Signal Corps: What happened?

SSG Harvey, I totally get what you are saying. I watched it happening before my very eyes just before I retired. I honestly believe it started near the end of MSE and DGM. We evolved from packet switching to having routers in our shelters.....routers that we were not allowed to even touch- even though it was a key component of our shelter! Yeah, we could put the HSMUX and HSMUX 2 cards in and they would even let us do the jumpers, but that router was OFF LIMITS. As a CCNA I was outraged at this. As MSE and DGM went away and the Win-T came into its own, this mentality increased. I used to have a label for this- the "mouse clicker and button pusher syndrome". All the troops knew is that "on this screen I click here, then push this button". Did they know wtf they just did? Nope. Did they do it right? Yes, but if you have no clue WHAT you just did (besides the physical action of clicking and pushing), how effective and technically proficient are you?? I would correct this anytime I ran across it, but I felt like the guy dog paddling against the raging current. Do the troops at least know the fundamentals of electronics? Networking? GROUNDING (great point btw)? Do they know the difference between a power ground and a signal ground? Do they understand what the PEP and the SEP are grounded separately? I could go on all night but I think you "get it" and are on the same page. It needs to be fixed- that's a fact.

I had an SF signal detachment (two platoons) in the '73-'74 timeframe. We were still using the obsolete but reliable AN/GRC-9 (the old Angry 9). In many instances, voice transmissions were ruled out by distance, and SF communicators relied on continuous wave radio operation, using International Morse Code. The CW key was clipped to the operator's thigh and power was provided by a hand cranked generator. (Internet photo)

SFC Steven Harvey SFC John Gates SFC Peter Cyprian and SSG (Join to see) Sgt Tom Cunnally
SFC Robert Giffin, thought this might interest you.

We lost many of those skills because that responsibility was taken out of our hands, or we simply didn't allocate the time to continue to teach it. As the war progressed, technology upgrades poured in, and as the theater developed we lost sight of a lot of the basics (not just signal). Home station train ups became so time sensitive that it seemed like leader development (which comes back to most of the OP's issues) took a back seat to reset, upgrade, train enough for NTC and deploy again. It seemed like you had just enough time to do it once and move on to the next event. In theater there was a contractor to install your equipment for you, fix your broken toys, and commercial telecomm and shore power gradually replaced tactical equipment.

I was an MSE platoon leader in 2004 in Iraq. My battalion commander regularly came around and played stump the chump with the PLs to spot check they were doing things like routine maintenance and understood the basics. I needed an extra kick in the pants since I went from the schoolhouse to leading one of his platoons without being around for the pre-deployment training.

Now that deployments have slowed down quite a bit and our equipment is becoming more "army green" we're relearning how to do it all ourselves again. The contract maintenance is gone and we have more than enough time for leaders to crawl and walk through every step of the process. There's definitely now no excuse for not doing.

You said signal and leaders in the same sentence and put them together...having spent my entire time in the military after 9/11 in the Signal Corps after joining at the age of 35, it's a shame that the leaders of signal see only the letters after people's names, mandatory training that HAS to take place, training that's done with a fire hose rather than understanding and of course the ever present PMCS and inventory...when training at the school house as an officer, very little if any time is devoted to actually how to train a unit, platoon, section, team or individual but a whole lot on how to CYA...your BOLC infantry experience is supposed to get you to understand how to train, I suppose....your powerpoint presentation is supposed to impress and inspire your subordinates to do their job...how is a 2LT going out to a battalion as their S6 (an O3 slot) going to know how to train that group? How is that 2LT going to convince that XO/S3/BC that it's vitally important to train on Tactical Comms when we utilize our Strategic network both at home and deployed? Hell it's hard enough for that BDE comms commander sitting at some echelon below BDE to know how to do that. Why on earth would I worry about WIN-T when I never use it here stateside? What unit commander is going to "waste" time training that asset? Let alone a whole company of signal that provides dial-up speed for 5 people and links to BDE at a speed of 256up and 256down or at best 4Mb over a LOS system? That 2LT is sunk...that O3 is sunk if they don't have the cohones to push back...take that 2LT out of the S6 slot and into a platoon to provide that key leadership experience with their level of I give a $%^t reduced...it's no wonder that units are having trouble getting trained. I've seen E8's at BDE that last set up VRC-12's now in charge of directing the IOM of WIN-T...that's not just a failure for the E8, they got set up for failure by the Officer Corps. In the active component on deployment, the 2LT/1LT can get rotated out after 30 days to go to CCC while the E5's and below sit in a tent tyring to keep the links together...inspirational I'm sure. If the 2LT's are not highly motivated to look out for their troops and not willing to push back on that field grade for training time, you get what you've seen...then those beaten up, abused untrained 2LT's grow into field grades with all the bad habits and attitudes instilled in them by getting pushed around and no training. And I'm sorry but not all of us get to live our lives in a Signal Battalion or BDE...generally the mission still happens because some non-comm or junior enlisted is high speed enough to get everyone's job done while working 18 hour days...and for this they get an AAM if they get recognized at all...the leaders you look for go where the action is, Combat Arms/MP etc....they do not go to Signal unless they are interested in CCNA, CCNP, NET+, CISSP, A+ etc to appear after their name, get out, and get bankrolled by some private entity...so really those guys are looking out for themselves not some 25Q that doesn't have a HCLOS to work on...Leadership is in short supply in the Signal world, it starts with the Officer Corps, infects the Senior NCO's and destroys the junior enlisted. Do this long enough, and the echelon you're at gets broken. If you find one worth a $%^t, hang on to them, follow them from post to post (if active) and tell all the Junior Officers to look at how that one does it....once the Officer Corps fixes their $%^t, we'll get to worry about the NCO's and from there the Junior Enlisted. Just my two cents...rant over.

I can speak for my last unit and assure you what you speak of is not the "standard" everywhere. I think it's like any organization, there is good and bad. I had a fantastic Platoon Sergeant who taught all of us just the fundamentals that you speak of. We even used those skills in FTXs as well as while we were deployed. It is the reason why the NCO is the backbone of the Army, because how we train our soldiers, is how they will train theirs. Leadership is the key to this problem.

I will say that many NCOs do not know about or use the tools that have been given to them... such as ATN.. which breaks down a training plan and go/no go assessment sheets.. but instead of asking what's wrong? Let's ask what are we doing to fix it? I was taught to use these tools and pass the information along.. and most senior leaders know of these tools but never look at it. They just know it's there! Call over to Signal Towers and find our what is available for you troops such as LWNS and ATN and then actually set substantial amount of time to conduct crew drills on the training calendar. AATW!!

Enter the JNN during 3ID deployment to Iraq. It was the first iteration and had a few bugs. IP telephony was new to the Army and not in AIT yet as this was not a program of record.
We go through more iterations culminating in Lot8/9. During that turbulence we had varying equipment models and configurations (layer 3 switch at the access case or not? How do we use the Content Engine? How to use Promina between JNNs on HCLOS over Serial?

During this era, you either got it or you didn't and we promoted people regardless as we had to fight a war while increasing the number of Brigades.
Enter WIN-T with TMs, a schoolhouse teaching material and experience at war. It got a bit better but the OPTEMPO and personnel turnover compounded with the lack of command emphasis on Signal training (in some/most units) due to the dissolution of the SIG BNs at the Divisions created a perfect storm.

Lets AAR as to how we succeeded in the mission: Some people stepped up and learned. Warrants, high speed NCOs and Soldiers and even some Officers get face time on the system and made it happen. Upper echelons published configurations, TTPs and provided in-theater equipment.

How we could have done better: Done more home station training. Convinced our leaders that we need time on our systems. Going to the field with the Brigade is not training for Signal as we are providing a service. The exception is when there is a published PACE plan that the Brigade can use to continue the fight when we are learning.

What you can do individually: Use http://www.signal-chief.com and check out the resources available on Milsuite, s6.army.mil and other collaboration sites.

SSG,

The change came about long before the introduction of WIN-T. It actually started with the Army's decision to dismantle Signal Battalions within Divisions in favor of the modularity of Unit of Action/Execution. These later became the Brigade Combat Teams we know today. As a result, the Signaleer's training focus was pushed to the back burner in favor of the maneuver unit commander's focus. This focus was usually centered on the certification of combat arms skills. Heck, you cannot fault them, that was their METL focus. With Signal Battalions, you had a Signal chain of command that had a METL focused around Signal proficiency, and all of their funds and focus were committed to achieving this task. I reminisce on the days of getting my site's LOS shots in in under 20 Minutes, and my 39D up and passing traffic in under 30. Whether we used Thursday's SGT Time or monthly team/PLT training, we trained to be the best at our craft. The thought of playing second fiddle to any other unit was just plain blasphemy. Our input in the training schedule aligned with the Brigade, Battalion and Company's METL so our training was never stepped on. The Army CIO/G6 has realized the mess caused by dismantling Signal Battalions and are currently comparing the effects of reintroducing a Signal Battalion or a larger G6/S6 back into the Division formations. one thing for certain, when the smoke clears and the testing ends, we must have a change in the BCT commander's focus. We must increase their understanding that Signal is one of his greatest weapon systems. Signal assets and personnel must be maintained and properly trained in order to be truly beneficial. Too often Commanders and XOs cringe at the thought of spending $50K on one circuit card, much less repairing an entire system. Our equipment cost big $$$$, and the battlefield is NOW digitized so BCS and MCS that give the commander that common operation picture and instant notification/visualization is a must have.

As an NCO, you must actively explore ways to train your Soldiers. No one knows their weaknesses better than you. We are working on reintroducing ARTEP standards for Signal MOSs, but until that comes into fruition, I need my NCOs to fight to protect their training and employ opportunity/hip pocket training to maximize Soldier proficiency.

My personal opinion is the reason for this loss of this knowledge comes from lack of proper mentorship. I have been in low optempo units and very high optempo units, and I can say in all honesty my leaders failed in the sense of mentoring the individuals trained to take their place. I have witness MSG slave driving their teams shops, or organizations to perform without taking the time to coach or teach what was expected from us. I watched them groom their 2ICs or ncos to be just like them thus growing more ncos that do not know how to mentor properly/effectively.

Many of my peers are severely lacking in general signal knowledge, and I.T certifications doesn't mean anything when you are deploying with our multitudes of different systems we deploy with.

Also our NCOES Schools are failing in teaching critical knowledge to our perspective cmfs as well in all areas. Like what happened to teaching hand receipt discipline? I just watched some of the most suspect transactions happen over handreciept transfers from ncos that just don't know what is required. Some didn't even know what a TM was?

If you are senior in your perspective signal mos take a couple of ncos and mentor them. Once you retire that information is gone, and that's how history repeats itself.

sorry I am just ranting at this point.

SFC Steven Harvey My SOBC class was the last to learn Tri-TAC and RATT rigs the first to learn how to run Radio Access Units (RAUs) in MSE in 1990. This early familiarity with Cellular technology helped me land where I am today. The downside is when the commercial side advances the technology faster than the military, the military will convert to get the benefit of the newest technology.

Commercialization of the skills needed to run the SNAPs, conversion of military to civilian, customers and equipment with dependence on bandwidth and high-speed connections. It will take another crisis in a remote country with NO infrastructure for us to re-learn our lessons.

With so much to learn about the new technology, leadership is making choices. It is doubtful an E-4 today could do the same as what I expected, they are not trained in it. Most I see can barely make a Radio call or control a Tactical net.