As Army Shrinks, Milley Considers Ways to Regenerate Force! Your Thoughts?

SFC (Join to see), sounds like something we could call the Dominquez Principle: "Unnecessary training expands to fill the time available."

1LT William Clardy - I don't think that would work. As I stated Congress passed law stating that National Guard can't be on Title 10 status for more than a year. When the Federal Gov calls you up the countdown starts on day one. The only way to fix this would be to rotate out soldiers in a unit and keep the unit there.

Well then, CPT (Join to see), this is something which I got tired of reminding folks about back when we first decided to occupy Iraq.
You will have a hard time successfully fighting a war if Congress isn't willing to declare that we are mobilizing for a war. Anything less than invoking the war-time mobilization plans and authorities makes as much sense as trying to have a baby without asking anybody to be pregnant for 9 months.

1LT William Clardy - At the start of the war this really wasn't so much of an issue as Guard units could go over the 12 months if needed. There was one guard unit that did 22 months. After that the rule came out. I think it was in 2008. When I went in 2009 with the Guard we could only do 12 months.

Actually, CPT (Join to see), when the decision was made to invade and occupy Iraq, one of my recurring admonitions to all the folks who were gung-ho about taking down Saddam was that they should tell their Congress-critters to activate the Selective Service system, because within a year the Regular Army units would be needing additional manpower to sustain both war efforts and it takes about a year from initial mobilization for the pipeline to fill and start producing troops and units ready for deployment forward.

Failure to actually mobilize for war is why the Army resorted to activating Guard units every other year and grabbing individual augmentees willy-nilly from the Guard and Reserves to fill manpower gaps. It was as clear and forseeable mistake as pretending that slapping soft-rolled steel plates on HMMWVs turned them into combat vehicles or that we could sustain the wear and tear on equipment in theater by cannibalizing parts from the rest of the Army instead of telling Congress up front how much money would be needed for the additional maintenance requirements (to name a couple of other high-level "let's pretend" decisions).

Just think of all the additional training that we have to attend. Soldiers will go to other schools. For us we send soldiers to BLC, ALC, and the lot of the other schools. I am sure a unit is not going to burn their training on this training. It is going to be look pretty rough if you want to maintain a career.

I've seen this recommendation multiple times. I think it has a LOT of merit, but it comes with several big disclaimers.
1. It cannot be one size fits all. I know MANY people who would happily drill 2 or 3 times as much as they do now. I know MANY who find the current level challenging due to career/job/family. Getting that (individually) tailored commitment right would take a lot of work.
2. Those who are willing/able to put in more time will have to be either in "special" higher tempo units or officially in a special status (IRR-like) and attached to units.
3. Those people and units that put in more time WILL be resourced better.
4. Those people and units will be TREATED better.
5. This will lead to "classes" and resentments in the reserve forces.

All that is a long way of saying prepare for tiered readiness (I think people are actually saying that out loud now) and the return of something similar to E-BDEs.

COL Vincent Stoneking - What is a E-BDE. I know my BCT was a Enhanced HBCT at one point. I didn't think anything of it. On what you were saying. I like the idea of having units more trained but it would really come at a cost. I am Active Duty with the Guard now at Benning but I drill in NC still. I don't mind really as I enjoy being a PL but going back to NC twice a month is not something I would like doing as often. I would like to see making some positions that are M-Day on Active duty orders or rotating out platoons for training. Set up a training area and send small groups there for a month at a time. I wouldn't want command elements there but a cadre that can evaluate the unit. I think we really need to push the readiness at the lowest levels and build up from there. When they have their drill the Battalion command can take a trained element and do with them as they wish.

As much as some hate to say it there are some better units out there. It is the same in the Army. A guy at 3rd ID is not seen on par with a guy from Ranger Bat. But the guy from Ranger Bat wanted to be there. I would make these enhanced units a voluntary unit. I don't know if that would work but I am sure it would attract the best.

An E(nhanced) BDE was essential a BDE with it's "divisional wedge" directly assigned to it. In the case of the one I belonged to, it was AR & IN (at various times 2&2, 2&1, 1&2). It also had FA, EN, and SPT BNs directly assigned as well as misc assets (MI Co, MP Plt, etc) and a robust (Div-sized) HQ. The idea was that it would be a deployable "package."

As such, it was afforded significantly more manning and funding, essentially "tier 1" and close to equivalent to an AC unit. Money for training, schools, additional ATs, etc. In return, it was expected to keep higher levels (85%+ based on my memory of many years ago, when I was very junior - almost certainly wrong...) of personnel and operational readiness.

While this presented great opportunities, it also presented optempo/burnout issues similar to the ones several people have mentioned here. It also created an incentive to hit those personnel and OR targets "by any means necessary." I'm sure you've been in the NG for long enough to imagine what some issues resulting from that might be. . .