Posted on May 1, 2020
How should a historian be utilized by our military?
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https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/March-April-2020/Loveland-Historians/
Some thoughts:
One major point I see us talking about here is strategy. If one can't tell by the vast portion of his sources that are centrally focused on strategic theory, it's evident in the final portion of his article as he brings his thoughts into application:
"Nonlinear systems are those that are far more complex. Actions made in such a system can create effects not easily anticipated since identifying relationships between variables is difficult and properties are not known values... A historian who is an expert on the operational variables can begin to understand the relationship dynamics in the nonlinear systems in which the Army operates."
This gives more substance to the utilization of historians than the simple fact that historians are "experts in causation," as he notes in the beginning. And when we arrive at his conclusion he states that the role of the historian should be shifted from solely focusing on documenting our own organization to that of a position that contributes to operational effectiveness. This is a practical application: history teaches us where we were, where we are, and where we need to be. A former mentor of mine often said, "History may not always repeat itself, but it certainly echoes". If we aren't learning from the mistakes and successes of our predecessors then we are failing as leaders.
The history of tactics and equipment in war are important command considerations, they directly inform the mission in the present. But moreover, historians can be trained experts on society, culture, language, politics, economy, religion, and ethnicity. These factors are a significant part of our operational environment and crucial to not only combat effectiveness, but the reconciliation process that must happen after combat in order to truly resolve the war.
Some thoughts:
One major point I see us talking about here is strategy. If one can't tell by the vast portion of his sources that are centrally focused on strategic theory, it's evident in the final portion of his article as he brings his thoughts into application:
"Nonlinear systems are those that are far more complex. Actions made in such a system can create effects not easily anticipated since identifying relationships between variables is difficult and properties are not known values... A historian who is an expert on the operational variables can begin to understand the relationship dynamics in the nonlinear systems in which the Army operates."
This gives more substance to the utilization of historians than the simple fact that historians are "experts in causation," as he notes in the beginning. And when we arrive at his conclusion he states that the role of the historian should be shifted from solely focusing on documenting our own organization to that of a position that contributes to operational effectiveness. This is a practical application: history teaches us where we were, where we are, and where we need to be. A former mentor of mine often said, "History may not always repeat itself, but it certainly echoes". If we aren't learning from the mistakes and successes of our predecessors then we are failing as leaders.
The history of tactics and equipment in war are important command considerations, they directly inform the mission in the present. But moreover, historians can be trained experts on society, culture, language, politics, economy, religion, and ethnicity. These factors are a significant part of our operational environment and crucial to not only combat effectiveness, but the reconciliation process that must happen after combat in order to truly resolve the war.
Military History
Historian
Strategy
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 8
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To me, an effective historian understands the strategic, operational, and tactical components of war to include doctrine, and Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Let's discuss actions leading up to, during, and after the Battle of the Bulge. Germany was low on supplies, fuel, low on experienced pilots, planes, and the quality of the soldiers were not to their standard, but they still had a large armored force. The US had plenty of supplies, soldiers, vehicles, tanks, and planes as they maneuvered toward Germany.
From Normandy is was slow going for the US due to the terrain and the area was heavily defended. Our Sherman tanks were inferior to German tanks due to the doctrine of Sherman tanks tasked as infantry support vehicles and very little improvement were made to fight the German tanks effectively. When the Battle of the Bulge commenced, the US had air superiority due to the superiority of the P-51 which was also an RMA. It is alleged the P-51s shot down 4,500 German planes and destroyed another 4,500 on the ground. Our lines were thin in many places because Eisenhower wanted a broad front.
At the Battle of the Bulge the Germans threw heavy armor divisions at us with a very limited fuel and supplies. Tactically speaking our fighter planes attrited the German units and attacked supply trains. The 101st and soldiers in the Ardennes Forest fought against the German armor divisions. The soldiers in the Ardennes Forest fell back but never retreated. The Germans eventually ran out of fuel and supplies and they retreated or surrendered en masse. Patton used the tactic of using fighter planes to attrit the enemy and decisively engage the enemy forward of his army. It gave him great intelligence and the freedom of maneuver to attack at his time and place of his choosing. His ability to move the army was unmatched in human history.
This is what I want from a historian. I want the historian to go from the big picture or strategic level to the tactical level. I also expect to learn about doctrine and RMAs that impacted wars. I also want to get a straight answer to why did we have air superiority at the time of the Battle of the Bulge if I asked that question. What were the conditions, plans, doctrine, tactics, RMAs, and other variables that impacted the battlefield, the campaign, and the war. That's my 2 cents.
A historian should be able to discuss the strategic, operational, and tactic aspects and how they are interconnected to paint an accurate picture. Military history can be a deep reservoir of lessons learned for future applications like:
- Tanks fight Tanks.
- Use air power to attrit and fix the enemy before we commit ground forces.
- Use air power to attrit the enemy air force.
- Light infantry need better weapons to fight armor units.
- Ensure supply trains are robust.
- Sometimes we need better intelligence.
-
From Normandy is was slow going for the US due to the terrain and the area was heavily defended. Our Sherman tanks were inferior to German tanks due to the doctrine of Sherman tanks tasked as infantry support vehicles and very little improvement were made to fight the German tanks effectively. When the Battle of the Bulge commenced, the US had air superiority due to the superiority of the P-51 which was also an RMA. It is alleged the P-51s shot down 4,500 German planes and destroyed another 4,500 on the ground. Our lines were thin in many places because Eisenhower wanted a broad front.
At the Battle of the Bulge the Germans threw heavy armor divisions at us with a very limited fuel and supplies. Tactically speaking our fighter planes attrited the German units and attacked supply trains. The 101st and soldiers in the Ardennes Forest fought against the German armor divisions. The soldiers in the Ardennes Forest fell back but never retreated. The Germans eventually ran out of fuel and supplies and they retreated or surrendered en masse. Patton used the tactic of using fighter planes to attrit the enemy and decisively engage the enemy forward of his army. It gave him great intelligence and the freedom of maneuver to attack at his time and place of his choosing. His ability to move the army was unmatched in human history.
This is what I want from a historian. I want the historian to go from the big picture or strategic level to the tactical level. I also expect to learn about doctrine and RMAs that impacted wars. I also want to get a straight answer to why did we have air superiority at the time of the Battle of the Bulge if I asked that question. What were the conditions, plans, doctrine, tactics, RMAs, and other variables that impacted the battlefield, the campaign, and the war. That's my 2 cents.
A historian should be able to discuss the strategic, operational, and tactic aspects and how they are interconnected to paint an accurate picture. Military history can be a deep reservoir of lessons learned for future applications like:
- Tanks fight Tanks.
- Use air power to attrit and fix the enemy before we commit ground forces.
- Use air power to attrit the enemy air force.
- Light infantry need better weapons to fight armor units.
- Ensure supply trains are robust.
- Sometimes we need better intelligence.
-
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MAJ Ken Landgren
I really don’t know much about the Korean War except we were not prepared for it. It seemed like when one side drove into enemy territory very far they could not sustain the momentum.i have a keen interest in General Ridgeway.when he took over US forces he had a week to prepare a beleaguered five to face the onslaught of the N Koreans & Chinese. He tied divisions together and confronted the division commanders and told them to move the HQs to the front. His army could not hold its position, so they withdrew south. He was a remarkable man as he had memorized thousands of soldiers names. He did a recon then conducted a map recon. He had memorized terrain features like hills, streams, and roads so he could visualize the terrain the divisions would encounter. Thus giving him clarity of advancing the whole army by phase lines. He was now the aggressor and probably saved Korea. ~305380:CSM Charles Hayden]
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CSM Charles Hayden
MAJ Ken Landgren Korea, early. Gee, I read it - 50 years ago.
The U S Army shaking down from MacArthur’s Army of Occupation with “palace guards’ at the Dai Ichi building in Tokyo to becoming a fighting force. M-1 rifles being unfrozen with warm urine!
Seems like it also covers ‘Task Force Smith’ at the Reservoir!
https://www.abebooks.com/book-search/author/s-l-a-marshall/kw/river-and-the-gauntlet/
ABE Books are cheap! Once one of their books was overly worn, overall, they have a great selection and a vast nationwide inventory from used booksellers.
The U S Army shaking down from MacArthur’s Army of Occupation with “palace guards’ at the Dai Ichi building in Tokyo to becoming a fighting force. M-1 rifles being unfrozen with warm urine!
Seems like it also covers ‘Task Force Smith’ at the Reservoir!
https://www.abebooks.com/book-search/author/s-l-a-marshall/kw/river-and-the-gauntlet/
ABE Books are cheap! Once one of their books was overly worn, overall, they have a great selection and a vast nationwide inventory from used booksellers.
S L a Marshall, River and the Gauntlet - AbeBooks
The River and the Gauntlet by S. L. A Marshall and a great selection of related books, art and collectibles available now at AbeBooks.com.
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MAJ Ken Landgren
Many armies that expected quick victories lost the war. General Lee went north hoping the union would sue for peace. Hitler and Napoleon expected quick victories in Russia. Hitler expected a quick victory in the Battle of the Bulge.
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MAJ Ken Landgren
Thank you sir. It is always a pleasure to make a reacquaintance with you. CSM Charles Hayden
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I recently assisted in a union organizing drive for civilian employees of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, including all of the civilian employees in the various Army Museums throughout the world. Although I played a small roll, I spoke with several Military Historians about the work they do. I learned they are understaffed, underutilized, lack cooperation, but are all highly dedicated to preserving history.
I urge all who have combat experience or have served in significant operations to contact the appropriate military history office and offer to share any knowledge you may have, as appropriate.
They are especially interested in hearing from Vietnam Veterans.
I urge all who have combat experience or have served in significant operations to contact the appropriate military history office and offer to share any knowledge you may have, as appropriate.
They are especially interested in hearing from Vietnam Veterans.
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SFC Herve Abrams
LTC Jason Mackay, no problem, Sir. English is my second language, so I sometimes need to rephrase things.
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SFC Herve Abrams
MAJ Ken Landgren, having been born in Algeria to parents who were also born in Algeria, I appreciate even more.
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MAJ Ken Landgren
I want to recount a funny story in N Africa. Apparently there was a small ship with soldiers and donkeys on a special mission. The ship hugged the coast and the waters were rough. When they reached the port of debarkation, all the soldiers and donkeys were seasick and throwing up. The donkeys were to carry equipment and were useless. The soldiers abandoned the animals and carried what they could. I laugh every time I think about that story. SFC Herve Abrams
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