T.E. Lawrence: The Enigmatic Lawrence of Arabia

On July 6, 1917, T. E. Lawrence and the Arabs captured port of Aqaba from the Turks. An excerpt from the article:

"Such victories were mere pinpricks against the Ottoman forces, however. Lawrence’s gaze now fell on the important Red Sea port of Aqaba. Taking it would secure the Arabs’ supply routes from Egypt, enable the revolt to tap into new sources of manpower and allow raiders to comfortably strike at the Hejaz Railway. Lawrence had visited Aqaba before the war and knew that the port was heavily defended from the sea at Wadi Itm, a narrow passage. Capture Wadi Itm, and the port would be in Arab hands. Lawrence consulted with Feisal and other Arab leaders, who liked his idea of slicing through the desert to surprise the Turks from behind. As a preliminary to the attack, it was necessary to establish contact with the powerful Howeitat tribe, which would swing the other tribes into support for the revolt. In March, Lawrence met the fierce and fearless Howeitat leader Auda abu Tayi, who had reputedly killed 75 rival Arabs and didn’t bother counting Turks. Lawrence explained his plan for Aqaba, which Auda thought feasible. Both men then worked out the details.

The two men liked each other, which says much for Lawrence’s ability to sway men more powerful than himself. Although he possessed abundant charisma and a forceful character, his strength lay in his ability to enable others to achieve their goals. He understood that to motivate the proud Bedouins one did not need to bark out orders, but rather to gain their respect through deeds and high personal courage. “Lawrence rarely spoke,” recalled Colonel Pierce C. Joyce, who fought alongside him. “He merely studied the men around him and when the argument ended…he then dictated his plan of action which was usually adopted and everyone went away satisfied.”

“It was not, as is often supposed, by his individual leadership of hordes of Bedouin that he achieved success,” Joyce added, “but by the wise selection of tribal leaders.” That and dispensing gold. “I combined their loose shower of sparks,” Lawrence wrote, “into a firm flame….”

As the Arab revolt became more successful, it attracted attention at the diplomatic level. The French and British had imperial designs in the region and opposed a strong, independent nation of Arabs. In meetings between the British politician Sir Mark Sykes and French diplomat Georges Picot in 1916, the Ottoman lands were carved up, with France taking Syria and Lebanon, while Britain would administer Mesopotamia, Transjordan and most of Palestine. Lawrence learned of that deal from a cynical letter Colonel Clayton had written outlining the Sykes-Picot Agreement, stating that “the occupation of Aqaba by Arab troops might well result in the Arabs claiming that place hereafter. It is thus essential that Aqaba should remain in British hands after the war.” As the British officers fighting alongside the Arabs learned of that agreement, they were appalled. Feisal, an astute politician, sensed that Britain and France had agreed upon some sort of a deal, and he began to lose faith in them. And Lawrence, an idealist nourishing a romantic image of Arab freedom, was plunged into a deep depression. He admired the Arabs and considered Feisal a friend. He was surrounded by men who passionately believed in the cause without knowing the truth. “In revenge,” Lawrence told himself, “I vowed to make the Arab Revolt the engine of its own success…to lead it so madly in the final victory that expediency should counsel to the Powers a fair settlement of the Arabs’ moral claims.”

But there was still much to be done. With Auda and his men, Lawrence set out on the long march through the simmering heat of the desert to Aqaba. Along the way, they blew up railway lines near the town of Deraa and then entered the barren, sun-beaten desert called El Houl. They visited one Bedouin camp after another, feasting on rice and lamb by night, recruiting and swelling their ranks by morning. But in the back of his mind Lawrence felt guilty, felt that he was betraying these men. “I had to join the conspiracy,” he wrote in Seven Pillars, “and…assured the men of their reward…but, of course, instead of being proud of what we did together, I was continually and bitterly ashamed.” His personal crisis worsened. In his notebook, Lawrence wrote on June 5: “Can’t stand another day here. Will ride north and chuck it.” Another message said ominously, “Clayton. I’ve decided to go off alone to Damascus, hoping to get killed on the way: for all sakes try and clear this show up before it goes further. We are calling them to fight for us on a lie, and I can’t stand it.”

Lawrence then broke away from the main force and embarked on an extraordinary 300-mile trip into Lebanon and Syria, talking with clan leaders to enroll their support for the revolt. With the help of local tribes, he blew up bridges and rode to the outskirts of Damascus to meet with resistance leaders. “At the time,” he recalled, “I was in a reckless mood, not caring very much what I did….A bodily wound would have been a grateful vent for my internal perplexities….” For that exploit, the army recommended Lawrence for Britain’s highest award for bravery, the Victoria Cross. He was ineligible, however, because no other British officer had witnessed his deed.

Back again with Auda, Lawrence and the Arabs made a large semicircular trek through the desert and fell on Aqaba from behind on July 6. The surprised Turkish garrison quickly surrendered. With that astonishing, almost bloodless victory, the Arab revolt became a force to be reckoned with. “After the capture of Aqaba,” he wrote in 1927, “things changed so much that I was no longer a witness of the Revolt, but a protagonist in the Revolt.”

Lawrence was being modest, for he played a major role. The Turks had offered a reward for his capture, and a report on the situation in Arabia, sent to Cairo in February 1917, said that “Lawrence with Feisal is of inestimable value….” After Aqaba, Lawrence was awarded the Companionship of the Bath and promoted to major. He then had an important meeting with the new commander in chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, General Sir Edmund Allenby, who agreed to Lawrence’s strategy for the revolt. “I gave him a free hand,” Allenby said after the war. “His cooperation was marked by the utmost loyalty, and I never had anything but praise for his work, which, indeed, was invaluable throughout the campaign.” Lawrence now held a powerful position, as an adviser to Feisal and a person who had Allenby’s confidence."