[Revision] | Why We Lost in Iraq and Afghanistan, by Daniel Bolger | Harper's Magazine

This was an interesting read. Having played a small part in this epic failure... I feel entitled to a few words to bookend the General. For the most part, he's correct-we simply failed to understand ourselves and our enemy. That being said, even the author-though extremely lucid and candid in his self-criticism-misses a larger point. No; it's not so much that he "misses" it... he seems afraid to say it. Frankly, I'm afraid to say it now.

The truth is, we no longer know what war is. In 1944, we knew well what war "is". In 1917... we may have only barely been ready for it, but we still knew what war "is". If we didn't know it in 1861, we certainly and profoundly understood it by 1864. War is not "nation building", neither is it possible to intertwine (the strategy of) warfare with public relations. Warfare is the application of lethal force towards compelling a nation, government, or people to cease a course of action... or short of that, annihilation.

Had we isolated those directly responsible for the attacks of 9/11... we could've quickly brought matters to a close. We might have ignored the complex and ancient systems of the East... and through a combination of direct actions against Al Qaeda and aggressive foreign policy against those funding them, ensured justice. Instead, we drew a bead on the heart and soul of jihad...neither comprehending how complex a battle that would be, nor how much that struggle would unravel the fabric of our own society.

Our war in Afghanistan should have lasted no longer than a year... and we should never have even been in Iraq. Africa, where we should've been involved more openly much sooner, and South America, where we had long held sway... were largely forgotten. We gave the Russian Federation breathing space to broaden and strengthen their position in Eastern Europe and Syria. Lost in intricate Islamic theological minutia... we even allowed Iran to wiggle out of the hole we'd shoved them into (strategically) in the 1980s. Most devastatingly, we seemed to become ignorant of the very real threats posed by long-standing enemies such as North Korea and China... allowing our conventional/strategic edge to "dull" as we centered on Counterinsurgency and Special Operations.

Speaking of that, and in conclusion... this war also cost us our lead as a conventional superpower in terms of the "culture" of the US Military. In 1991, we understood the roles of the various branches. Our flag officers saw the importance in clear tasking for divisions, task forces, wings, groups, etc. Our strategies included a true sense of the use of "combined arms" as Eisenhower or even Patton might have used them. After 2004 however, we became enraptured with "Asymmetric Warfare"... and began to start trying to mold the entire Armed Forces into Special Operation's "image". We may very well have improved many aspects of the Services by doing so... but I fear the price will be weighed in a complete breakdown in the specific focus on doctrine between maneuver and sustainment.