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From: Army Times
Are the Iraqis up to the fight?
That's the question that will preoccupy senior U.S. military leaders for the next few months as a small team of Americans tries to prepare a massive force of Iraqis for the decisive Battle of Mosul.
U.S. officials hope to launch the invasion of Iraq's second largest city in April or May with a force of 20,000 to 25,000 Iraqi soldiers.
In sheer numbers, that's twice the size of the force that the U.S. military rallied for the second Battle of Fallujah in November 2004, which totaled about 10,000 American troops.
Yet this enemy is fundamentally different; there are few expectations that the fighters loyal to the Islamic State group, also known as ISIS and ISIL, to immediately melt into a shadowy insurgency.
Instead, the force inside Mosul, though estimated to be fewer than 2,000, is likely to square off and engage in close-quarters, urban-style maneuver warfare.
"These guys fight really hard, they'll keep coming at you, and the Iraqis will have to be willing to take a lot of causalities," said James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Iraq who is now a fellow with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
"These guys are going to suffer considerably more than 10 percent casualties — and they are not the U.S. Marines. If they start taking 10 percent casualties, are they going to continue to press forward? I don't know," Jeffrey said.
U.S. military planners are hoping that relentless close-air support will provide the Iraqis with a decisive edge.
The constant threat of 500-pound precision-guided bombs from U.S. aircraft means the Islamic State militants cannot amass large numbers of forces, stockpile weapons, or use the vehicles with heavy artillery that they seized from fleeing Iraqi forces last year.
What they can do, however, is take the .50-caliber machine guns and other heavy weaponry out of those vehicles and mount them inside third-story windows overlooking narrow streets. They can lay improvised explosive devices. And they can fight room to room and draw the Iraqi forces deep into Mosul's dense neighborhoods.
"It takes a tremendous amount of courage and discipline to fight in urban areas. Unlike a wide variety of other types of warfare, it's very much about small-unit leadership," said retired Air Force Maj. Gen. James Poss, who works at Mississippi State University.
The last time Iraqi forces faced this enemy in June, they dropped their weapons, shed their uniforms and fled in droves.
"Iraq army regular forces have not done well against ISIS," Jeffrey said. "Without American adviser teams, I'm a little worried about this."
Top U.S. military officials are talking about the potential advantage of putting more boots on the ground, beyond the 3,000-troop cap that President Obama authorized in November.
Military experts say the Iraqis could use help from several types of U.S. support troops. For example, joint terminal attack controllers could embed with Iraqi ground units to help provide more precise targeting information for airstrikes, and teams of intelligence experts also might help improve the effectiveness of covering airstrikes.
And small teams of combat advisers on the ground, including special operations forces, could boost the tactical performance of individual Iraqi units.
Defense Secretary Ash Carter recently suggested he was open to requesting more troops if further analysis shows it will help achieve success.
When asked about the current cap of about 3,000 troops during a visit to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, on Feb. 23, the new Pentagon chief said: "That's one of the things I want to climb on top of, a very reasonable question. What do we need? … and what is a [boots-on-the-ground] limit, and what's that for anyway? What's the purpose of having a limit?
"We'll do what it takes to get success here," Carter told the assembled U.S. troops.
Mosul is critical for the Islamic State in several ways. Beyond its symbolic value as the largest city controlled by the militants, Mosul is a key transportation hub. Losing it will make it difficult for the Islamic State to maintain its supply lines from the cities it controls in Syria.
The city also has numerous oil wells, making it an important source of cash.
If the invasion fails, the U.S. military may begin to consider returning large-scale combat forces to Iraq, retired Army Gen. Jack Keane told the House Armed Services Committee on Feb. 26.
"If this offensive fails ... maybe a reasonable alternative is to have an Arab coalition force that the United States is a part of, formed in Kuwait, and we put that force on the ground, which would mean some brigade combat teams," Keane said.
"Is that something we should do now? Absolutely not. That is a burden that should be borne by the Iraqis. But if it is a failure and we can't seem to get there, should that be an alternative that we should at least consider? I think it is."
http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/02/27/mosul-battle/24063655/
Are the Iraqis up to the fight?
That's the question that will preoccupy senior U.S. military leaders for the next few months as a small team of Americans tries to prepare a massive force of Iraqis for the decisive Battle of Mosul.
U.S. officials hope to launch the invasion of Iraq's second largest city in April or May with a force of 20,000 to 25,000 Iraqi soldiers.
In sheer numbers, that's twice the size of the force that the U.S. military rallied for the second Battle of Fallujah in November 2004, which totaled about 10,000 American troops.
Yet this enemy is fundamentally different; there are few expectations that the fighters loyal to the Islamic State group, also known as ISIS and ISIL, to immediately melt into a shadowy insurgency.
Instead, the force inside Mosul, though estimated to be fewer than 2,000, is likely to square off and engage in close-quarters, urban-style maneuver warfare.
"These guys fight really hard, they'll keep coming at you, and the Iraqis will have to be willing to take a lot of causalities," said James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Iraq who is now a fellow with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
"These guys are going to suffer considerably more than 10 percent casualties — and they are not the U.S. Marines. If they start taking 10 percent casualties, are they going to continue to press forward? I don't know," Jeffrey said.
U.S. military planners are hoping that relentless close-air support will provide the Iraqis with a decisive edge.
The constant threat of 500-pound precision-guided bombs from U.S. aircraft means the Islamic State militants cannot amass large numbers of forces, stockpile weapons, or use the vehicles with heavy artillery that they seized from fleeing Iraqi forces last year.
What they can do, however, is take the .50-caliber machine guns and other heavy weaponry out of those vehicles and mount them inside third-story windows overlooking narrow streets. They can lay improvised explosive devices. And they can fight room to room and draw the Iraqi forces deep into Mosul's dense neighborhoods.
"It takes a tremendous amount of courage and discipline to fight in urban areas. Unlike a wide variety of other types of warfare, it's very much about small-unit leadership," said retired Air Force Maj. Gen. James Poss, who works at Mississippi State University.
The last time Iraqi forces faced this enemy in June, they dropped their weapons, shed their uniforms and fled in droves.
"Iraq army regular forces have not done well against ISIS," Jeffrey said. "Without American adviser teams, I'm a little worried about this."
Top U.S. military officials are talking about the potential advantage of putting more boots on the ground, beyond the 3,000-troop cap that President Obama authorized in November.
Military experts say the Iraqis could use help from several types of U.S. support troops. For example, joint terminal attack controllers could embed with Iraqi ground units to help provide more precise targeting information for airstrikes, and teams of intelligence experts also might help improve the effectiveness of covering airstrikes.
And small teams of combat advisers on the ground, including special operations forces, could boost the tactical performance of individual Iraqi units.
Defense Secretary Ash Carter recently suggested he was open to requesting more troops if further analysis shows it will help achieve success.
When asked about the current cap of about 3,000 troops during a visit to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, on Feb. 23, the new Pentagon chief said: "That's one of the things I want to climb on top of, a very reasonable question. What do we need? … and what is a [boots-on-the-ground] limit, and what's that for anyway? What's the purpose of having a limit?
"We'll do what it takes to get success here," Carter told the assembled U.S. troops.
Mosul is critical for the Islamic State in several ways. Beyond its symbolic value as the largest city controlled by the militants, Mosul is a key transportation hub. Losing it will make it difficult for the Islamic State to maintain its supply lines from the cities it controls in Syria.
The city also has numerous oil wells, making it an important source of cash.
If the invasion fails, the U.S. military may begin to consider returning large-scale combat forces to Iraq, retired Army Gen. Jack Keane told the House Armed Services Committee on Feb. 26.
"If this offensive fails ... maybe a reasonable alternative is to have an Arab coalition force that the United States is a part of, formed in Kuwait, and we put that force on the ground, which would mean some brigade combat teams," Keane said.
"Is that something we should do now? Absolutely not. That is a burden that should be borne by the Iraqis. But if it is a failure and we can't seem to get there, should that be an alternative that we should at least consider? I think it is."
http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/02/27/mosul-battle/24063655/
Mosul
ISIS
Iraq
Posted >1 y ago
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We can teach them tactics, we can arm them, we can support them, but we cannot give them the will to stand and fight. That has to come from within, and I'm not sure it's there. That's my primary concern, and I think it's the reason the Iraqi military failed so miserably the first time they faced opposition without U.S. personnel at their side.
I hope they have the required courage and discipline cited in the article, but - again - that's not something we can buy for them. It has to come from within.
I hope they have the required courage and discipline cited in the article, but - again - that's not something we can buy for them. It has to come from within.
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The Germans used artillery and plans to pound buildings, but unbeknownst to the German Army that those buildings became perfect nests for Russian Infantry.
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Well, we now in 13 Nov, 2015, the Kurd cut off the supply line to Mosul. Where is the Iraqis forces? We should have just support the Kurd instead of this useless Iraqis government.
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