Posted on Mar 19, 2019
Winning the Deep Fight: Why We Should Return to Echeloned Reconnaissance and Security - Modern...
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"Looking toward future campaigns of similar scale and intensity, the US Army should learn from its successes in 1991 and prioritize the fielding of reconnaissance and security forces with cross-domain capabilities. This means clearly recognizing the current dilemmas that corps and divisions, now bereft of the dedicated capabilities once provided by ACRs and DIVCAVs, negotiate when echeloning non-habitual reconnaissance forces to shape conditions in deep areas for attacking brigade combat teams. Such missions are too difficult to be considered tasks that any unit can perform well with a little practice; rather, they require dedicated formations with unique skills and capabilities. The requirement for contested information collection in non-permissive environments will only become more acute as peer adversaries and regional aggressors refine and improve anti-access and area denial defenses."
Winning the Deep Fight: Why We Should Return to Echeloned Reconnaissance and Security - Modern...
Posted from mwi.usma.edu
Recon
Cavalry
Recon Scout
Posted >1 y ago
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What I remember of Desert Storm was our ability to attain air superiority and see it evolve into air supremacy. Iraqi divisions were fixed and dug into a defense. We decided the Republican Guard to be the Iraqi center of gravity, so destroying Iraq's best division put fear into the other divisions. We also learned that the relatively new weapons systems gave us higher stand off ranges.
I firmly believe the GPS was key to our maneuver and the feints by the Marines and 1st Cav were brilliantly executed for the intended responses.
I firmly believe the GPS was key to our maneuver and the feints by the Marines and 1st Cav were brilliantly executed for the intended responses.
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LTC Eric Udouj
But we lost out on the role of the Cavalry Regiment afterwards - overlooked by our promoting the parts of the war we believed to have been success. Agree on GPS - it was the game changer of desert warfare... and it was probably the biggest game changer of that war.
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LTC Eric Udouj
Ken - other item that was a real winner -- MLRS! But then there were many things not in the worked great that were swept to the side as the DoD looked forward to the next fight... and skipped the fight it was stuck in when the Gulf War just would not end. The M577 was unable to keep up with its combat elements.... and the M113 was still in use and not able to keep up with the M2/3 or M1A1... alot of problems in the long manuevers conducted during those 100 hours. And then there was the Blue-on-Blue air attacks on US and Allied forces... which gave way eventually to a Blue Force Tracker... which was a lot better than infra-red chem lites..
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MAJ Ken Landgren
LTC Eric Udouj - You are right about the Cavalry Regiment. General Stuart hurt Lee's Army by not being his eyes and ears at Gettysburg.
I also concur with our armored vehicles out running logistics.
As for fratricide, the M1's 8 power sights did little to identify a friend or foe from 3,000 km away. Our range was greater than the ability to identify targets.
I also concur with our armored vehicles out running logistics.
As for fratricide, the M1's 8 power sights did little to identify a friend or foe from 3,000 km away. Our range was greater than the ability to identify targets.
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I have to agree with Sir, such missions cannot be performed by shaking and backing trains. It requires proper doctrinal and recurring training in order to achieve the expertise level demanded by such missions!!!!!
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LTC Eric Udouj
Agree - and we pushed that down to the BDE level for BDE recon elements - and lost the ability to go deep - or to employ cavalry elements that can guard the flanks when wee went to all Stryker regiments.
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