Posted on Dec 19, 2018
Open Scientific Collaboration May Be Helping North Korea Cheat Nuclear Sanctions
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For years, the world has imposed strict sanctions on North Korea in an attempt to stop its development of nuclear weapons. Officials from nations across the globe have seized shipments of raw materials, shut down shell companies and interdicted ships smuggling equipment.
But despite these efforts, last year North Korea tested the most powerful weapons known to humanity: a nuclear device far larger than any it had tested before, and an intercontinental ballistic missile that put much of the world, including the U.S., within range.
Now, new research shared exclusively with NPR shows one way the North may have been able to develop these technologies despite the global blockade. An analysis published Wednesday by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey of North Korean studies in scientific journals suggests Pyongyang is circumventing the sanctions regime through open research collaborations with other countries.
Of the 1,304 papers they analyzed, about half, researchers believe, could have direct or indirect military applications. About 100 are "of concern" — meaning they need a close look. Most of the papers, 913 in total, are collaborations with Chinese scientists. A small fraction of those papers include additional co-authors of other nationalities.
But despite these efforts, last year North Korea tested the most powerful weapons known to humanity: a nuclear device far larger than any it had tested before, and an intercontinental ballistic missile that put much of the world, including the U.S., within range.
Now, new research shared exclusively with NPR shows one way the North may have been able to develop these technologies despite the global blockade. An analysis published Wednesday by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey of North Korean studies in scientific journals suggests Pyongyang is circumventing the sanctions regime through open research collaborations with other countries.
Of the 1,304 papers they analyzed, about half, researchers believe, could have direct or indirect military applications. About 100 are "of concern" — meaning they need a close look. Most of the papers, 913 in total, are collaborations with Chinese scientists. A small fraction of those papers include additional co-authors of other nationalities.
Open Scientific Collaboration May Be Helping North Korea Cheat Nuclear Sanctions
Posted from npr.org
China
North Korea
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Nuclear
Posted 6 y ago
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CPL James S.
offered IMHO only:
I'm not entirely sure this is a "downside" considering the existence of the internet. It *may* help facilitate a nuclear program but in all honesty, the information is available to anyone who is able to read - it's just not centrally located in one easy to reach database or book. MIT offers free education to anyone who can use the internet, and those courses include everything from A&P to quantum mechanics.
Taking the requisite courses and reading up on the Princeton Plasma Physics labs, reading arXiv and keeping abreast of the physics journals is a far faster, easier and more effective means to create a nuclear program than even collaboration *unless* said national collaboration is willing to actually invest the money and build the program for N. Korea.
I think the bigger threat will be militarized biological programs which don't seem to have near the same level of concern to most people. Getting your MD teaches you enough to be a considerable threat.
I could be wrong, though.
I'm not entirely sure this is a "downside" considering the existence of the internet. It *may* help facilitate a nuclear program but in all honesty, the information is available to anyone who is able to read - it's just not centrally located in one easy to reach database or book. MIT offers free education to anyone who can use the internet, and those courses include everything from A&P to quantum mechanics.
Taking the requisite courses and reading up on the Princeton Plasma Physics labs, reading arXiv and keeping abreast of the physics journals is a far faster, easier and more effective means to create a nuclear program than even collaboration *unless* said national collaboration is willing to actually invest the money and build the program for N. Korea.
I think the bigger threat will be militarized biological programs which don't seem to have near the same level of concern to most people. Getting your MD teaches you enough to be a considerable threat.
I could be wrong, though.
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PO1 William "Chip" Nagel
Appropriate and prudent reviews and vetting of open scientific collaboration with nations of concern, especially North Korea, are one thing.
But alarmist suspicion can go beyond the practical.
For instance, I often see active steering on vehicles transporting the blades for wind farms; it is quite entertaining to watch them negotiate corners and exits. I also see it on modern farm equipment, and it is available on certain BMW automobiles.
As the article states, most western researchers are heavily vetted prior to openly collaborating with North Korean researchers, but it is less certain here that Chinese scientists are similarly vetted.
Perhaps we should officially endeavor to work more cooperatively with Chinese scientists to seek assurances that their open collaborative research is appropriately vetted.
But, without telling the Chinese scientists what ongoing research we think has future military value, just how do we do that?
Appropriate and prudent reviews and vetting of open scientific collaboration with nations of concern, especially North Korea, are one thing.
But alarmist suspicion can go beyond the practical.
For instance, I often see active steering on vehicles transporting the blades for wind farms; it is quite entertaining to watch them negotiate corners and exits. I also see it on modern farm equipment, and it is available on certain BMW automobiles.
As the article states, most western researchers are heavily vetted prior to openly collaborating with North Korean researchers, but it is less certain here that Chinese scientists are similarly vetted.
Perhaps we should officially endeavor to work more cooperatively with Chinese scientists to seek assurances that their open collaborative research is appropriately vetted.
But, without telling the Chinese scientists what ongoing research we think has future military value, just how do we do that?
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