Posted on Jun 30, 2015
SSG Carlos Madden
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I worked with these teams in Iraq and still in contact with one of them. I think the asymmetrical nature of our wars called for enormous resources in this area which the DoD and Dept of State were unprepared for. Could it have been better executed? Perhaps. There was a need that needed to be filled quickly and I personally found the HTT's I worked with to be a great asset.

Curious how others HTT experiences were? Was pulling the plug on this a good thing or no?

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/06/29/human-terrain-system-afghanistan/29476409/?utm_source=feedblitz&utm_medium=FeedBlitzRss&utm_campaign=usatodaycomworld-topstories
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COL Jon Thompson
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I served as an HTT leader in Baghdad in 2008-2009 as mobilized USAR officer. I enjoyed our work and felt we made somewhat of a difference which I wrote about twice in Army publications. That being said, I was very critical of the hiring process at that time. BAE had the contract at the time and seemed to be rushing people into the program regardless of true qualifications. Some of these were people I called serial contractors because they went from contract to contract and many left HTS in 2009 when the decided to convert the contractor positions to Term GS positions. Several others had no business being in the training much less being down range. Overseas, we could not do the social science research with any academic rigor because that would have required team members to live with the locals. But we did the best we could by talking to people from all socio-economic strata and I directly attribute one of analysts with preventing a kinetic action in the Rusafa zone of Baghdad because she understood the local populace reactions when the ISF went into arrest a local Sunni warlord. I believe we need the capability and hate to see it go away as it is even more important now in simmering areas before conflict actually begins. But HTS did this to themselves.
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SSG Carlos Madden
SSG Carlos Madden
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Sir, thanks for sharing. You summed up many of my thoughts better than I could. I'd be curious about your publications if you don't mind. I was in Iraq in 2009-2010 so we likely have some similar experiences and perspectives.
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COL Jon Thompson
COL Jon Thompson
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I had one published in the July-Aug 2010 Military Review journal published by CGSC and second in the NOV-DEC 2010 Infantry magazine. Here is the link to the Military Review article: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100831_art013.pdf
Here is the link to the Infantry magazine article. http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2010/NOV-DEC/pdfs/NOV-DEC%2010.pdf

I would be interested to hear your feedback after you read them.
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CSM Michael J. Uhlig
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"A key concern for them was the militarization of their field and the potential that their work would be used to target insurgents, a violation of their ethical code not to hurt those they study."

Are you kidding me, cry me a river! War is not a game and these contracts paid 3/4 a BILLION DOLLARS! You can't run with the big dogs......I bet they were NOT crying when they were balancing their bank accounts.
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COL Jon Thompson
COL Jon Thompson
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They were crying in 2009 when the Army converted them from highly paid civilian contractors to GS term employees even though many of those were at GS15 level. Teams that were solely staffed by contractors all but folded up in Baghdad. Too many of them were purely mercenaries looking for the next contractor position.
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SSG Carlos Madden
SSG Carlos Madden
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CSM, in a way you hit the nail on the head. I felt the Dept. of State approach was too "soft" (and they lacked logistics to actually do their jobs properly) and the military was too "hard." The Army's primary job being eliminating threats, didn't help much long term when suddenly they were asked to foster government relationships and build infrastructure. What we are lacking is something in the middle that can take on the global challenges of the 21st cent but still operate like a fighting force - some kind of "lethal diplomat."
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CSM Michael J. Uhlig
CSM Michael J. Uhlig
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SSG Carlos Madden, those "lethal diplomats" are already trained in FID and when at home station, they wear a beret that is Green or Tan....
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SSG Carlos Madden
SSG Carlos Madden
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CSM Michael J. Uhlig Exactly. We need more of them - a lot more. Now if only someone can come up with a way to make (and pay) for more SOCOM members without lowering standards.
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LT Intelligence
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As someone with a background in Anthropology these teams always seemed interesting to me. I remember when they were recruiting in newspapers back in 2005 or so and the academic anthropology world was in an uproar about it. Certainly seems like a useful concept but I think the lessons learned should be taken and absorbed back into the Intel/PSYOP/Civil Affairs world to have the capabilities in an organic fashion. If anything cultural awareness and understanding will not be going away as an important part of warfare any time soon. Just my 2 cents.
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MAJ Docent
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Lawrence of Arabia was also an Anthropologist.
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