Posted on Jul 12, 2014
Interesting article on the Garrison Army and Mission command
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At least I think it is. In addition to the drawdown, how will the return to garrison/bureaucratic norms impact both the force and retention?
Having seen the 90's, 00's, and the 10's to date (as well as just a bit of the 80's and having been a military brat in the 70's), I have my opinions, but I am interested in yours.
I note that I am currently reading D'Estes' Eisenhower, and there is little that is truly new under the sun.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-armys-next-enemy-peace/2014/07/10/f02b5180-f0dc-11e3-914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html
Having seen the 90's, 00's, and the 10's to date (as well as just a bit of the 80's and having been a military brat in the 70's), I have my opinions, but I am interested in yours.
I note that I am currently reading D'Estes' Eisenhower, and there is little that is truly new under the sun.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-armys-next-enemy-peace/2014/07/10/f02b5180-f0dc-11e3-914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 12
Vince, interesting article.
LTG(Ret) Barno relates his observations about the CSA's comments in 1979 about 'selective disobedience". This hasn't really changed much today in spirit, it's merely in wording. I remember a conversation I with my boss about my job being to manage failure because there were too many requirements to satisfy and not enough resources (time, $$, people, etc) to complete them. It was my job as the commander to figure out which were the 'glass balls' and which were the 'rubber balls'.
I agree with his assessment of risk taking in peacetime being eliminated. We have a larger focus on minimizing risk in garrison to the point that we fail to adequately appreciate the impact of the failure (both good and bad) and instead just look at in a single-minded view that "Failure is bad .. ABSOLUTELY BAD!". From a leadership view, leaders have to be given the opportunity to fail, we just need to ensure that there is something there to ensure that they aren't going to fail catastrophically.
However, I disagree with his views on the technology having corrosive effects being a new thing though. I imagine that Grant was complaining about the corrosive (probably didn't use that word) effects of the telegraph because Lincoln was able to directly and more frequently communicate with him. I do agree with the effects though, but I see the challenge of mitigating those effects as nothing new and something that all leaders throughout the military need to handle.
What's the answer? In order to break the compliance culture that he speaks about (and I agree - it seems we're morphing more and more into that), leaders need to exercise self-control and push-back. How's the saying go? ... Lack of planning on your part doesn't constitute an emergency on my part. Put another way, just because it's important to you doesn't mean it's important to me. I have a job to do and missions to accomplish. If it's important to my organization, mission, or my soldiers, then it's important to me. If some requirement is there but doesn't have the importance ... well, refer to my comments above about my role being to manage failure.
LTG(Ret) Barno relates his observations about the CSA's comments in 1979 about 'selective disobedience". This hasn't really changed much today in spirit, it's merely in wording. I remember a conversation I with my boss about my job being to manage failure because there were too many requirements to satisfy and not enough resources (time, $$, people, etc) to complete them. It was my job as the commander to figure out which were the 'glass balls' and which were the 'rubber balls'.
I agree with his assessment of risk taking in peacetime being eliminated. We have a larger focus on minimizing risk in garrison to the point that we fail to adequately appreciate the impact of the failure (both good and bad) and instead just look at in a single-minded view that "Failure is bad .. ABSOLUTELY BAD!". From a leadership view, leaders have to be given the opportunity to fail, we just need to ensure that there is something there to ensure that they aren't going to fail catastrophically.
However, I disagree with his views on the technology having corrosive effects being a new thing though. I imagine that Grant was complaining about the corrosive (probably didn't use that word) effects of the telegraph because Lincoln was able to directly and more frequently communicate with him. I do agree with the effects though, but I see the challenge of mitigating those effects as nothing new and something that all leaders throughout the military need to handle.
What's the answer? In order to break the compliance culture that he speaks about (and I agree - it seems we're morphing more and more into that), leaders need to exercise self-control and push-back. How's the saying go? ... Lack of planning on your part doesn't constitute an emergency on my part. Put another way, just because it's important to you doesn't mean it's important to me. I have a job to do and missions to accomplish. If it's important to my organization, mission, or my soldiers, then it's important to me. If some requirement is there but doesn't have the importance ... well, refer to my comments above about my role being to manage failure.
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A failure to do the same today would exact high costs. As a young captain with multiple combat deployments recently told me: “They won’t have to shrink the force; lots of great people will leave because they are going to make it too painful for them to stay.”
The above sums up the article well. The military IS losing its best and brightest but the politicians don't care. Why?
I do disagree with one thing. The headline. The enemy isn't going to be peace. It will be ourselves.
The above sums up the article well. The military IS losing its best and brightest but the politicians don't care. Why?
I do disagree with one thing. The headline. The enemy isn't going to be peace. It will be ourselves.
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SSG (Join to see)
MSG, the truth IS the truth whether one chooses to believe it or not. The fact is I PERSONALLY have NOT nor will EVER cheapen promotions, retention or awards. The fact is those already HAVE been cheapened. I can speak from personal experience of seeing many personnel getting promoted, undeservedly. Many of them don't even KNOW their jobs yet they get promoted. This goes from promotions to E4 all the way to E8. I also know of other NCOs and Officers who have THEIR experiences with the same. Just because you personally don't see it doesn't mean it doesn't exist. I mention awards too because it's in the same category. They have been highly cheapened. That's not me doing it, that's just me stating a fact.
Just to be clear, I am NOT saying any of the above to be disrespectful or even spiteful towards you or other seniors. I'm only stating what is the truth. I would respectfully ask you to answer this question. Have you ever seen personnel get promoted who did not deserve it for whatever reason, whether incompetence, previous criminal actions, etc? Whether you wish to post the answer on here or not is up to you. All I request is some introspection.
One final thought, I will be the first to admit, and I have stated this multiple times before, that I have an AAM that I did NOT deserve. It was a cheapened award for "participating" in a deployment.
Just to be clear, I am NOT saying any of the above to be disrespectful or even spiteful towards you or other seniors. I'm only stating what is the truth. I would respectfully ask you to answer this question. Have you ever seen personnel get promoted who did not deserve it for whatever reason, whether incompetence, previous criminal actions, etc? Whether you wish to post the answer on here or not is up to you. All I request is some introspection.
One final thought, I will be the first to admit, and I have stated this multiple times before, that I have an AAM that I did NOT deserve. It was a cheapened award for "participating" in a deployment.
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I was asked in another forum how one goes about countering the trends listed in the article. My answer was as follows:
It really gets down to prioritization (focus groups better than "selective disobedience" among Flag Officers. ), knowing "what hill you're willing to die on", and moral courage.
You need to know your unit, what is important to its performance, and what isn't. You have to ensure that the important things get done and get to the unimportant things when and as they can be fit in - or not.
The trick is this may ruin your OER and end your career. Seniors may not appreciate your waving the BS flag. Especially about what they just stated was the "Army's #1 priority" of the day.
I have more than once informed a senior "Roger, understood, not doing it." As I have always had strong reasoning, that has worked when I've played that card (which has NOT been often). That said, I am a reservist and the Army isn't my livelihood. I acknowledge that I might not have done so were my ability to pay the mortgage impacted. I like to think I would, but I don't know that I would.
It really gets down to prioritization (focus groups better than "selective disobedience" among Flag Officers. ), knowing "what hill you're willing to die on", and moral courage.
You need to know your unit, what is important to its performance, and what isn't. You have to ensure that the important things get done and get to the unimportant things when and as they can be fit in - or not.
The trick is this may ruin your OER and end your career. Seniors may not appreciate your waving the BS flag. Especially about what they just stated was the "Army's #1 priority" of the day.
I have more than once informed a senior "Roger, understood, not doing it." As I have always had strong reasoning, that has worked when I've played that card (which has NOT been often). That said, I am a reservist and the Army isn't my livelihood. I acknowledge that I might not have done so were my ability to pay the mortgage impacted. I like to think I would, but I don't know that I would.
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I understand his concern, especially towards the end of the article. First, he is concerned about losing good combat leaders. Secondly, he is concerned with a bureaucracy focused Army that will become stagnant with rules regulations and lose focus on intense training.
One thing is certain, no matter how the politicians try to paint the picture, there will always be conflict. It is for this purpose the military exists, and they should train like it was the real thing.
One thing is certain, no matter how the politicians try to paint the picture, there will always be conflict. It is for this purpose the military exists, and they should train like it was the real thing.
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Like Vincent says, "... little that is truly new under the sun". We humans have a behavioral-psychology tendency to ignore history and believe that we're the first to deal with these issues.
I think a peacetime military will be very frustrating for training because we won't be able to use a realistic amount of fuel & ammunition. During the next war, this deficiency will kill a lot of good people who developed bad combat habits (which saved their scarce training budgets). The "good" news is that technology and simulators are finally picking up the slack, although admittedly they may just develop a new generation of bad habits.
As for zero-risk leadership: on 8 December 1941, the U.S. Navy's submarine force went to war with three decades of flawed attack tactics and with severe torpedo design/material problems that required three years to fix. Nearly a third of the commanding officers were fired during 1942 for being "too conservative" and not risking the boat (and the crew). Over the next 45 months, we lost a quarter of the force. Yet despite the horrifying incompetence and attrition, enough risk-takers emerged (in all ranks) to get the job done. Those people were there during the whole peacetime, but they had to stay out of trouble until their skill set was approved for wartime use.
I think peacetime risk-taking should involve a lot of communication with the chain of command. Get your ideas out there, try to spend some money on them, at a minimum run a command-post exercise to see if it works in simulations. But don't throw surprise parties for the boss (or the troops)-- especially when it costs $250K just to set up that exercise or operation. Don't deviate from the plan and claim that it's "initiative" or "disruptive innovation". Just ask questions during the AARs and get your thoughts in the journals and magazines and websites and do as much as you can to validate them-- so that people can rediscover them during the next war.
Garrison forces are a good thing. I hope that we can devote entire careers to training without ever having to fight wars. In fact, I hope that we can shrink the active-duty forces to such a compact level that Congress and the NCA would be unable to start an offensive war without months of diplomacy. Heaven forbid that the State Department and the NSC should actually do their work without DoD's "help".
I think a peacetime military will be very frustrating for training because we won't be able to use a realistic amount of fuel & ammunition. During the next war, this deficiency will kill a lot of good people who developed bad combat habits (which saved their scarce training budgets). The "good" news is that technology and simulators are finally picking up the slack, although admittedly they may just develop a new generation of bad habits.
As for zero-risk leadership: on 8 December 1941, the U.S. Navy's submarine force went to war with three decades of flawed attack tactics and with severe torpedo design/material problems that required three years to fix. Nearly a third of the commanding officers were fired during 1942 for being "too conservative" and not risking the boat (and the crew). Over the next 45 months, we lost a quarter of the force. Yet despite the horrifying incompetence and attrition, enough risk-takers emerged (in all ranks) to get the job done. Those people were there during the whole peacetime, but they had to stay out of trouble until their skill set was approved for wartime use.
I think peacetime risk-taking should involve a lot of communication with the chain of command. Get your ideas out there, try to spend some money on them, at a minimum run a command-post exercise to see if it works in simulations. But don't throw surprise parties for the boss (or the troops)-- especially when it costs $250K just to set up that exercise or operation. Don't deviate from the plan and claim that it's "initiative" or "disruptive innovation". Just ask questions during the AARs and get your thoughts in the journals and magazines and websites and do as much as you can to validate them-- so that people can rediscover them during the next war.
Garrison forces are a good thing. I hope that we can devote entire careers to training without ever having to fight wars. In fact, I hope that we can shrink the active-duty forces to such a compact level that Congress and the NCA would be unable to start an offensive war without months of diplomacy. Heaven forbid that the State Department and the NSC should actually do their work without DoD's "help".
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It is true that the majority of our force today knows nothing of a peace time army. I think it is a time to take a knee and focus on developing and educating our future leaders.
It is also a time to truly reflect on lessons learned to ensure our leaders tomorrow don't make the same mistakes that we did. Good article.
It is also a time to truly reflect on lessons learned to ensure our leaders tomorrow don't make the same mistakes that we did. Good article.
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I would say that doctrine would dictate that the BC and CSM at the level appointed would be appropriate, but in real world application the CSM still plays the role assigned were as the LTC can (not always) pander to the masses that is the Staff. Take the "Think on your feet" Mission Command and play it against the Garrison Leadership styles and we fail, same way the other way around. For an adaptable force I would say to "find a middle ground" and lien which ever way we need, mission dependent. Stay strong and fight the fight! Combat proven Soldiers need to stay, they will adapt. A Combat vet make a Soldier, a trainee does not make a combat vet or Soldier regardless of rank. That is not meant to put down ANYONE who has not gone to war, but to make the point of retaining and sustaining our proven forces in this time of need for guidance.
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COL Randall C.
SFC (Join to see) - What the heck are you talking about!?
"but in real world application the CSM still plays the role assigned were as the LTC can (not always) pander to the masses that is the Staff"
I hope to God that this isn't the start of the discussions devolving into the roles, functions of the senior officer and enlisted soldier in a unit and a comparison of their importance.
"but in real world application the CSM still plays the role assigned were as the LTC can (not always) pander to the masses that is the Staff"
I hope to God that this isn't the start of the discussions devolving into the roles, functions of the senior officer and enlisted soldier in a unit and a comparison of their importance.
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I would say that doctrine would dictate that the BC and CSM at the level appointed would be appropriate, but in real world application the CSM still plays the role assigned were as the LTC can (not always) pander to the masses that is the Staff. Take the "Think on your feet" Mission Command and play it against the Garrison Leadership styles and we fail, same way the other way around. For an adaptable force I would say to "find a middle ground" and lien which ever way we need, mission dependent. Stay strong and fight the fight! Combat proven Soldiers need to stay, they will adapt. A Combat vet make a Soldier, a trainee does not make a combat vet or Soldier regardless of rank. That is not meant to put down ANYONE who has not gone to war, but to make the point of retaining and sustaining our proven forces in this time of need for guidance.
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Discussion already started elsewhere - https://www.rallypoint.com/answers/interesting-article-on-the-garrison-army-and-mission-command
Interesting article on the Garrison Army and Mission command | RallyPoint
At least I think it is. In addition to the drawdown, how will the return to garrison/bureaucratic norms impact both the force and retention? Having seen the 90's, 00's, and the 10's to date (as well as just a bit of the 80's and having been a military brat in the 70's), I have my opinions, but I am interested in yours. I note that I am currently reading D'Estes' Eisenhower, and there is little that is truly new under the sun....
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I feel that we are in denial in some aspects. We keep saying we are going "back to the basics" that we overlooked during the "war years". However, I have Soldiers still coming in from basic and AIT who cannot pass ht/wt or APFT. The standards are still not being enforced. We have grown to meet a mission and now are downsizing like we always do after wartime. However, there is debate about the levels if we are dipping too low. One thing I have heard from lower enlisted all the way up is why do we still have so many General Officers? Do we need so many 4 star generals? I cannot cite or quote how many GOs we have compared to WWII, but some argue that we won WWII in multiple theaters with fewer 4 star generals. We cut but in the wrong areas, as they cost the most money, etc.
I think that if we use common sense (bring your own as it is not issued at CIF) we can focus on training and preparing for our next conflict, but if we do not listen to reason we will be out measuring how tall the grass is and making up new regulations and focusing too much on random stuff that really should not matter than on actual training for war. We all know we will have another one some day so train for that as we are a force to deter and to go take action.
I think that if we use common sense (bring your own as it is not issued at CIF) we can focus on training and preparing for our next conflict, but if we do not listen to reason we will be out measuring how tall the grass is and making up new regulations and focusing too much on random stuff that really should not matter than on actual training for war. We all know we will have another one some day so train for that as we are a force to deter and to go take action.
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