Iran’s Evolving Nuclear Program and Implications for U.S. Policy

The article is long. So, I posted the option of last resort at the bottom of the article. This issue has been playing out for the past 6 months with Israel pulling off delayed strikes to slow the Shia down. The US refused to sell tanker aircraft to Israel and the Israel delegation meeting with their US counter parts fell flat. But I am not surprised the current administration has hopes to revive the JCPOA.
Whatever one thinks about the issue of Iran's nuclear weapon desires, it is a concern for the world as Iran has declared to destroy Israel. Which brings me to my point of posting this info for fellow military persons who have much greater depth of knowledge on Iran's Shia leadership helping to usher in the 12th Imam.
Iran has the know how it appears to push forward quickly with building a Nuclear bomb. They are staling the talks America wants at present. If you were Iran, what would you do first? Talks or hit your enemy before they hit you? Is destruction of New York an option for Iran?

The option of last resort: a military strike. The risks of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear program are not insignificant: Iran would likely retaliate against the United States or its allies in the region and conflict could escalate to a large-scale war. Iran might also withdraw from the NPT and reconstitute its nuclear program covertly and away from international inspectors. But to be blunt, those risks—some of which the United States can attempt to mitigate—may be worth it to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon under certain circumstances. The threshold for what constitutes “an Iranian attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon” should be high. An Iranian dash to a bomb using declared facilities, an attempt by Iran to enrich to 90 percent, a decision by Tehran to throw out all inspectors and remove monitoring equipment, or the discovery of a sufficiently advanced covert enrichment site are all good candidates. It could also be a combination of developments that causes U.S. experts to determine that they are not confident they would know of an Iranian dash or a covert program until it was too late. It is not, however, the addition of more centrifuges at known sites, an accumulation of multiple bombs’ worth of material at lower levels of enrichment, or even possibly a restarted weapons program (provided it was caught early on and was not on the cusp of succeeding).
Eric Brewer is deputy director and senior fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).