How can the Air Force improve combat pilot retention?

Here's a thought... How about letting combat pilots BE combat pilots? Maybe if we stopped forcing good pilots out of the cockpit and into staff (ie: SQ and/or Wing CC) billets, maybe a few more would decide to stick around. Sometimes it's not all about the money or bonuses. Some of us just wanted to do the job we were trained for without having to be covered up in all the administrivia Big Blue is so fond of. In that regard, I think Lt Col Jim Coe may have hit on the very solution the AF needs to consider.

This is background to the question from my perspective. I helped with two pilot or aircrew retention studies while I was in the Air Force. Once in the late 1970s and once in the mid-1980s. I also watched the Air Force struggle with the problem in the mid-1990s. Do you see the pattern here? Yep, about every 10 years the Air Force realizes it is losing more pilots, and sometimes other aircrew members, than it wants (forecasts) to lose.

The losses in the 70s and 80s coincided with hiring in the airline industry. In the 1970s and 1980s it was largely about the money. The airlines paid better than the Air Force in those decades and offered opportunities for pilots to advance to six-figure salaries as senior captains. In those decades, making over $100K was a big deal. We also found that non-tangibles were important. When an airline pilot had non-flying days, they were essentially days off. When Air Force pilots had non-flying days, they were expected to do their "additional duties" to keep the flying squadron running. The airline pilots had dispatchers and flight planners who did most of the mundane work of planning flights, checking manifests, and filing flight plans. The airline pilots showed up an hour or so before takeoff looked over the paperwork and went to the aircraft to fly. The Air Force pilots were showing up about 3 hours before takeoff and doing their own flight planning, then going to the aircraft to fly. Aside from all that, the airline pilots didn't have to put up with "all the military crap" because they were hired to fly and if they did that well, then their company was happy. The study in the 1990s found much the same things. The pilots wanted to fly, but the Air Force wanted them to be officers (performing duties other than flying) and pilots.

Some things changed as a result of the studies. Flight pay increased making the Air Force pilot's pay more competitive with the airlines. The Air Force promised to reduce the burden of additional duties by assigning more non-flying NCOs and Officers to the flying squadron to take over some of the day-to-day work of running the unit. (Units I was in at the time acquired manpower positions for administrative officers, administrative clerks, and operations NCOs.) Automated flight planning systems came into being reducing some of the flight planning workload. In the mid-1980s, serious conversations about how to allow pilots to continue to fly even if they didn't get promoted led to offering some passed-over Captains the opportunity to stay until 20 years of service--essentially they became what the Navy calls "limited duty officers." The post-pilot training service obligation was increased from four years to five. (It may be more today.) Aircrew officers were offered bonuses if they would agree to remain on active duty after their initial obligation. The biggest external sign that the AF was trying to do something to retain aircrew members first showed up in the late 1980s: the leather flying jacket. Yes, the Air Force began issuing the leather flight jacket as an incentive for aircrew members to remain in the Service.

Of the retention inducements, I think the greatest would be the opportunity for pilots to fly frequently and regularly throughout their career. Many people who become Air Force pilots do it because they love flying. When the requirement to do other stuff overwhelms the opportunity to fly, they leave the Air Force and go to work for an employer who wants them to simply fly the airplane well (the airlines). These pilots don't want to be the Squadron Commander; they want to focus on being the best Aircraft Commander they can be. IMO there are a couple of ways the Air Force could capitalize on the value of these pilots. 1) Limited duty officers: At the 7-year point, pilots would be required to make a decision to follow the operations track or the command track. If they choose the operations track, then their grade is capped at O-3. They will be guaranteed at least 20 years of service and never permitted to hold command or supervisory positions. They will receive enhanced flight pay so their total compensation remains competitive with, but less than, the Command track officers. If they choose the command track, then they will continue about as pilots do today to compete for command positions and promotions. The command track pilots receive "traditional" flight pay. The number of command track pilots will be closely controlled to ensure the supply of highly qualified officers to command Squadrons, Groups, and Wings--leading to general officer status--is adequate. 2) Flight Officers: The Air Force brings back warrant officer ranks for the specific purpose to providing a professional pilot cadre. They would be referred to a "flight officers" in grades 1 through 5. Following the Army example, but not exactly, grades 4 and 5 would be Chief Flight Officers. Recruiting could focus on people with two years of college or an Associate Degree who want to fly for the Air Force. They would go through a Flight Officer Candidate School and then enter AF pilot training as a FO-01. After completing pilot training, they would be assigned to flying squadrons and compete for promotion within the FO grades based mainly on their capability as a pilot. Like Army WOs they could remain in the Service for up to 30 years. They would never command a unit.

As the article explains, its not just pilots and pay, its the toxic culture in the Air Force. I watched it grow before I got out and it affects Enlisted and Officers alike. Congress is adding to the fire by trying to eliminate pay to members to save a dime. The new retirement system, the re-design of the BAH that is in congress now and the tri-care system that includes having members and retired members pay more into the system, are just symptoms to a larger inept Air Force ruled by bureaucracy and politics instead of leaders.

The Air Force and Congress keep attacking the people for saving, and ensuring their own political agendas are met by increasing spending on bloated projects that have no oversight, and suits the needs of Corporations and individuals. Military is about people. You need them to fly your drones, fix your aircraft, and run your operations. Instead of leaders, and workers, the Air Force promotes politicians and managers. The new Air Force head that comes to power needs to come wielding a broad sword and remove the cancer. He will have to fight Congress, Lobbyist, Corporations, and still perform the main job of the Air Force around the world. He is going to be hard to find good leaders with in to, because many have left due to worsening conditions, better employment opportunity on the outside, or because they were force out by the establishment because they didn't fit the corporate/political mold.

What ever suggested is just a patch. Until the culture of the Air Force is changed, I don't see it getting better. In fact every Army official I talk to just talks about when the Air Force will come back under them. At the rate the leadership in the Air Force is failing, I expect it sooner than later.