( FIGHT CLUB ) -Looking for a fight-call me out-

Many reports are online about the commands I served in. I connect how I ended up in homelessness and fighting to these reports I found some 20 years later.

"Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420, 1988)"

I was homeless chronically and fighting way before I ever got to the VA. I was posting for more fights. I would rather fight then anything else I cared about. Dude said they "heard that smack 3 neighborhoods away", I had to learn hand to hand combat, as a way to survive on and off the ship, before weapons were involved.

Do you believe that hand to hand combat should be the fundamental ninja science for all service members every single one?

Further More I found numerous articles that some put on on the exact FFG's I served that were undermanned to save $979,000 a year in operating costs, by replacing full time active duty with me a young guy 18 in a reserve enlistment, who would be denied all the services at the va including a homeless housing voucher, of being a veteran because I had a reserve enlistment after 5 years assigned to the FFG got a sea service ribbon etc etc etc in deck


I don't know if anyone else has had the same experience that the branch inspector general was investigating its own commands and stating things like "systemic weakness in training and administration"

Yes it is true and it is true that I would end up really well messed up as a result and now looking for friends and understanding.

Then I found my actual father that was missing was a Vietnam Era 1966-68 Infantry Combat Vet who had real hand to hand combat wounds and other stories..


Here are just a few of the reports I mentioned

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oliver_Hazard_Perry-class_frigate
Cost: US $122 Million
The Oliver Hazard Perry class is a class of guided-missile frigates named after the U.S. Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry, the hero of the naval Battle of Lake Erie. Also known as the Perry or FFG-7 (commonly "fig seven") class,
The first of the 51 U.S. Navy built Oliver Hazard Perry frigates entered into service in 1977, and the last remaining in active service, USS Simpson, was decommissioned on 29 September 2015.[2]



https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a272492.pdf


VIII. CONCLUSION
A. TOTAL SAVINGS
The bottom line is that sending an FFG from the Active
Fleet to the Naval Reserve Force saves about $979,000 per year, or about 6.1% of all operating and support costs.


https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evolution-of-the-militarys-current-activereserve-force-mix/d-4968.ashx

Evolution of the Military's Current Active-Reserve Force Mix




U.S. Navy (USN) The Navy Reserve has evolved over time from a semi-autonomous strategic reserve in terms of platforms and trained individuals to what is today a strategic and operational reserve that is a mix of individuals and unit types that either complement or mirror elements of the AC. In the former case, the RC provides “skills and expertise to complete the Total Force inventory of capabilities”1 and in the latter case, the RC provides “skills and expertise that match the AC to offer greater capacity at lower carrying cost.”2 This evolution can be traced back to the aftermath of WW II, when the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft and trained the Navy Reserve to staff them in anticipation of a need for a large force to wage war with the Warsaw Pact. By the end of the Cold War, this scenario had become obsolete. In the case of ships, as the size of the fleet declined, the Navy moved to a policy of fully manning all its ships so that these ships would not require RC augmentation in the event of war. In addition, the problems of maintaining ships in standby status with part-time personnel and the impracticality of rotating part-time personnel to deployed units made employing reservists, other than full-time support (FTS) personnel, to operate ships unworkable, and the Navy Reserve Fleet (NRF) disappeared.

To meet the demands for experienced petty officers as the fleet expanded toward its goal of 600 ships, the Navy relied, in part, on voluntary recalls designed to draw prior-service sailors into the Reserves and then back onto active duty. To backfill the petty officers who went to the fleet, the Navy initiated the Sea/Air Mariner (SAM) program to attract new recruits to the Naval Reserve by offering tuition assistance. However, this program proved unsuccessful because its benefits and 6-year obligation compared unfavorably with Army and Air Force programs.66


https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA032080.pdf

1975 DOD Annual Report to Secretary Defense Reserve Forces
Manpower and recruiting problems also directly affected readiness as well as impacting on training through increased requirements for retraining or for initial skill qualification. Since the outset of the no-draft era, we have had to rely to a great extent on veteran volunteers to meet our strength needs.

Although the recruiting of veterans has allowed us to meet our goals, over-dependence on veterans has some problems. SInce veterans come to the Reserve with their specialties already determined by prior training and experience, the ability to manage the specialties of personnel to match specific mobilization billet requirements is reduced because of geographic locations. In addition, large imputes of veterans increased the average grade and longevity of our manpower, resulting in higher pay costs. These were offset to some extent by reduction in the necessity to provide lengthy periods of initial training. As a result we have reached a point where we must now place greater emphasis on recruitment of young, non-prior service personnel.

Another aspect is to have the Guard and Reserve readily available under conditions other then a national emergency or a declaration of war. Such authority would demonstrate our swift response capability for mobilization and would serve as a warning to potential aggressors and as encouragement to our allies.

This legislation will enable the Services to plan for broader application of the “Total Force Policy” in satisfying contemporary national defense requirements. The “Total Force Policy” dictates that all available forces—U.S. Active Forces, U.S. Guard and Reserve Forces, and the forces of our allies—would be considered in determining the Defense needs to most future contingencies. In carrying out these missions, the volunteer potential of the Reserve Forces will continue to be fully exploited.



3. To increase integration of Reserve Forces in active forces missions
B. Test manning active Navy Destroyers with a mix of 80 percent active personnel and 20 percent reservists in comparison with 100% active manned ships.”


https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1976-77_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150722-417


1976 Annual Defense Department Report

Another more important initiative is our plan to man some of our active surface combatants at 80% of active manning, relying on selected reserve personnel to fill the remaining billets upon mobilization.”

Admittingly, there are some potential problems involved in the 80/20 concept, most of which center around the interrelated factors of maintenance and operational tempo. The concept is predicated on the assumption that the understrength active crew, augmented by reserves during drill periods, would be able to maintain their ship in adequate material condition and conduct the required training for basic combat missions.”


https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA257555.pdf

NAVAL RESERVE: AN ORGANIZATION IN TRANSITION

by
Richard Charles Mazza
Lieutenant Commander, United States Naval Reserve
B.A., Boston State College, 1978



ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the issues facing the Naval Reserve as
it transitions from its cold war mission to new and, possibly, expanded roles under the
New National Military Strategy.




A. MANAGEMENT
In 1988, Naval Reserve CINCPACFLT Detachment 420
(CINCPACFLT DET 420) conducted a management review and
organizational analysis of the Naval Reserve. The CINCPACFLT
Det 420 Management Assistance Team (MAT) was tasked by the
Director of Naval Reserve to conduct this analysis. Although
the emphasis was on the Naval Reserve Surface Force and
CNAVRES organization as a whole, their analysis addressed
issues encountered by the Naval Air Reserve Force as well.
The MAT findings maintained that the administrative and
organizational problems facing the Naval Reserve were a result
of the Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy
principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork,
completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET
420, 1988)
The MAT found that there was a prevailing failure to
comply with CNAVRES policy throughout the Naval Reserve.
Equally as serious as this non-compliance was the toleration
of willful non-compliance. Organizational disconnects, as
well as a lack of standardized command selection criteria,
were noted as a contributory factor in the observed widespread
lack of leadership.

The lack of organizational vigor in the Naval Reserve was
attributed to the double and triple hatting of commanders at
various echelons of command.
Numerous violations of the traditional notion of chain of
command were noted in which clear lines of authority and
responsibility were diffused through a myriad of "stove pipe"
commands within the Naval Reserve. The lack of
standardization of command authority and responsibility was
contrary to established Navy policy and tradition.
Fragmentation and rivalries between different segments of
the Naval Reserve has led to a breakdown of the traditional
concept of teamwork. This fragmentation has led to localized
politicalization of various reserve commands in which policies
and directives are promulgated that are not necessarily
consistent with the mission of the Naval Reserve.
The MAT also noted a consistent lack of completed staff
work among the various levels of the Naval Reserve. Although
the MAT could not pin down the exact cause, it was speculated
that poor morale could be the cause of poor staffwork or that
poor staffwork could be a factor in poor morale. Poor
staffwork prior to the establishment of significant changes in
reserve policy or command authority has, in the past, led to
unnecessary administrative duplication, and prolonged
confusion over lines of legitimate command authority and
Responsibility.


b. Personnel/Mobilization
In the early 1970's, the Naval Reserve began a major
effort to align Naval Reserve units with active force
commands. This period of horizontal integration of reserve
units with active components was an effort to
institutionalize the "one Navy" concept originally envisioned
under the Total Force Concept. Naval surface reserve force
ships were horizontally integrated into the active fleet for
operational control. For non-hardware or augment units, this
was the beginning of the gaining command concept presently in
place.
Under the gaining command concept, training and
mobilization standards were developed and implemented through
input received from the active forces. Although not formally
institutionalized, direct or mutual support to active commands
greatly increased to the point where many essential warfare
and support functions are now carried out by the Naval
Reserve. (Chaloupka et al., U.S. Naval Reserve History)



https://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/3715654/FID863/SURFACE/50401.PDF


1995 5040.1

1. Purpose. To issue policy, provide guidance, and assign responsibility for RATE of Selected Reserve (SELRES)components in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships.




3. Background The RATE program was initiated in response to a Navy Inspector General report documenting systemic weaknesses in the training and administration of SELRES personnel assigned to NRF ships. Historically, NRF ships and their SELRES components fell outside the cognizance of normal Reserve Readiness Inspectionsand, as a result, did not receive periodic formal oversight of the administration and training of the SELRES component.



They stopped it this concept. But it left me well trying to transfer into the Army out of Navy all together and medically disqualified by MEPS 1998. I still had ability and pride and dedication with poverty of a reserve enlistment to still see the next 4 years through of the enlistment till honorably discharged.