The US Marines Bold Risky Plan to Defeat China

Regaining Lost Capability
By Robert Dixon Jr
LtCol USMC (Ret.)
When one man calls you a horse laugh at him. When two men call you a horse listen to what they say, and when three men call you a horse go out and buy a saddle.
SSgt P.R.P McVey, 3 rd Force Recon
Recently four retired Marine four stars, (Generals Krulak, Conway, Zinni and Wilhelm), two former Commandants and two former Combatant Commanders published an op-ed in The Hill essentially saying the Marine Corps was broken and no longer the nation’s premier 911 force. They state, “Unfortunately, this national treasure has been dismantled, divested, purpose designed and reoriented into a static, missile based reconnaissance and surveillance force focused on a single threat and region.” They then laid out six capability sets of what an ideal 911 force would possess. These are summarized here:
1. An expeditionary force in readiness, rapidly deployable by air and sea for crisis response.
2. A balanced combined arms force optimized to operate in austere environments including STOVL, tilt rotor, rotary wing and fixed wing aviation operating from expeditionary airfields. Amphibious ships and afloat prepositioning negate initial requirements for developed ports and airfields.
3. Task organized for any mission, consisting of flexible forces that can easily converge and composite into larger combat formations.
4. Global Focus capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict, capable of operating in any clime or place not overly focused on a single scenario or pacing threat.
5. Responsive to all Combatant commands requirements and actively seek ways to contribute to their requests for forces.
6. Training education and concepts base for doctrine, organization and equipping that emphasizes maneuver, close combat, adaptability and flexibility.
These capability sets clearly state where the Marine Corps needs to go, if it desires to once again be the nation’s premier 911 force in readiness. The question for the current CMC is how do we regain these capabilities and do it quickly.
The main thing is keeping the main thing the main thing.
Stephen Covey
Fortunately for the Marine Corps righting the ship doesn’t require wholesale repudiation of every policy decision of the last four years, but it does require following Stephen Covey’s maxim about keeping the main thing the main thing. For the Marine Corps that means a reorientation to an institutional understanding that being a global crisis response force is its primary contribution to the nation i.e. the main thing. This doesn’t mean that the Corps doesn’t acknowledge DoD guidance that PACOM is the priority Theater or that Marines can’t support the Navy in sea control/denial ops but that’s the Navy’s main thing, not the Marines. This organizational recognition of the problem is the first and essential step to any recovery. Next a deep dive into the six capability sets to recommend actions needed.
1. An expeditionary force in readiness, rapidly deployable by air and sea for crisis response. General Berger in his initial planning guidance stated: “In crisis prevention and crisis response, the Fleet Marine Force – acting as an extension of the Fleet – will be first on the scene, first to help, first to contain a brewing crisis, and first to fight if required to do so.” This statement was not reflective of actual Marine Corps capabilities and in fact did not improve during the ensuing four years but should be the operational goal of the Corps. Rapid crisis response is dependent on three factors, forward deployment posture, readiness and alert posture of the force and maneuver/mobility assets. Forward posture is the geographic proximity to the crisis, readiness and alert posture defines the capabilities and timely response of the force. Maneuver and mobility assets are the tools that project the force. The Marine Corps needs to address all three factors.
Currently the forward presence posture goal for Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEUs) of 2.0 is woefully inadequate for a global 911 force. 3.0 ARG/MEU forward presence posture allows near simultaneous in three Theaters, this should be the stated Marine Corps requirement for amphibious shipping replacing the 2 Marine Expeditionary Brigade Assault Echelon (MEB AE) requirement that General Berger abrogated on becoming Commandant. This would translate into 30-33 amphibious ships depending on the number of Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF). The Navy is currently unable to source sufficient amphibious shipping to achieve a 2.0 goal. According to Marine Corps testimony to Congress this has resulted in numerous failures to support COCOMS. These include failure to respond to a EUCOM request following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an earthquake in Turkey and the evacuation of the US Embassy in Khartoum. General Berger himself stated that he felt he’d let down the Commander of Africom by not having a MEU available to support the evacuation. He did not mention that it was he that had eliminated the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force- Crisis Response Africa (SP-MAGTF-CR-AF) that would have been capable of conducting that mission.
The Marine Corps cannot build its own amphibious ships but it can use creativity and flexibility to mitigate the shortfalls. So far the Marine Corps response has been to lament the failures and decry the perfidy of the Navy. Ironically the evacuation of The US Embassy in Sudan provides good examples of mitigation steps the Marine Corps can take. The evacuation was conducted by land based SOF aircraft and an EPF (Expeditionary Fast Transport). As previously mentioned the aircraft could have been
provided by the SP-MAGTF-CR-AF and a Marine Det could have been embarked on the EPF. The Marine Corps must embrace employment of shore based crisis response MAGTFs and employment of alternate platforms such as the EPF, ESB (Expeditionary Sea Base) and T-AKE (Dry Cargo Ammunition Ship) in order to regain its place as the nation’s premier 911 force. Whining is not a Marine tradition, problem solving is. Mitigation steps should include:
-Exploit USMC aviation capabilities to establish shore based SP MAGTFs to enhance global responsiveness.
-Employ alternate platforms to fill amphibious shipping shortfalls, deploying hybrid ARGs, a mix of traditional amphibs and alternate platforms as well as deploying Dets on alternate platforms where appropriate. Marines should view scheduled MEU deployments like crossing the Line of Departure, never miss your scheduled LD crossing! If 3 ships are unavailable employ what is a mix of alternate platforms and if some MAGTF elements need to deploy by air and link up with alternate or late arriving platforms in Theater do so, MEU organic aviation and provide intra Theater mobility.
-Reposition existing amphibious ships. In concert with the Navy, advocate for the establishment of a FDNF in 6 th Fleet just like in 7 th Fleet. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has frightened Europeans to the bone and provides a unique opportunity new basing agreements. The Navy has ships based in Europe, just not any amphibious ships. Italy, Greece and Spain are potential hosts. In the long term the Marines should seek to forward base a MEU in EUCOM to promote persistent presence and readiness.
-Prioritize amphibious ship construction and stop advocating for the Landing Ship Medium (LSM). Shipbuilding is a zero sum enterprise and spending on the LSM will be at the expense of traditional amphibs and that’s one reason the Navy is happy to buy them. The LSM will have a crew of 70 to embark and transport 50 Marines at 14 knots. Its mission is rapid maneuver of Marines, pre-hostilities, to execute Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). 14 knots has not been considered rapid since the age of sail. Existing aviation assets and EFPs can accomplish is mission better and they’re already paid for and in service. This program risks replacing the LCS as the white elephant of Navy shipbuilding and should be terminated.
-Establish alert Air Contingency Forces (ACF) in each MEF with a reinforced Rifle Company as the lead element deployable in 6 hours to reinforce forward deployed MAGTFs. Follow on elements would incrementally build to a MEU sized force.
2. Balanced combined arms force optimized to operate in austere environments. This includes expeditionary aviation operations of STOVL, tilt rotor, rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft from austere airfields. Amphibious and prepositioning ships with at sea offload capability facilitate projection of the force without need for existing ports and airfields.
In order for the Marines to once again be the premier 911 force the MEUs need to be a combat credible
force, not just a force on scene. This means a balanced combined arms force capable of being projected ashore in the face of armed opposition. Despite protestations to the contrary, divestments have diminished Marine Corps combat capabilities required for crisis response. The divestment of armor, direct support artillery and breaching capabilities mean the Marine Corps is incapable of fielding the basic element of a fully capable Battalion Landing Team (BLT) without external augmentation. In 1993 the absence of US armor in Mogadishu cost American lives and the Secretary of Defense his job. In future contingencies a diminished MEU will no longer be the force of choice but will instead be like the old time pug, described by a writer as “looks good in the shower, can’t fight.”
Steps to restore combined arms capabilities and enhance the combat power of the Marine Corps:
-Restore armored breaching capabilities with ABVs and tanks sufficient to equip forward deployed MEUs
-Restore direct support artillery sufficient to field tube artillery Bn in each Division of four Batteries of 8 howitzers each, manned for split battery operations.
-The Marine Corps forecasts a return of great power conflict consisting of high intensity combat and resulting in higher casualties. To deal with this they have increased medical personnel in the Infantry Bn.
Unfortunately they’ve also cut rifle strength in the vey units most likely to incur casualties, the Rifle Squads. The Marine Corps has succeeded in high intensity combat time and again and robust Companies and Bns had the resilience to absorb casualties that smaller formations did not. Not only should cuts to Rifle Squads be restored but the 4 th Rifle Company should be restored to the Inf Bn. Current conflicts,
whether in the Ukraine or the highly populated urban littoral of Gaza share the reality that they are manpower intensive, requiring robust formations capable of absorbing losses. Rifle strength should never be the bill payer for new force structure.
-Deploy MEUs with a full F-35B Squadron of 10 aircraft. No other asset is more essential to the MEU being capable of commencing combat operations on arrival in a crisis.
-Restore cuts to assault support aviation. They provide unique capabilities for projecting and sustaining combat power ashore.
3. Capable of task organizing for any mission, consisting of flexible forces that can easily converge and composite into larger combat formations.
Force design 2030 created a new organization for the execution of EABO, the Littoral Combat Regiment (LCR). The primacy of the MAGTF should be reestablished and the LCRs eliminated. Two additional MEU
Command Elements should be established in PACOM to execute EABO when required and to strengthen crisis response capabilities.
Men can go anywhere despite anything, except opposition by better men willing to go anywhere despite anything. (Charlie Black’s 14 Proverbs)
4. Global Focus capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict, capable of operating in any clime or place not overly focused on a single scenario or pacing threat. Events of the last 4 years have shown the folly of focusing on a single scenario by an organization tasked global crisis response responsibilities. Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine and almost daily threats against NATO has significantly changed the strategic landscape. Russia represents the only military existential threat to the US Homeland and effective deterrence of Russia has taken on new urgency not seen since the Cold War. The Marine Corps must do better than gapped episodic presence in EUCOM as a global crisis response force. Some will argue that because the Marine Corps is not a heavy mechanized force that it has no role to play but a Marine Corps with a traditional focus on dismounted operations in complex terrain, to include urban and arctic operations is very relevant. Finland joining NATO added 800 miles of land border with Russia, fronting St Petersburg and the Kola Peninsula, there will be ample opportunity for the Marines to contribute to deterrence.
In the designated Priority Theater of PACOM it has become increasingly acknowledged that the primary scenario that could lead to war with China is an invasion of Taiwan, not sovereignty issues in the South China Sea. The Marine Corps needs to reevaluate the EABO Concept and its de facto use of the Chinese surface as its pacing threat. The Chinese Army, as well as the North Korean Army need to be added to the pacing threats in Theater and emphasized.
Recommended steps:
-Reinvigorate Marine Corps commitment to Arctic operations, with large scale deployments to Norway during the winter season.
-Conduct Joint Arctic interoperability training and exercises with the newly formed 11 th Airborne Division in Alaska.
-Focus Marine Infantry on urban operations. The heavily populated urban littoral hasn’t gone away and remains the most likely scenario for future conflict.
5. Responsive to all Combatant commands requirements and actively seek ways to contribute to their requests for forces. Flexibility and adaptability is the key to responsiveness. The willingness to offer unique Marine Corps capabilities and assets can only increase Marine Corps relevance and value to the nation. For example the Marine Corps possesses 2 aircraft with unmatched capabilities, the MV-22B and the F-35B. The Marine Corps should be willing to deploy stand alone Squadrons or Aircraft Groups to support the Joint
Force. Marines have done this in the past such as supporting the Army in the invasion of Luzon in World
War II and Operation Shufly in the early stages of the Vietnam War. This does not change the primacy of the MAGTF and when major deployments of Marine air and ground combat units occur they should be organized and fight as a MAGTF. No Marine ground unit should ever be in combat without supporting Marine Aviation.
6. Training education and concepts base for doctrine, organization and equipping that emphasizes maneuver, close combat, adaptability and flexibility.
A rejuvenated crisis response capability must be reflected in Service and Joint Doctrine. This is particularly true of compositing during rapid crisis response. Command relations must be clearly stated and understood for a seamless process of building up combat capability. This needs to become a part of
Amphibious Doctrine and Joint Forcible Entry Doctrine.
As previously stated doctrine must reflect the “main thing”. The Marine Corps exists to provide Land Power to the Joint and Naval Force to seize and hold terrain in the face of armed opposition. It does this through ground combat elements supported by organic Tac Air and assault support aircraft. The Marine Corps has many other capabilities, but that is the reason it exists, the heart of its ethos, in short the main thing. It loses sight of this at its peril as a fighting organization and as the Nation’s premier 911 Force.
The opinions expressed herein are solely the authors and not presumed to be endorsed by anyone else living or dead.

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