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In Ukraine this past year, the world witnessed the successful use of maskirovka by the Russian Federation. This type of military operation should be of particular interest to the United States and NATO. Translated, maskirovka means something similar to “camouflage,” “disguise,” or “masked warfare”. It is defined as a broad concept of military deception that emphasizes the use of various forms of camouflage, concealment, diversions, feints, secrecy, imitation and disinformation conducted in conjunction in order to disguise military capabilities, plans and intentions.
Maskirovka as a military concept can be used at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Used effectively, maskirovka enhances surprise - one of the key principles of warfare. It has four major principles that must be adhered to in order to be successful. These principles are activity, plausibility/ plausible deniability, variety, and continuity. Activity refers to the aggressive and persistent use of the forms of maskirovka (camouflage, diversions, disinformation, etc.) in order to give the enemy a false idea and includes changing the use of these forms as necessary to support this false idea. Plausibility or plausible deniability means that all maskirovka must be plausible in order to make the enemy believe that the false idea must be true and to keep the true intentions of the operation unknown. The principle of variety means that the use of maskirovka must be unpredictable and that patterns or repetition of use must be avoided so that the enemy will be unable to anticipate its use. The fourth and final principle of continuity refers to the fact that maskirovka must be a part of all plans and continued throughout the entire duration of an operation in order to be successful.
Maskirovka was first developed by the Soviet Union in the 1920s and it was used extensively by Soviet troops throughout World War II. Today, Russian military units have applied the lessons they learned during that conflict to effectively apply maskirovka to operations in both Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. When used effectively, maskirovka can both disguise strengths and hide weaknesses. The principle of plausible deniability was used effectively when the “Green Men” appeared in Crimea with no identifiable insignias and claimed to be local self-defense forces and militias. Statements from Russian politicians and diplomats supporting that there were no Russian troops conducting operations in Crimea were plausible, even though they were regarded as highly suspicious. These statements were persistent and plausible enough to keep NATO and Western European countries confused and hesitant to confront Russia (either militarily or politically) about their involvement in Crimea. This also demonstrated the proper uses of the maskirovka principles of both activity and continuity. Only after the successful military operation to secure Crimea and its subsequent annexation, did Russia admit that its military forces had been involved.
In operations supporting the Eastern Ukrainian separatists in and around the Donetsk region, Russia has also been using maskirovka, but with varying degrees of effectiveness. The use of Chechens and other “volunteer” military forces in the Donetsk region are quite possibly disguised GRU (military intelligence forces) and Spetsnaz (Russian Special Forces) directly supporting the separatists. Although this is denied by Russia, it would demonstrate the use of the maskirovka principle of variety by using different forms of imitation and deception from what was used in Crimea. It also provides Russia with plausible deniability for direct military involvement in Ukraine. When ten Russian paratroopers were captured thirteen miles inside Ukraine, Russia claimed that they had gotten lost while on patrol and had crossed into Ukraine by accident. This was only moderately plausible at best, but it allowed Russia to explain a violation of Ukrainian sovereignty as a mere accident. US and NATO satellite pictures showing Russian military convoys and artillery in Ukraine and along the border have been dismissed as propaganda (specifically, images from computer games) but the plausibility of this explanation is fairly poor and not easily supported by evidence. Russia also claims that the separatists are not armed with Russian weapons and supplies, but rather from looted Ukrainian weapon stocks. This is more plausible than the explanation of the satellite pictures, but it is highly unlikely when evidence routinely shows large numbers of military type vehicles regularly crossing the Russian border towards the separatist held city of Donetsk. Mounting Russian casualties, transported from the Donetsk region back to Russia in vehicles marked “Cargo 200” (a Russian term for military casualties) makes the plausible deniability of Russian military involvement even harder to sustain over time.
It is important for us to learn from the Russian use of maskirovka when conducting military operations in a limited manner in Ukraine. When used effectively, maskirovka disguises the capabilities, plans and intentions of a military operation. When the military aspects of maskirovka are used in continuity with political, diplomatic and economic strategies, it enhances the effectiveness of surprise; one of the key principles of warfare. It must be understood that this strategy also has clear limitations. The longer an operation continues, the more likely it is that the enemy will discover the maskirovka techniques being employed.
The linked article provides additional information about the conflict and Russia’s use of maskirovka. https://medium.com/war-is-boring/maskirovka-is-russian-secret-war-7d6a304d5fb6
As military leaders, what would be the most effective way of disrupting an adversary’s use of maskirovka in a limited warfare situation, as Russia is currently doing in Eastern Ukraine, without escalating into a fully fledged military conflict? Do the current tactics and techniques we use to combat insurgents adequately prepare use to counter the use of maskirovka by a professional military?
Maskirovka as a military concept can be used at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Used effectively, maskirovka enhances surprise - one of the key principles of warfare. It has four major principles that must be adhered to in order to be successful. These principles are activity, plausibility/ plausible deniability, variety, and continuity. Activity refers to the aggressive and persistent use of the forms of maskirovka (camouflage, diversions, disinformation, etc.) in order to give the enemy a false idea and includes changing the use of these forms as necessary to support this false idea. Plausibility or plausible deniability means that all maskirovka must be plausible in order to make the enemy believe that the false idea must be true and to keep the true intentions of the operation unknown. The principle of variety means that the use of maskirovka must be unpredictable and that patterns or repetition of use must be avoided so that the enemy will be unable to anticipate its use. The fourth and final principle of continuity refers to the fact that maskirovka must be a part of all plans and continued throughout the entire duration of an operation in order to be successful.
Maskirovka was first developed by the Soviet Union in the 1920s and it was used extensively by Soviet troops throughout World War II. Today, Russian military units have applied the lessons they learned during that conflict to effectively apply maskirovka to operations in both Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. When used effectively, maskirovka can both disguise strengths and hide weaknesses. The principle of plausible deniability was used effectively when the “Green Men” appeared in Crimea with no identifiable insignias and claimed to be local self-defense forces and militias. Statements from Russian politicians and diplomats supporting that there were no Russian troops conducting operations in Crimea were plausible, even though they were regarded as highly suspicious. These statements were persistent and plausible enough to keep NATO and Western European countries confused and hesitant to confront Russia (either militarily or politically) about their involvement in Crimea. This also demonstrated the proper uses of the maskirovka principles of both activity and continuity. Only after the successful military operation to secure Crimea and its subsequent annexation, did Russia admit that its military forces had been involved.
In operations supporting the Eastern Ukrainian separatists in and around the Donetsk region, Russia has also been using maskirovka, but with varying degrees of effectiveness. The use of Chechens and other “volunteer” military forces in the Donetsk region are quite possibly disguised GRU (military intelligence forces) and Spetsnaz (Russian Special Forces) directly supporting the separatists. Although this is denied by Russia, it would demonstrate the use of the maskirovka principle of variety by using different forms of imitation and deception from what was used in Crimea. It also provides Russia with plausible deniability for direct military involvement in Ukraine. When ten Russian paratroopers were captured thirteen miles inside Ukraine, Russia claimed that they had gotten lost while on patrol and had crossed into Ukraine by accident. This was only moderately plausible at best, but it allowed Russia to explain a violation of Ukrainian sovereignty as a mere accident. US and NATO satellite pictures showing Russian military convoys and artillery in Ukraine and along the border have been dismissed as propaganda (specifically, images from computer games) but the plausibility of this explanation is fairly poor and not easily supported by evidence. Russia also claims that the separatists are not armed with Russian weapons and supplies, but rather from looted Ukrainian weapon stocks. This is more plausible than the explanation of the satellite pictures, but it is highly unlikely when evidence routinely shows large numbers of military type vehicles regularly crossing the Russian border towards the separatist held city of Donetsk. Mounting Russian casualties, transported from the Donetsk region back to Russia in vehicles marked “Cargo 200” (a Russian term for military casualties) makes the plausible deniability of Russian military involvement even harder to sustain over time.
It is important for us to learn from the Russian use of maskirovka when conducting military operations in a limited manner in Ukraine. When used effectively, maskirovka disguises the capabilities, plans and intentions of a military operation. When the military aspects of maskirovka are used in continuity with political, diplomatic and economic strategies, it enhances the effectiveness of surprise; one of the key principles of warfare. It must be understood that this strategy also has clear limitations. The longer an operation continues, the more likely it is that the enemy will discover the maskirovka techniques being employed.
The linked article provides additional information about the conflict and Russia’s use of maskirovka. https://medium.com/war-is-boring/maskirovka-is-russian-secret-war-7d6a304d5fb6
As military leaders, what would be the most effective way of disrupting an adversary’s use of maskirovka in a limited warfare situation, as Russia is currently doing in Eastern Ukraine, without escalating into a fully fledged military conflict? Do the current tactics and techniques we use to combat insurgents adequately prepare use to counter the use of maskirovka by a professional military?
Ukraine
Russia
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 6
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The Russians effectively fought the entirety of the cold war using this broad brush tactic. They knew we could out spend them on the technological front, so they basically masked their lack of money with a quantity of crude(albeit in some cases very effective)weaponry, aircraft and submarines. The Russians have always looked at themselves as having the NEED to defend themselves against three very large fronts to their homeland therefore using such tactics has enabled them to do so without the investment in an appropriate amount of troop strength. Cousin Vlad, is an ex-spook who REALLY likes the covert side of warfare. He LIKES the ability to infiltrate, execute, and extricate without PROOF of presence.
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CPT (Join to see)
Uncle Putin (as I like to refer to him) is also a judo expert. Judo principles include using maximum efficienty and minimum effort. I believe this also applies to Russia's current military doctrine to a certain extent. A weaker opponent can defeat a stronger one by avoiding the stronger opponents attacks and counterattacking. He definitely appreciates the use of covert warfare as well. It allows him to achieve his objectives without his enemies even being fully aware of it.
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CPT (Join to see) - Very interesting article!! I hadn't heard the term, but was familiar with the concept.
Regarding the combating of Maskirovka, that is a unique challenge. For one, I think many in the world are concerned about facing off against Russia for a second Cold War. The rebuilding of the USSR ideals under Vladimir Putin went virtually unnoticed until the re-annexation of the Crimea. Many dismissed the threat as they believed the USSR to still be financially crippled after the government auctioned off some of it's front line fighters and tanks to finance a Russian recession.
The reality is that it is important to unilaterally stand against these kinds of actions. It is a gamble, but one that is extremely important. The problem is that many of the UN nations are afraid of crossing Russia, or want concrete evidence, so even a weak excuse of "Sorry, I got lost on patrol and wandered more than 100 miles into your territory" would placate them. Additionally, some of these nations are reliant on Russian technology for their own military, so it creates a crutch when it comes to resistance. The US will not send it's finest fighters overseas (for good reason), but the Russians are willing to offer substantially better options in some aspects, and it is also likely cheaper than American aircraft as well. Nations like Poland are just now starting to break away from the Kalashnikov and try to develop their own weapons system based on the 5.56 round.
The additional challenge is the oil pipeline travelling from Russia into Europe. I believe they said it was around 2 billion gallons pumped a year into Europe (I don't remember the timeframe, just the 2 billion). Shutting that off would vastly inflate the costs of operating daily life in Europe, and would also hamper the UN/NATO forces ability to provide fuel in the event of mounting a counteroffensive.
There will come a time when the Russians will invade another area (potentially the rest of Ukraine), and the Europeans will need to decide how they are going to do it. This is much the same game that Hitler played in the 1930s when he started annexing the Sudetenland and invading surrounding small countries. Same excuses, "This was our land once...it was wrongfully stolen from us" and "These people are German/Russian. They have asked us to help reunite with their Fatherland/Motherland."
v/r,
CPT Butler
Regarding the combating of Maskirovka, that is a unique challenge. For one, I think many in the world are concerned about facing off against Russia for a second Cold War. The rebuilding of the USSR ideals under Vladimir Putin went virtually unnoticed until the re-annexation of the Crimea. Many dismissed the threat as they believed the USSR to still be financially crippled after the government auctioned off some of it's front line fighters and tanks to finance a Russian recession.
The reality is that it is important to unilaterally stand against these kinds of actions. It is a gamble, but one that is extremely important. The problem is that many of the UN nations are afraid of crossing Russia, or want concrete evidence, so even a weak excuse of "Sorry, I got lost on patrol and wandered more than 100 miles into your territory" would placate them. Additionally, some of these nations are reliant on Russian technology for their own military, so it creates a crutch when it comes to resistance. The US will not send it's finest fighters overseas (for good reason), but the Russians are willing to offer substantially better options in some aspects, and it is also likely cheaper than American aircraft as well. Nations like Poland are just now starting to break away from the Kalashnikov and try to develop their own weapons system based on the 5.56 round.
The additional challenge is the oil pipeline travelling from Russia into Europe. I believe they said it was around 2 billion gallons pumped a year into Europe (I don't remember the timeframe, just the 2 billion). Shutting that off would vastly inflate the costs of operating daily life in Europe, and would also hamper the UN/NATO forces ability to provide fuel in the event of mounting a counteroffensive.
There will come a time when the Russians will invade another area (potentially the rest of Ukraine), and the Europeans will need to decide how they are going to do it. This is much the same game that Hitler played in the 1930s when he started annexing the Sudetenland and invading surrounding small countries. Same excuses, "This was our land once...it was wrongfully stolen from us" and "These people are German/Russian. They have asked us to help reunite with their Fatherland/Motherland."
v/r,
CPT Butler
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SSgt (Join to see)
Don't forget, CPT (Join to see), the Russians also have a very good buddy buddy system w/ China. Those who have been paying attention have been wary of "the Bear & Dragon" since the fall of the wall. It can, if one were to delve into it to potentially insanity-inspiring depths, very scary.
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CPT (Join to see)
SSgt (Join to see) - very true. Even more scary considering the amount of economic dependence that much of the world has on the Chinese exports. If they were to close ties immediately, it could cripple the bulk of the United States' industrial capabilities for a short (but critical) timeframe to allow whatever goals to be met. Much the same as Pearl Harbor set the US back 6 months....this reliance could easily set us back at LEAST that, not to mention the financial dependence due to the rising debt.
There are a lot of variables at work now that were previously unheard of in earlier conflicts.
v/r,
CPT Butler
There are a lot of variables at work now that were previously unheard of in earlier conflicts.
v/r,
CPT Butler
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Defense against any lie, including maskirovka, is the truth. However, the effectiveness of this defense is dependent entirely upon the target population's (in this case, decision-makers at the U.N.) willingness to believe.
It doesn't matter how many lies you expose, if the target really wants to believe in the deception (i.e., they don't want to escalate to a shooting war), then they'll pretend to buy off on whatever explanation is given, no matter how weak it is.
It doesn't matter how many lies you expose, if the target really wants to believe in the deception (i.e., they don't want to escalate to a shooting war), then they'll pretend to buy off on whatever explanation is given, no matter how weak it is.
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SSgt (Join to see)
MAJ (Join to see) lies spread faster & can be more easily believed than the truth, as people don't want to believe the truth if it upsets their delicate balance.
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CPT (Join to see)
I think it is important to remember what Sun Tzu said:
All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
If the lie is expertly crafted, it resembles the truth and will be believed. But your point about the target population's willingness to believe is also an important point MAJ (Join to see). Those who are unwilling to face the truth for the sake of convenience are bound to be constrained by lies.
All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
If the lie is expertly crafted, it resembles the truth and will be believed. But your point about the target population's willingness to believe is also an important point MAJ (Join to see). Those who are unwilling to face the truth for the sake of convenience are bound to be constrained by lies.
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SFC (Join to see)
Just as the Euro has unified the economies of Europe in the hopes of preventing future wars between those nations, the global economy has created a quasi-dependence between countries such as the US and China. When and if any use of force to prevent further aggression in the Ukraine, the US debt to China and the Wuropean dependency on Russian oil will be the greatest influences on those decisions. The aggression will be denounced with wirds but until it directly affects the countries that have the ability to stop it, nothing will be done. Status Quo intact. Other than the service men an women whi wear the uniform, whonelse is truly willing to make the necessary sacrifices needed to support such a major political and economic move?
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