Posted on Jan 9, 2018
Is the SFAB capable of changing the way our regional partners fight?
7.18K
2
5
1
1
0
The concept of the SFAB (Security Force Assistance Brigade) is long overdue, given the United States Military's dedication to advise and assist missions around the globe. It's worth looking at the ability of these Brigades to make actual change however. That is a large portion of what they will be tasked with accomplishing with our regional partners. Advising at the tactical level can make tactical change, but as we have seen recently, the change is not long-lasting. Remove the advising unit and often, the force returns to its previous state of readiness and training. Can these SFABs make a difference on a strategic level? Can they make changes that are lasting when the strategic and institutional enterprise of our regional partners are not making DOTMLPF-P focused changes? Without a strategic or institutional level advise and assist capability in place to synchronize those tactical efforts, are we wasting our time, money and blood?
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 2
Greetings to all in this thread.
Appreciate the insightful comments here about the importance of avoiding the tendency to "mirror-image" foreign military counterparts with their U.S. military organizations.
On a PTOC basis, have been providing, on PTOC basis, advice and assistance as a US Army FAO (Middle East/CENTCOM-concentration) LREC SME to a USMC organization which is somewhat equivalent of MATA, based in the Tidewater Virginia area.
Side observation FWIW = No one at MATA, MCOE, or at SFA Command at Fort Bragg has answered my queries and offers of some relevant open-source materials on similar mirror-imaging by "other-than-US" [i.e. Russian, British and PRC Chinese, among others] military advisory & training groups which are directly applicable to the MATA's baseline POI for its CATC or to the 2d SFABs' pre-deployment training program (PTP) before that SFAB goes "wheels up" to missions in Afghanistan.
(Ironic situation, in that -- briefly -- while the Marines can't get enough of such "read ahead and get smart early" materials, there is no apparent interest in receiving and benefitting from them by Army counterparts, CENTCOM / SOCCENT, or ARCENT.)
Many thanks in advance for any attention and assistance. Today is Saturday, 23 March 2019.
Regards,
Stephen H. Franke
LTC, FAO / MI / SOF /
Attaché / SFA / HUMINT,
US Army Retired
San Pedro, California
Appreciate the insightful comments here about the importance of avoiding the tendency to "mirror-image" foreign military counterparts with their U.S. military organizations.
On a PTOC basis, have been providing, on PTOC basis, advice and assistance as a US Army FAO (Middle East/CENTCOM-concentration) LREC SME to a USMC organization which is somewhat equivalent of MATA, based in the Tidewater Virginia area.
Side observation FWIW = No one at MATA, MCOE, or at SFA Command at Fort Bragg has answered my queries and offers of some relevant open-source materials on similar mirror-imaging by "other-than-US" [i.e. Russian, British and PRC Chinese, among others] military advisory & training groups which are directly applicable to the MATA's baseline POI for its CATC or to the 2d SFABs' pre-deployment training program (PTP) before that SFAB goes "wheels up" to missions in Afghanistan.
(Ironic situation, in that -- briefly -- while the Marines can't get enough of such "read ahead and get smart early" materials, there is no apparent interest in receiving and benefitting from them by Army counterparts, CENTCOM / SOCCENT, or ARCENT.)
Many thanks in advance for any attention and assistance. Today is Saturday, 23 March 2019.
Regards,
Stephen H. Franke
LTC, FAO / MI / SOF /
Attaché / SFA / HUMINT,
US Army Retired
San Pedro, California
(0)
(0)
DOTMLPF-P? Really? Lesson number one about "Advise and Assist" operations,you cannot impose Western standards onto a non-Western culture or military. Show me an officer who claims that one of our foreign partners that may receive SFAB assistance will some day stand up a certified "Center of Excellence" and I will show you a liar.
(0)
(0)
COL (Join to see)
That's the entire point of the question. Our goals aren't to make sure that X platoon of Y Company for Z Battalion is really good (or marginal) at marksmanship. Our goal (the strategic goal) is to make their entire Army good at it. That means those officers you mention with their oars deep in the water are wasting their time if there isn't some kind of organization advising the institutional level of their army. The reason why we have good "T" and good "L" in the Army isn't because it magic'ed into being. The D,O, M and F at the institutional level establishes the machine that enables us to have the Army that we have. Without it, it would fall apart. Without it, there are no standards to uphold...and everything becomes regionally standardized...if that. After 20+ years in the Army, I thought I had a pretty good handle on how things operated. Then I got stationed to a place that let me know I didn't know a damn thing about the Army except where the wheel met the concrete...and that wheel to pavement knowledge is all we are imparting to our regional partners. The only reason you can't change the culture of a small unit is because the culture of the organization is not changing or being forced to change from the INSIDE. We can't do it, but we can introduce concepts and ways which can do that...but you can't do it as a SFC in a platoon advise and assist mission. That sort of thing takes general officers doing their own A&A mission at the strategic and operational levels. I know of two organizations in the military that do this kind of work now...and have been doing it for a while. This whole advise and assist thing ain't new, but the way we are doing it in some places creates the illusion that tactical A&A is enough to make a change.
(1)
(0)
SFC (Join to see)
You stated if you remove the advisory element, the partner force will revert back to its native state. That is absolutely true, but they will retain more of the tactical training than they will the strategic level stuff because it is easier to replicate. Using doctrinal systems like DOTMLPF-P or systems of training require significant investments into institutions many of these partner forces lack the capacity to sustain or develop. Look at how long it took the U.S. and other NATO partners to get the Romanians ready to field their first battalion level task force ready to operate within the NATO standard. It took nearly 20 years to develop their NCO corps, revamp their junior and mid-grade staff officer courses, and bring their tactics and planning online with NATO standards and expectations. 20 years, and this was an organization that already had a doctrinal infrastructure, albeit Soviet based.
I agree with that the SFAB concept is great, but when you try to apply the top down approach to say a country like Niger or Nigeria, it just simply is not going to work as well as what many of SFAB proponents say it will. The concept is really a lot more limited than how it is being marketed.
My prediction is that the SFAB concept will succeed with many of our newer NATO allies (the former Eastern Bloc countries). It will see moderate success with the Iraqis and Afghans while the US and its allies are paying the bills and they will abandon the concept if left on their own. Developing African nations? The concept will never be effective or will only have extremely limited and temporary success.
I agree with that the SFAB concept is great, but when you try to apply the top down approach to say a country like Niger or Nigeria, it just simply is not going to work as well as what many of SFAB proponents say it will. The concept is really a lot more limited than how it is being marketed.
My prediction is that the SFAB concept will succeed with many of our newer NATO allies (the former Eastern Bloc countries). It will see moderate success with the Iraqis and Afghans while the US and its allies are paying the bills and they will abandon the concept if left on their own. Developing African nations? The concept will never be effective or will only have extremely limited and temporary success.
(0)
(0)
COL (Join to see)
I definitely agree on your predictions. It has to do with culture and their willingness to adapt and change. Eastern European armies are more aligned to the western way of war and its fundamental requirements. Arab armies are not, though there are some notable examples of separate cultures existing within the military despite regional cultural norms. Some middle eastern armies are better than others. Some have adapted themselves to incorporate modern military institutional practices. It's these ones that are able to rise above the tactical focus and begin to see real change. The Romanians may have taken 20 years, and that may seem tectonic in timeline, but its really not when you are talking about lasting change at the Army level. Depends what we are looking for. An SFAB will have success at increasing the technical proficiency of a partnered unit, but it will have no lasting effects unless there is institutional change in the force. Are we looking for the quick win in a small area, or a long term partner who can assist in fulfilling national strategic interests in the region? Both? All I'm saying is that there has to be an effort and a real investment in security cooperation operations above the tactical level to see significant change. Aaaand...I find it hard to believe that this isn't a topic that anyone is commenting on. Every one must be too busy posting news stories.
(0)
(0)
Read This Next