special-operations-forces-remain-critical-stu-bradin

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/special-operations-forces-remain-critical-stu-bradin?trk=v-feed&lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ad_flagship3_feed%3BJkEwbXXaukYUda2hQtDWPQ%3D%3D


RP Members and Connections wanted to share this articel from LinkedIn about Special Forces. I try not to post anymore political messages since the 2016 Elections, but I thought this was an important article. What are your thoughts? (I've copied the entire article for your convenience)

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES WILL REMAIN CRITICAL
By Stu Bradin
President / CEO at Global SOF Foundation


Next week the United States will inaugurate a new president. The new administration will contain a lot of former military figures who will provide a lot of foreign policy advice to the new president. They will face the same challenges as the Obama administration, and in many cases, they will have limited options. But one thing is clear: the former military leaders in the administration know and understand the value of Special Operations Forces (SOF).

A memorandum written earlier by Mira Ricardel, a former Bush administration official and co-leader of Trump's Pentagon transition team, listed the following defense priorities: (1) defeating the Islamic State (IS); (2) eliminating budget caps; (3) developing a new cyber strategy; and (4) finding greater efficiencies. The first listed priority is to defeat IS. As the new administration builds its strategy, cost will be an important criterion (See priority #4), and SOF will be heavily used based on value and capability. Unfortunately, most SOF units from developed nations are already operating at an extremely high tempo, and the constant deployment cycle is taking its toll on the force. Nevertheless, it is likely these forces will be asked to do more.

First, to truly defeat IS, the United States (US) and its international partners will have to conduct or support operations in remote places around the world. I am not talking about Iraq or Afghanistan; I am talking about operations in Pakistan, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, and possibly the Gulf States. Many of these nations have historically hamstrung Counter Terrorism (CT) operations and allowed for “safe havens” that preclude the defeat of IS. These are the vary locations soon to be Secretary of Defense Mattis says we must deny to AQ/ISIS as we apply pressure. In some instances the US and its allies have violated sovereign borders in pursuit of CT targets, but those operations are not at a scale that will eliminate the safe havens. Increasing special operations missions in these locations will require a clear strategy and a willingness to take calculated risks. U.S. Special Operations Command will be a critical contributor to the formulation of this future strategy, and the new administration will do well to listen to this nation’s SOF leadership—both at SOCOM and U.S. Central Command.

Second, the US and its allies will have to increase or enhance their special operations capabilities. Due to the rigorous assessment and selection of SOF, most nations cannot fill their current ranks. As a result, growing the number of SOF in nations like the US, the UK, and France is not realistic. The only hope for growth is with other international partners. Many nations see the value of SOF, and they are increasing their SOF to support their own national security requirements. Many international SOF partners are also trying to add capability and to become more interoperable with US and NATO forces. But they face the same struggle most mature SOF faces: defense bureaucracies are full of conventional officers that served well during the Cold War, but they still see SOF as merely an enabler to a larger conventional fight. These nations also are challenged by the myth that SOF is getting a lot of defense funding (a myth to which many in the US also subscribe).

In fact, most nations’ SOF receive less than 5% of their national defense budget. Additionally, many nations are not addressing the capability shortfalls of their SOF. SOF aviation, for example, is critical to modern special operations. To put it bluntly, you cannot tell SOF to take trucks or walk to an objective. Anyone that has operated on a road in an operational area with IEDs know this well. Aviation support is one of the many support functions that make SOF unique and so successful.

If the Trump administration truly wants to achieve its first priority to defeat IS, then it will need a policy and funding stream to better develop partner SOF in a holistic manner. And it cannot just fund partners to only participate in current combat operations. The US spends between $15 – 20B annually in security assistance. Everyone in government knows the system is broken, and the 2017 NDAA directs a detailed report on the current state of play and recommendations for overhauling the entire framework. No matter what changes are made, there will be intense lobbying to continue funding legacy, Cold War capabilities, and SOF will continue to get table scraps in resourcing. Hopefully the Congressional leadership will recognize the critical role that Iraqi and Afghan SOF have played in their nations: they have acted as a catalyst in transforming these broken militaries. We need to reinforce success and establish a stand-alone, multi-year program to develop dedicated SOF partners in key nations. An initial and baseline step would be to require 10 – 15% of security assistance funding to go to international SOF partners.

A lot of people are euphoric at the start of a new presidential administration. US SOF, with its flat chain of command, ability to deploy rapidly, and cost effectiveness, will certainly remain a critical piece to defeating IS. But achieving this goal without bankrupting the nation will require the US to ally with partner nations in a coalition. As the new administration takes over, I hope it takes this goal seriously and does the right thing.