Posted on Oct 25, 2018
Irregular Warfare Isn’t Going Away, Thai Counterinsurgency Lessons Matter | Small Wars Journal
3.05K
14
6
6
6
0
"The Thai understand, for example, that you cannot kill your way out of an insurgency. All the best targeting in the world and the most efficient capture or kill programs alone will not change the mind of an entire insurgent movement. The Thai believe it is best to go to the source of the fire – the insurgent ideology – and reduce it to the point that it has little appeal. Accordingly, in COIN, the Thai believe that a counter political warfare movement has to be constructed, fielded, and expanded in order to facilitate a win. This policy makes commander’s intent, doctrine, and strategy (end goals, ways/methods, and means) all lean political."
Irregular Warfare Isn’t Going Away, Thai Counterinsurgency Lessons Matter | Small Wars Journal
Posted from smallwarsjournal.com
COIN (Counterinsurgency)
Terrorism
Posted 6 y ago
Responses: 3
2
2
0
Insurgency is the route of global terrorism. Terror outfits recruit their cadre from within the Nation they intend to attack or disrupt, politically or economically. Terror outfit leaders impart radical ideology to their pupils, radical military officers provide training in basics of psychological warfare and in planning, motivating, leading, and directing political aggitations. Most insurgent are trained in the art of giving up of their lives in the name of Allah, citing that the Qur'an teaches about jihad and self-destruction.
COIN, in principle, teaches us to counter insurgencies by thinking like the enemy; building the relationship matrix to trace the root of the insurgency and then, kill the cancer from its source. COIN interests me a lot, because I love gathering, analyzing and sharing information about Insurgents, Insurgencies and COIN
COIN, in principle, teaches us to counter insurgencies by thinking like the enemy; building the relationship matrix to trace the root of the insurgency and then, kill the cancer from its source. COIN interests me a lot, because I love gathering, analyzing and sharing information about Insurgents, Insurgencies and COIN
(2)
(0)
LTC Eric Udouj
Good points Gene! Terror is just one pillar in an insurgency ---- not the other way around. In the pst 20 years we often seem to be on the other way around focus.. and fell off the ledge. Mao did not tell much well but he did great in his laying out the 3 levels of an insurgency.
(1)
(0)
2
2
0
1
1
0
Great article!
LTC Udouj, as you metioned a counter political movement, based on the Thai, is required. A true human domain effort. As such standard military footprint is reduced. Then how can an unumber amount of high ranking brass can be justified in such area of operation? This type of operation if pretty much run by Information Related Capability SME and a many analyst with regional expertise.
LTC Udouj, as you metioned a counter political movement, based on the Thai, is required. A true human domain effort. As such standard military footprint is reduced. Then how can an unumber amount of high ranking brass can be justified in such area of operation? This type of operation if pretty much run by Information Related Capability SME and a many analyst with regional expertise.
(1)
(0)
LTC Eric Udouj
Back six years ago in the Joint Forces Staff College - my team wrote a paper on the Thai COIN efforts and tactics and or predictions on where it was going. We saw - even then - that the Thai political effort to work with an enemy it knew - and ignore the actual most dangerous groups who wanted nothing to do with the old separatist factions.... was going to mean this would continue and be in cycles for a long time. Kind of like the Thais always saying there is no AQ or IS in this fight... and yet seeing AQ MTTs types visiting Malaysia or ignoring that Bangkok is a means of moving funds for many different organizations. So of course they are not there. :) But the links from the jihadi groups go to several places, and no surprise Pakistan is one. There is a religious training path that allows some Southern Thais to go to Pakistan for religious schooling...
Part of getting PSYOP and IW to really work is that you have to have a very good read of your enemy - and not several versions with different security elements - but a solid TAA on each group. If you do not have that - it makes it hard to be effective with a population that remembers well the government excesses in the past.... But if politically you only focus on the old known enemy - it kind of misses the whole Communications Revolution aspect where most of the insurgents got internet access now... and communications far from the village they are hanging out in. And so this campaign goes on and on.. and in the search for solutions - only a few look back to what broke to start it in 2004 in the first place!
Part of getting PSYOP and IW to really work is that you have to have a very good read of your enemy - and not several versions with different security elements - but a solid TAA on each group. If you do not have that - it makes it hard to be effective with a population that remembers well the government excesses in the past.... But if politically you only focus on the old known enemy - it kind of misses the whole Communications Revolution aspect where most of the insurgents got internet access now... and communications far from the village they are hanging out in. And so this campaign goes on and on.. and in the search for solutions - only a few look back to what broke to start it in 2004 in the first place!
(1)
(0)
MAJ Javier Rivera
LTC Eric Udouj a very interesting point/statement you make Sir! What catches my attention the most is your emphasis on keeping up with current environment trends. Also, solid TAAs which requires dedicated folks with both the institutional and background knowledge. Something hard to accomplishe if those task to perform them are in a rotational baisis, be 6 months or a year. Not even a 3 years gig would suffice in my humbled opinion!
(1)
(0)
Read This Next
Continue with Facebook 
Continue with Google