The mutiny by the Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps, can you believe this?

A recent report from Tehran alleges that some senior commanders of the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have disobeyed orders to deploy to Syria with their troops. They are said to have mutinied because of the rising toll among their fellow corpsmen in Syria. The report also states that these senior commanders have been joined by junior officers and all have been brought before a court martial on charges of mutiny and treason.

The mutiny by the Iran Revolutionary Guards Corp is only one sign that the country’s political leaders do not reflect the war-weariness of the people.

If the report that a mutiny of sorts has taken place among the rank and file of the IRGC is correct (and there is every reason to believe it is), it could well be the prelude to a revised Syria policy in Tehran. Iran’s semi-official Fars news agency reported that around thirty IRGC personnel had been killed in Syria in recent weeks. While this toll pales into insignificance when compared to the overall deaths that occur on a daily basis in Syria, it remains notable in that most of the casualties, if not all, have been senior commanders of the IRGC, which is widely seen to be among Iran’s most elite troops. When asked why senior commanders of this corps were being killed so frequently, IRGC Public Relations Chief General Ramezan Sharif told the Fars News Agency that the IRGC had boosted the number of its “advisors” in Syria due to the victories of Syrian troops (presumably against rebel groups). While Iran claims not to have troops in Syria apart from its senior officers who “advise” Syrian troops, it was reported in early October that “hundreds” of Iranian soldiers had deployed to Syria to fight alongside government troops there.

The figure of thirty IRGC casualties within the last few weeks is more or less borne out by an independent study conducted by the Levantine Group. Their research noted that Iran suffered the loss of forty-four military personnel in Syria in October. Of these, thirty were Iranian nationals, ten were Afghans, one was Pakistani and three were of unknown nationality. Of the forty-four casualties, again, were three Brigadiers General, three Colonels and a Lieutenant Colonel. The three Afghans killed were, presumably, Shiite refugees conscripted by Iran to fight in Syria. The Fatemioun Brigade, which consists of Afghan refugees who fled to Iran to escape the persecution they faced from their Sunni-majority co-religionists in Afghanistan, is now the second-largest Iranian force in Syria after its Hezbollah fighters. The number of Afghan deaths in Syria demonstrates that Iran does not only have “advisors” in Syria and that its involvement in Syria and its determination to keep Bashar al Assad in power is deeper than previously thought. Iran is also allegedly violating international law by accepting boys below the age of eighteen to fight in Syria.

A Washington-based Iran expert says, however, that the exact number of casualties Iran has suffered is difficult to determine but added that Tehran has every reason to downplay the exact figure. Ali Alfoneh, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defence of Democracies in Washington believes that data collected from open-source funeral notices in Iran show that ‘165 Iranian nationals, 154 Afghan nationals, and 26 Pakistani nationals - all Shiites - have been killed in combat in Syria since January 2013’.

Some of the senior personnel killed in Syria this year alone were General Mohammad Ali Allahdadi in January, General Hossein Hamedani on 9 October and Brigadier General Reza Khavari on 22 October. Interestingly, General Hassan Shateri was assassinated in Syria, allegedly by “mercenaries and supporters” of Israel, in February 2013. Israel, following its usual form, did not comment on this allegation. General Allahdadi was killed along with six Hezbollah fighters when an Israeli helicopter fired upon the group. Among the six fighters was Jihad Mughniyeh, the son of Hezbollah’s late commander, Imad Mughniyeh, who is believed to have been assassinated by Israel in Damascus in 2008. Allahdadi was said to have been sent to Syria to act as an advisor to the al Assad Administration against the “Takfiri-Salafi terrorists” - Iran’s term for Sunni extremists. General Hossein Hamedani was killed by Islamic State fighters.

It would appear, then, that Iran’s advisors could be killed by Syrian rebel forces, some of whom have been trained by the CIA and wish to topple the al Assad regime, by Islamic State fighters who see the Shiites as apostates from the true version of Islam (although to be fair this is precisely how the Shia perceive Sunni Muslims) or by Israel. Little wonder then that several IRGC generals from the city of Ahvaz, which is situated along the border with Iraq and has a significant Arab population, have chosen to retire rather than fight in Syria. An official investigation is said to have been initiated into the number of general staff from that region who have chosen to retire rather than to fight in the service of Iran’s Shia leaders against the Arabs.

This situation has caused Tehran several problems, not least of which is the fact that, apart from not having enough general and other senior staff with sufficient experience and training to advise on and prosecute the war in Syria, the IRGC is said to be the protector of the Iranian revolution, which is Ruhollah Khomeini’s main legacy. If the corps does not protect it, Iran’s hard-line, theocratic rulers, who appear to have a very strong desire to remain in power in this world, believe the ideals of the revolution could be lost to “Western influences”. In other words, despite the efforts of the theocracy, the West will have won against Khomeini, the theocracy and the revolution in the longer term, a thought and outcome that is anathema to them. Other possible outcomes from the mutiny of the IRGC could include the loss of influence over Hezbollah fighters, the loss of prestige and influence in the Middle East to Saudi Arabia and the possible overthrow of the al Assad regime in Damascus, which could also lead to the diminution of Iranian influence in the region. Tehran will undoubtedly take all the steps it deems necessary to stop further mutiny among its armed forces.