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On September 11, 9, the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest ends. From the article:
"Background
In 4 CE the Roman general (and later emperor) Tiberius entered Germania and subjugated the Cananefates in Germania Inferior, the Chatti near the upper Weser River and the Bructeri south of the Teutoburg Forest. After these conquests he led his army across the Weser.
In early 6 CE Legatus Gaius Sentius Saturninus[11][12] and Consul Legatus Marcus Aemilius Lepidus led a massive army of 65,000 heavy infantry legionaries, 10,000–20,000 cavalrymen, archers, 10,000–20,000 civilians (13 legions and their entourage, totalling around 100,000 men) in an offensive operation against Maroboduus,[13][14] the king of the Marcomanni, who were a tribe of the Suebi. Following their defeat at the hands of Drusus I in 9 BCE the Marcomanni had fled into the territory of the Boii, from which they formed an alliance with the Hermunduri, Quadi, Semnones, Lugians, Zumi, Butones, Mugilones, Sibini and Langobards.[15] Later in 6 CE, leadership of the Roman force was turned over to Publius Quinctilius Varus, a nobleman and experienced administrative official from a patrician family[13] who was related to the Imperial family.[16] He was assigned to consolidate the new province of Germania in the autumn of that year.[13]
Tiberius was then forced to turn his attention to the Bellum Batonianum, also known as the Great Illyrian Revolt, which broke out in the province of Illyricum. Led by Bato the Daesitiate,[17] Bato the Breucian,[18] Pinnes of Pannonia,[19] and elements of the Marcomanni, it lasted nearly four years. Tiberius was forced to stop his campaign against Maroboduus and recognise him as king[20] so that he could then send his eight legions (VIII Augustan, XV Apollonian, XX Victorious Valerian, XXI Predator, XIII Twin, XIV Twin, XVI Gallic and an unknown unit[21]) to crush the rebellion in the Balkans.
Nearly half of all Roman legions in existence were sent to the Balkans to end the revolt, which was itself triggered by constant neglect, endemic food shortages, high taxes, and harsh behavior on the part of the Roman tax collectors. This campaign, led by Tiberius and Quaestor Legatus Germanicus under Emperor Augustus, was one of the most difficult, and most crucial, in the history of the Roman Empire. Due to this massive redeployment of available legions, when Varus was named Legatus Augusti pro praetore in Germania, only three legions were available to him.
Varus' name and deeds were well known beyond the empire because of his ruthlessness and crucifixion of insurgents. While he was feared by the people, he was highly respected by the Roman senate. On the Rhine, he was in command of the XVII, XVIII, and XIX legions. These had previously been led by General Gaius Sentius Saturninus, who had been sent back to Rome after being awarded an ornamenta triumphalia.[22] The other two legions in the winter-quarters of the army at castrum Moguntiacum[23] were led by Varus' nephew, Lucius Nonius Asprenas[21] and perhaps Lucius Arruntius.
Following the attacks of Drusus I in 11–9 BCE, Varus' opponent, Arminius, along with his brother Flavus,[24][25] had been sent to Rome as tribute by their father, Segimerus the Conqueror,[26][27] chieftain of the noblest house in the tribe of the Cherusci. Arminius then spent his youth in Rome as a hostage, where he had received a military education, and even been given the rank of Equestrian. During Arminius' absence, Segimerus was declared a coward by the other Germanic chieftains, because he had submitted to Roman rule, a crime punishable by death under Germanic law. Between 11 BCE and 4 CE, the hostility and suspicion between the Germanic tribes deepened. Trade and political accords between the warlords deteriorated. Tacitus wrote that the Chatti were hostile, and subjugated the Cherusci, but were themselves "pacified" between 4 and 6 CE.[28] Velleius Paterculus also reports that in the years 1–4 CE, there was unrest in Germania.[29]
After his return from Rome, Arminius became a trusted advisor to Varus,[30] but in secret he forged an alliance of Germanic tribes that had traditionally been enemies. These included the Cherusci,[13] Marsi,[13] Chatti,[13] Bructeri,[13] Chauci, Sicambri, and remaining elements of the Suebi, who had been defeated by Caesar in the Battle of Vosges. These five were some of the fifty Germanic tribes at the time.[31] Using the collective outrage over Varus' tyrannous insolence and wanton cruelty to the conquered,[23] Arminius was able to unite the disorganized tribes who had submitted in sullen hatred to the Roman dominion, and maintain said alliance until the most opportune moment to strike.[32]
Between 6 and 9 CE, the Romans were forced to move eight of eleven legions present in Germania east of the Rhine river to crush a rebellion in the Balkans, leaving Varus with only three legions to face the Germans.[21] This represented the perfect opportunity for Arminius to defeat Varus.[20]
While Varus was on his way from his summer camp west of the Weser river to winter headquarters near the Rhine, he heard reports of a local rebellion, reports which had been fabricated by Arminius.[14] Edward Shepherd Creasy writes that "This was represented to Varus as an occasion which required his prompt attendance at the spot; but he was kept in studied ignorance of its being part of a concerted national rising; and he still looked on Arminius as his submissive vassal ...".
Varus decided to quell this uprising immediately, expediting his response by taking a detour through territory that was unfamiliar to the Romans. Arminius, who accompanied him, directed him along a route that would facilitate an ambush.[14] Another Cheruscan nobleman, Segestes, brother of Segimerus and unwilling father-in-law to Arminius,[27][33] warned Varus the night before the Roman forces departed, allegedly suggesting that Varus should apprehend Arminius, along with other Germanic leaders whom he identified as participants in the planned uprising. His warning, however, was dismissed as stemming from the personal feud between Segestes and Arminius. Arminius then left under the pretext of drumming up Germanic forces to support the Roman campaign. Once free from prying eyes, he immediately led his troops in a series of attacks on the surrounding Roman garrisons.
Recent archaeological finds place the battle at Kalkriese Hill in Osnabrück county, Lower Saxony.[13] On the basis of Roman accounts, the Romans were marching northwest from what is now the city of Detmold, passing east of Osnabrück after camping in the area, prior to the attack.
Battles
Varus' forces included his three legions (Legio XVII, Legio XVIII, and Legio XIX), six cohorts of auxiliary troops (non-citizens or allied troops) and three squadrons of cavalry (alae). Most of these lacked combat experience, both with regard to Germanic fighters, and under the prevalent local conditions. The Roman forces were not marching in combat formation, and were interspersed with large numbers of camp followers. As they entered the forest northeast of Osnabrück, they found the track narrow and muddy. According to Dio Cassius a violent storm had also arisen. He also writes that Varus neglected to send out reconnaissance parties ahead of the main body of troops.
The line of march was now stretched out perilously long—between 15 and 20 kilometres (9.3 and 12.4 mi).[30] It was in this state when it came under attack by Germanic warriors armed with light swords, large lances and narrow-bladed short spears called fremae. The attackers surrounded the entire Roman army, and rained down javelins on the intruders.[34] Arminius, recalling his education in Rome, understood his enemies' tactics, and was able to direct his troops to counter them effectively by using locally superior numbers against the dispersed Roman legions. The Romans managed to set up a fortified night camp, and the next morning broke out into the open country north of the Wiehen Hills, near the modern town of Ostercappeln. The break-out was accompanied by heavy losses to the Roman survivors, as was a further attempt to escape by marching through another forested area, as the torrential rains continued. The rain prevented them from using their bows[citation needed] because the sinew strings become slack when wet, and rendered them virtually defenseless. Their shields also became waterlogged and heavy.[citation needed]
The Romans undertook a night march to escape, but marched into another trap that Arminius had set, at the foot of Kalkriese Hill. There a sandy, open strip on which the Romans could march was constricted by the hill, so that there was a gap of only about 100 meters between the woods and the swampland at the edge of the Great Bog. The road was further blocked by a trench, and, towards the forest, an earthen wall had been built along the roadside, permitting the Germanic tribesmen to attack the Romans from cover. The Romans made a desperate attempt to storm the wall, but failed, and the highest-ranking officer next to Varus, Legatus Numonius Vala, abandoned the troops by riding off with the cavalry. His retreat was in vain, however, as he was overtaken by the Germanic cavalry and killed shortly thereafter, according to Velleius Paterculus. The Germanic warriors then stormed the field and slaughtered the disintegrating Roman forces. Varus committed suicide,[30] and Velleius reports that one commander, Praefectus Ceionius, shamefully surrendered, then later took his own life,[35] while his colleague Praefectus Eggius heroically died leading his doomed troops.
Roman casualties have been estimated at 15,000–20,000 dead, and many of the officers were said to have taken their own lives by falling on their swords in the approved manner.[30] Tacitus wrote that many officers were sacrificed by the Germanic forces as part of their indigenous religious ceremonies, cooked in pots and their bones used for rituals.[36] Others were ransomed, and some common soldiers appear to have been enslaved.
All Roman accounts stress the completeness of the Roman defeat. The finds at Kalkriese of 6,000 pieces of Roman equipment (largely scraps), but only a single item that is clearly Germanic (part of a spur), suggests few Germanic losses. However, the victors would most likely have removed the bodies of their fallen, and their practice of burying their warriors' battle gear with them would have also contributed to the lack of Germanic relics. Additionally, several thousand Germanic soldiers were deserting militiamen and wore Roman armour, and thus would appear to be "Roman" in the archaeological digs. It is also known that the Germanic tribes wore perishable organic material, such as leather, and less metal.
The victory was followed by a clean sweep of all Roman forts, garrisons and cities (of which there were at least two) east of the Rhine; the remaining two Roman legions in Germania, commanded by Varus' nephew Lucius Nonius Asprenas, were content to try to hold the Rhine. One fort, Aliso, most likely located in today's Haltern am See,[37] fended off the Germanic tribes for many weeks, perhaps even a few months. After the situation became untenable, the garrison under Lucius Caedicius, accompanied by survivors of Teutoburg Forest, broke through the siege, and reached the Rhine. They resisted long enough for Lucius Nonius Asprenas to organize the Roman defense on the Rhine with two legions and Tiberius to arrive with a new army, preventing Arminius from crossing the Rhine and invading Gaul."
"Background
In 4 CE the Roman general (and later emperor) Tiberius entered Germania and subjugated the Cananefates in Germania Inferior, the Chatti near the upper Weser River and the Bructeri south of the Teutoburg Forest. After these conquests he led his army across the Weser.
In early 6 CE Legatus Gaius Sentius Saturninus[11][12] and Consul Legatus Marcus Aemilius Lepidus led a massive army of 65,000 heavy infantry legionaries, 10,000–20,000 cavalrymen, archers, 10,000–20,000 civilians (13 legions and their entourage, totalling around 100,000 men) in an offensive operation against Maroboduus,[13][14] the king of the Marcomanni, who were a tribe of the Suebi. Following their defeat at the hands of Drusus I in 9 BCE the Marcomanni had fled into the territory of the Boii, from which they formed an alliance with the Hermunduri, Quadi, Semnones, Lugians, Zumi, Butones, Mugilones, Sibini and Langobards.[15] Later in 6 CE, leadership of the Roman force was turned over to Publius Quinctilius Varus, a nobleman and experienced administrative official from a patrician family[13] who was related to the Imperial family.[16] He was assigned to consolidate the new province of Germania in the autumn of that year.[13]
Tiberius was then forced to turn his attention to the Bellum Batonianum, also known as the Great Illyrian Revolt, which broke out in the province of Illyricum. Led by Bato the Daesitiate,[17] Bato the Breucian,[18] Pinnes of Pannonia,[19] and elements of the Marcomanni, it lasted nearly four years. Tiberius was forced to stop his campaign against Maroboduus and recognise him as king[20] so that he could then send his eight legions (VIII Augustan, XV Apollonian, XX Victorious Valerian, XXI Predator, XIII Twin, XIV Twin, XVI Gallic and an unknown unit[21]) to crush the rebellion in the Balkans.
Nearly half of all Roman legions in existence were sent to the Balkans to end the revolt, which was itself triggered by constant neglect, endemic food shortages, high taxes, and harsh behavior on the part of the Roman tax collectors. This campaign, led by Tiberius and Quaestor Legatus Germanicus under Emperor Augustus, was one of the most difficult, and most crucial, in the history of the Roman Empire. Due to this massive redeployment of available legions, when Varus was named Legatus Augusti pro praetore in Germania, only three legions were available to him.
Varus' name and deeds were well known beyond the empire because of his ruthlessness and crucifixion of insurgents. While he was feared by the people, he was highly respected by the Roman senate. On the Rhine, he was in command of the XVII, XVIII, and XIX legions. These had previously been led by General Gaius Sentius Saturninus, who had been sent back to Rome after being awarded an ornamenta triumphalia.[22] The other two legions in the winter-quarters of the army at castrum Moguntiacum[23] were led by Varus' nephew, Lucius Nonius Asprenas[21] and perhaps Lucius Arruntius.
Following the attacks of Drusus I in 11–9 BCE, Varus' opponent, Arminius, along with his brother Flavus,[24][25] had been sent to Rome as tribute by their father, Segimerus the Conqueror,[26][27] chieftain of the noblest house in the tribe of the Cherusci. Arminius then spent his youth in Rome as a hostage, where he had received a military education, and even been given the rank of Equestrian. During Arminius' absence, Segimerus was declared a coward by the other Germanic chieftains, because he had submitted to Roman rule, a crime punishable by death under Germanic law. Between 11 BCE and 4 CE, the hostility and suspicion between the Germanic tribes deepened. Trade and political accords between the warlords deteriorated. Tacitus wrote that the Chatti were hostile, and subjugated the Cherusci, but were themselves "pacified" between 4 and 6 CE.[28] Velleius Paterculus also reports that in the years 1–4 CE, there was unrest in Germania.[29]
After his return from Rome, Arminius became a trusted advisor to Varus,[30] but in secret he forged an alliance of Germanic tribes that had traditionally been enemies. These included the Cherusci,[13] Marsi,[13] Chatti,[13] Bructeri,[13] Chauci, Sicambri, and remaining elements of the Suebi, who had been defeated by Caesar in the Battle of Vosges. These five were some of the fifty Germanic tribes at the time.[31] Using the collective outrage over Varus' tyrannous insolence and wanton cruelty to the conquered,[23] Arminius was able to unite the disorganized tribes who had submitted in sullen hatred to the Roman dominion, and maintain said alliance until the most opportune moment to strike.[32]
Between 6 and 9 CE, the Romans were forced to move eight of eleven legions present in Germania east of the Rhine river to crush a rebellion in the Balkans, leaving Varus with only three legions to face the Germans.[21] This represented the perfect opportunity for Arminius to defeat Varus.[20]
While Varus was on his way from his summer camp west of the Weser river to winter headquarters near the Rhine, he heard reports of a local rebellion, reports which had been fabricated by Arminius.[14] Edward Shepherd Creasy writes that "This was represented to Varus as an occasion which required his prompt attendance at the spot; but he was kept in studied ignorance of its being part of a concerted national rising; and he still looked on Arminius as his submissive vassal ...".
Varus decided to quell this uprising immediately, expediting his response by taking a detour through territory that was unfamiliar to the Romans. Arminius, who accompanied him, directed him along a route that would facilitate an ambush.[14] Another Cheruscan nobleman, Segestes, brother of Segimerus and unwilling father-in-law to Arminius,[27][33] warned Varus the night before the Roman forces departed, allegedly suggesting that Varus should apprehend Arminius, along with other Germanic leaders whom he identified as participants in the planned uprising. His warning, however, was dismissed as stemming from the personal feud between Segestes and Arminius. Arminius then left under the pretext of drumming up Germanic forces to support the Roman campaign. Once free from prying eyes, he immediately led his troops in a series of attacks on the surrounding Roman garrisons.
Recent archaeological finds place the battle at Kalkriese Hill in Osnabrück county, Lower Saxony.[13] On the basis of Roman accounts, the Romans were marching northwest from what is now the city of Detmold, passing east of Osnabrück after camping in the area, prior to the attack.
Battles
Varus' forces included his three legions (Legio XVII, Legio XVIII, and Legio XIX), six cohorts of auxiliary troops (non-citizens or allied troops) and three squadrons of cavalry (alae). Most of these lacked combat experience, both with regard to Germanic fighters, and under the prevalent local conditions. The Roman forces were not marching in combat formation, and were interspersed with large numbers of camp followers. As they entered the forest northeast of Osnabrück, they found the track narrow and muddy. According to Dio Cassius a violent storm had also arisen. He also writes that Varus neglected to send out reconnaissance parties ahead of the main body of troops.
The line of march was now stretched out perilously long—between 15 and 20 kilometres (9.3 and 12.4 mi).[30] It was in this state when it came under attack by Germanic warriors armed with light swords, large lances and narrow-bladed short spears called fremae. The attackers surrounded the entire Roman army, and rained down javelins on the intruders.[34] Arminius, recalling his education in Rome, understood his enemies' tactics, and was able to direct his troops to counter them effectively by using locally superior numbers against the dispersed Roman legions. The Romans managed to set up a fortified night camp, and the next morning broke out into the open country north of the Wiehen Hills, near the modern town of Ostercappeln. The break-out was accompanied by heavy losses to the Roman survivors, as was a further attempt to escape by marching through another forested area, as the torrential rains continued. The rain prevented them from using their bows[citation needed] because the sinew strings become slack when wet, and rendered them virtually defenseless. Their shields also became waterlogged and heavy.[citation needed]
The Romans undertook a night march to escape, but marched into another trap that Arminius had set, at the foot of Kalkriese Hill. There a sandy, open strip on which the Romans could march was constricted by the hill, so that there was a gap of only about 100 meters between the woods and the swampland at the edge of the Great Bog. The road was further blocked by a trench, and, towards the forest, an earthen wall had been built along the roadside, permitting the Germanic tribesmen to attack the Romans from cover. The Romans made a desperate attempt to storm the wall, but failed, and the highest-ranking officer next to Varus, Legatus Numonius Vala, abandoned the troops by riding off with the cavalry. His retreat was in vain, however, as he was overtaken by the Germanic cavalry and killed shortly thereafter, according to Velleius Paterculus. The Germanic warriors then stormed the field and slaughtered the disintegrating Roman forces. Varus committed suicide,[30] and Velleius reports that one commander, Praefectus Ceionius, shamefully surrendered, then later took his own life,[35] while his colleague Praefectus Eggius heroically died leading his doomed troops.
Roman casualties have been estimated at 15,000–20,000 dead, and many of the officers were said to have taken their own lives by falling on their swords in the approved manner.[30] Tacitus wrote that many officers were sacrificed by the Germanic forces as part of their indigenous religious ceremonies, cooked in pots and their bones used for rituals.[36] Others were ransomed, and some common soldiers appear to have been enslaved.
All Roman accounts stress the completeness of the Roman defeat. The finds at Kalkriese of 6,000 pieces of Roman equipment (largely scraps), but only a single item that is clearly Germanic (part of a spur), suggests few Germanic losses. However, the victors would most likely have removed the bodies of their fallen, and their practice of burying their warriors' battle gear with them would have also contributed to the lack of Germanic relics. Additionally, several thousand Germanic soldiers were deserting militiamen and wore Roman armour, and thus would appear to be "Roman" in the archaeological digs. It is also known that the Germanic tribes wore perishable organic material, such as leather, and less metal.
The victory was followed by a clean sweep of all Roman forts, garrisons and cities (of which there were at least two) east of the Rhine; the remaining two Roman legions in Germania, commanded by Varus' nephew Lucius Nonius Asprenas, were content to try to hold the Rhine. One fort, Aliso, most likely located in today's Haltern am See,[37] fended off the Germanic tribes for many weeks, perhaps even a few months. After the situation became untenable, the garrison under Lucius Caedicius, accompanied by survivors of Teutoburg Forest, broke through the siege, and reached the Rhine. They resisted long enough for Lucius Nonius Asprenas to organize the Roman defense on the Rhine with two legions and Tiberius to arrive with a new army, preventing Arminius from crossing the Rhine and invading Gaul."
Battle of the Teutoburg Forest - Wikipedia
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