Posted on Apr 23, 2020
The Navy isn’t ready to stop killing its sailors yet
685
4
3
4
4
0
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 1
Alright... Let's try and get some perspective. I don't want to take away from a number of (very) good points made by the author. I've lived it,and understand it. Most officers spend approximately two years on a ship per tour... I did two tours "back to back" on the same ship, in the same role. I served under three COs, two XOs, and two different DHs while there. I got to know not only the Sailors in my division... but most on the ship, extremely well. I'd like to think I learned something from them. Every branch of the Military comes with its own special version of risk, sacrifice, and adversity. If you're in the Infantry... you close with and engage the enemy while living worse than some farm animals. If you're a maintainer... you deal with long hours of pulling off complex and vitally important tasks often bordering on the superhuman. If you're a missileer, you're living on the razor's edge of potentially world-altering events demanding extreme focus, dedication, and loyalty. If you're a special operations warrior... you're leaping from aircraft at high altitude, swimming in freezing water, or infiltrating behind enemy lines. If you're a U.S. Surface Sailor... you're at sea for months on end, performing myriad boring and tedious tasks, routinely without sufficient rest, and always under threat from either potential enemies, or the sea herself. "Eternal Father, Strong to Save" evokes a few salty tears from men who've served before the mast for a reason. No one's going to question that there are plenty of self-serving, indecisive, or simply weak officers. I've seen (and likely done) some pretty stupid things at sea. Junior officers can only be taught so much in the class room... they have to have experience and guidance in order to properly apply it. The margin between making the "right" and "wrong" call on the Bridge can often be measured very narrowly; made worse by the fact that often... these JOs are among the most sleep-deprived and practically inexperienced personnel aboard. Every warship at sea is a functioning piece of U.S. sovereign territory... a base housing some of our most critical tactical and/or strategic assets. To be captain of one is to be at the sharp end of the spear of foreign policy. Crozier's acts are admirable in the sense that any CO who loves his people more than his career has "got his heart in the right place". I'd love to serve under him. However, they're censurable because this entire, elaborate infrastructure exists for one purpose... to be the heavy hand of the People of the United States either in their defense, or to exact their just retribution on our foes. Bringing back a carrier under emergency conditions has an impact on all of that. It leaves a "hole" in the line... one that someone else has to fill. We're talking about thousands of personnel, and billions of dollars of equipment. It takes time to make things happen. Personally, I think Moldy acted improperly. I'd like to think a fellow USNA graduate who served as a rotary wing aviator, and taught at the U.S. Air Force Academy would know better than to personally insult a commander in public, before his people. That said, none of this gets at the heart of why from collisions at sea, to sickness aboard... we seem to be continuously receiving "black eyes". The reality is that just like the British, Spanish, and Romans before us... we're finding out the price of maintaining a "global armed presence" is often very steep. We're not making Sailors so they can earn college credits, acquire valuable certifications and training, and obtain critical benefits (all of which they deserve by the way)... we're making them because our enemies and potential enemies have to be countered. If we as a nation are incapable of choosing between investing vastly more money, or surrendering to these threats... incidents like those mentioned may indeed be a reality. In the middle of a two theater war, we let go hundreds of personnel; not because they were inept... but because we needed to make budget cuts. This happens periodically in the Navy (if not all the services), and translates to an increased demand on those who remain.
(0)
(0)
CPT Lawrence Cable
Just a question since the Navy trains officers in a completely different fashion than the Army. A former Naval Officer has told me at one time new Officers in the Surface Fleet did a rotation through the divisions on a training ship at sea before going to an operational command, but that practice has been discontinued and replaced by OJT at their first assignment. First, is that factual? Second, do you think that could be part of the command problems if true?
Army system is much more school oriented. I can't imagine trying to complete even just the Academic side of Officer Basic while doing my job in an operational platoon.
Army system is much more school oriented. I can't imagine trying to complete even just the Academic side of Officer Basic while doing my job in an operational platoon.
(0)
(0)
LCDR Joshua Gillespie
CPT Lawrence Cable - That's an excellent question, and as I've been away from it for over a decade, things have doubtless changed. When I was a JO, how you got to your first operational (vs. training) command had everything to do with your designator (akin to MOS), and the "pipeline"... i.e., how many billets (openings) there were for the same. I was a "special needs" case (Fallen Angel), and it was immediately after 9/11... so I ended up replacing a more senior winged aviator in a disassociated sea tour billet because one-I asked for a forward deployed assignment, and two-I don't think they knew what else to do with me at that point. As best I can recall "second hand", had I been an "1100 series" (Surface Warfare) vs. "1300 series" (Aviation), I would've gone through SWOS before reporting for a DIVO tour, then back to the schoolhouse, and back out again from round two; or some version of that (someone with a better memory might correct me). I presume that would've included serving with a completely different department each time. As to the "rotation"; that sounds "off", even for back then... but so too does a straight "OJT" process without any formal academic/practicum at SWOS. What I do know is that no JO arrives at their first division (aka, platoon) command "qualified"... that's accomplished over approximately a year; no more than two, while afloat. You complete pre-designated qualification standards which are signed off by a senior qualified person (often senior enlisted), before you are put before a review board of the CO and the senior officers aboard. a similar process is required to stand watch as the Officer of the Deck, Underway (bridge officer). Successfully doing so results in the coveted "SWO pin", and full designation as a Surface Warfare Officer. Initially, this was also open to officers of other designators, so I completed the qualification standards. However, by the time I got ready to sit the board... the Navy changed that policy (or so I was informed). Pin or no pin, I was still an OOD, so that put me in an interesting position; "training" new 1100 folks for their boards as I was one of only two qualified underway OODs on the watchbill. It also meant that I did "double duty" as both a qualified HCO (Helicopter operations Control Officer) running the flight deck (several hours per day, depending on flight schedule) and my division... while also pulling a twelve hour shift on the bridge each day as OOD (usually the night shift, since I had other duties at day). On top of that, I was also responsible for a Force Protection Team (internal security), and rotated through the Combat Information Center watchbill. My "collateral duties" (such as FPTT) all required short "schools", usually offered at our home port. These were usually less than a week, and included mixed classes of officer and enlisted, from a variety of ranks. The point to this rather lengthy (and rambling) response is that no-the Navy doesn't exactly stick people on the bridge of a warship without a lot of training. However, much of it is indeed accomplished while they are performing a variety of other "active" roles, and while holding a divisional billet. It's a lot to digest, and it would be "easier" perhaps if there were more people to share the load... but that costs money.
(0)
(0)
Read This Next