) 2d Bull Run, 29 Aug. 1862, Sigel's Attack at 1000 hrs. (6) 2d Bull Run, 29 Aug. 1862, Longstreet's Corps Arrives as Porter;s Corps Stalls, 1200 hrs. (7) 2d Bull Run, 29 Aug. 1862, Grover's Attack at 1500 hrs. (8) 2d Bull Run, 29 Aug. 1862, Kearny's Attack & Hood vs, Hatch, 1700-1900 hrs.
Civil War
Manassas
Military History
Edited 22 d ago
Posted 22 d ago
Responses: 6
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It's amazing how armies respond to the 'fog of war'. Up to Gettysburg, the Confederates seemed to have the upper hand every time things didn't go as planned. Then comes Gettysburg and suddenly the Federal troops were able to use it to their advantage. I believe both sides were able to do this because of great leadership at every level.
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SSG Robert Pratt
I believe Stonewall Jackson's death following Chancellorsville was a major blow to Lee's army and one of the possible reasons for their poor performance at Gettysburg.
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MAJ Dale E. Wilson, Ph.D.
SSG Robert Pratt - I agree with both of you. Meade proved to be a good corrective at Gettysburg. Lee was in a real funk after Jackson's loss. Had he been willing to trust Longstreet the way he had Jackson, things would have turned out differently at Gettysburg. Once Grant arrived on the scene, the CSA's fate was sealed . . .
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Battle Of Bull Run Pictures from theFirst Battle Of Bull Run of the American Civil War This sketch was made during the battle by Alfred Ward. It
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MAJ Dale E. Wilson, Ph.D.
Nice selection, but all are of the 21 July 1861 battle rather than this three-day matchup. . . .
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SSG William Jones
MAJ Dale E. Wilson, Ph.D.
Right. The 1st Battle of Manassas lends foundation and insight for the 2nd.
Right. The 1st Battle of Manassas lends foundation and insight for the 2nd.
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MAJ Dale E. Wilson, Ph.D.
Yankees named battles after neighboring rivers most of the time; the rebels after towns. Hence Bull Run vs. Manassas, Antietam vs. Sharpsburg and several others.
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