Posted on Jan 15, 2021
Operation Desert Storm—30 Years Later: My View from the Joint Staff
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Posted 4 y ago
Responses: 6
DESERT STORM
I can write this as I had to research Desert Storm and give a brief. I focus a lot on manuever.
It was said a retired COL and military historian suggested a large flanking movement. It was a very bold recommendation because one usually thinks about units outflanking the enemy. It did help that our Air Force and Army Aviation pounded Iraqi units in the desert.
I do believe the Iraqis made an assumption that we were not capable of maneuvering hundreds of miles in the open desert with any efficacy. However, GPS became a huge force multiplier.
The Marines were off the coast of Kuwait. It caused some Iraqi divisions to orient to the east. 1st CAV did feints from the south which caused Iraqi divisions to orient to the south. The majority of Iraqi divisions were oriented to the south and the east. A good portion of our army went west then turned north-east and completely flanked and surprised the Iraqis.
Desert Storm also became a proving ground for next generation munitions, aircraft, and tanks. Our M1s hade a huge effective firing range advantage. Just for arguments sake let’s say our M1 effective range is 3000 meters to the 2000 meters for the T-72. That meant we had a 1000 meter advantage and our M1s could kill with impunity. That is called stand off distance. Even more frustrating for the Iraqi T-72s is their rounds could not penetrate M1 armor.
The Republican Guard units were supposed to be elite and the true strength of the Iraqi Army. We easily annihilated them and those we did not retreated to Iraq. The Iraqis folded like a deck of cards. Once an army is in full retreat like in Desert Storm it is virtually impossible to fight effectively. I am sure their fear was compounded by the fact they faced us as we were closing in and a large portion of our army was in their deep rear area.
The logistics to build up a 500,000 person army and vehicles was immense. I read at the peak there were the equivalent of 500 semi trucks hauling stuff each day. The logistics general was being pushed around by Corps Commanders so he was given another star on the spot.
I would like to say perhaps Desert Storm tricked us into believing war is an easy endeavor.
I can write this as I had to research Desert Storm and give a brief. I focus a lot on manuever.
It was said a retired COL and military historian suggested a large flanking movement. It was a very bold recommendation because one usually thinks about units outflanking the enemy. It did help that our Air Force and Army Aviation pounded Iraqi units in the desert.
I do believe the Iraqis made an assumption that we were not capable of maneuvering hundreds of miles in the open desert with any efficacy. However, GPS became a huge force multiplier.
The Marines were off the coast of Kuwait. It caused some Iraqi divisions to orient to the east. 1st CAV did feints from the south which caused Iraqi divisions to orient to the south. The majority of Iraqi divisions were oriented to the south and the east. A good portion of our army went west then turned north-east and completely flanked and surprised the Iraqis.
Desert Storm also became a proving ground for next generation munitions, aircraft, and tanks. Our M1s hade a huge effective firing range advantage. Just for arguments sake let’s say our M1 effective range is 3000 meters to the 2000 meters for the T-72. That meant we had a 1000 meter advantage and our M1s could kill with impunity. That is called stand off distance. Even more frustrating for the Iraqi T-72s is their rounds could not penetrate M1 armor.
The Republican Guard units were supposed to be elite and the true strength of the Iraqi Army. We easily annihilated them and those we did not retreated to Iraq. The Iraqis folded like a deck of cards. Once an army is in full retreat like in Desert Storm it is virtually impossible to fight effectively. I am sure their fear was compounded by the fact they faced us as we were closing in and a large portion of our army was in their deep rear area.
The logistics to build up a 500,000 person army and vehicles was immense. I read at the peak there were the equivalent of 500 semi trucks hauling stuff each day. The logistics general was being pushed around by Corps Commanders so he was given another star on the spot.
I would like to say perhaps Desert Storm tricked us into believing war is an easy endeavor.
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I retired on 31 July 88. As Desert Shield was being formed, I began receiving postcards from the Dept of the Army inquiring about my health and announcing the possibility of a recall to active duty - at Walter Reed. I thought that was pretty strange as I was living in San Antonio at the time. One postcard each week during Desert Shield / Desert Storm.
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I was on the Rock. On a 1 yr unaccompanied tour. Plus PI and Korea. We got extended 3 months. II MEF rolled out before I got home. Spoke with Group G1, she advised me to enjoy leave without much detail, due to being unsecure line. CLNC was a ghost town. Outstanding job by all that were there. It will be forever studied. I saw the damage later with a MEU over there, the trail of death. JSTARS had them dialed in.
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