The Principles of a Just War

Read Micheal Waltzer's Just and Unjust Wars. In summary of his argument:

I claimed that Michael Walzer’s assertion that soldiers are morally equal -that they are not responsible for ad bellum considerations- is incorrect. Soldiers do indeed possess a level of ad bellum responsibility. To prove this claim, I examined the concept of willing participation and the underlying principles of moral equality itself, eventually differentiating between moral and political responsibility for wartime justice. In the process, I relied on the concept of echelonment as an indicator both of willing participation and, correspondingly, of responsibility for ad bellum considerations. Furthermore, I claim that this alteration to Walzer’s system of justice does not greatly affect its structure. I end with a suggestion regarding how men can be punished that have different mixtures of justice and injustice with respect to both ad bellum and in bello justice.
There exists a spectrum regarding soldiers’ participation in war. Some are more willing participants, some are less. The degree to which they willfully participate in war determines, directly, their moral responsibility for its ad bellum justification. If a soldier, at any level, is fully committed to the cause and gives his full assent to it, he can be held accountable for an ad bellum consideration because he contributes all he can to the cause of the war. If the war is just, he should be commended; if unjust, condemned.
Willing participation is not readily clear, however, either for outside observers or, sometimes, to soldiers themselves. The standard I introduce to demonstrate, with reasonable variance, the level of a soldier’s willingness to participate in a war is the echelon at which he operates and contributes to the war effort. The higher the echelon, the more willing his participation. Hence, officers and administrative enlisted soldiers are, at higher levels, responsible for the ad bellum causes of a war. Men with rank have other options for employment –they can resign if they like- if they stay, they stay at their own moral and physical peril. Hence, if there are just and unjust sides of a war, there are just and unjust soldiers inside it. Soldiers that seek the just end freely and willingly are just soldiers, while free and willing unjust ones are not. Wherever they fall, soldiers are not morally equal if some seek justice. The willing participation of soldiers invalidates their moral equality to one another.
Furthermore, the concept of moral equality invalidates itself. Walzer claims that the common traits which bind the soldier class together engender an equality amongst them. Examining these traits, we can see that the activity in which they participate, the type of loyalty they share, and the alienation to which they subject each another are predicated on the moral divisions between them. The causes which separate them are the causes for wars. What soldiers share is an opposition to one another based on the end which their political communities desire. Insofar as these ends can be just and unjust, soldiers are not equal. Precisely because they exist as soldiers in service to a cause, they are not equals.
This state of inequality does not destroy the deontological system of prohibitions and permissions which governs actions in bello, however. All soldiers are still bound by their prohibition against killing noncombatants, unless those noncombatants propagate or sustain the forces on the unjust side of a war. They are still permitted to kill one another because that is their job. Their responsibilities ad bellum entail a greater duty to consider earnestly the justice of the cause for which they fight – a duty which every leader ought to take seriously. Furthermore, we –the United States and other Western liberal countries- have already forced a liberal system of international governance onto the world, some would say unjustly. Effectively, we have fought unjustly for a just end. We need not be afraid of admitting that there are some just combatants and some unjust. This fear would extend from concern that we are justifying ideological crusading by admitting the qualifying effect of ad bellum considerations on in bello constraints. However, the only crusade that could be justified by this system is one that perpetuates the system itself. The only crusaders allowed are ones that wish to preserve the system of justice.
Furthermore, the responsibility which soldiers can hold is of two separate types. Some hold moral responsibility for ad bellum considerations – just or unjust, the soldiers are morally responsible according to their willing participation in the war. Others hold political accountability for these considerations. This type of responsibility is demonstrable and requires evidence provided within a political authority structure to prove culpability and assign punishment. Effectively, it requires an articulated legal system. All soldiers that are politically accountable are morally culpable.
However, some soldiers exist in complicated situations of justice. For instance, Erwin Rommel fought justly for an unjust cause while Arthur Harris fought unjustly for a just cause. They possess responsibility for their actions and the actions of their country. However, if they demonstrated a willing desire to separate themselves from their country’s injustice, they can be free from political accountability, given sufficient evidence. While it is more difficult to determine, it may also release them from moral responsibility for the community’s maligned will as well.
Overall, I wanted to prove that soldiers are not full moral equals. I sought to demonstrate this from Michael Walzer’s perspective without wholly rejecting his approach or greatly modifying his system. The argument I make in these pages seems accurately to reflect the complexity of their real-world situation. When there are just and unjust sides to a war, then the soldiers therein are either just or unjust. They bear responsibility according to the justice of their cause and their willing participation in it. However, this overarching moral inequality does not completely invalidate the moral rules which govern their actions with respect both to each other and to noncombatants. On the contrary, respect for justice on both sides can qualify their guilt in such a way that even unjust soldiers can be politically exonerated from punishment. In the final analysis, the inequality permitted by the system serves only to protect the system itself anyway, so wholesale injustice is still prohibited. Walzer’s system –though modified- remains.

http://www.usna.edu/Ethics/_files/documents/HehirPg1-28_Final.pdf

I recommend to you Rev J. Bryan Hehir, the President of Catholic Charities USA, as a definitive authority on this subject. Father Hehir speaks to the war colleges and academies. Link above will provide you one of his presentations.

Also recommend the account of Thucydides, The Prince, and Mere Christianity.

This relates to the debate on the nature versus the character of war and also now how nuclear weapons and terrorism have acted to change both. I personally would argue that as humans we have not caught on yet to this concept.

PFC Eric Minchey

Yes, these are important considerations for those making policy and sending our armed forces to war. As soldiers, we go where we are ordered, when we are ordered and do what needs to be done.