Posted on Apr 30, 2015
What does the Philippine Insurrection teach us about Vietnam, Iraq, Afghan, WOT?
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This was part of our on-line training before going through ramp-up training and tactical training prior to deployment to Afghanistan.
It's very relevant inasmuch as unconventional warfare, by its very nature and its name, is the antithesis of conventional thought. Perhaps a better word is asymmetric, or even low-intensity. Melding those two admittedly strange bedfellows is a very complicated undertaking.
To wit: it's a completely different mindset and one that was used by the Vietcong and the NVA against us in 'Nam. In fact, we used it ourselves during the Revolutionary War in the 1770s and 1780s, also to great effect, against the Brits.
As is known by most through doctrine, the people of a place where such a war is being conducted are the center of gravity. Getting them to sympathize or subscribe to whatever viewpoint is the overarching goal, because that brings legitimacy. That is no small undertaking, but paradoxically, it's usually executed, when successful, by a relatively small group of people, much to the consternation of the larger force. Small footprint; big potential.
All a force that's outgunned, outmaneuvered or outnumbered has to do is not lose. They don't have to win, tactically speaking; they just need to make sure they don't lose the psychological advantage. If they are still part of the dialogue, particularly with today's 24-hour news cycle and instant gratification, they are still players, whether that's reflected in reality or not.
With our tendency toward shortsightedness and tunnel vision, realistically, all an opposing force needs to do these days is simply outlast the majority of our collective attention span. If they do, they won't lose. By implication, then, they've won. Sad to say, most people have long lost their taste for OEF, OIF and the so-called Global War On Terror.
It's very relevant inasmuch as unconventional warfare, by its very nature and its name, is the antithesis of conventional thought. Perhaps a better word is asymmetric, or even low-intensity. Melding those two admittedly strange bedfellows is a very complicated undertaking.
To wit: it's a completely different mindset and one that was used by the Vietcong and the NVA against us in 'Nam. In fact, we used it ourselves during the Revolutionary War in the 1770s and 1780s, also to great effect, against the Brits.
As is known by most through doctrine, the people of a place where such a war is being conducted are the center of gravity. Getting them to sympathize or subscribe to whatever viewpoint is the overarching goal, because that brings legitimacy. That is no small undertaking, but paradoxically, it's usually executed, when successful, by a relatively small group of people, much to the consternation of the larger force. Small footprint; big potential.
All a force that's outgunned, outmaneuvered or outnumbered has to do is not lose. They don't have to win, tactically speaking; they just need to make sure they don't lose the psychological advantage. If they are still part of the dialogue, particularly with today's 24-hour news cycle and instant gratification, they are still players, whether that's reflected in reality or not.
With our tendency toward shortsightedness and tunnel vision, realistically, all an opposing force needs to do these days is simply outlast the majority of our collective attention span. If they do, they won't lose. By implication, then, they've won. Sad to say, most people have long lost their taste for OEF, OIF and the so-called Global War On Terror.
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Thanks for sharing this piece of history. I was always told that "acquiring the Philippines" was a strategic military move to get closer to Asia. It's nice to read the whole history.
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