Posted on Sep 15, 2022
SPC John Tacetta
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Chief Eddie Gallagher and Major Ian Fishback present two very different schools of thought on the conduct of war, particularly at the operational level. What do you feel we need to teach our new soldiers about these two approaches?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ian_Fishback
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eddie_Gallagher_(Navy_SEAL)
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Responses: 3
MSgt Steve Sweeney
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I'm not sure the two Wikipedia articles are sufficient to capture the "schools of thought" in question. If you are meaning to ask should we brutalize and torture enemy prisoners or detainees in our charge, I am going with "no". On the other hand, should we impose over-restrictive rules of engagement in some hopes of pacification? Again I say "no".
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SPC John Tacetta
SPC John Tacetta
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They are not, but they're a starting point.

SOCOM has been at the center of some very contentious incidents, which seems to be the result of their greater utilization in conflicts that revolve around insurgency rather than "standard" warfare. Standard formations have had their own incidents, but the greater incidence appears centered around the very small community that is seeing what some see as overutilization. They seem to be the "canary in the coal mine."

Are we failing to properly train our soldiers in the "rules of war" or is the leadership telling themselves (and the rank and file) that the ends justify the means? Are we allowing "bad apples" to spoil the barrel?

As a junior enlisted, I was instructed rather heavily in the Articles of the Geneva Convention, what constitutes a Lawful Order and to refuse Unlawful Orders. I understand that "this is war" and bad things happen, and, thankfully, I have never had to really put my training to the test, but do you feel that we've strayed too far from the path?
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MSgt Steve Sweeney
MSgt Steve Sweeney
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SPC John Tacetta - When you say "we've", do you mean you and I, USSOCOM, the military and DoD as a whole, or the entire nation? Too many convoluting factors to tell. Are we talking about actual or perception? Are there more incidents in USSOCOM, or are they just scrutinized more? Is it just a few "bad apples" or institutionalized?

At some level I feel you must think we have - strayed that is - which became the motive to ask the question. So for arguments sake, lets say "we" have. What do you suggest be done about it? What does proper "law of war" training look like? How often? How do you evaluate the lessons have been learned prior to deployment into an actual combat theater? How much time and money will additional training cost, and is the juice ultimately worth the squeeze? Is it a problem of ignorance, culture, or morality? If it is the latter, you are not going to get much out of additional training.

It is a question and problem similar, and potentially related to, the question of how to prevent or reduce veteran suicides. A couple of training standdowns just isn't going to cut it. It is a much deeper and engrained issue, and I don't feel the DoD is properly equipped or structured to address it without seriously detracting from the primary defense and warfighting mission.
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SPC John Tacetta
SPC John Tacetta
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Yes. All of the above.
Dark sites, extraordinary renditions, denying irregulars captured in arms combatant status, stress positions, and enhanced interrogations, as examples. During my enlistment these were all held out as illegal acts punishable under the UCMJ. Now they seem "acceptable" even if morally questionable. The end justifying the means. Which course should we be teaching our warriors?

I hadn't thought of the suicide aspect, but, as Major Fishback argued, perhaps our soldiers' participation in actions that they find morally antithetical to their upbringing, but that might be tolerated or encouraged in Theatre., has produced a "psychic trauma" that our returning Vets are failing to reconcile. I'm not talking about killing in the line of duty, but the dissonance between dehumanizing the enemy and seeing their actual humanity. Many may pass through this gauntlet unscathed, but clearly there's a wreckage of broken bodies and minds to contend with. Having lived through the Vietnam era I don't remember suicides outnumbering combat casualties in the aftermath of that conflict. As some have crudely pointed out elsewhere on this site, there seems to be no shortage of blue cords in the homeless shelters MSgt Steve Sweeney .
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MSgt Steve Sweeney
MSgt Steve Sweeney
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SPC John Tacetta - Suicide is sometimes a slow process... But at the core of both issues is morality and culture.
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SFC Casey O'Mally
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One should never give up his or her honor in order to prosecute war. Defeating the bad guy by becoming even worse is no path to honor, glory, or even long-term success. Eventually, the chickens come home to roost.

On the other hand, while maintaining virtue is important, there is such a thing as being too virtuous. War is Hell. Any pretense that it is not is delusion. When engaged in combat, kill quickly, efficiently, and without reservation.

But AFTER the combat, care for the wounded of BOTH sides, treat enemy prisoners humanely, and give what care you are tactically and strategically able to give to the bystanders.


We have to walk the center path. If we make our warriors into social workers, they will not win wars. But if we allow them to turn themselves into murderers (and there is a difference between murders and "good kills") and torturers, they will not win wars, either.
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SPC John Tacetta
SPC John Tacetta
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I cannot vote you up more than once, and that's a shame.
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CSM Darieus ZaGara
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As they are taught, neither of these men is well versed enough in the operational side of war to speak to how the military should train and operate at that level.

The military has laws and rules of conduct, and specifics on how to handle prisoners of war. If a Service member operates outside of the boundaries there actions should be reviewed by the appropriate authorities to determine if their actions were justified based on the situation on the ground at the time it occurred. There is no one answer to any like solution therefore, the rules, standards and laws must be upheld and that is the only answer for institutional training.

I may have missed the mark as the pint is foggy to me.
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SPC John Tacetta
SPC John Tacetta
2 y
Having served numerous combat tours, it seems to me that both men can speak knowledgably about field operations.

Gallagher was the "tough guy" kicking ass and taking names and only ran into trouble has his travails bled, so to speak, outside his community. The brass, belatedly tried to rein him in, but the highest power lauded him and gave him a pass. Now he's strutting about.

Fishback wrestled with the psychic trauma he felt his men suffered by engaging in acts that he saw as counter to the ideals embodied in the Geneva Convention. He passed in relative obscurity.

Who has more to teach us about the ethics of warfare, if one can ask such a question?

I must have served an IPA.
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CSM Darieus ZaGara
CSM Darieus ZaGara
2 y
my point is tgat you can not develop trainjng and development including operational techniques based on the experiences of an individual or even a small group from the same mindsets. I to served a few days in the Army, I respect and value the contributions of all, I have led and supported conventional, and joint, including multinational service members, as well as Special Forces in sector. They all had various operational playbook, none like the other, and all effective for their specialty’s. We all had one thing in common, the Theatre Commands rules of engagement.

In closing I have a great respect for your service as well. Thank you, SPC John Tacetta
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CSM Darieus ZaGara
CSM Darieus ZaGara
2 y
i fully respect your service, I too have been around the the battlefield a bit. My point was not that these men/Warriors do not have value in operational tactics, it is simply a fact that no one man can design operational tactics for the services. They both had operational experience and value to this operations. My experience comes from being the Soldier in the field of operation, up to the Senior Enlisted Leader for many organizations having conventional, joint, and multinational experience.

On the field of battle each organization had standing operational order tgat are inferred by the senior leaders concept of the enemy and how they need to be treated in any environment. It takes a team of experienced strategists to do see t all aspects of the mission at hand to determine the glide path for operations within the scope of the rules of engagement. The Warriors identified certainly have extremely valuable input, but neither can derive tactical responses to any given situation.

I respect these men and the challenges I mourn for any loss of life of any citizen let alone a brother at arms. These men both e soured sone very challenging situations and deserve our full respect where appropriate. Thank you for your very valuable insights. SPC John Tacetta
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