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http://www.janes.com/article/50510/us-military-views-north-korean-icbm-as-operational
Key Points
•NORAD's chief said his command views North Korean ICBMs as "operational today"
•The long-range KN-08 missile is not known to have been tested and likely faces significant reliability issues
The US military is operating under the assumption that North Korea is able to miniaturise a nuclear weapon for long-range strike; however, experts believe this is more of a remote and long-term possibility.
"Our assessment is that they have the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the [US] homeland," Admiral William Gortney, head of North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Northern Command, told reporters at the Pentagon on 7 April. "We assess that it's operational today," he said.
Not much is certain about the Hwasong-13 (US designation KN-08) road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). It has been shown at least twice during public parades but the six missiles displayed in April 2012 may have been replicas.
"We haven't seen them test the KN-08 yet and we're waiting [for them] to do that," Adm Gortney said. "That's the way we think, that's our assessment of the process."
Adm Gortney said he believed it is "prudent" to take such a risk-adverse approach to judging North Korean capabilities.
Elaine Bunn, deputy assistant US secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy, took a similar position but judged that "the reliability of an untested KN-08 is likely to be very low". She spoke the same day during an event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Bunn noted that while North Korea has paraded but not tested the KN-08, it has experimented with enough satellite launch vehicle (SLV) technology that it could conceivably develop an ICBM. A recent example is the Unha-3 SLV, which was succesfully test launched in December 2012.
Although any such ICBM is likely to be unreliable, she said the issue is how much risk the United States could accept, given what she called a lack of confidence in its understanding of North Korea's leadership and its decision making calculus.
As for the role of 'deterrence', Bunn said she has confidence about overall deterrence of major nuclear powers such as Russia and China regarding attacks on the US homeland, but "less confidence" about deterring North Korea or potentially Iran.
The US missile defence system, the Ground-based Midcourse Defence (GMD) system, is not designed to defend against attacks from Russia or China because they have enough weapons and countermeasures to easily overwhelm the GMD.
Key Points
•NORAD's chief said his command views North Korean ICBMs as "operational today"
•The long-range KN-08 missile is not known to have been tested and likely faces significant reliability issues
The US military is operating under the assumption that North Korea is able to miniaturise a nuclear weapon for long-range strike; however, experts believe this is more of a remote and long-term possibility.
"Our assessment is that they have the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the [US] homeland," Admiral William Gortney, head of North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Northern Command, told reporters at the Pentagon on 7 April. "We assess that it's operational today," he said.
Not much is certain about the Hwasong-13 (US designation KN-08) road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). It has been shown at least twice during public parades but the six missiles displayed in April 2012 may have been replicas.
"We haven't seen them test the KN-08 yet and we're waiting [for them] to do that," Adm Gortney said. "That's the way we think, that's our assessment of the process."
Adm Gortney said he believed it is "prudent" to take such a risk-adverse approach to judging North Korean capabilities.
Elaine Bunn, deputy assistant US secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy, took a similar position but judged that "the reliability of an untested KN-08 is likely to be very low". She spoke the same day during an event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Bunn noted that while North Korea has paraded but not tested the KN-08, it has experimented with enough satellite launch vehicle (SLV) technology that it could conceivably develop an ICBM. A recent example is the Unha-3 SLV, which was succesfully test launched in December 2012.
Although any such ICBM is likely to be unreliable, she said the issue is how much risk the United States could accept, given what she called a lack of confidence in its understanding of North Korea's leadership and its decision making calculus.
As for the role of 'deterrence', Bunn said she has confidence about overall deterrence of major nuclear powers such as Russia and China regarding attacks on the US homeland, but "less confidence" about deterring North Korea or potentially Iran.
The US missile defence system, the Ground-based Midcourse Defence (GMD) system, is not designed to defend against attacks from Russia or China because they have enough weapons and countermeasures to easily overwhelm the GMD.
IHS Jane's
North Korea
Nuclear
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 3
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Interesting. It is, as you say, blatantly something or other . . . total BS certainly comes to mind!
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Viewing a missile that hasn't (as far as anyone knows) actually been tested as "operational" when the definition of "operational" includes being equipped with a warhead that isn't known to exist and where the capacity to produce such a warhead is only theoretical is either [1] blatantly paranoid, [2] blatantly fear mongering, [3] blatantly budget padding, or [4] a combination of two or more of the foregoing - especially if the actual existence of the missile is still unknown.
While the "supreme leadership" of (North)Korea may (and quite possibly is) a sandwich, thermos, and basket short of a picnic not EVERYONE it (North)Korea relishes the thought of what an American counter-strike in response to an ineffectual attack on the United States of America would do to their country (and them personally).
When Kim Jong-un screams the order to "Fire" the missile, it's much more likely that what will be fired will be 9mm, 7.62mm, and/or 5.56mm rather than ICBM.
Face it, if (North)Korea actually had a nuclear explosive device then it could quite easily deliver it to any American port city in the hold of a cargo vessel - provided that it wanted to accept the consequences of what would be a devastating (but not decisive - or even essentially productive) "first strike".
I suspect that the adverse effect of the WTC/Pentagon mass murders was so damaging to America and its economy was because it was [1] so small (only 0.000079% of the population were casualties and [2] "the government" didn't actually have anyone concrete to focus the public wrath on (it was pretty easy to point to Japan after Pearl Harbor but "We must attack and destroy six guys (not all of whom we are sure we know the identity of) in a cave (we think) someplace (we're not sure where) more or less in some other country (but we're not really sure which one)." simply doesn't sell well. A nuclear attack on an American target won't have those drawbacks.
[Of course, if ISIL gets a (North)Korean nuclear weapon then they won't hesitate to use it because all the tracers are going to point to (North)Korea and (North)Korea is a "heretic state" so it won't matter if it gets nuked. Which is probably the best safeguard against ISIL getting either a (North)Korean or Pakistani nuclear weapon.]
While the "supreme leadership" of (North)Korea may (and quite possibly is) a sandwich, thermos, and basket short of a picnic not EVERYONE it (North)Korea relishes the thought of what an American counter-strike in response to an ineffectual attack on the United States of America would do to their country (and them personally).
When Kim Jong-un screams the order to "Fire" the missile, it's much more likely that what will be fired will be 9mm, 7.62mm, and/or 5.56mm rather than ICBM.
Face it, if (North)Korea actually had a nuclear explosive device then it could quite easily deliver it to any American port city in the hold of a cargo vessel - provided that it wanted to accept the consequences of what would be a devastating (but not decisive - or even essentially productive) "first strike".
I suspect that the adverse effect of the WTC/Pentagon mass murders was so damaging to America and its economy was because it was [1] so small (only 0.000079% of the population were casualties and [2] "the government" didn't actually have anyone concrete to focus the public wrath on (it was pretty easy to point to Japan after Pearl Harbor but "We must attack and destroy six guys (not all of whom we are sure we know the identity of) in a cave (we think) someplace (we're not sure where) more or less in some other country (but we're not really sure which one)." simply doesn't sell well. A nuclear attack on an American target won't have those drawbacks.
[Of course, if ISIL gets a (North)Korean nuclear weapon then they won't hesitate to use it because all the tracers are going to point to (North)Korea and (North)Korea is a "heretic state" so it won't matter if it gets nuked. Which is probably the best safeguard against ISIL getting either a (North)Korean or Pakistani nuclear weapon.]
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