4
4
0
The requisite tool kit for COIN is filled with nation building tools: providing security, schools, government, police, military, judicial system, hospitals, infrastructure, sanitation, and economic development. We are supposed to make the indigenous people to stop and fight insurgents (how), and fight the insurgents (how)? We are also supposed to know the culture and the ramifications of it (how)? We bask in our glory when twice a month we have a good drone strike. We are regressing and not being critical thinkers in my opinion.
Posted in these groups: 
COIN (Counterinsurgency)
COIN (Counterinsurgency)
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 3
3
3
0
A common issue of framing the problem based on the tool in your hand.
Apaches are great. Apaches do fine work. Not every airframe needs to be an Apache.
COIN is fine. COIN is great. Not everything we do needs to be COIN. Most things aren't counter insurgencies. HINT: If there is not an extant government or civil society in place, there cannot be an insurgency, if there is not an insurgency, countering it doesn't make a lot of sense... (additionally, countering an insurgency may well allow a society that we don't like to stabilize....)
Apaches are great. Apaches do fine work. Not every airframe needs to be an Apache.
COIN is fine. COIN is great. Not everything we do needs to be COIN. Most things aren't counter insurgencies. HINT: If there is not an extant government or civil society in place, there cannot be an insurgency, if there is not an insurgency, countering it doesn't make a lot of sense... (additionally, countering an insurgency may well allow a society that we don't like to stabilize....)
(3)
(0)
3
3
0
MAJ Ken Landgren WO1 Tim Vaclav Agreed with both of you. The COIN philosophy is to allow the static security conditions for the local government to work. The military cannot make a government legitimate in the population's mind and will, only the local government can do this.
Once we changed the definition of 'winning' from a military definition to a State Dept definition = legitimate and effective local government, we have one of two options:
The military must take over the role of government, like we did post-WWII in Germany, Japan, Korea, France, etc. and we will be military 'governors' for a period of a minimum of 10-15 years to truly establish stability, takes 500K - 1M soldiers for the ME
OR
the military should be removed from the environment and inserted only to kill a specific threats that are made against the US government or specific US interest. (Special Forces will be busy forever.)
Once we changed the definition of 'winning' from a military definition to a State Dept definition = legitimate and effective local government, we have one of two options:
The military must take over the role of government, like we did post-WWII in Germany, Japan, Korea, France, etc. and we will be military 'governors' for a period of a minimum of 10-15 years to truly establish stability, takes 500K - 1M soldiers for the ME
OR
the military should be removed from the environment and inserted only to kill a specific threats that are made against the US government or specific US interest. (Special Forces will be busy forever.)
(3)
(0)
MAJ Ken Landgren
You are right. Nobody understood the characteristics of the dynamics of the people, government, and military. They had no George Washington to lead them.
(1)
(0)
MAJ Ken Landgren
The military problems in Afghanistan are:
- The Taliban can blend into the populace.
- The Taliban don’t fear us.
- Their inability to wage war has not been achieved.
- They can be hard to find in the terrain.
- Their passion to spearhead Shariah Law is strong.
- They have freedom to maneuver if we don’t own the land.
- They have logistics.
- They refuse to fight in very large battles.
- They often have the element of surprise.
- We can not protect the indigenous people.
It is difficult to build up a country if we can’t provide security. I see many parallels with Vietnam and Afghanistan. The big difference is the Taliban can’t grow into the size of a conventional army.
COIN is not working as we planned due to many military problems. The Soviets and Alexander the Great conducted total war against the Afghans but still lost. In light of this situation, I believe the best we can do is to find a political end. A victory will be establishing a democratic government and society that can protect itself, but that is yet to be seen.
- The Taliban can blend into the populace.
- The Taliban don’t fear us.
- Their inability to wage war has not been achieved.
- They can be hard to find in the terrain.
- Their passion to spearhead Shariah Law is strong.
- They have freedom to maneuver if we don’t own the land.
- They have logistics.
- They refuse to fight in very large battles.
- They often have the element of surprise.
- We can not protect the indigenous people.
It is difficult to build up a country if we can’t provide security. I see many parallels with Vietnam and Afghanistan. The big difference is the Taliban can’t grow into the size of a conventional army.
COIN is not working as we planned due to many military problems. The Soviets and Alexander the Great conducted total war against the Afghans but still lost. In light of this situation, I believe the best we can do is to find a political end. A victory will be establishing a democratic government and society that can protect itself, but that is yet to be seen.
(0)
(0)
3
3
0
I will have to echo WO1 Vaclav on this one sir. COIN in it's generic form would work in a nation with a national identity, we have to adapt it in order for it to work with a tribal/clan identity.
(3)
(0)
Read This Next
Continue with Facebook 
Continue with Google