8
8
0
I read an article titled “Dempsey: Half of Iraqi Army not OK as US Partners” (http://rly.pt/1Dxjxvy) and it really got me thinking. In it, GEN Dempsey concluded only 26 of the 50 Iraqi Army Brigades are capable partners for the U.S. With that in mind, I do not ever see a time in the future where U.S. elements partner alongside Iraqi elements in training and exercises at JMRC or a venue like that. What I do see is a step back to the Military Training Teams (MTTs), Border Transition Teams (BTTs), Embedded Training Teams (ETTs), Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams (SFAATs), etc. that were utilized to advise, assist and train the Iraqi security forces. Some of these were very successful. Most were not.
I was the Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) of a Border Transition Team for the 6th Iraqi Border Police. They were headquartered in Sinjar in northwestern Iraq. Our team was the fifth team to fall in on this unit. It was a long year, much like it was a long year for many who deployed and did this sort of mission. My point is this. We were the fifth team to train this particular unit. Were they any more capable of securing their border after a year with us? I don’t think so. Were they any more capable after completing a year with the team that replaced us? Again, I don’t think so. Evidence is the amount of contraband, weapons, and foreign fighters that move freely across the border between Syria and Iraq.
We now have about 1,600 military advisors on the ground again in Iraq with more being identified. These folks will not have a “combat role.” That phrase always gets to me. Every time you go outside of the wire, you assume a combat role. To prepare for anything shy of that is inviting disaster. These advisors are out there with their Iraqi counterparts without the aid of dedicated Quick Reaction Force (QRF), without the aid of dedicated infantry, armor, or field artillery support. They not only have to be cognizant of the ISIS and the external threat that those forces possess, but they also have to sleep with one eye open because the insider threat is as real as it ever was.
GEN Dempsey said that this is about “training them in protected locations and then enabling them (Iraqi security forces)” so that they can “fight the fight” required to beat ISIS militants back across the border into Syria. Are U.S. trainers the answer? What improvements in training aids, or additional resources, will these trainers have that my team and the many others who have done this mission in the past didn’t have? Would you volunteer to deploy on one of these training teams?
I was the Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) of a Border Transition Team for the 6th Iraqi Border Police. They were headquartered in Sinjar in northwestern Iraq. Our team was the fifth team to fall in on this unit. It was a long year, much like it was a long year for many who deployed and did this sort of mission. My point is this. We were the fifth team to train this particular unit. Were they any more capable of securing their border after a year with us? I don’t think so. Were they any more capable after completing a year with the team that replaced us? Again, I don’t think so. Evidence is the amount of contraband, weapons, and foreign fighters that move freely across the border between Syria and Iraq.
We now have about 1,600 military advisors on the ground again in Iraq with more being identified. These folks will not have a “combat role.” That phrase always gets to me. Every time you go outside of the wire, you assume a combat role. To prepare for anything shy of that is inviting disaster. These advisors are out there with their Iraqi counterparts without the aid of dedicated Quick Reaction Force (QRF), without the aid of dedicated infantry, armor, or field artillery support. They not only have to be cognizant of the ISIS and the external threat that those forces possess, but they also have to sleep with one eye open because the insider threat is as real as it ever was.
GEN Dempsey said that this is about “training them in protected locations and then enabling them (Iraqi security forces)” so that they can “fight the fight” required to beat ISIS militants back across the border into Syria. Are U.S. trainers the answer? What improvements in training aids, or additional resources, will these trainers have that my team and the many others who have done this mission in the past didn’t have? Would you volunteer to deploy on one of these training teams?
Training
ISIS
Iraq
Posted 10 y ago
Responses: 13
6
6
0
In the language of todays political arena the term "advise and assists" translates to "these people have no frickin clue what they're doing, nor do they have any real desire to do it, so we're going to send our people over their to do it all for them while they "assist" us."
(6)
(0)
1SG (Join to see)
SSG (Join to see) And remember now...we'll do it with no US "boots on the ground!" Does that mean US advisors will be going barefoot, or with issued desert camoflaged sandals.
(1)
(0)
SSG (Join to see)
In order to better understand the enemy and the people that we'll be "advising", everyone will be issued two pairs of Belleville's new "Jesus Jogger" combat sandal.
(0)
(0)
3
3
0
3
3
0
MSG Steven Stankovich,
This is incredibly interesting. I served in Iraq in 2007 - 2008 and my finding was a shell or movie set as opposed to substance in the IPs and Military of Iraq.
The concept of advise and assist has been used to death and not in a good way. During Viet Nam we had Military Assistance Command - Vietnam which was a similar concept utilizing Special Forces advisors to train and patrol with friendly forces. What happens when these friendly forces are attacked and our "advisors" are with them? It is no less combat than any other situation. You could not be more correct, "everytime you go outside of the wire, you assume a combat role. To prepare for anything shy of that is inviting disaster."
Our forces no matter where they are and no matter the mission should have the best force protection, intelligence, support, and reinforcements possible. I will never disagree that our forces must follow the guidance of elected leaders. But our elected leaders must also heed what senior military professionals report, advise, and request.
This is a great topic and I thank you for asking the hard question and creating such a valid and timly discussion.
SFC Joseph M. Finck USA (Ret)
This is incredibly interesting. I served in Iraq in 2007 - 2008 and my finding was a shell or movie set as opposed to substance in the IPs and Military of Iraq.
The concept of advise and assist has been used to death and not in a good way. During Viet Nam we had Military Assistance Command - Vietnam which was a similar concept utilizing Special Forces advisors to train and patrol with friendly forces. What happens when these friendly forces are attacked and our "advisors" are with them? It is no less combat than any other situation. You could not be more correct, "everytime you go outside of the wire, you assume a combat role. To prepare for anything shy of that is inviting disaster."
Our forces no matter where they are and no matter the mission should have the best force protection, intelligence, support, and reinforcements possible. I will never disagree that our forces must follow the guidance of elected leaders. But our elected leaders must also heed what senior military professionals report, advise, and request.
This is a great topic and I thank you for asking the hard question and creating such a valid and timly discussion.
SFC Joseph M. Finck USA (Ret)
(3)
(0)
1SG Steven Stankovich
Thank you for the input SFC Dr. Joseph Finck, BS, MA, DSS. Great point about MAC-V. We have been doing this a while. I remember in 2004 when I was a PSG in Afghanistan. We ran into a ETT that consisted of a CPT and a SFC. They were embedded with an Afghan Candak. I asked the second time we ran into them who do they call if the sh#t hits the fan? He said I'll call you. We laughed a little but we both knew that my scout platoon could be on the other side of a God knows where and we could not be their QRF. Tough times...
(2)
(0)
Read This Next
Continue with Facebook 
Continue with Google