Bring the Tanks Back: It Is Time to Put a U.S. Armored Brigade in Germany

We should have never left...

Here's something to ponder in addition to this discussion, why doesn't the Army Reserves have a DIV HQ? The NG component has several and we're constantly tapped to support the active component at many different events. I'm all for putting a Div HQ back in Europe but we also need to consider putting a couple in the Reserve component.

In the early 1980s, when I was stationed near the Fulda Gap in West Germany, the US had thousands of tanks in Germany. I was then stationed with 3/61st ADA, which was attached to the 3rd Armored Division (3AD). Even then, our conventional land forces were seen as being little more than a "speed bump" to Soviet armored/mechanized forces that were expected to come pouring through the Fulda Gap. This much, I heard personally from General Kroesen, who was then the Commander of US Forces in Europe. It was ultimately hoped that our Air Force would make the Soviets bleed, until such a time we could bring more forces to Europe and hopefully push back the Soviets. (It was expected that we would lose much, if not all of West Germany to such an invasion, perhaps even the Low-Countries.)

Fast forward to 2019, and as far as I know, we have zero tanks in Europe! In addition, we have a drastically altered battle strategy that has shifted the US from consideration and utilization of heavy mechanized forces to much lighter forces that can be moved from location-to-location far more quickly, (though with much-reduced punching power.) This "shift" began in the early-to-mid 1980s when the US Army gave its 9th Infantry Division (9ID) the new designation of a light infantry division. The 9ID was also known as the US Army's High Technology Test Bed (HTTB). By 1983 I was serving in the 109th MI Bn, (CEWI), of 9th Infantry Division. There were many discussions then taking place as to if this was such a wise move, yet it was the new developments in the Middle-East and eventually the elimination of the Soviet Union as a strategic threat that shut the door on old World War II-era battle strategies.

By the early 1990s, when we moved our forces to the Middle-East to counter the Iraqi forces then under Saddam Hussein, we still had not abandoned the massed-forces approach to battle and took with us there the entire 3AD! If memory serves me correctly, I believe we had somewhere near 300,000 or so service members (including those of allied nations that participated,) massed against Saddam's forces. To the surprise of many, Iraq lasted all but 100 hours, once hostilities on the ground commenced. Roughly a year later, I would hear MG Reno (Chief of Manpower Management, USPERSCOM) state that while it was great that the war ended so quickly, he wasn't sure it was the best thing for the US, just the same. He, along with many other "older" officers and NCO's thought that this would serve to erase the hard lessons learned in Vietnam. (The 2003 Invasion of Iraq and the subsequent insurgency warfare would prove them correct!)

Today, an armored division would be far from a viable threat to Russia, which has considerably more forces, tanks, fighters, etc., in the vicinity. It could even be argued that the placement of such a division, without also the commitment of sizeable additional forces necessary (field artillery assets, infantry assets, air defense assets, helicopter gunships, additional fighters, and fighter/bombers, etc.,) could give the Russians the chance to quickly defeat a sizeable US force, affecting our morale considerably. Of course, any action against such a force would immediately commit the US to war early on. (If such an action takes place against a NATO ally, Article Five of the treaty would commit all members to action in support of the injured party.) If this is the intention, then we could do this with significantly fewer forces. Given my understanding of the matter (admittedly forged during the Cold War,) an armored division would not last very long at all against a full-on Russian invasion. Unless we are willing to return to the days reminiscent of the 1980s in Europe, perhaps it would be better for us to rethink matters and to find other solutions to the current Russian threat.

I fear that ultimately if push comes to shove, the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons would very much be likely, especially if it is evident that one-side-or-the-other is about to fold. Where that then goes is not difficult to imagine. My training is in science, and I am not a tactician by any stretch of the imagination. Yet, if we face the loss of an armored division early on, I could also see us using tactical nuc's far sooner. Keep in mind also that even if have an armored division in Europe, we would still have to move equipment back-and-forth across the Atlantic, to ensure that we have and maintain the necessary skills and resources necessary, should a Russian invasion ever occur. This would mean no saving at all in this area.

Ultimately, keeping Russia a belligerent nation comes at a price. Even with my Cold War mentality, I can now see that there were many things we could have done differently, that could have helped us to avoid today's Russia under Vladimir Putin. Perhaps we could still salvage things at some point, as Putin will not live forever. Given today's realities, there are still myriads of other steps and strategies we can take without committing an entire armored division to serve as a proverbial trip-wire; especially as USAREUR is a ghost of its former Cold War days. If you've read this far, thank you very much for your kind patience.