Winning with Intelligence – The Inchon Landing

“Intelligence reduces the unknowns that plan­ners must face and forms the basis for both deliberate and crisis action planning,” the Naval Doctrinal Publica­tion points out. (2) In today’s terminology this is “intel­ligence preparation of the battlespace.” In the case of the amphibious assault at Inchon, an attack that led to the collapse of the North Korean army and the taking of some 125,000 prisoners, intelligence gathering and planning allowed US forces to overcome geographic disadvantages and take the enemy by surprise.

On 25 June 1950 four columns of North Korean infantry and tanks under the command of Marshal Choe Yong Gun surprised the world by driving south and pushing South Korean and contingents of US forces to the southeast corner of the Korean peninsula. While winning a series of tactical successes, the North was unable to gain its strategic objective— command of all Korea—and was faced with the proposition of using all its remaining forces against the last allied forces holding the Pusan perimeter.

Through August and into September, the North threw 13 infantry and two armored divisions (98,000 men) at the Allies, necessitating the commitment of all UN reserves. And while the North suffered horren­dous casualties, its tenacious attacks and acceptance of losses suggested a stronger force than they had.