Posted on Sep 10, 2018
Commentary: The US Air Force needs a light attack aircraft
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With all due respect to Rep. Coffman, I disagree for two reasons. His point re: Syria not having "significant anti-aircraft capability" is patently false, with Pantsir 1 and S-400 systems representing state-of-the-art anti-aircraft capability provided by Russia. https://www.businessinsider.com/pantsir-s1-makes-russian-air-defenses-stronger-2018-2
The ZSU 23-4 is also an extremely effective system widely sold and traded around the world, and it would easily take down any light-attack aircraft. The "there's no threat" argument just doesn't hold water. 2nd, the USAF has a major pilot shortage, if you haven't heard already. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/04/11/the-militarys-stunning-fighter-pilot-shortage-one-in-four-billets-is-empty/
What aircraft cockpits does Rep. Coffman plan to leave vacant in order to fill his fleet of light attack airplanes? Where is he getting the additional pilots? This proposal just doesn't add up without a significant shift in policy and resources, and it would come at a loss to the high-end portion of the warfighting spectrum.
The ZSU 23-4 is also an extremely effective system widely sold and traded around the world, and it would easily take down any light-attack aircraft. The "there's no threat" argument just doesn't hold water. 2nd, the USAF has a major pilot shortage, if you haven't heard already. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/04/11/the-militarys-stunning-fighter-pilot-shortage-one-in-four-billets-is-empty/
What aircraft cockpits does Rep. Coffman plan to leave vacant in order to fill his fleet of light attack airplanes? Where is he getting the additional pilots? This proposal just doesn't add up without a significant shift in policy and resources, and it would come at a loss to the high-end portion of the warfighting spectrum.
Commentary: The US Air Force needs a light attack aircraft
Posted from airforcetimes.com
Airplanes
Pilot
Training
Military Budget
Strategy
Posted 6 y ago
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Col Joseph Lenertz speaking from the perspective of one of the little specks on the ground, we need CAS that carries a lethal variety of munitions that can loiter on station for significant periods of time. We would prefer it to be survivable for the air crew so they can get in close and get after it. We won't always have a cooperative enemy, a point on which I think we agree. Fighting a near peer will put us against deliberate arrays of multiple overlapping types of Air Defense and Counter air capabilities. We need these air frames to also be able to fight the deep fires fight so we can dismantle the enemy in depth.
Pick an airframe that works....for each of the services, I think the Marines (less), Army (more), and SOF (more) are the customer here. There is life below 3000 feet AGL. The Air Force was basically forced at gun point to field the A10, its treatment and approach to it bears this out. Trying to continually off ramp the airframe since the 1980s. It's initial design and avionics spartan as not to tie up too much in it as it would be 'gone soon'.
In the great Title 10 and Joint capabilities brawl, the Air Force has kept that mission along with intratheater lift. In the immortal words of Yoda: Do or not do. If the service wants to focus on Air Dominance (i.e. High end) at the exclusion of all else, give the airframes, personnel, and budgets to the Army so they can execute their own CAS. Sound crazy? Not really. That was life before 1947. The Marines fly CAS as part of the MAGTF, the Army could do the same thing as an extension of combined arms operations. Many countries have the mud on the windshield guys separate from the counter air guys.
Pick an airframe that works....for each of the services, I think the Marines (less), Army (more), and SOF (more) are the customer here. There is life below 3000 feet AGL. The Air Force was basically forced at gun point to field the A10, its treatment and approach to it bears this out. Trying to continually off ramp the airframe since the 1980s. It's initial design and avionics spartan as not to tie up too much in it as it would be 'gone soon'.
In the great Title 10 and Joint capabilities brawl, the Air Force has kept that mission along with intratheater lift. In the immortal words of Yoda: Do or not do. If the service wants to focus on Air Dominance (i.e. High end) at the exclusion of all else, give the airframes, personnel, and budgets to the Army so they can execute their own CAS. Sound crazy? Not really. That was life before 1947. The Marines fly CAS as part of the MAGTF, the Army could do the same thing as an extension of combined arms operations. Many countries have the mud on the windshield guys separate from the counter air guys.
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Col Joseph Lenertz
I would enjoy having this discussion in more depth. You are correct that the Army did execute their own fixed wing CAS before 1947. It was a disaster. The North Africa campaign. The term "Penny Packeting" was born. Every commander was assigned an equal but insufficient number of aircraft. No commander, even while in the rear, would share his fixed wing across division lines. The whole concept failed to recognize the unique characteristics of fixed wing aircraft...speed and range. It makes them a theater-level asset in order to make them able to be allocated where needed most. Army Roles and missions, and the prioritization of those within the Army. USAF roles and missions, and the prioritization of those within the USAF. Centralized control and decentralized execution. Allocation and apportionment of theater airpower. Al of these must be understood to have an informed discussion about Air as a co-equal domain. Neither the Army nor the Marines is the Air Force's customer. Like I said, plenty to discuss.
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LTC Jason Mackay
Col Joseph Lenertz if we are prohibited from acquiring the capability organically then we are someone’s customer. That was the outcome of joint capabilities assessment and Title 10 parsing to minimize duplication and force joint ness.
I do t think the WWII era ground air integration outcome is instructive or indicative of how the Army would run it. I think the CCA of rotary wing or the contemporary MAGTF or a yet to be named realization of the dream of AirLand Battle.
I do t think the WWII era ground air integration outcome is instructive or indicative of how the Army would run it. I think the CCA of rotary wing or the contemporary MAGTF or a yet to be named realization of the dream of AirLand Battle.
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If it said "The US Air Force needs a light attack drone", I may have been inclined to give it consideration. But, it doesn't, and it doesn't hold water for the reasons you state. The fact that some member of Congress is promoting the idea makes me even more leery...
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Col Joseph Lenertz
Agree, especially in light of the new policy which allows us to "enlist" enlisted drone pilots.
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I think drones would be the way to go on this. Not airplane seats to be filled.
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