Posted on Aug 18, 2015
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70 Years of Military Mediocrity

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Thomas Jefferson Hall, West Point’s library and learning center, prominently features two quotations for cadets to mull over. In the first, Jefferson writes George Washington in 1788: “The power of making war often prevents it, and in our case would give efficacy to our desire of peace.” In the second, Jefferson writes Thomas Leiper in 1815: “I hope our wisdom will grow with our power, and teach us that the less we use our power, the greater it will be.”

Two centuries ago, Jefferson’s points were plain and clear, and they remain so today: while this country desired peace, it had to be prepared to wage war; and yet the more it avoided resorting to raw military power, the more it would prosper.

Have America’s military officers and politicians learned these lessons? Obviously not. In the twenty-first century, the U.S. unquestionably ranks number one on this planet in its preparations for waging war -- we got that message loud and clear -- but we’re also number one in using that power aggressively around the globe, weakening our nation in the process, just as Jefferson warned.

Of course, the world today is a more complex and crowded place than in Jefferson’s time and this country, long a regional, even an isolationist power, is now an imperial and global superpower that quite literally garrisons the planet. That said, Jefferson’s lessons should still be salutary ones, especially when you consider that the U.S. military has not had a convincing victory in a major “hot” war since 1945.

There are undoubtedly many reasons for this, but I want to focus on two: what cadets at America’s military academies really learn and the self-serving behavior of America’s most senior military officers, many of whom are academy graduates. Familiar as they may be with those words of Jefferson, they have consistently ignored or misapplied them, facilitating our current state of endless war and national decline.

America’s Military Academies: High Ideals, Cynical Graduates

America’s military academies are supposed to educate and inspire leaders of strong character and impeccable integrity. They’re supposed to be showcases for America’s youth, shining symbols of national service. Ultimately, they’re supposed to forge strong military leaders who will win America’s wars (assuming those wars can’t be avoided, as Jefferson might have added). So how's their main mission going?

I taught at the Air Force Academy for six years, and I’ve talked to former cadets as well as fellow officers who taught at Arm's West Point and the Navy's Annapolis. Here are a few reflections on the flaws of these institutions:

1. In reality, the unstated primary mission of the three military academies is to turn raw cadets into career officers dedicated and devoted to their particular branch of service. On the other hand, service to the American people is, at best, an abstract concept. More afterthought than thought, it is certainly mentioned but hardly a value consistently instilled.

Careerism and parochialism are hardly unique to military academies. Still, as one former cadet wrote me, it’s surprising to encounter them so openly in institutions dedicated to “service before self.” More than a few of his peers, he added, were motivated primarily by a desire for “a stable, well-paying career.” While a perfectly respectable personal goal, to be sure, it’s a less than desirable one at academies theoretically dedicated to selfless, even sacrificial service.

2. The academic curriculum is structured to prepare cadets for the technical demands of their first jobs, meaning that it’s heavily weighted toward STEM (science/technology/engineering/math). Despite the presence of a Cadet Honor Code, the humanities and questions of ethics play too small a role in the intellectual and moral development of the students.

3. Cadets quickly learn that excelling within the system is the surest path to coveted opportunities -- increasingly scarce pilot slots, Special Ops schools, or the like -- after graduation. Educationally speaking, they are driven by the idea of advancement within the conformist norms defined by their particular academy and branch of service. A system that rewards energetic displays of conformity also tends to generate mediocrity as well as cynicism. As one former cadet put it to me, “There is something deeper and more perverse here as well: The ‘golden boys’ [in the eyes of Academy officialdom] got the coveted slots but were generally hated by their cynical peers. Cynicism seems to define the Academy experience.”

A former colleague of mine had this comment: “The [military] academies don't make great people and they don't always make good people better. I have seen them turn off a few really good people, however.”

4. Because the academies are considered prestige institutions as well as symbols of rectitude and their reputations are always at stake, few risks are taken. Misconduct, when it occurs, is frequently hushed up "for the good of the Academy." Scandals involving cheating, sexual assaults, and religious discrimination have often been made worse by not being dealt with openly and honestly. Cadets know this, which is another reason many emerge from their education as cynics when it comes to the high ideals the academies are supposed to instill.

5. As schools, they are remarkably insular, insider outfits often run by academy graduates whose goals tend to be narrow and sometimes even bizarrely parochial. For example, I knew of one superintendent (a three-star general) at the Air Force Academy whose number one goal was a winning football program. In that sense, he certainly reflected American society: think of the civilian college presidents who desire just that for their institutions. But military academies are supposed to be about creating leaders, not winning football trophies -- and the two bear remarkably little relationship to each other no matter how many times the Duke of Wellington is (mis)quoted about the Battle of Waterloo being won on the playing fields of Eton.

6. Finally, there’s a strong emphasis at all the academies on simply keeping cadets busy. To the point where -- especially in their first year -- they're often sleep-deprived and staggering into class. Theoretically, this is meant to be a test both of their commitment to military life and their ability to handle pressure. Whether they learn anything meaningful while dazed or sleeping in class is not discussed. Whether this is a smart way to develop creative and strong-minded leaders is also not up for consideration.

As one former cadet put it: busywork and demanding rituals that sometime cross the line and become hazing are embraced in military education as a “rite of passage.” The idea “that we [cadets] suffered through something and prevailed is an immensely powerful psychological ‘badge’ which leads to pride (or arrogance) and confidence (or hubris).”

Add up the indoctrination and the training, the busywork in classrooms and the desire to excel in big-time collegiate sports, and what you tend to graduate is a certain number of hyper-motivated true believers and a mass of go-along cynics -- young men and women who have learned to subsume their doubts and misgivings, even as they trim their sails in the direction of the prevailing winds.

While the cadets are encouraged to over-identify with their particular academy and service branch, they’re also encouraged to self-identify as “warriors,” as, that is, an elite apart from and superior to the civilians they’re supposed to serve. That this country was founded on civilian control of the military may be given lip service, but in the age of the ascendant national security state, the deeper sentiments embedded in an academy education are ever more distant from a populace that plays next to no part in America’s wars.

That the classic civilian-military nexus, which was supposed to serve and promote democracy, has turned out to have a few glitches in our time should surprise no one. After all, President Dwight Eisenhower warned us about what was coming back in 1961. As Ike noticed, the way it was working -- the way it still works today -- is that senior officers in the military too often become tools of the armaments industry (his “military-industrial complex”) even as they identify far too closely with the parochial interests of their particular service branch. Add to this the distinctly twenty-first-century emphasis on being warriors, not citizen-soldiers, and you have the definition of a system of self-perpetuating and self-serving militarism rather than military service.

To the extent that the military academies not only fail to curb this behavior but essentially encourage it, they are failing our democracy.

America’s Senior Officers: Lots of Ribbon Candy, No Sweetness of Victory

In my first article for TomDispatch back in 2007, I wrote about America’s senior military leaders, men like the celebrated David Petraeus. No matter how impressive, even kingly, they looked in their uniforms festooned with ribbons, badges, and medals of all sorts, colors, and sizes, their performance on the battlefield didn’t exactly bring to mind rainstorms of ribbon candy. So why, I wondered then, and wonder still, are America’s senior military officers so generally lauded and applauded? What have they done to deserve those chests full of honors and the endless praise in Washington and elsewhere in this country?

By giving our commanders so many pats on the back (and thanking the troops so effusively and repeatedly), it’s possible that we've prevented the development of an American-style stab-in-the-back theory -- that hoary yet dangerous myth that a military only loses wars when the troops are betrayed by the homefront. In the process, however, we've written them what is essentially a blank check. We’ve given them authority without accountability. They wage “our” wars (remarkably unsuccessfully), but never have to take the blame for defeats. Unlike President Harry Truman, famous for keeping a sign on his desk that read “the buck stops here,” the buck never stops with them.

Think about two of America’s most celebrated generals of the twenty-first century, Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal and how they fell publicly from grace. Both were West Point grads, both were celebrated as “heroes,” despite the fact that their military "surges" in Iraq and Afghanistan proved fragile and reversible. They fell only because Petraeus was caught with his pants down (in an extramarital affair with a fawning biographer), while McChrystal ran afoul of the president by tolerating an atmosphere that undermined his civilian chain of command.

And here, perhaps, is the strangest thing of all: even as America’s wars continue to go poorly by any reasonable measure, no prominent high-ranking officer has yet stepped forward either to take responsibility or in protest. You have to look to the lower ranks, to lieutenant colonels and captains and specialists (and, in the case of Chelsea Manning, to lowly privates), for straight talk and the courage to buck the system. Name one prominent general or admiral, fed up with the lamentable results of America’s wars, who has either taken responsibility for them or resigned for cause. Yup -- I can’t either. (This is not to suggest that the military lacks senior officers of integrity. Recall the way General Eric Shinseki broke ranks with the Bush administration in testimony before Congress about the size of a post-invasion force needed to secure Iraq, or General Antonio Taguba’s integrity in overseeing a thorough investigation of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib. Their good deeds did not go unpunished.)

Authority without accountability means no one is responsible. And if no one is responsible, the system can keep chugging along, course largely unaltered, no matter what happens. This is exactly what it’s been doing for years now in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

Can we connect this behavior to the faults of the service academies? Careerism. Parochialism. Technocratic tendencies. Elitism. A focus on image rather than on substance. Lots of busywork and far too much praise for our ascetic warrior-heroes, results be damned. A tendency to close ranks rather than take responsibility. Buck-passing, not bucking the system. The urge to get those golden slots on graduation and the desire for golden parachutes into a lucrative world of corporate boards and consultancies after “retirement,” not to speak of those glowing appearances as military experts on major TV and cable networks.

By failing to hold military boots to the fire, we've largely avoided unpleasantness between the military and its civilian leadership, not to speak of the American public. But -- and here's the rub -- 70 years of mediocrity since World War II and 14 years of failure since 9/11 should have resulted in anti-war protests, Congressional hearings, and public controversy. It should have created public discord, as it did during the Vietnam War, when dissent was a sign of a healthy democracy and an engaged citizenry. Nowadays, in place of protest, we hear the praise, the applause, the thank-yous followed by yet another bombastic rendition of “God Bless America.” Let’s face it. Our military has failed us, but haven’t we failed it, too?

Listening Again to Jefferson

America’s military academies are supposed to be educating and developing leaders of character. If they're not doing that, why have them? America’s senior military leaders are supposed to be winning wars, not losing them. (Please feel free to name one recent victory by the U.S. military that hasn’t been of the Pyrrhic variety.) So why do we idolize them? And why do we fail to hold them accountable?

These are more than rhetorical questions. They cut to the heart of an American culture that celebrates its military cadets as its finest young citizens, a culture that lauds its generals even as they fail to accept responsibility for wars that end not in victory but -- well, come to think of it, they just never end.

The way forward: I don’t have to point the way because Thomas Jefferson already did. Just read his quotations in the West Point library: we need to become a peace-loving nation again; we need to act as if war were our last resort, not our first impulse; we need to recognize that war is corrosive to democracy and that the more military power is exercised the weaker we grow as a democratic society.

Jefferson’s wisdom, enshrined at West Point, shouldn’t be entombed there. We need a new generation of cadets -- and a few renegade generals of my generation as well -- who want to serve us by not going to war, who know that a military is a burden to democracy even when victorious, and especially when it’s not. Otherwise, we’re in trouble in ways we haven’t yet begun to imagine.

http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/8004088
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LTC Stephen F.
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CW4 (Join to see) I am a graduate of the USMA class of 1980. To be honest, I have never been very impressed with the Huffington Post. [Updated 2040 8/18/2015]
This "article" which was published by the Huffington Post was written by somebody who was an instructor at USAFA. When I was a cadet in the late 1970's we had to memorize the NY Times headlines of that particular morning and be familiar enough to describe them to any passing upper class man [in those days there were only upper classmen since I was in the first class with women cadets.] In those days the NY Times was anti-military in general and anti-West Point in particular.
I have added editorial comments in brackets to this trash piece :-)
This may apply to the USAFA but the comments to do apply to the USMA or the USNA.

"America’s military academies are supposed to educate and inspire leaders of strong character and impeccable integrity. They’re supposed to be showcases for America’s youth, shining symbols of national service. Ultimately, they’re supposed to forge strong military leaders who will win America’s wars (assuming those wars can’t be avoided, as Jefferson might have added). So how's their main mission going?
I taught at the Air Force Academy for six years, and I’ve talked to former cadets as well as fellow officers who taught at Arm's West Point and the Navy's Annapolis. Here are a few reflections on the flaws of these institutions:
1. In reality, the unstated primary mission of the three military academies is to turn raw cadets into career officers dedicated and devoted to their particular branch of service. On the other hand, service to the American people is, at best, an abstract concept. More afterthought than thought, it is certainly mentioned but hardly a value consistently instilled. [The mission of the Military Academies both stated and unstated is to prepare young men and women to serve as military officers in their respective branches. The prejudice of the author seems to come across in his "raw cadets" and "career officers" both terms seem to be negative in this particular author's view.

2. Careerism and parochialism are hardly unique to military academies. Still, as one former cadet wrote me, it’s surprising to encounter them so openly in institutions dedicated to “service before self.” More than a few of his peers, he added, were motivated primarily by a desire for “a stable, well-paying career.” While a perfectly respectable personal goal, to be sure, it’s a less than desirable one at academies theoretically dedicated to selfless, even sacrificial service.

2. The academic curriculum is structured to prepare cadets for the technical demands of their first jobs, meaning that it’s heavily weighted toward STEM (science/technology/engineering/math). Despite the presence of a Cadet Honor Code, the humanities and questions of ethics play too small a role in the intellectual and moral development of the students. [The academic, physical, and military instruction portions of the curriculum prepare the cadets for the assignments throughout their military careers and in many cases outside the military careers.]

3. Cadets quickly learn that excelling within the system is the surest path to coveted opportunities -- increasingly scarce pilot slots, Special Ops schools, or the like -- after graduation. Educationally speaking, they are driven by the idea of advancement within the conformist norms defined by their particular academy and branch of service. A system that rewards energetic displays of conformity also tends to generate mediocrity as well as cynicism. As one former cadet put it to me, “There is something deeper and more perverse here as well: The ‘golden boys’ [in the eyes of Academy officialdom] got the coveted slots but were generally hated by their cynical peers. Cynicism seems to define the Academy experience.” [This may be something which happens at USAFA but I doubt it is as perverse as the author states. AT USMA cadets in their first two years do not generally have "opportunities" to shape their potential for "highly coveted" post graduation assignments. The author uses conformists as though the mere mention of the word should strike disgust in the eyes of the reader. ]

A former colleague of mine had this comment: “The [military] academies don't make great people and they don't always make good people better. I have seen them turn off a few really good people, however.” [There is some truth to the second statement; but, that applies to most challenging institutions whose business includes shaping young people. The first statement is BS]

4. Because the academies are considered prestige institutions as well as symbols of rectitude and their reputations are always at stake, few risks are taken. Misconduct, when it occurs, is frequently hushed up "for the good of the Academy." Scandals involving cheating, sexual assaults, and religious discrimination have often been made worse by not being dealt with openly and honestly. Cadets know this, which is another reason many emerge from their education as cynics when it comes to the high ideals the academies are supposed to instill. [As a century man at West Point which means I had 100 punishment tours as a cadet I know this is BS. Violations especially honor violations are not tolerated at USMA. The year before I got there. there was a cheating scandal in Electrical Engineering which forced out many members of the class of 1978. I doubt the USAFA is as bad as the author states but I know this behavior he cites does not apply to USMA.]

5. As schools, they are remarkably insular, insider outfits often run by academy graduates whose goals tend to be narrow and sometimes even bizarrely parochial. [More BS. The Service Academies are exposed to members of the public each week as throngs of tourists and sports fans descend upon the academies. There are visiting scholars and cadets take part in intercollegiate scholarly exercises and partnerships throughout the year. For ultra-liberal outsiders the military as a whole is bizarre :-)]

6. Finally, there’s a strong emphasis at all the academies on simply keeping cadets busy. To the point where -- especially in their first year -- they're often sleep-deprived and staggering into class. [This is pure BS. Yes cadets have always been kept busy in part to teach us how to both react under stress and to operate in a stressful environment. More importantly each part of the day is scheduled to help each cadet do as much as they can as they are developing into leaders of the US Army. Sleep, class, drill and ceremonies, organized sports, study hall, etc. are each important parts of the development process.]
COL Mikel J. Burroughs, LTC Stephen C., SGT Forrest Stewart, SGT (Join to see), SPC (Join to see)
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LTC Stephen F.
LTC Stephen F.
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Sgt Aaron Kennedy, MS - Yes, the USMMA is a quietly guarded secret :-)
Every graduate I have ever met has been a very fine individual.
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Sgt Aaron Kennedy, MS
Sgt Aaron Kennedy, MS
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LTC Stephen F. Likewise. My NJROTC instructor recommended trying to get VP Nominations from there since that (combo) would be the least likely 5 slots used up at any point, and you could still end up an Active Navy Officer after graduation (at that time).
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MAJ Operations Officer (S3)
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I agree with LTC Ford that point 4 is absolute garbage. Say what you will about the academies' effectiveness, but from experience they err much more in punishing suspected misconduct too harshly rather than sweeping things under the rug.
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LTC Stephen C.
LTC Stephen C.
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Nicely done, LTC Stephen F.! If I could offer a first hand or knowledgeable critique, I would, but knowing you as I do I say, "mission accomplished"!
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MAJ Dima Intelligence Analyst
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The academies, at the end of the day, are human institutions, not without error and certainly not without room for improvement. There's a joke that West Point runs on "200 (+) years of tradition unhindered by progress." The high standards they are meant to embody are important but believing they will always be upheld and never missed is foolish. I found his points very relevant to my experience (I can only speak for myself of course and from the perspective of a junior officer).

The article lacks a useful way forward. Just do what Jefferson said....okay, and implementing that in today's environment will be a challenge. Always a frustrating thing for me to read critical pieces that fail to provide viable alternatives.

Thank you for sharing.
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CPT Aaron Kletzing
CPT Aaron Kletzing
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Well said, thanks!
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SGT Infantryman (Airborne)
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I don't know the first thing about West Point officers with the exception of working with them in Vietnam. They were no different than any newby in Vietnam. They had to learn the ropes to keep them alive, to keep us alive, and they realized pretty quick what they learned on paper wasn't always the way things were. The first thing they picked up on rather quickly was you don't salute in the field or back at the AO. They were excellent officers and great men to work for and with. We were a team, and they were, are, team players.
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LTC Stephen C.
LTC Stephen C.
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Well stated, SGT (Join to see).
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SGT Infantryman (Airborne)
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Thanks Sir.
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COL Ted Mc
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SGT (Join to see) - Sergeant; Officers (like Enlisted personnel) learn some lessons MUCH faster when someone is trying to kill them.
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That they do, COL Ted Mc. It doesn't take long to understand the ropes, when you are getting shot at. In that Huey, we were a team of one. The pilots depended on me and the A/C to keep the ship in the air,mans them safe, and we certainly depended on them to do the same thing, and know what to in an emergency. We never let each other down. This poem was written by a pilot to the Guys In Back.

To the GIB (Guys In Back)
To the GIB, who made Viet Nam possible. The helicopter was the life blood of the Grunt. It took him to war, and it brought him home. It supported him with everything from water and ammo to air support and medevac. It hauled the Artillery, it scouted , it flew convoy cover, it did things the designers would never think it could. If someone could think of it, the Aircrews would, and did, get it done.
But GIB was the one who made it work. You had it ready to fly sometimes for a 0400 takeoff after getting back at 2300. You'd fly all day, protecting us with your guns and your eyes, loading and unloading anything and everything. Sometimes jumping out in a Hot LZ to find and bring back the wounded , and then try to keep them alive en route to the hospital, there are many people alive because of the GIB.
After a long day you'd come home, clean the mess, patch the holes, clean the guns and get ready to do it all over again. There were good pilots and there were some that could have been better, but I've never heard of a aircraft that couldn't find some GIB that wasn't Crazy enough to give it a try. We flew days, we flew nights, we flew good weather, we flew bad weather, but if we were needed, we'd kick the tire and light the fire, pull pitch
and fly into whatever was awaiting us and the GIF always knew the GIB would take care of him first no mater what. You earned your wings in combat.
Please accept these from a GIF who would not have made it home without MY GIB.
To the 173rd AHC Crewmembers at the Louisville VHCMA Reunion June 23, 2001
From WO2 Chuck Broadhurst
173 AHC / Robinhoods / Lai Khe, Vietnam
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