Posted on Sep 15, 2016
Introduction of the Tank in World War I | Greatest Tank Battles
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First time Tanks are used in warfare. September 15, 1916. Battle of the Somme.
http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-i/battle-of-the-somme
http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-i/battle-of-the-somme
WWI
Tanks
Warfare
Military History
World History
Edited 8 y ago
Posted 8 y ago
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Thanks for honoring the introduction of the British and Canadian tanks at the Battle of the Somme SGT John " Mac " McConnell Here is the rest of the story plus a map of the objective for the tanks ad a couple images.
"On the far left of the British offensive, the Canadian 2nd Division (with 6 tanks) was to attack in an easterly direction (along the Albert-Bapaume road) and then swing north to capture the fortified village of Courcelette. The 3rd Canadian Division (without tanks) would make a subsidiary attack north and westward, toward the much feared and heavily contested Mouquet Farm (“Mucky” Farm in the parlance of a wry trench soldier). This attack was designed mainly to cover the left flank of 2nd Division’s advance.
The main British attack, to the south-east of the Canadians – where the cavalry was waiting to win the war – was carried out by III Corps made up of 8 British divisions and the New Zealand Division.
Such a new weapon was the tank that the men who commanded, drove, and manned the guns didn’t even have a proper unit that bore the name ‘Tank’ or ‘Armoured’. At this early stage, tankers were part of the Machine Gun Corps, then more specifically, as of May 1916, the ‘Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps’, wearing the familiar crossed Vickers guns as their cap badges. To say the tank had been rushed into production would be an understatement – the very first prototype trundled out of the factory on 13 January 1916. Eight months later a force of 47 tanks (a pitifully small number according to most) would take part in this historic Battle of Flers-Courcelette.
The Mark I tank came in two variants – ‘Male’ and ‘Female’. The Male tank’s armament was two quick-firing 6-pounder naval guns mounted in a sponson on each side of the hull, and 4 Hotchkiss machine guns. The tank weighed in at 28 tons. The Female carried 5 Vickers and 1 Hotchkiss machine guns and weighed a svelte 27 tons. The 105hp Daimler engine could propel the beasts at (as listed) 4 mph over unbroken ground but given the pockmarked visage of the Somme, it would be more like 1.5 or 2 mph – at best. In other words, the Mark I trundled much slower across the battlefield than an infantry soldier in full kit attacking across no-man’s-land.
Infantry moves off with armour for the first time in history in what would become known as the Battle of Flers-Courcelette. Notice the awkward steering aid wheels attached to the rear of the Mark I tank.
Infantry moves off with armour for the first time in history in what would become known as the Battle of Flers-Courcelette. Notice the awkward steering aid wheels attached to the rear of the Mark I tank. The cage on top was to prevent grenades from being tossed on top of the tank. Notice the open hatch behind the 6-pounder sponson. (Photo: IWM Q5575)
The Canadian allotment for the Battle of Flers-Courcelette was 6 tanks, to be used only as part of the initial assault. There is a report that had the number of tanks at 7 (one in reserve, which would be VERY odd) but the number 6 seems more likely. The 6 rhomboid-shaped behemoths of No. 1 Section, C Company, HSMGC were all given names of refined French drinks that began with the letter C – Champagne, Cognac, Chartreuse, Chablis, Crème de Menthe and Cordon Rouge. The 6 went into action with the 2nd Canadian Division in two groups of three. The first group – Champagne (Male), Cognac (Female) and Cordon Rouge (Female) – were assigned to the 6th Brigade on the division’s northern flank. As part of 4th Brigade, the second group – Crème de Menthe (Male), Chartreuse (Male) and Chablis (Female) – were to attack, one on, and the other two astride, the Albert-Bapaume road.
In the northern sector it was decided that the 3 tanks attached to 6th Brigade would move off with the infantry, under the cover of the standard artillery creeping barrage, adopted as necessary for ANY advance to have a chance of succeeding. Since they were slower than a foot soldier, the tanks were to ‘mop up’ any pockets of resistance the infantry had bypassed, a role at this stage in their development to which they were ideally suited.
On the 4th Brigade front, the 3 tanks moved off before the infantry. Even though they were slower than an advancing infantryman, 100-meter wide artillery-free ‘lanes’ were left in the creeping barrage for fear of stray shrapnel striking the new tanks – which they would have no doubt survived. Thus, the creeping barrage – the one weapon BEST SUITED to protect the infantry who would be advancing in the wake of the tanks – was denied the infantry in the hope that this untried tracked weapon of questionable reliability would be an adequate substitute. As Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson so bluntly put it, “The arrival of the tank was now causing confusion where none had existed before”.
Tactics involving armoured vehicles were ‘somewhat unevolved’ would also state the obvious. Though the Army Commanders (Rawlinson and Gough) had seen ‘displays’ of the tanks in France, and it was assumed that they had read the few pages on suggested implementation of tanks in combat by Lt. Col. E.D Swinton (the ‘Father” of the tank) and had impressed their Corps Commanders to do the same, this may not have been the case. Addressing this issue, historian Trevor Pidgeon writes, “These men knew next to nothing about the new weapon, its technical characteristics and limitations, and were unable to contribute significantly to the debate. Pulteney’s (III Corps commander) decision to send the tanks through High Wood was a display of arrogance born of ignorance.” Add to this that much of the time tank crews should have been training with the infantry (and working on basic co-ordination with the artillery), instead was spent parading before staff officers, curious about the new weapon. Many of the tanks that showed up for battle were worn out and their crews dead beat. One veteran later recalled, “… if only we had been able to reconnoiter… if only there had been some proper practice over ground that was like the Somme: and if only we had had a little more sleep and a little less showing off, what a marvelous story this Somme battle might have been.”
At 06:20 – Zero Hour, the Canadians of 6th Brigade and their iron-clad British friends were off. For the infantry, the attacks went very well. The initial barrage had performed wonderfully and the scores of German dead and wounded the Canadians found in the front line trenches bore witness. The tankers on the other hand, had a different view of the barrage. The ground was so churned up — over weeks, not just days — by the artillery, getting going was a trial.
Champagne and Cognac got stuck shortly after crossing Sugar Trench and their crews abandoned what would have been sitting ducks, despite their crews’ valiant attempts to extricate the machines from the moonscape. It was here that the only casualty to any tank crews attached to the Canadians occurred. A shell killed Pte. H. Brotherwood just as Champagne’s commander, Lt. Wheeler, had told his men to abandon the tank. Brotherwood is buried at Pozières Military Cemetery.
C6 (Cordon Rouge), after its successful debut, trundles down the Albert-Bapaume road back towards Albert, cheered on. C6 (Cordon Rouge), after its successful debut, trundles down the Albert-Bapaume road back towards Albert, cheered on. (Photo: Tank Museum 410)
Cordon Rouge, the last of 6th Brigade’s three tanks, however, was having a much better time of it. The tank made it across the German front line trench and drove alongside Sugar Trench, silencing several machine gun posts as it went. That done, it circled southwest, crossing the Brigade boundary, returning down along the Albert-Bapaume Road up which the 4th Brigade was attacking, taking care of any pockets of resistance left behind by the infantry. The tank’s commander, 2/Lt. J. Allen was later awarded the Military Cross for his actions on the 15th.
Along the Albert-Bapaume Road the 3 tanks with 4th Brigade had a similar success-failure ratio. Chartreuse had trouble getting forward because of shell damage to its steering gear. A short time later, the engine seized and the crew was forced to abandon her. Chablis lost its left track shortly after its start and it too was left on the field. Crème de Menthe had considerable success however, making it to the Sugar Factory (a considerable strong point, just south of Coucelette and north of the main road), providing excellent support to the 20th (Central Ontario) and 21st (Eastern Ontario) Battalions fighting in the ruined factory. The tank’s 6-pounders destroyed walls and dealt with the machine guns behind them. The commander of this tank, Capt. A. M. Inglis was to receive the Distinguished Service Order for his part in the historic attack.
In July 1916, Bovill was transferred from the Royal Artillery (where he was a driver) to the Canadian War Records Office where he became official cameraman as a lieutenant. Bovill was with the Canadians in the front line during the battle for Courcelette, and was even witnessed by the Germans there. With such evidence this film footage is generally considered the real thing and not staged in a safe location. Creme de Menthe's attack along the Albert-Bapaume road proved integral to the fighting around the ruined Sugar Factory, helping to ensure good gains by the Canadian infantry.
C5 (Creme de Menthe) is advancing to the attack in this still frame from a film sequence probably taken by British-born cameraman Oscar Bovill. In July 1916, Bovill was transferred from the Royal Artillery (where he was a driver) to the Canadian War Records Office where he became official cameraman as a lieutenant. Bovill was with the Canadians in the front line during the battle for Courcelette, and was even witnessed by the Germans there. With such evidence this film footage is generally considered the real thing and not staged in a safe location. Creme de Menthe's attack along the Albert-Bapaume road proved integral to the fighting around the ruined Sugar Factory, helping to ensure good gains by the Canadian infantry. (Source: IWM 2044)
The 6 tanks attached to 2nd Division played no part in the actual capture of Courcelette, which was to fall later that day to the Canadians of the 5th Brigade which passed through the 4th and 6th Brigades and swept into the village (with the 7th Brigade of the 3rd Division on its left flank).
Ironically, the Canadian attack had succeeded where the British attack to the east had not. BEF Commander-in-Chief Haig would, alas, not be able to ‘push the cavalry through’ to the open country and Berlin beyond. Haig’s old-fangled dreams of victorious horse-mounted troopers would never again be realized. While the tank’s outing at Flers-Courcelette proved tactically ineffective, it was seen as an important if awkward first step in the evolution of Combined Arms. It wouldn’t be for another 14 months that an improved model of British tank would play a pivotal and successful role in an Allied offensive — at Cambrai on 20 November 1917. Even at Cambrai, Haig clung on to the notion of cavalry as saviour, but Cambrai was a triumph for the tank and a humiliation for the horse. The vaunted cavalry’s days were numbered."
COL Mikel J. Burroughs LTC Stephen C. Capt Seid Waddell CW5 (Join to see) CW5 Charlie Poulton SGM David W. Carr LOM, DMSM MP SGT SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL SFC William Farrell SSgt Robert Marx SSG James J. Palmer IV aka "JP4" SSgt (Join to see) TSgt Joe C. SGT (Join to see) SP5 Mark Kuzinski SGT Forrest Stewart SGT Robert Hawks SPC (Join to see) SrA Christopher Wright
http://mapleleafup.ca/ww1/sommetanks.html
"On the far left of the British offensive, the Canadian 2nd Division (with 6 tanks) was to attack in an easterly direction (along the Albert-Bapaume road) and then swing north to capture the fortified village of Courcelette. The 3rd Canadian Division (without tanks) would make a subsidiary attack north and westward, toward the much feared and heavily contested Mouquet Farm (“Mucky” Farm in the parlance of a wry trench soldier). This attack was designed mainly to cover the left flank of 2nd Division’s advance.
The main British attack, to the south-east of the Canadians – where the cavalry was waiting to win the war – was carried out by III Corps made up of 8 British divisions and the New Zealand Division.
Such a new weapon was the tank that the men who commanded, drove, and manned the guns didn’t even have a proper unit that bore the name ‘Tank’ or ‘Armoured’. At this early stage, tankers were part of the Machine Gun Corps, then more specifically, as of May 1916, the ‘Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps’, wearing the familiar crossed Vickers guns as their cap badges. To say the tank had been rushed into production would be an understatement – the very first prototype trundled out of the factory on 13 January 1916. Eight months later a force of 47 tanks (a pitifully small number according to most) would take part in this historic Battle of Flers-Courcelette.
The Mark I tank came in two variants – ‘Male’ and ‘Female’. The Male tank’s armament was two quick-firing 6-pounder naval guns mounted in a sponson on each side of the hull, and 4 Hotchkiss machine guns. The tank weighed in at 28 tons. The Female carried 5 Vickers and 1 Hotchkiss machine guns and weighed a svelte 27 tons. The 105hp Daimler engine could propel the beasts at (as listed) 4 mph over unbroken ground but given the pockmarked visage of the Somme, it would be more like 1.5 or 2 mph – at best. In other words, the Mark I trundled much slower across the battlefield than an infantry soldier in full kit attacking across no-man’s-land.
Infantry moves off with armour for the first time in history in what would become known as the Battle of Flers-Courcelette. Notice the awkward steering aid wheels attached to the rear of the Mark I tank.
Infantry moves off with armour for the first time in history in what would become known as the Battle of Flers-Courcelette. Notice the awkward steering aid wheels attached to the rear of the Mark I tank. The cage on top was to prevent grenades from being tossed on top of the tank. Notice the open hatch behind the 6-pounder sponson. (Photo: IWM Q5575)
The Canadian allotment for the Battle of Flers-Courcelette was 6 tanks, to be used only as part of the initial assault. There is a report that had the number of tanks at 7 (one in reserve, which would be VERY odd) but the number 6 seems more likely. The 6 rhomboid-shaped behemoths of No. 1 Section, C Company, HSMGC were all given names of refined French drinks that began with the letter C – Champagne, Cognac, Chartreuse, Chablis, Crème de Menthe and Cordon Rouge. The 6 went into action with the 2nd Canadian Division in two groups of three. The first group – Champagne (Male), Cognac (Female) and Cordon Rouge (Female) – were assigned to the 6th Brigade on the division’s northern flank. As part of 4th Brigade, the second group – Crème de Menthe (Male), Chartreuse (Male) and Chablis (Female) – were to attack, one on, and the other two astride, the Albert-Bapaume road.
In the northern sector it was decided that the 3 tanks attached to 6th Brigade would move off with the infantry, under the cover of the standard artillery creeping barrage, adopted as necessary for ANY advance to have a chance of succeeding. Since they were slower than a foot soldier, the tanks were to ‘mop up’ any pockets of resistance the infantry had bypassed, a role at this stage in their development to which they were ideally suited.
On the 4th Brigade front, the 3 tanks moved off before the infantry. Even though they were slower than an advancing infantryman, 100-meter wide artillery-free ‘lanes’ were left in the creeping barrage for fear of stray shrapnel striking the new tanks – which they would have no doubt survived. Thus, the creeping barrage – the one weapon BEST SUITED to protect the infantry who would be advancing in the wake of the tanks – was denied the infantry in the hope that this untried tracked weapon of questionable reliability would be an adequate substitute. As Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson so bluntly put it, “The arrival of the tank was now causing confusion where none had existed before”.
Tactics involving armoured vehicles were ‘somewhat unevolved’ would also state the obvious. Though the Army Commanders (Rawlinson and Gough) had seen ‘displays’ of the tanks in France, and it was assumed that they had read the few pages on suggested implementation of tanks in combat by Lt. Col. E.D Swinton (the ‘Father” of the tank) and had impressed their Corps Commanders to do the same, this may not have been the case. Addressing this issue, historian Trevor Pidgeon writes, “These men knew next to nothing about the new weapon, its technical characteristics and limitations, and were unable to contribute significantly to the debate. Pulteney’s (III Corps commander) decision to send the tanks through High Wood was a display of arrogance born of ignorance.” Add to this that much of the time tank crews should have been training with the infantry (and working on basic co-ordination with the artillery), instead was spent parading before staff officers, curious about the new weapon. Many of the tanks that showed up for battle were worn out and their crews dead beat. One veteran later recalled, “… if only we had been able to reconnoiter… if only there had been some proper practice over ground that was like the Somme: and if only we had had a little more sleep and a little less showing off, what a marvelous story this Somme battle might have been.”
At 06:20 – Zero Hour, the Canadians of 6th Brigade and their iron-clad British friends were off. For the infantry, the attacks went very well. The initial barrage had performed wonderfully and the scores of German dead and wounded the Canadians found in the front line trenches bore witness. The tankers on the other hand, had a different view of the barrage. The ground was so churned up — over weeks, not just days — by the artillery, getting going was a trial.
Champagne and Cognac got stuck shortly after crossing Sugar Trench and their crews abandoned what would have been sitting ducks, despite their crews’ valiant attempts to extricate the machines from the moonscape. It was here that the only casualty to any tank crews attached to the Canadians occurred. A shell killed Pte. H. Brotherwood just as Champagne’s commander, Lt. Wheeler, had told his men to abandon the tank. Brotherwood is buried at Pozières Military Cemetery.
C6 (Cordon Rouge), after its successful debut, trundles down the Albert-Bapaume road back towards Albert, cheered on. C6 (Cordon Rouge), after its successful debut, trundles down the Albert-Bapaume road back towards Albert, cheered on. (Photo: Tank Museum 410)
Cordon Rouge, the last of 6th Brigade’s three tanks, however, was having a much better time of it. The tank made it across the German front line trench and drove alongside Sugar Trench, silencing several machine gun posts as it went. That done, it circled southwest, crossing the Brigade boundary, returning down along the Albert-Bapaume Road up which the 4th Brigade was attacking, taking care of any pockets of resistance left behind by the infantry. The tank’s commander, 2/Lt. J. Allen was later awarded the Military Cross for his actions on the 15th.
Along the Albert-Bapaume Road the 3 tanks with 4th Brigade had a similar success-failure ratio. Chartreuse had trouble getting forward because of shell damage to its steering gear. A short time later, the engine seized and the crew was forced to abandon her. Chablis lost its left track shortly after its start and it too was left on the field. Crème de Menthe had considerable success however, making it to the Sugar Factory (a considerable strong point, just south of Coucelette and north of the main road), providing excellent support to the 20th (Central Ontario) and 21st (Eastern Ontario) Battalions fighting in the ruined factory. The tank’s 6-pounders destroyed walls and dealt with the machine guns behind them. The commander of this tank, Capt. A. M. Inglis was to receive the Distinguished Service Order for his part in the historic attack.
In July 1916, Bovill was transferred from the Royal Artillery (where he was a driver) to the Canadian War Records Office where he became official cameraman as a lieutenant. Bovill was with the Canadians in the front line during the battle for Courcelette, and was even witnessed by the Germans there. With such evidence this film footage is generally considered the real thing and not staged in a safe location. Creme de Menthe's attack along the Albert-Bapaume road proved integral to the fighting around the ruined Sugar Factory, helping to ensure good gains by the Canadian infantry.
C5 (Creme de Menthe) is advancing to the attack in this still frame from a film sequence probably taken by British-born cameraman Oscar Bovill. In July 1916, Bovill was transferred from the Royal Artillery (where he was a driver) to the Canadian War Records Office where he became official cameraman as a lieutenant. Bovill was with the Canadians in the front line during the battle for Courcelette, and was even witnessed by the Germans there. With such evidence this film footage is generally considered the real thing and not staged in a safe location. Creme de Menthe's attack along the Albert-Bapaume road proved integral to the fighting around the ruined Sugar Factory, helping to ensure good gains by the Canadian infantry. (Source: IWM 2044)
The 6 tanks attached to 2nd Division played no part in the actual capture of Courcelette, which was to fall later that day to the Canadians of the 5th Brigade which passed through the 4th and 6th Brigades and swept into the village (with the 7th Brigade of the 3rd Division on its left flank).
Ironically, the Canadian attack had succeeded where the British attack to the east had not. BEF Commander-in-Chief Haig would, alas, not be able to ‘push the cavalry through’ to the open country and Berlin beyond. Haig’s old-fangled dreams of victorious horse-mounted troopers would never again be realized. While the tank’s outing at Flers-Courcelette proved tactically ineffective, it was seen as an important if awkward first step in the evolution of Combined Arms. It wouldn’t be for another 14 months that an improved model of British tank would play a pivotal and successful role in an Allied offensive — at Cambrai on 20 November 1917. Even at Cambrai, Haig clung on to the notion of cavalry as saviour, but Cambrai was a triumph for the tank and a humiliation for the horse. The vaunted cavalry’s days were numbered."
COL Mikel J. Burroughs LTC Stephen C. Capt Seid Waddell CW5 (Join to see) CW5 Charlie Poulton SGM David W. Carr LOM, DMSM MP SGT SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL SFC William Farrell SSgt Robert Marx SSG James J. Palmer IV aka "JP4" SSgt (Join to see) TSgt Joe C. SGT (Join to see) SP5 Mark Kuzinski SGT Forrest Stewart SGT Robert Hawks SPC (Join to see) SrA Christopher Wright
http://mapleleafup.ca/ww1/sommetanks.html
Infantrymen curiously eye the new British Army weapon – a Mark I ‘tank’ – before its debut in the Battle of Flers-Courcelette on 15 September 1916. Here, a ‘C’ Company ‘Male’ tank, with 6-pounder naval gun in each side sponson, prepares for action with a British unit. (Photo: IWM-Q 5574)
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Winston Churchill was the driving force behind the development of the tank and named it to confuse any enemy that got wind of it. Officially they were self propelled tanks for transporting water to troops in the trenches
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Thanks SGT John " Mac " McConnell those tanks are big and look as scary as the Civil War ironclad LTC Stephen F. has posted.
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