Say it ain’t so, CNO! Do more unlawful command influence woes dog Fitz cases?

Comments on any setting or media outlet that draw conclusions on pending cases by those is the chain of command should be avoided. Stating basic things such as the name and what the charges are is one thing, it still has to be proved in a Court or Court Martial proceeding. No predictions even should be made, its up the court and only the court to make determinations whether the accused is guilty or not. The basic rule should always be don't talk about details or impressions on pending cases when You are a key person in the chain of command or represent them. It seems more and more liberty is being taken by upper echelon people than ever should be in more recent times than ever before. To much speculation or even false statement can get people in a lot of trouble, well at least the used to. There may be a problem here.

So I'm just a landlubber, and freely admit to not knowing much about how to operate a warship.
Having said that, do you mean to tell me that NOBODY stands watch on deck to identify navigational hazards? How in the hell does a giant mountain of steel sneak up on a warship than can detect targets hundreds of miles away? Hell, crew in their racks below decks would have been able to hear the other ship coming through the hull.
This is negligence of the first order on behalf of the OOD and whomever was on the bridge, as well as the Captain. No if, ands, or buts. I don't want to hear about how this cat or that cat wasn't "trained enough". Bullshit. That is a nine-figure piece of American technical marvel, crewed by some of our finest young men and women, and it was darn near sunk and several are dead by somehow blundering into the path of a commercial vessel.
And it wasn't even the first time that happened that year.

There are theories out there that some kind of navigational spoofing technology was in play, and the fact that there were multiple instances in the same squadron points to structural problems - for that, the Commodore was sacked.
But I can't fathom how in the hell there was nobody on deck, maybe simply smoking a heater, that didn't see this coming.
Command interference be damned, someone - lots of someones - need to be held to account here.

I'm not an attorney, so the impact of "unlawful command influence" on the cases against these officers is a topic too lofty for me to comment upon. What I will say (having read enough of the cited material to form an opinion supported by my own experiences) is that anyone who thinks this can be "pinned" solely on a couple of JOs and an O-5... is either ignorant of facts, or culpable in a long-standing, self-perpetuating problem. I'm "out", so I can speak my mind... though I'll attempt to do so respectfully. Bottom line-the Fleet has a problem. This problem is in three parts: First- we are training officers based on ill-fitting paradigms. What are they? Are they operational leaders entrusted with highly complex, responsibility-laden tasks... or are they segregated figureheads occupying an administrative space until they achieve sufficient "experience" to become executive leaders? If the former, the training needs to be longer, more specialized, and mirror that of other maritime professionals. If the latter, then their presence on the bridge (if not their presence altogether) needs to be re-assessed. Second-this isn't the 19th Century; we need to start acting like it. Modern warships are intricate weapons system platforms requiring high levels of skill to operate. There's very little use for "taking a round turn" when one's ability to interpret a myriad of electronic signals into a broad spectrum sight picture diminishes with exhaustion, and/or artificially induced or external stressors. Third-you can't build a professional force by increasing the input of pipeline, then purging product every ten years. We should be tailoring the demand for officer candidates against the needs created by attrition... not adjusting attrition to keep pace with throughput. In more colloquial terms, imagine firing or harassing-to-resignation a mid-level manager based only on the need to open up their position to new hires. I think the Navy shares some of the blame; not all certainly... but some. The answer is to start treating shiphandlers just like aviators... take the time to train them and allow them to build practical experience before imposing a pointless 24 month "deadline" on their qualifications. Allow senior non-commissioned personnel and more experienced mid-level officers to retain operational control of divisions while incoming JOs focus on learning the trade. Cut the "fat" in shore-side "good deal" billets to give mid-level people more time/experience at sea, and provide sufficient manning to mean that no qualified bridge watch-stander takes the conn with less than adequate rest. Separate career tracks to allow SWOs to focus on their primary trade (frankly, no one's going to become an "expert" on everything just by hoping around for a few years). Let LDOs, Warrants, and other SME officers lead the Engineering, DC, and similar divisions/departments, with line-qualified SWOs leading operations, deck, and weapons divisions. Finally... require every single qualified OOD to pass examination (and receive certification) as Third Mate Merchant Marine.