Posted on May 27, 2015
Steep decline in promotion rates? What does it mean for the Army?
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I have some friends who are up for the FY15 LTC Army Competitive Category (ACC) board. The **rumor** is that the board results were pulled back because promotion rates were below 50%. Compare this to the 2012 story below where promotion rates to LTC were 83%. Is this the "new normal"? Why would promotion rates be so low? Is reduced force structure to blame? Too many O-5s and O-6s still on active duty? Is the Army trying to get rid of the generation that fought the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?
http://archive.armytimes.com/article/20120729/NEWS/207290315/O-5-selections-plummet-lowest-rate-decade
http://archive.armytimes.com/article/20120729/NEWS/207290315/O-5-selections-plummet-lowest-rate-decade
Officers
Promotions
LTC
MAJ
Army
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 34
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I'm at year 18 -- when I came in in 1996, it was a big deal to retire as a LTC -- because so few folks made it that far.
Looking at your profile, this probably is unheard of for you. But just as we've dropped the "no major left behind" program at CGSC & are back to actually boarding all attendees, we have no need to keep or promote every person we have on the rolls.
Yep, that could feel like a sucker punch, but in reality, your year group came in on a high note and just hasn't seen a time when career progression was reality instead of a bubble.
Agree that it's annoying to see less-than-stellar individuals leading, but talent management has plenty of discussion streams here on RP -- a much bigger issue.
Looking at your profile, this probably is unheard of for you. But just as we've dropped the "no major left behind" program at CGSC & are back to actually boarding all attendees, we have no need to keep or promote every person we have on the rolls.
Yep, that could feel like a sucker punch, but in reality, your year group came in on a high note and just hasn't seen a time when career progression was reality instead of a bubble.
Agree that it's annoying to see less-than-stellar individuals leading, but talent management has plenty of discussion streams here on RP -- a much bigger issue.
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MAJ (Join to see)
Moon, you are looking at the aggregate number for the promotion board. Depending on your specific branch it could have been as low as 35%.
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LTC (Join to see)
A MAJ Jäger said, there needs to be more transparency and if we are "trimming the force allowing only the best and brightest to stay" that should apply all the way to the top. No exceptions. If a GOMAR is a kiss of death for a 0-3 then it certainly should be for an 0-5/6/7 etc.
The military needs to publish the board evaluation criteria and ALSO the metrics/ demographics of WHO they pick up to see if the words match the actions. Do certain MOSs, alumni, gender, race, year group, OER scores, disciplinary records etc get differing results with the board. The Major is right, if the issue is the standard and quality apply that to everyone equally and transparently.
The military needs to publish the board evaluation criteria and ALSO the metrics/ demographics of WHO they pick up to see if the words match the actions. Do certain MOSs, alumni, gender, race, year group, OER scores, disciplinary records etc get differing results with the board. The Major is right, if the issue is the standard and quality apply that to everyone equally and transparently.
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LTC (Join to see)
The “no major left behind” phrase was used commonly to refer to the Active Army’s decision to eliminate a boarding process for CGSC (then ILE) attendance. Everybody got to go to the resident school, whereas previously only about 50% were selected, and some only for the “box of books” distance learning program. Both of these acted as a vector check on FGOs’ careers. If you didn’t get selected for CGSC/ILE, it was unlikely that you’d make LTC. When we needed numbers, everyone got to go to the school (which had less demand bc some folks were unavailable due to deployment), thus, like the educational law “No Child Left Behind,” no majors were left behind.
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This happens every time following major conflicts. As drawdown of forces occur, the need for the various ranks are reduced, particularly those at the top. While those at the top are career officers, they are less likely to leave early and, as a result, the military gets top heavy, which affects promotion rates to those higher ranks.
The only way to alleviate the situation is to convene SERB Boards with the promotion boards. Promotion boards select the best qualified for promotion, while the SERB boards identify and select the least productive/qualified personnel for early retirement, freeing up the slots for those selected for promotion.
Maybe the Army should consider the "temporary promotion" policies that were used in previous times (like WW II), whereas people are temporarily promoted during time of war, but revert back to their "permanent rank" in peacetime.
The only way to alleviate the situation is to convene SERB Boards with the promotion boards. Promotion boards select the best qualified for promotion, while the SERB boards identify and select the least productive/qualified personnel for early retirement, freeing up the slots for those selected for promotion.
Maybe the Army should consider the "temporary promotion" policies that were used in previous times (like WW II), whereas people are temporarily promoted during time of war, but revert back to their "permanent rank" in peacetime.
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COL Jean (John) F. B.
MAJ (Join to see)
I have lived through a few of these and there is no perfect system. If, as you say, the SERB results only got those who voluntarily retired, there will probably be another round to force others out. Until the end strength is where it needs to be and promotion rates are high enough to keep quality personnel in, the Army will continue to mold the force through identification and elimination of under-performers (as compared to their peers). But, as I stated, there is no perfect system and it is certainly not fool proof. Who is considered an under-performer is in the eyes of the beholder. Most are not that clear cut.
For example, I noticed that you are an Infantry officer assigned as an Army Attaché (which, I guess, means you are a FAO). That, at least in my experience, puts you at risk when compared to your peers who served in operational assignments (S3/XO, etc) as majors and who would be considered more "branch qualified" than you. That has been a problem with FAO, Special Operations, Aviation, and other "specialties" in the Army for years. Officers serving in those specialties were being passed over for schools and promotions at a much higher rate than their peers due to the amount of time they spent "outside their branch". That has been partially alleviated by creation of the Aviation Branch, Special Operations Branch and full-time Acquisition assignments, however, to my knowledge, the FAO issue had not been addressed. Maybe it has now... That is the reason I had strings pulled to get me out of FAO (I lived in Paris for 14 years, speak fluent French, etc. and was selected for French Command and Staff College and an assignment to the embassy in Paris). Although that would have been a great assignment (5 years in Paris), I knew it would be the kiss of death and I would never have made it past LTC, if I had gotten that far. As such, I had some folks help get me out of it. Hopefully, that issue has now been resolved. As important as FAOs are to our military and country, they have been getting the short end of the stick in boards.
Unfortunately, things will most likely get worse before they get better and a lot of good officers will suffer because of it (and a lot of officer who are content to just get by will continue to do so).
I have lived through a few of these and there is no perfect system. If, as you say, the SERB results only got those who voluntarily retired, there will probably be another round to force others out. Until the end strength is where it needs to be and promotion rates are high enough to keep quality personnel in, the Army will continue to mold the force through identification and elimination of under-performers (as compared to their peers). But, as I stated, there is no perfect system and it is certainly not fool proof. Who is considered an under-performer is in the eyes of the beholder. Most are not that clear cut.
For example, I noticed that you are an Infantry officer assigned as an Army Attaché (which, I guess, means you are a FAO). That, at least in my experience, puts you at risk when compared to your peers who served in operational assignments (S3/XO, etc) as majors and who would be considered more "branch qualified" than you. That has been a problem with FAO, Special Operations, Aviation, and other "specialties" in the Army for years. Officers serving in those specialties were being passed over for schools and promotions at a much higher rate than their peers due to the amount of time they spent "outside their branch". That has been partially alleviated by creation of the Aviation Branch, Special Operations Branch and full-time Acquisition assignments, however, to my knowledge, the FAO issue had not been addressed. Maybe it has now... That is the reason I had strings pulled to get me out of FAO (I lived in Paris for 14 years, speak fluent French, etc. and was selected for French Command and Staff College and an assignment to the embassy in Paris). Although that would have been a great assignment (5 years in Paris), I knew it would be the kiss of death and I would never have made it past LTC, if I had gotten that far. As such, I had some folks help get me out of it. Hopefully, that issue has now been resolved. As important as FAOs are to our military and country, they have been getting the short end of the stick in boards.
Unfortunately, things will most likely get worse before they get better and a lot of good officers will suffer because of it (and a lot of officer who are content to just get by will continue to do so).
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MAJ (Join to see)
COL Jean (John) F. B. Sir: thanks for the comment. Two points: 1) FAO I has been single-tracked since the late 90s and now FAOs compete with other operational support types for promotion; recent FAO promotion rates are just slightly higher than the Army average; 2) folks in my year group and those just a bit older and younger aren't at risk for non-select because of our branch, or because of our performance, but because the Army has opted to manage the force structure by cutting younger officers vs. targeting senior officer reductions. This is a choice the Army is making---cut the year groups that have been at war since they commissioned in 99 and later but keep ltcs for 28 years and cols for 30, while continuing to maintain bloated levels of GOs for a force structure reduced by 90,000 Soldiers. The message this sends is not pleasant. It also is likely to leave us with an old officer corps, much like many armies around the world, where promotions stagnate with concomitant negative impact on readiness, retention, and recruitment. On the non-reduction in GO numbers.,..cutting the force structure by 15% would logically lead to a 15% reduction at all ranks. What we've seen is a reduction at the major level and below, including all enlisted ranks, and very extremely limited reductions at ltc and above.
Also, on the performance point, even in the osbs we saw officers with no bad paper and a preponderance of ACOMs cut; with a promotion rate less than 50%, we'll be letting really quality officers go and keeping their slightly older peers who got promoted inboards with rates around 90%. I understand year group management is a legal requirement; I just think the Army isn't doing itself any favors by excluding YG 97 and earlier from a hard look.
Also, on the performance point, even in the osbs we saw officers with no bad paper and a preponderance of ACOMs cut; with a promotion rate less than 50%, we'll be letting really quality officers go and keeping their slightly older peers who got promoted inboards with rates around 90%. I understand year group management is a legal requirement; I just think the Army isn't doing itself any favors by excluding YG 97 and earlier from a hard look.
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COL Jean (John) F. B.
MAJ (Join to see)
Good points, thanks. I was aware of the single-tracking, as it occurred before I retired in 2000, however, it would have been better to establish a FAO branch, like Aviation and Special Operations did. I served on battalion command and LTC promotion boards in the late 90's and I can tell you that FAOs took some hits because of lack of "branch qualification". Although they may be single-tracked, they are still in a branch and that creates an expectation of branch qualification. In a promotion board process, when board members are reviewing thousands of records, only a few minutes are spent with each. As such, when you see a photo and file of an Infantry officer, for example, and do a quick review of OERS, assignments, schools, etc., your brain automatically compares him to other Infantry officers. Hopefully, the system has matured to the point that is no longer an issue. From the info you provided about recent selection rates, it appears that it might have corrected itself.
I understand your comments about the force structure and how the "culling" is being done. Like I said, we have been through this before and we'll get through it. Unfortunately, we will lose some very good officers in the process.
Good points, thanks. I was aware of the single-tracking, as it occurred before I retired in 2000, however, it would have been better to establish a FAO branch, like Aviation and Special Operations did. I served on battalion command and LTC promotion boards in the late 90's and I can tell you that FAOs took some hits because of lack of "branch qualification". Although they may be single-tracked, they are still in a branch and that creates an expectation of branch qualification. In a promotion board process, when board members are reviewing thousands of records, only a few minutes are spent with each. As such, when you see a photo and file of an Infantry officer, for example, and do a quick review of OERS, assignments, schools, etc., your brain automatically compares him to other Infantry officers. Hopefully, the system has matured to the point that is no longer an issue. From the info you provided about recent selection rates, it appears that it might have corrected itself.
I understand your comments about the force structure and how the "culling" is being done. Like I said, we have been through this before and we'll get through it. Unfortunately, we will lose some very good officers in the process.
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COL Jean (John) F. B.
I saw some very good people leave the military as a result of the various drawdowns. Like I have said for years, the military will never be horny, because we are always screwing ourselves.
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When I was Commissioned in 1992, the drawdown from Desert Storm was near an end. The Army took the minimal number of 2LTs on Active Duty, the Reserves, and the Guard. Promotion rates in the ranks were not high at this time. I remember a Battalion Commander telling me in 1995 that at that time to consider making it to MAJ as career success because promotion rates were that low. 50% is not low considering the military is in the midst of a drawdown from Iraq and Afghanistan.
Part of the reason why you saw high promotion rates were a second order effect from the previous drawdown before OEF/OIF. There were significant shortages in officers from year groups 1991-1994 because the Army only Commissioned the bare minimum required in each of those years. They didn't take in to account that a lot of officers in those year groups elected to get out after their initial term was up or prior to the 10 year mark. It resulted in shortages in my year group throughout my time in the military. Promotion rates were high because of this. They went higher because we increased the size of the Army to be able to keep up with the manning requirements to support OIF/OEF.
The promotion rates go in cycles. At some point they will go up again because the Army will cut numbers and as a result of this additional officers will get out along the way because we have a history of doing "more with less people" and at some point some Soldiers will say enough is enough and get out rather than stay in during declining morale and being asked to do more and more work. It's happened during the 1990's and it'll happen again.
This is not about getting rid of officers with combat experience, it's a simple numbers game to get down to the approved strength. While the intent is to focus on those who have derogatory information in their files, PT failures, overweight, etc.; good people will be put out as well along the way. I lost some very good SPCs in my first unit because they had hit the 8 year mark and couldn't get promoted because the promotion points were at the max level for their MOS. I hated to see them go, but the points were not dropping below 798 and these guys had done everything they could to get points and still couldn't achieve the 798. It's a sad reality of drawing down the military, some good people will be put out too.
Part of the reason why you saw high promotion rates were a second order effect from the previous drawdown before OEF/OIF. There were significant shortages in officers from year groups 1991-1994 because the Army only Commissioned the bare minimum required in each of those years. They didn't take in to account that a lot of officers in those year groups elected to get out after their initial term was up or prior to the 10 year mark. It resulted in shortages in my year group throughout my time in the military. Promotion rates were high because of this. They went higher because we increased the size of the Army to be able to keep up with the manning requirements to support OIF/OEF.
The promotion rates go in cycles. At some point they will go up again because the Army will cut numbers and as a result of this additional officers will get out along the way because we have a history of doing "more with less people" and at some point some Soldiers will say enough is enough and get out rather than stay in during declining morale and being asked to do more and more work. It's happened during the 1990's and it'll happen again.
This is not about getting rid of officers with combat experience, it's a simple numbers game to get down to the approved strength. While the intent is to focus on those who have derogatory information in their files, PT failures, overweight, etc.; good people will be put out as well along the way. I lost some very good SPCs in my first unit because they had hit the 8 year mark and couldn't get promoted because the promotion points were at the max level for their MOS. I hated to see them go, but the points were not dropping below 798 and these guys had done everything they could to get points and still couldn't achieve the 798. It's a sad reality of drawing down the military, some good people will be put out too.
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It means the Army is downsizing and we are going back to pre-911 timelines for both NCOs and Officers. Eisenhower was commissioned in 1915. In 1936 he was promoted to LTC... 1944 he was promoted 5 star. This is way of the Army. The Army ebbs and flows with what is going in our world.
http://www.nps.gov/features/eise/jrranger/chronomil1.htm
This happened too after the cold war and Desert Storm (92-94), when the Army went (in short order) from 800k to 450k. I was 85, and I missed the cuts, but 86 and 87 were destroyed...
http://www.nps.gov/features/eise/jrranger/chronomil1.htm
This happened too after the cold war and Desert Storm (92-94), when the Army went (in short order) from 800k to 450k. I was 85, and I missed the cuts, but 86 and 87 were destroyed...
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MAJ (Join to see)
Sir: agreed, with the amendment that the Army is exempting YG 97 and older from hard looks at files, and giving this group a pass while cutting from yg98 and younger. We're already extremely top heavy; this trend will make us more so, and, bluntly, this is bad for the Army.
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COL Charles Williams
Gentlemen (back in my day) this happened too after the cold war and Desert Storm (92-94), when the Army went (in short order) from 800k to 450k. I was 85, and I missed the cuts, but 86 and 87 were destroyed...
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MAJ (Join to see)
@MAJ Carl Ballinger Any data to support your assertion that the Army is not top heavy ltcs and cols? Evidence suggesting otherwise is the recent low promotion rates. And, of course, please stop suggesting what my argument is or isn't; I've been clear on this: we want the best officers, and gutting one YG but keeping everyone from previous ygs doesn't give the Army the best officers.
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COL Charles Williams
Gentlemen,
I have no current information, as I am now retired, but I can you tell before I left in 2013, my branch and many branches were top heavy on both senior enlisted and officers. Promotion rates nearly doubled during the mid to late 2000s. Some background.
1. In 2010, the MP Branch had roughly 36 authorized Colonel Positions, and over 100 Colonels. Many of these were in non-MP jobs (MACOM, Army, Joint Staff, etc), but they were still counted against the branch.
2. MP Branch added 60 Companies, after 911, and probably 15-20 Battalion HQ... some of these units will be enduring requirements, some have been deactivated or will be.
3. In the MP Branch (and Engineer) there was a lot of grade plate reduction (officer and NCO), which also created overages in the enlisted and officer ranks. As an example. The Combat Support MP Co (160 people/60 vehicles) in 2005 had 3 x E-8 slots (1SG, Operations SGT, and Rear Battle NCO). Thru two iterations of grade plate reductions two of the E-8 slots were reduced to E-7. So, in two years, the MP Regiment had 3 times as many E-8s as it had slots. This was not uncommon for any branch.
4. Branches compete against each other for spaces.
5. OSP and SERBs are also evidence we have too many...
I have no current information, as I am now retired, but I can you tell before I left in 2013, my branch and many branches were top heavy on both senior enlisted and officers. Promotion rates nearly doubled during the mid to late 2000s. Some background.
1. In 2010, the MP Branch had roughly 36 authorized Colonel Positions, and over 100 Colonels. Many of these were in non-MP jobs (MACOM, Army, Joint Staff, etc), but they were still counted against the branch.
2. MP Branch added 60 Companies, after 911, and probably 15-20 Battalion HQ... some of these units will be enduring requirements, some have been deactivated or will be.
3. In the MP Branch (and Engineer) there was a lot of grade plate reduction (officer and NCO), which also created overages in the enlisted and officer ranks. As an example. The Combat Support MP Co (160 people/60 vehicles) in 2005 had 3 x E-8 slots (1SG, Operations SGT, and Rear Battle NCO). Thru two iterations of grade plate reductions two of the E-8 slots were reduced to E-7. So, in two years, the MP Regiment had 3 times as many E-8s as it had slots. This was not uncommon for any branch.
4. Branches compete against each other for spaces.
5. OSP and SERBs are also evidence we have too many...
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MAJ (Join to see)
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp
Carl: data is always available at DMDC. You'll be surprised to find that the ranks of ltc and col actually increased from Apr 2012 to Apr 2013 to Apr 2014 before ever so slight drops (7% and 3%) in Apr 2015. GOs decreased just 2% during this same time frame. This against a backdrop of more substantial cuts at lower ranks. Does it really take the same # of ltc, col, and GO to lead a substantially smaller force? The data supports my argument: the Army is top heavy; the trend is good, though, as we are starting to see decreases.
Carl: data is always available at DMDC. You'll be surprised to find that the ranks of ltc and col actually increased from Apr 2012 to Apr 2013 to Apr 2014 before ever so slight drops (7% and 3%) in Apr 2015. GOs decreased just 2% during this same time frame. This against a backdrop of more substantial cuts at lower ranks. Does it really take the same # of ltc, col, and GO to lead a substantially smaller force? The data supports my argument: the Army is top heavy; the trend is good, though, as we are starting to see decreases.
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MAJ (Join to see)
Carl, using your logic back at you, as you don't like my data, finding the answer is on you. How many ltc and cols are authorized?
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MAJ (Join to see)
Recognizing your aversion to data, though, here's your answer:
Sources: DOPMA and DMDC.
For GOs in the Army, the limit is 302. Currently, there are 309. So, top heavy. (But GOs I joint assignments can be excluded from this limit). Taking the other statutory limits, the Army is limited to either 187 or 230 GOs, with another minimum of 85 being in non-counting Joint assignments. so, in summary, currently top heavy by 7 GOs, or 122, or 77, depending on what part of the U.S. code you reference. Rand concludes that the Army is top heavy by 7, so I'll use that.
Sources: DOPMA and DMDC.
For GOs in the Army, the limit is 302. Currently, there are 309. So, top heavy. (But GOs I joint assignments can be excluded from this limit). Taking the other statutory limits, the Army is limited to either 187 or 230 GOs, with another minimum of 85 being in non-counting Joint assignments. so, in summary, currently top heavy by 7 GOs, or 122, or 77, depending on what part of the U.S. code you reference. Rand concludes that the Army is top heavy by 7, so I'll use that.
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MAJ (Join to see)
For colonels, DOPMA authorizes 3631 colonels at the current force structure. There are currently 4,351 colonels. Excess of 720.
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MAJ (Join to see)
This informs my argument: let's cut the 962 excess GO, col, and ltc, send them off to involuntary retirement, selecting out the worst performers; through normal attrition (non-select for promotion and retirement) clear out those that have been twice passed over for promotion who are at/near mrd, and promote more of the mid-range performers from the younger ygs.
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MAJ (Join to see)
I would note that the limits above are law; I can't find any data on actual billets that the Army may have created in excess of statutory limits; which makes sense, as I doubt the Army would want to publicize that it is in violation of U.S. Law.
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LTC (Join to see)
Interesting point about general officers -- their numbers are *excruciatingly* managed. While there is a limit on the number of GO positions in the Army at each rank as established by Congress, there are a number of positions which don't count against any service because they are nominative from any service/any component. So theoretically, if the Active Army is only allowed to have 10 two-star generals, but one of them is picked up for a Chairman's position, this allows a one-star to pin on, since the individual in the Chairman's position doesn't "count" against the Army's numbers. But there's not a gob of these positions, so it's not as if they're sucking the lifeblood out of military finances.
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MAJ (Join to see)
MAJ Carl Ballinger Carl, this is all public data. All you have to do is know how to use DMDC databases, which are open to the public, to search for what you're looking for. You also would have to know how to read US Code, and know which law (DOPMA) is relevant to this discussion. Its really not that hard. And it is all very public, releasable data (as required, in fact, by several parts of the US Code).
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MAJ (Join to see)
LTC (Join to see) Ma'am: Agreed with your point; you'll note I accounted for this in one of my previous posts; the US Code states that GOs in joint assignments don't count against Service limits, and I used RAND's estimate that the Army is +7 GOs above. One could figure this out, if one could find a list of all the Army generals serving in actual JDAL billets, count them; and then find a list of all the Army generals serving in Army billets, and count them; and then add the two numbers together to see if they surpassed the various limits established by DOPMA and the US Code.
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MAJ (Join to see)
MAJ Carl Ballinger Carl, I care because, like you, I care about the readiness and health of the Army as it relates to national defense. Apparently unlike you, I think this topic negatively impacts the readiness and health of the Army as it relates to national defense. How? By retaining arguably lower quality officers from older year groups while involuntarily separating or retiring higher quality officers from younger year groups, in this specific case (if what we're hearing is correct) by gutting YG99 (by promoting less than half to LTC). My basic logic is that every year group is more or less the same quality, and that those YG99 officers in the, say, the bottom 38th to 51st percentile are higher quality officers than those YG98/97/earlier officers in the bottom 37th/17th/6th percentile (as the previous YG promotion rates were 63%, 83%, and an average of 94% from FY01-FY12), and yet we're keeping the older, lower quality officers. Lower quality officers = bad for the health and readiness of the Army as it relates to national defense.
Two comments:
1) With this action, the Army is implicitly stating that YG99 is lower quality than previous year groups. Yes, this might be a function of the drawdown, but the Army has a huge range of options to execute the drawdown, and is choosing to target YG99 and younger, (YG98 is in here, too, with a promotion rate of 63%) vs. targeting YG97 and older.
2) The Army should be transparent about this, beyond stating the obvious that the Army is going through a drawdown. Explain to the force why YG98-99 and younger are deemed lower quality than YG97 and earlier. Explain why we aren't clearing the nearly 1,000 excess LTC and COL.
Two comments:
1) With this action, the Army is implicitly stating that YG99 is lower quality than previous year groups. Yes, this might be a function of the drawdown, but the Army has a huge range of options to execute the drawdown, and is choosing to target YG99 and younger, (YG98 is in here, too, with a promotion rate of 63%) vs. targeting YG97 and older.
2) The Army should be transparent about this, beyond stating the obvious that the Army is going through a drawdown. Explain to the force why YG98-99 and younger are deemed lower quality than YG97 and earlier. Explain why we aren't clearing the nearly 1,000 excess LTC and COL.
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MAJ (Join to see)
MAJ Carl Ballinger You're absolutely right--our poor evaluation system doesn't do much to really identify the best in the first place. It might identify the very, very, very best, those guys that have always gotten ACOMs on every OER (I'm convinced there is a correlation between ACOM and "the best"), but from my experience, stratification on an OER depends more on 1) timing and 2) passion about the rated officer and "standing" of the rater than on actual demonstrated performance or assessed potential. I do think the system we have now (with forced distribution rater profiles) is better than the previous system.
I also agree with you: lower promotion rates at the end of the day are better for the Army, and parity is difficult in a time of rapid force restructuring.
Also, I should mention the bell-curve; each cohort likely has two easily identifiable gropus: a group of "the best officers" that accounts for maybe 10-20% of the population, another group of "the worst officers" that accounts for another 10-20% of the population; the rest of the 60-80% of each cohort is probably just about the same on terms of merit. So as long as promotion rates are below 80%, the Army is probably cutting the "worst" officers; when the rates averaged 94% for 12 years, not so much.
I also agree with you: lower promotion rates at the end of the day are better for the Army, and parity is difficult in a time of rapid force restructuring.
Also, I should mention the bell-curve; each cohort likely has two easily identifiable gropus: a group of "the best officers" that accounts for maybe 10-20% of the population, another group of "the worst officers" that accounts for another 10-20% of the population; the rest of the 60-80% of each cohort is probably just about the same on terms of merit. So as long as promotion rates are below 80%, the Army is probably cutting the "worst" officers; when the rates averaged 94% for 12 years, not so much.
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As many others have already replied, it is just a fact of life in a shrinking Army. Fewer promotions are needed to fill a given number of slots. Simple math.
Especially in an economy like we currently have. Most especially given the (relative) governmental austerity, were there are going to be fewer working for/consulting for fed.gov positions (where a lot of LTCs and COLs seem to go). The Officers in those slots are going to tend to stay right up to their MRDs, all things being equal. Result: Even fewer slots needing fills.
The QSBs, etc are aimed at SUBSTANDARD PERFORMERS (with the paper to back it up). At senior levels, they aren't going to garner many. Their records are at least average, at least on paper, where it counts. The decision was made to use these force shaping tools to get rid of the easy low-hanging fruit.
Getting rid of those who simply are not exceptional therefore logically (and correctly) falls to the promotion boards. You promote those who have demonstrated the ability for greater responsibility, and don't promote those who haven't. Again, based on their paper record, which is the only one that counts in a centralized system like ours.
End result: Lower promotion rates. Like LTC (Join to see) , I've been in a while and recall when it was the NORM for Officers to punch out at MAJ because LTC just wasn't happening. In fact, being non-select for CGSC was what they call a "clue"... I fully expect this to become a reality again. I likewise expect that the average TIG for CPT to MAJ will go up, as will MAJ to LTC, for those who make it. I expect at least another 18-24 months at CPT, and another 24-36 months at MAJ, unless we have another war. Peacetime armies have slower promotions. It's just a fact of life.
I can understand some frustration in feeling that people who "got lucky", "skated by", or "won the lottery" are the ones sitting on boards making the decisions. Again, it's just a fact of life, especially in a rapidly shrinking force. First, by policy/law (I think it's law, but I'm too lazy to look now) members of promotion boards must be at least LTC. Second, members of the board must outrank the considered population. The later is just basic common sense. How can someone consider your potential for service at a higher grade if they are not intimately familiar with service at that higher grade? The end result, no matter your current rank, you board will always be composed of people at least 2-3 years senior to you. In a rapidly shrinking force, that will mean they got "breaks" because of the different optempo and manning requirements. It's not good or bad, it just is. Seniors will always be seniors, doing senior things.
I would be surprised if it was 50%, but I would be unsurprised by 60-65%.
Especially in an economy like we currently have. Most especially given the (relative) governmental austerity, were there are going to be fewer working for/consulting for fed.gov positions (where a lot of LTCs and COLs seem to go). The Officers in those slots are going to tend to stay right up to their MRDs, all things being equal. Result: Even fewer slots needing fills.
The QSBs, etc are aimed at SUBSTANDARD PERFORMERS (with the paper to back it up). At senior levels, they aren't going to garner many. Their records are at least average, at least on paper, where it counts. The decision was made to use these force shaping tools to get rid of the easy low-hanging fruit.
Getting rid of those who simply are not exceptional therefore logically (and correctly) falls to the promotion boards. You promote those who have demonstrated the ability for greater responsibility, and don't promote those who haven't. Again, based on their paper record, which is the only one that counts in a centralized system like ours.
End result: Lower promotion rates. Like LTC (Join to see) , I've been in a while and recall when it was the NORM for Officers to punch out at MAJ because LTC just wasn't happening. In fact, being non-select for CGSC was what they call a "clue"... I fully expect this to become a reality again. I likewise expect that the average TIG for CPT to MAJ will go up, as will MAJ to LTC, for those who make it. I expect at least another 18-24 months at CPT, and another 24-36 months at MAJ, unless we have another war. Peacetime armies have slower promotions. It's just a fact of life.
I can understand some frustration in feeling that people who "got lucky", "skated by", or "won the lottery" are the ones sitting on boards making the decisions. Again, it's just a fact of life, especially in a rapidly shrinking force. First, by policy/law (I think it's law, but I'm too lazy to look now) members of promotion boards must be at least LTC. Second, members of the board must outrank the considered population. The later is just basic common sense. How can someone consider your potential for service at a higher grade if they are not intimately familiar with service at that higher grade? The end result, no matter your current rank, you board will always be composed of people at least 2-3 years senior to you. In a rapidly shrinking force, that will mean they got "breaks" because of the different optempo and manning requirements. It's not good or bad, it just is. Seniors will always be seniors, doing senior things.
I would be surprised if it was 50%, but I would be unsurprised by 60-65%.
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MAJ (Join to see)
MAJ Carl Ballinger COL Vincent Stoneking
A GOMER was enough to separate an untold number of captains and majors in the FY14 OSBs and SERBs. For a colonel, though, a GOMER means you get to stay in command of one of the Army's most elite entities.
Just another example of O-5s and O-6s and above with "bad paper" continuing to serve, while captains and majors and below are cut for the same reasons.
And another example of less than stellar transparency from the Army.
With details of reprimands and misconduct by a one-star and an O-6 from the Special Operations community in the last several days, one might ask if this is a trend in a certain community?
http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/careers/army/2015/06/04/ranger-regiment-investigation-vanek/28510899/
A GOMER was enough to separate an untold number of captains and majors in the FY14 OSBs and SERBs. For a colonel, though, a GOMER means you get to stay in command of one of the Army's most elite entities.
Just another example of O-5s and O-6s and above with "bad paper" continuing to serve, while captains and majors and below are cut for the same reasons.
And another example of less than stellar transparency from the Army.
With details of reprimands and misconduct by a one-star and an O-6 from the Special Operations community in the last several days, one might ask if this is a trend in a certain community?
http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/careers/army/2015/06/04/ranger-regiment-investigation-vanek/28510899/
Army: 75th Ranger Regiment commander investigated
The commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment faced an investigation over allegations of misconduct.
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MAJ (Join to see)
MAJ Carl Ballinger I accept your premise that there is (or should be) a modicum of privacy regarding institutional decisions about the management of an individual officer's career. I also agree that faulty OSB/SERB logic and arbitrariness is not a reason to encourage more bad choices by the Army. At some point, though--and I'm not sure where that point is--officer conduct becomes public interest. The 75th Ranger Regiment Commander getting a GOMOR for misconduct and remaining in command may or may not be public business, depending on the type and severity of the misconduct. At this point, though, while unfortunate for individuals and the concept of innocent until proven guilty, I think we're past the point of giving the Army a "pass" in these sorts of things, given the Army's demonstrated propensity for obfuscating the truth (in the case of BG Mulholland), aggressively pursuing administrative action against lower ranking officers for alleged but unproved/unprove-able misconduct (Amerine, Golsteyn), and etc. Apart from the BG Mulholland example, which serves the public interest by sending a message to the force that such misconduct is not tolerated, the other potent example is LTC (Retired) Jeff Sinclair (formerly BG Sinclair), who the Army retired at LTC because as a COL and BG his service was not honorable. The reason for his retirement and subsequent reduction is public business, one, because he committed serious crimes, and two, because it sends a message that to the force that "adultery, maltreatment of his accuser and two other improper relationships, and making derogatory comments about women" is not acceptable (well, it sort of sends a mixed message, as many argue/argued that he should be in jail, not drawing a fat retirement paycheck, but that's a different topic.) Like it or not, military officers are public servants, and as such, should be (and sometimes are) held accountable publicly.
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MAJ (Join to see)
MAJ Carl Ballinger
http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/florida-public-intoxication-laws.htm
http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/disorderly-conduct-florida.htm
Seems if there was enough of a reason for a GOMOR, there may likely have been a crime committed. To be fair, we don't know the whole story, say, if the police were/were not involved, if he was/was not charged with a crime, if he was/was not arrested, if he was/was not prosecuted. Thus, we can't say whether he was alleged to have committed a crime---we could say the article does not specify, though.
At any rate, the article suggests he may have been in violation of numerous Florida laws.
There's also the matter of MCM and UCMJ. Surely with your encyclopedic knowledge of MCM and UCMJ, you could understand that several articles exist (some criminal, some not) that may or may not apply to this situation. Again, we can't really make a good assessment, because we don't know the whole story. Maybe someday the GOMOR will leak and we can then discuss this on the merits of the case, rather than based on opaque Army responses and investigative journalism.
http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/florida-public-intoxication-laws.htm
http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/disorderly-conduct-florida.htm
Seems if there was enough of a reason for a GOMOR, there may likely have been a crime committed. To be fair, we don't know the whole story, say, if the police were/were not involved, if he was/was not charged with a crime, if he was/was not arrested, if he was/was not prosecuted. Thus, we can't say whether he was alleged to have committed a crime---we could say the article does not specify, though.
At any rate, the article suggests he may have been in violation of numerous Florida laws.
There's also the matter of MCM and UCMJ. Surely with your encyclopedic knowledge of MCM and UCMJ, you could understand that several articles exist (some criminal, some not) that may or may not apply to this situation. Again, we can't really make a good assessment, because we don't know the whole story. Maybe someday the GOMOR will leak and we can then discuss this on the merits of the case, rather than based on opaque Army responses and investigative journalism.
Florida Public Intoxication Laws: Drunk in Public Penalties and Sentencing | Criminal Law
Laws punishing public intoxication vary widely among states. This article discusses Florida’s public intoxication law, but other alcohol-related issues may also apply to your case. For example, someone at a bar who has too much to drink, gets angry, and
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Less than 50% is very de motivating. If this is true, seems like a cop out for the Army, as they'd essentially be separating 8 or 9 times as many officers through non-select for promotion as they did in the OSB. They said they would continue to shape the force through normal procedures, but below 50% is ridiculous. But, then again, the class of 1999 did not go through OSB or SERB.
Do you by chance mean FY15 board results, as The Fy 16 board meets this coming January?
How reliable is your source of info?
Force reduction is the "why" to this, though. As we promoted everyone to LTC for the last 15 years (last year's board excluded), we can't just continue to promote everyone when the jobs just don't exist.
Alternatively, maybe those in primary zone, generally commissioned in 1999, just had bad records. I find this hard to believe for an entire cohort, though.
Do you by chance mean FY15 board results, as The Fy 16 board meets this coming January?
How reliable is your source of info?
Force reduction is the "why" to this, though. As we promoted everyone to LTC for the last 15 years (last year's board excluded), we can't just continue to promote everyone when the jobs just don't exist.
Alternatively, maybe those in primary zone, generally commissioned in 1999, just had bad records. I find this hard to believe for an entire cohort, though.
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CPT (Join to see)
Sir,
In what I've researched, whether by design or not, it sounds like separating officers, by way of non-select for promotion (as opposed to OSB), would be the preferable mechanism to utilize because....as absolutely crummy as it sounds, it sounds like certain benefits would be lost/not have to be paid/or have to be repaid if THAT is the mechanism used.
There, it would seem, would be an enormous cost savings.
By utilizing the non-select for promotion route as a mechanism, it sounds like its also easier to make a case that it was the "officer's fault" for being separated. (Afterall, they didn't make themselves competitive enough to promote = their fault.)
With declining selection rates, however, an officer could theoretically have no unfavorable actions/GOMORs/etc, and just have not enough stellar OERs, and still not be promoted.
In what I've researched, whether by design or not, it sounds like separating officers, by way of non-select for promotion (as opposed to OSB), would be the preferable mechanism to utilize because....as absolutely crummy as it sounds, it sounds like certain benefits would be lost/not have to be paid/or have to be repaid if THAT is the mechanism used.
There, it would seem, would be an enormous cost savings.
By utilizing the non-select for promotion route as a mechanism, it sounds like its also easier to make a case that it was the "officer's fault" for being separated. (Afterall, they didn't make themselves competitive enough to promote = their fault.)
With declining selection rates, however, an officer could theoretically have no unfavorable actions/GOMORs/etc, and just have not enough stellar OERs, and still not be promoted.
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LTC Hillary Luton
If you think 50% is bad, last year I faced a promotion rate in the AGR program of 11% to Colonel. Needless to say, I saw the writing on the wall and decided it was time to make way for younger officers with greater potential.
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MAJ (Join to see)
Ma'am: bold move on your part---from what we're seeing, not many of your active duty peers have the same perspective. @LTC Hillary Luton
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This is the new normal. The army is nearing the end of the most current phase of ARSTUC (army force restructuring) inactivating 11 BCTs, and is going to announce (in the near future) that they will likely cut another 2-5 BCTs. The 11 BCTs each held roughly 77 MTOEd LTC positions. Staff sections are shrinking at all levels. The boards are becoming more selective, and selecting less because there are just not enough authorized positions available anymore.
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MAJ (Join to see)
CPT (Join to see) I appreciate your logic here; but the fact that we currently have 935 excess O-5 and O-6 suggests makes me question if ARSTUC is the issue.
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CPT (Join to see)
See above for my comments regarding ARSTRUC Sir. I site the draw down as the direct cause for lowered promotion rates. Harder to get promoted equals harder to stay in. This is a simple way of pushing people out without boarding them out. HRC is also discussing more OSBs for O4-O6. And another for CPTs. Excess during a draw down and drastically lowered promotion rates has happened historically. The army is going back to its pre-9/11 time in grade standard a and post gulf war promotion rates.
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CPT (Join to see)
See above for my comments regarding ARSTRUC Sir. I site the draw down as the direct cause for lowered promotion rates. Harder to get promoted equals harder to stay in. This is a simple way of pushing people out without boarding them out. HRC is also discussing more OSBs for O4-O6. And another for CPTs. Excess during a draw down and drastically lowered promotion rates has happened historically. The army is going back to its pre-9/11 time in grade standard a and post gulf war promotion rates.
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MAJ (Join to see)
CPT (Join to see) You're the second person today that I've seen mention additional OSB/SERB for O3-O6---where are you hearing this?
I agree with your logic on ARSTRUC. I disagree with the Army's method for managing the size of the officer corps, unless there's a plan for aggressive OSB/SERB for O5-O6 to clear the excess as you suggest. If there is such a plan, the Army needs to start getting its message out----noting that controlling the message on this drawdown is not an Army strong point.
I agree with your logic on ARSTRUC. I disagree with the Army's method for managing the size of the officer corps, unless there's a plan for aggressive OSB/SERB for O5-O6 to clear the excess as you suggest. If there is such a plan, the Army needs to start getting its message out----noting that controlling the message on this drawdown is not an Army strong point.
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In a perfect world, Id like to see promotion rates stay moderately high and involuntary separations/ forced retirements go through the roof to meet end strength goals.
From an impartial review board.. visit every MSC, three step process. Review records, interview those affected and hear testimony /mitigation. Then hand out pink slips and move on to next MSC.
Start at the top with GO and Senior NCO.. then work your way down to private and LT
From an impartial review board.. visit every MSC, three step process. Review records, interview those affected and hear testimony /mitigation. Then hand out pink slips and move on to next MSC.
Start at the top with GO and Senior NCO.. then work your way down to private and LT
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While I doubt the promotion rates will be like they were 5-6 years ago, the low ones you are seeing now are a product of the drawdown and should't be expected to last more than a few year groups until the Army stabilizes at the desired end strength and rank distribution. Yeah, it's gonna suck for the next couple year groups, and there's really nothing you can do about that. Timing sometimes works for you, sometimes works against you.....
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MAJ (Join to see)
Sir: agreed, timing can be good or bad. But It might be helpful for the Army as an institution to show a bit more empathy to the current year groups for whom the timing sucks. Comments like yours reflect the reality, and the reality sucks. But the reality is harder to accept as part of the deal when it comes from the current swath of ltcs and cols who were promoted when rates were at historic highs just a couple years ago.
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LTC Paul Labrador
MAJ (Join to see), I will be the first to admit that I benefited from good timing. My year group was the first CPT board after the '97 selection debacle where ANC lost almost 2 whole year groups. I was also promoted to O-5 at the tail end of the high promotion rates. Again, sometimes timing helps, sometimes it kicks you in the nuts. That's life. The only thing you can do is make sure you are doing the best job you can, and getting into assignments that broaden your skill set to enhance your value to the Army. But remember, at the end of the day we are ALL expendable....
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The DoD does not want to have an official RIF (reduction in force) Because they entitles soldiers to additional privileges and benefits. So in an era where budgets are tight it is easy to attack the 1% who serve for savings because the military is expensive. So they cap the number of promotions/slots/billets and kick people out because "they failed to promote". Failing to promote is "on the soldier" and the actual RIF continues without the commensurate statutory obligations that are attached to a RIF. Prepare for a time when the military is mostly part time and very few are allowed to reach the stage where they can receive retirement benefits. Many would say this is "disloyal and a beech of the leader led relationship". But it definitely will save millions of no one were allowed to stay long enough to retire.
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