Hide and Seek … The Deadly Game Facing the DoD

As the military starts the process of making up for lost time and opportunity in the modernization of the force, I think that special attention needs to be paid to an old system and process that needs to be made new again. I am speaking about the need for ground forces, to re-learn the skill of camouflage and concealment for their equipment and installations.

During the entire duration of the Cold War, our forces in NATO were trained and equipped with camouflage systems that were state of the art … low visibility paints, painted in “Woodland” patterns on the vehicles, Command Posts at all levels that were covered in 3-D camouflage netting when they could not be hidden in a barn … and so on. We trained to deploy these net systems quickly and efficiently; however, if you have ever been a crewman on an M577 Command Post Vehicle or the driver of a 5-Ton Cargo Truck, you know that “quick and efficient” were not terms that were often used in conjunction with these net systems. In fact, I do not think we can include most of the expletives that were offered by those Cold War warriors here. But, we used the nets and the paint and the main means of concealment and deception because we knew the enemy we faced had the means and the technology to detect us … he had an air force, some emerging satellite capability, and ground sensors such as newly developing NOD’s at his disposal; and, if he could detect us, then he could find us and kill us. Our camouflage systems were intended to reduce the risk of detection through observation and sensors. So, with great pain and strain, we did what we had been trained as soldiers to do. Hide in plain sight.

But, the Cold War came to an end and the military continued to train in the way it had since the end of World War II. That is, until Desert Storm. We deployed to the desert to fight a war that was completely different than our NATO experience in terms of terrain and threat. When we first went to the desert, there was a threat that we could be attacked from the air… but, that threat seemed to fade quickly as the buildup in the desert continued. The reliance on vehicles painted tan that would blend with the operational terrain seemed to be enough; given that the Iraqi air force never got off the ground. Iraqi technology was inferior and our own technology to “see” the threat before they could “see” us was far superior. No need for all those pesky camo nets. They were there; but, we did not need to use them.

Then 9/11 … Afghanistan and then Iraq. We knew the threat and their capabilities in Iraq. And, as for Afghanistan, the threat posed by the Taliban was probably equal to a military of the early 19th century. In neither case was there a threat from the air … and therefore, no requirement to hide from collection sensors of any sophistication nor the need to disguise where we were and what we were doing. Some net systems were deployed to the theaters; and in the field, warriors continued to learn the benefits of being able to conceal themselves from observation … thru an evolution of camouflage patterns and materials for uniforms to help with the task. However, our logistics installations and vehicle parks were not camouflaged. There was no attempt at masking the movement of our convoys or hiding them from air observation, or satellite detection, radar, IR, or Near IR because there was no appreciable threat.

Fast forward to 2018 … the near peer threats are changing at lightning speed. From the 19th century Taliban to North Koreans with nuc’s and an air force, along with Russians in the Baltic and Ukraine, the Chinese in the South China Sea, and the Iranians all over the globe. And, they are all equipped with very competent air forces, UAV’s for surveillance, satellite imagery produced by highly sophisticated radars and ground sensors to see in the night … as well as IR, Near IR, Radar and the newest technology on the street, SWIR. We could once say that “We Owned the Night” and we did … but, today anyone can purchase a NOD on the internet and that is part of the technology gap that has opened, and we are falling further behind our near peer threats at a rapid rate.

So, with sensors looking for us from space to the ground and all the environment in between, what must we do to close that detection gap?

We must go back to the lessons learned in WWII and our Cold War experience. We must deny the threat the ability to find us. Today, that means that we must have a solution that can defeat and degrade a variety of sensors and technologies that we face in our near peer threats. It’s no longer a case of simple concealment. It is a complex process that needs to be relooked and addressed by the Department’s leadership. Failing to do this will result in a scenario that yields those famous words: ’You go to war with the equipment you have … not the equipment you would like to have.’

The technology is available to start meeting this challenge. The requirements for an improved camouflage net system are being addressed by the US Army’s Natick Laboratories with the pending award of Phase I contracts for the new Ultra Lightweight Camouflage System (ULCANS). The new requirements call for a 2-D net system, much easier to deploy and recover than the old 3-D net system discussed earlier. The capabilities and requirements for the performance of the ULCANS System are sensitive and we cannot go into the details at this time ... in this paper.

Along with the advances anticipated in the ULCANS System, there is an opportunity to provide significantly improved camouflage, concealment and detection avoidance for vehicles and personnel when stationary and on the move. Here is where we lag. The technology, which is proven in the field, has yet to be made a requirement for our ground combat and logistics forces. Tanks, APC’s, JLTV’s and GMV’s, vehicles across the entire fleet can be kitted with solutions that will reduce their visual, IR Near IR, SWIR and Radar signatures when stationary or on the move. Early discussions with elements of the DoD have shown that there is a recognition of the problem and real need to start moving in the direction of providing solutions to the force; but, so far, DoD has not released a requirement. And, we all know what that means.

The same is true for dismounted forces. There are technology solutions available today that can make a soldier literally disappear from the view of an IR device, or provide snipers concealment in a manner that will make them undetectable by those seeking them with sensors out on the battlefield. These and other solutions are the game changers that our warriors will need to stay ahead of the threats.

It is imperative to overall survival of our fighting forces to be prepared for the next conflict by looking forward and not back. The last war we fought is over and we need to prepare for an enemy that is better equipped and “technology-ed up” than any we have faced in the last 15 years. I know that some will point out that the current budgets do not support this … but, the budget to close the gap between today’s peer threat and our ability to defeat and degrade must be a significant part of what we are looking to fix. The solution does not cost a great deal of money in the great scheme of things. The threat is here today, and we need to get the leaders moving on making new solutions a requirement … before DoD is in a game of catch up!