2
2
0
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/obama-said-to-consider-more-us-troops-to-train-iraqi-forces/ar-BBkTrkC
They are spending their efforts in the wrong way. Contrary to popular belief, Ramadi didn't fall because of poor training. They held it for 17 months. It fall because they ran out of ammo. They don't need to train more troops when there isn't enough ammo for the troops that they have. And now they want to train the Iraqi tribes? Where are they going to get their ammo? Ridiculous!
I suppose that we do still need to train more troops there, but what they really need to do now is to send more supplies along with some higher level advisors to oversee the Iraqi command and control, logistics and the use of equipment that we supply. This will not only keep them from misusing it corruptly, it will give us a certain measure of control over our investment, since those trainers will help them, monitor usage, and be a stipulation to further supplies.
The other area we really need to improve in is intelligence. What was a total failure about Ramadi, is the fact that it completely blind sided us. Now this is where the tribes can really come in. Start training some of them to collect intelligence for us along with some of the more reliable ISF as supervisors. Eventually they can pick up the program where we left off. The key here is to have a good intelligence exchange. Give them intelligence that only U.S. SIGINT and air can produce (along with the support above), in exchange for HUMINT from the tribes. To start we are going to have to stop being penny wise and pound foolish about our own intelligence spending.
They are spending their efforts in the wrong way. Contrary to popular belief, Ramadi didn't fall because of poor training. They held it for 17 months. It fall because they ran out of ammo. They don't need to train more troops when there isn't enough ammo for the troops that they have. And now they want to train the Iraqi tribes? Where are they going to get their ammo? Ridiculous!
I suppose that we do still need to train more troops there, but what they really need to do now is to send more supplies along with some higher level advisors to oversee the Iraqi command and control, logistics and the use of equipment that we supply. This will not only keep them from misusing it corruptly, it will give us a certain measure of control over our investment, since those trainers will help them, monitor usage, and be a stipulation to further supplies.
The other area we really need to improve in is intelligence. What was a total failure about Ramadi, is the fact that it completely blind sided us. Now this is where the tribes can really come in. Start training some of them to collect intelligence for us along with some of the more reliable ISF as supervisors. Eventually they can pick up the program where we left off. The key here is to have a good intelligence exchange. Give them intelligence that only U.S. SIGINT and air can produce (along with the support above), in exchange for HUMINT from the tribes. To start we are going to have to stop being penny wise and pound foolish about our own intelligence spending.
Iraq
Foreign Policy
Camp Ramadi
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 5
0
0
0
We have this notion building up a country and democratizing it will win hearts and minds. What is their passion? It is a paradigm of great resources spent and great energy to keep up with all the Lines of Effort like the police, judicial system, governance, hospitals, infrastructure, education, medical, capitalism, the military, and lets throw fighting insurgency in there. We are using our vast resources to back into a position where we think we won, but the insurgents still are there and ready to fight.
Other countries have shored up the police force, and sent fighters to live with friendly indigenous fighters to find and kill the insurgents.
Other countries have shored up the police force, and sent fighters to live with friendly indigenous fighters to find and kill the insurgents.
(0)
(0)
Sgt Andre Vaillancourt
Yes Sir. I know. I was there. The thing is that the insurgency was very weak after we pulled out until the Syrian civil war. That is when Al Qaeda In Iraq grew into ISIS in Syria and could use it as a base of operations to attack Iraq. This changed the calculus of everything because the ISF were only trained and equipped for internal security.
Many warned that this would happen, including me, but it fell on deaf ears. There was only one official State Dept. visit to Baghdad between the pull out in 2011 and the ISIS offensive in 2014, even thought our largest and mort expensive embassy is there. This didn't have to be this bad at all. We could have really mitigated this threat if we acted sooner. So its not that our earlier efforts failed so much as events in the world caused a different situation.
Many warned that this would happen, including me, but it fell on deaf ears. There was only one official State Dept. visit to Baghdad between the pull out in 2011 and the ISIS offensive in 2014, even thought our largest and mort expensive embassy is there. This didn't have to be this bad at all. We could have really mitigated this threat if we acted sooner. So its not that our earlier efforts failed so much as events in the world caused a different situation.
(1)
(0)
MAJ Ken Landgren
We wore American glasses to look at the qualities of Iraqi Democracy, when we really need to know the Iraq perspective.
(1)
(0)
Sgt Andre Vaillancourt
We could have done a better job of that, but you don't get a better Iraqi perspective by cutting off contact with their government for 3 years while they are besieged by ISIS. Now even many of the Free Syrian Army wish that they never even revolted against Assad, because of how it promoted ISIS.
(0)
(0)
0
0
0
0
0
0
It's not even close, ISIS is not afraid to die, Iraqi soldiers are afraid to die.
(0)
(0)
Read This Next
Continue with Facebook 
Continue with Google