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on Soviet Major General Dmitri Polyakov and the Cold War.
on Soviet Major General Dmitri Polyakov and the Cold War.
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Polyakov: The Greatest Cold War Spy
Dmitri Polyakov: the daring double agent who kept the Cold War from becoming hot. Get your FREE trial of MagellanTV here: https://try.magellantv.com/historyd...
Thank you my friend SGT (Join to see) for making us aware that on March 15, 1988 Soviet Major General and spy for the CIA Dmitri Polyakov was executed at the age of 66.
Polyakov: The Greatest Cold War Spy
Dmitri Polyakov: the daring double agent who kept the Cold War from becoming hot.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rcGn5XbSbPk
Images:
1. GRU Major General Dmitri Fyodorovich Polyakov
2. Dmitri Polyakov, then holding the rank of colonel, at a diplomatic reception in India
3. KGB counterintelligence sketches of where Polyakov communicated with the CIA in Moscow – leaving a chalk mark at Gorky Park to signal his handlers, and sending burst transmissions from a bus stop across from the US Embassy.
4. Nina and Dmitri Polyakov at a diplomatic reception in New Delhi, c. 1974
Background from {[https://rijmenants.blogspot.com/2011/03/gru-general-dmitri-polyakov.html]}
GRU General Dmitri Polyakov
Dmitri Fyodorovich Polyakov, Major General in the GRU, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, was the highest ranking Soviet officer ever to have been recruited by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Hardly known to the public, Polyakov was without a doubt the most important and influential American intelligence asset of the Cold War era.
Born in the Ukraine in 1921, Polyakov graduated from Artillery School in June 1941, the same month that Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union. He served as an artillery officer in the Second World War, where he received decorations for bravery. After the war he studied at the Frunze Military Academy and received GRU courses after which he entered the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence). In 1951 he was sent on his first mission for a five years tour to New York with the Soviet Military Staff Committee of the United Nations.
In 1959, on his second tour in New York, Polyakov approached FBI counterintelligence agents and offered them to work as an informant. Within the FBI he was known by the codename TOPHAT. Because of his intelligence value, Polyakov was turned over to the CIA, who gave him the code names BOURBON and ROAM. As a Soviet officer, he had access to reports on missiles, tanks, military procedures and the Soviet way of thinking.
As a GRU officer, he was able to identify all GRU officers abroad, and how and where they were operating. As a high ranking GRU officer, he also had access to Soviet economic and foreign policy, information that grew in importance as he climbed up in the GRU ranks. Polyakov proved to be the crown jewel of the CIA, providing extremely valuable inside information to U.S. intelligence. In 1980, Polyakov retired as GRU officer, ending a 21 year career as a spy for the United States.
By the end of 1985, the CIA's Soviet-East European Division, controlling intelligence assets in the Soviet Union, started losing their agents. Some were arrested, others disappeared. Despite draconian security measures to protect these sources, one operation after the other was lost, and the CIA had no idea what was going on. It triggered one of the largest mole hunts ever in the U.S. intelligence community. Meanwhile, the CIA believed that Polyakov slid through the net because, as a dedicated sportsman, he continued to write articles for a Soviet hunting magazine.
However, suspicion arouse in 1986 when his publications came abruptly to an end. The CIA had already cut contact with Polyakov for security reasons and had no idea what was going on. It was only in 1988 that General Polyakov's true fate became known, when the Soviet newspaper Pravda published his execution. Already in 1986, he was arrested by the KGB, put on trial and sentenced to death for treason.
It would take a joint CIA/FBI team nine years to find the mole that gave their agents to the Soviets. On February 21, 1994, the FBI arrested Aldrich Hazen Ames on charges of espionage on behalf of Russia and the former Soviet Union. He was the CIA counterintelligence branch chief for Soviet operations in 1983. It was only 2001, after the arrest of FBI counter-intelligence agent Robert Philip Hanssen on February 18, that it became clear that Polyakov was betrayed by both Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, two of the most damaging spies in the American history.
On the National Archives website, there are two interesting interviews, one with Sandy Grimes, CIA expert on Soviet intelligence, and another with John Mabey, FBI counter-intelligence agent, about their involvment in the Polyokov case. Elaine Shannon published Death of a Perfect Spy on Time.'
FYI SSG Paul HeadleeCPL Michael PeckSgt (Join to see)PO1 Steve Ditto SPC Michael Terrell CPL Douglas ChryslerSP5 Geoffrey Vannerson SSG Michael Noll SSG William Jones Maj Marty Hogan SPC Michael Oles SRTSgt George RodriguezPO3 Charles Streich SGT (Join to see) SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth SFC (Join to see) TSgt Joe C. SPC Michael Duricko, Ph.D SGT Steve McFarland
Polyakov: The Greatest Cold War Spy
Dmitri Polyakov: the daring double agent who kept the Cold War from becoming hot.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rcGn5XbSbPk
Images:
1. GRU Major General Dmitri Fyodorovich Polyakov
2. Dmitri Polyakov, then holding the rank of colonel, at a diplomatic reception in India
3. KGB counterintelligence sketches of where Polyakov communicated with the CIA in Moscow – leaving a chalk mark at Gorky Park to signal his handlers, and sending burst transmissions from a bus stop across from the US Embassy.
4. Nina and Dmitri Polyakov at a diplomatic reception in New Delhi, c. 1974
Background from {[https://rijmenants.blogspot.com/2011/03/gru-general-dmitri-polyakov.html]}
GRU General Dmitri Polyakov
Dmitri Fyodorovich Polyakov, Major General in the GRU, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, was the highest ranking Soviet officer ever to have been recruited by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Hardly known to the public, Polyakov was without a doubt the most important and influential American intelligence asset of the Cold War era.
Born in the Ukraine in 1921, Polyakov graduated from Artillery School in June 1941, the same month that Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union. He served as an artillery officer in the Second World War, where he received decorations for bravery. After the war he studied at the Frunze Military Academy and received GRU courses after which he entered the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence). In 1951 he was sent on his first mission for a five years tour to New York with the Soviet Military Staff Committee of the United Nations.
In 1959, on his second tour in New York, Polyakov approached FBI counterintelligence agents and offered them to work as an informant. Within the FBI he was known by the codename TOPHAT. Because of his intelligence value, Polyakov was turned over to the CIA, who gave him the code names BOURBON and ROAM. As a Soviet officer, he had access to reports on missiles, tanks, military procedures and the Soviet way of thinking.
As a GRU officer, he was able to identify all GRU officers abroad, and how and where they were operating. As a high ranking GRU officer, he also had access to Soviet economic and foreign policy, information that grew in importance as he climbed up in the GRU ranks. Polyakov proved to be the crown jewel of the CIA, providing extremely valuable inside information to U.S. intelligence. In 1980, Polyakov retired as GRU officer, ending a 21 year career as a spy for the United States.
By the end of 1985, the CIA's Soviet-East European Division, controlling intelligence assets in the Soviet Union, started losing their agents. Some were arrested, others disappeared. Despite draconian security measures to protect these sources, one operation after the other was lost, and the CIA had no idea what was going on. It triggered one of the largest mole hunts ever in the U.S. intelligence community. Meanwhile, the CIA believed that Polyakov slid through the net because, as a dedicated sportsman, he continued to write articles for a Soviet hunting magazine.
However, suspicion arouse in 1986 when his publications came abruptly to an end. The CIA had already cut contact with Polyakov for security reasons and had no idea what was going on. It was only in 1988 that General Polyakov's true fate became known, when the Soviet newspaper Pravda published his execution. Already in 1986, he was arrested by the KGB, put on trial and sentenced to death for treason.
It would take a joint CIA/FBI team nine years to find the mole that gave their agents to the Soviets. On February 21, 1994, the FBI arrested Aldrich Hazen Ames on charges of espionage on behalf of Russia and the former Soviet Union. He was the CIA counterintelligence branch chief for Soviet operations in 1983. It was only 2001, after the arrest of FBI counter-intelligence agent Robert Philip Hanssen on February 18, that it became clear that Polyakov was betrayed by both Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, two of the most damaging spies in the American history.
On the National Archives website, there are two interesting interviews, one with Sandy Grimes, CIA expert on Soviet intelligence, and another with John Mabey, FBI counter-intelligence agent, about their involvment in the Polyokov case. Elaine Shannon published Death of a Perfect Spy on Time.'
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LTC Stephen F.
Footage of Dmitri Polyakov's arrest by the KGB
Dmitri Fyodorovich Polyakov (Russian: Дмитрий Фёдорович Поляков) (July 6, 1921 - March 15, 1988) was a Soviet Major General, a high-ranking GRU officer, and ...
Footage of Dmitri Polyakov's arrest by the KGB
Dmitri Fyodorovich Polyakov (Russian: Дмитрий Фёдорович Поляков) (July 6, 1921 - March 15, 1988) was a Soviet Major General, a high-ranking GRU officer, and a prominent Cold War spy who revealed Soviet secrets to the Central Intelligence Agency.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w0-1ogBb6kg
Images:
1. 1986 Dmitri Polyakov arrest based on Soviet moles Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames exposing him.
2. Major General Dmitri Fyodorovich Polyakov at his trial for espionage
3. Moscow woods
4. smug former senior Central Intelligence Agency officer Aldrich Hazen Ames
Background from {[https://espionagehistoryarchive.com/2016/01/22/washingtons-gru-general/]}
Major General Dmitri Fyodorovich Polyakov
WASHINGTON’S GRU GENERAL
JANUARY 22, 2016 MARK HACKARD 1 COMMENT
GRU Maj. Gen. Dmitry Polyakov (1921-1988) was a decorated veteran of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) and an old-line Stalinist. Yet beginning in 1959, when on assignment under diplomatic cover at the UN Mission in New York, he was also a US intelligence asset after he volunteered his services to the FBI. Until his arrest in 1986, Polyakov shared the GRU’s most guarded secrets on its international agent networks with Washington, making him the highest-ranking and most damaging mole in the history of Soviet intelligence. Polyakov was finally brought to heel in 1986, when the KGB tracked him down thanks to leads from their own moles – CIA officer Aldrich Ames and FBI special agent Robert Hanssen. The KGB’s Third Chief Directorate, military counterintelligence, swung in to action.
________________________________________
From the last decade of the Soviet Union presented in the FSB Museum’s “Spy Gallery,” it especially follows to turn our attention to a photograph of an elderly man sitting in the dock of the accused in the proceedings hall of the Supreme Court’s Military Collegium.
He knew his punishment beforehand and wasn’t hoping for leniency. Almost 25 years of work for the FBI and CIA could not be atoned for by his candid admissions. On the conscience of former General Dmitry Feodorovich Polyakov was the blood of Soviet secret intelligence officers, the shattered fates of his colleagues in intelligence, and the most important state secrets betrayed to the adversary.
Polyakov crossed his Rubicon when he was working in New York. He himself offered US intelligence his services. Later, explaining his acts in Lefortovo Prison, he was clearly dissembling:
The basis of my treachery was my aspiration to openly state my views and doubts somewhere, as well as the constant drive to work beyond the edge of risk. And the greater the danger, the more interesting my life became.
Over a quarter century of work for the Americans, his pseudonyms were changed several times. Among them – Top Hat, Bourbon, and Donald F. Former CIA chief James Woolsey spoke of the unmasked general:
Of all the US secret agents recruited in the years of the Cold War, Polyakov was the jewel in the crown.
Polyakov betrayed 19 illegals, more than 150 agents among foreign citizens, and exposed 1,500 officers’ membership in Soviet military intelligence. From New York the trail of treachery to the new places of his service – Burma, India, the General Staff central apparatus, and the Soviet Army’s Military-Diplomatic Academy.
“During one of the interrogations,” recalls counterintelligence officer Y.I. Kolesnikov, who had a direct relation to the Polyakov case, “Investigator Aleksandr Dukhanin and I asked the former general a question: ‘Dmitry Fedorovich, did you not feel bad for the people you betrayed, our illegals that you yourself trained for this complex work abroad? So much effort and time was contributed. And primarily their fate. After all, after this only one thing awaited them, and you understood perfectly well what that was. These were illegals who for the sake of their Motherland went out for the highest cause. No one ever envied them. People bowed their heads before them. They evoked a sense of the highest respect and pride. Did you understand all that when you were betraying them?'”
“That was my job” Polyakov answered with his characteristic cynicism. “May I have a cup of coffee?”
“I recall these words for all my life. I had seen a whole galaxy of traitor-spies, but Polyakov, in spite of all the repulsiveness of his nature, stayed in my memory for a long time. It’s worth only looking more attentively at his photograph with his saccharine smile on his face, to look into his eyes, and everything will be clear.”
The fruits borne by the traitor to the Motherland were not sweet. “From practically the very beginning of working with the CIA, I understood that I had committed a fateful mistake, a most grave crime.” Polyakov gave such an evaluation to his activity during one of the interrogations. “Endless torments of the soul that lasted this whole period harried me so much that several times I was ready to turn myself in. And only the thought of what would happen to my wife, children, and grandchildren, as well as fear of shame, stopped me, and I continued my criminal ties and to stay silent in order to only somehow delay the hour of reckoning.”
“That is all crap and the pathological lies of a traitor and betrayer,” Kolesnikov thinks. “There was no fateful mistake, and Polyakov knew this well. He was a professional intelligence officer and realized his actions. No one compromised him, and no one set him up in any honey traps. He himself went to the Americans and already then understood that in the course of working with them he’d be selling human lives. He had no other ‘goods.’ He also understood that the information he handed over, which he searched out with some kind of diabolical perseverance, would wreak colossal harm to his country. Not the fear of shame, but the destructive fear of exposure, prevailed over him all those years.”
Why did Polyakov act with impunity for such a long time? He was a cold-blooded, cynical, and intelligent professional who had perfectly mastered the lessons of our Fatherland’s school of intelligence and counterintelligence, which he used in operations to communicate with the CIA, rejecting out of hand instructions in this area from the Americans. So it was from the very beginning of his espionage career, and so it would continue along its entire length. He refused large sums of money, for example, understanding perfectly well that extra cash would inevitably attract the attention of those around him and counterintelligence, of which he was wary for his entire life of treachery.
FYI SSG Paul HeadleeCPL Michael PeckSgt (Join to see)PO1 Steve Ditto SPC Michael Terrell CPL Douglas ChryslerSP5 Geoffrey Vannerson SSG Michael Noll SSG William Jones Maj Marty Hogan SPC Michael Oles SRTSgt George RodriguezPO3 Charles Streich SGT (Join to see) SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth SFC (Join to see) TSgt Joe C. SPC Michael Duricko, Ph.D SGT Steve McFarland
Dmitri Fyodorovich Polyakov (Russian: Дмитрий Фёдорович Поляков) (July 6, 1921 - March 15, 1988) was a Soviet Major General, a high-ranking GRU officer, and a prominent Cold War spy who revealed Soviet secrets to the Central Intelligence Agency.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w0-1ogBb6kg
Images:
1. 1986 Dmitri Polyakov arrest based on Soviet moles Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames exposing him.
2. Major General Dmitri Fyodorovich Polyakov at his trial for espionage
3. Moscow woods
4. smug former senior Central Intelligence Agency officer Aldrich Hazen Ames
Background from {[https://espionagehistoryarchive.com/2016/01/22/washingtons-gru-general/]}
Major General Dmitri Fyodorovich Polyakov
WASHINGTON’S GRU GENERAL
JANUARY 22, 2016 MARK HACKARD 1 COMMENT
GRU Maj. Gen. Dmitry Polyakov (1921-1988) was a decorated veteran of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) and an old-line Stalinist. Yet beginning in 1959, when on assignment under diplomatic cover at the UN Mission in New York, he was also a US intelligence asset after he volunteered his services to the FBI. Until his arrest in 1986, Polyakov shared the GRU’s most guarded secrets on its international agent networks with Washington, making him the highest-ranking and most damaging mole in the history of Soviet intelligence. Polyakov was finally brought to heel in 1986, when the KGB tracked him down thanks to leads from their own moles – CIA officer Aldrich Ames and FBI special agent Robert Hanssen. The KGB’s Third Chief Directorate, military counterintelligence, swung in to action.
________________________________________
From the last decade of the Soviet Union presented in the FSB Museum’s “Spy Gallery,” it especially follows to turn our attention to a photograph of an elderly man sitting in the dock of the accused in the proceedings hall of the Supreme Court’s Military Collegium.
He knew his punishment beforehand and wasn’t hoping for leniency. Almost 25 years of work for the FBI and CIA could not be atoned for by his candid admissions. On the conscience of former General Dmitry Feodorovich Polyakov was the blood of Soviet secret intelligence officers, the shattered fates of his colleagues in intelligence, and the most important state secrets betrayed to the adversary.
Polyakov crossed his Rubicon when he was working in New York. He himself offered US intelligence his services. Later, explaining his acts in Lefortovo Prison, he was clearly dissembling:
The basis of my treachery was my aspiration to openly state my views and doubts somewhere, as well as the constant drive to work beyond the edge of risk. And the greater the danger, the more interesting my life became.
Over a quarter century of work for the Americans, his pseudonyms were changed several times. Among them – Top Hat, Bourbon, and Donald F. Former CIA chief James Woolsey spoke of the unmasked general:
Of all the US secret agents recruited in the years of the Cold War, Polyakov was the jewel in the crown.
Polyakov betrayed 19 illegals, more than 150 agents among foreign citizens, and exposed 1,500 officers’ membership in Soviet military intelligence. From New York the trail of treachery to the new places of his service – Burma, India, the General Staff central apparatus, and the Soviet Army’s Military-Diplomatic Academy.
“During one of the interrogations,” recalls counterintelligence officer Y.I. Kolesnikov, who had a direct relation to the Polyakov case, “Investigator Aleksandr Dukhanin and I asked the former general a question: ‘Dmitry Fedorovich, did you not feel bad for the people you betrayed, our illegals that you yourself trained for this complex work abroad? So much effort and time was contributed. And primarily their fate. After all, after this only one thing awaited them, and you understood perfectly well what that was. These were illegals who for the sake of their Motherland went out for the highest cause. No one ever envied them. People bowed their heads before them. They evoked a sense of the highest respect and pride. Did you understand all that when you were betraying them?'”
“That was my job” Polyakov answered with his characteristic cynicism. “May I have a cup of coffee?”
“I recall these words for all my life. I had seen a whole galaxy of traitor-spies, but Polyakov, in spite of all the repulsiveness of his nature, stayed in my memory for a long time. It’s worth only looking more attentively at his photograph with his saccharine smile on his face, to look into his eyes, and everything will be clear.”
The fruits borne by the traitor to the Motherland were not sweet. “From practically the very beginning of working with the CIA, I understood that I had committed a fateful mistake, a most grave crime.” Polyakov gave such an evaluation to his activity during one of the interrogations. “Endless torments of the soul that lasted this whole period harried me so much that several times I was ready to turn myself in. And only the thought of what would happen to my wife, children, and grandchildren, as well as fear of shame, stopped me, and I continued my criminal ties and to stay silent in order to only somehow delay the hour of reckoning.”
“That is all crap and the pathological lies of a traitor and betrayer,” Kolesnikov thinks. “There was no fateful mistake, and Polyakov knew this well. He was a professional intelligence officer and realized his actions. No one compromised him, and no one set him up in any honey traps. He himself went to the Americans and already then understood that in the course of working with them he’d be selling human lives. He had no other ‘goods.’ He also understood that the information he handed over, which he searched out with some kind of diabolical perseverance, would wreak colossal harm to his country. Not the fear of shame, but the destructive fear of exposure, prevailed over him all those years.”
Why did Polyakov act with impunity for such a long time? He was a cold-blooded, cynical, and intelligent professional who had perfectly mastered the lessons of our Fatherland’s school of intelligence and counterintelligence, which he used in operations to communicate with the CIA, rejecting out of hand instructions in this area from the Americans. So it was from the very beginning of his espionage career, and so it would continue along its entire length. He refused large sums of money, for example, understanding perfectly well that extra cash would inevitably attract the attention of those around him and counterintelligence, of which he was wary for his entire life of treachery.
FYI SSG Paul HeadleeCPL Michael PeckSgt (Join to see)PO1 Steve Ditto SPC Michael Terrell CPL Douglas ChryslerSP5 Geoffrey Vannerson SSG Michael Noll SSG William Jones Maj Marty Hogan SPC Michael Oles SRTSgt George RodriguezPO3 Charles Streich SGT (Join to see) SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth SFC (Join to see) TSgt Joe C. SPC Michael Duricko, Ph.D SGT Steve McFarland
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LTC Stephen F.
DMITRI POLYAKOV The Cold Wars Most Famous Spy - The Gaming Pit Podcast Highlights
Hello guys welcome to the Task Force i hope you enjoy my videos. If you do please hit that subscribe & like button. More below..........In this episode we ar...
DMITRI POLYAKOV The Cold Wars Most Famous Spy - The Gaming Pit Podcast Highlights
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3H-NJYr9OA
Images:
1. Entryway to the FSB Museum at Lubyanka, Moscow
2. Former senior Central Intelligence Agency officer Aldrich Hazen Ames. in handcuffs.
3. Red Square, morning
4. Red Square, Moscow, 1988
Background from {[https://look.substack.com/p/bratskaya-mogila-a-common-unmarked]}
The enormous intelligence advantages offered by Russian spies and the devastating consequences that flow from their betrayal is best illustrated by the Cold War spy, Dmitri Polyakov. Polyakov, a high-ranking intelligence officer in the Soviet GRU, approached FBI counterintelligence agents in New York in 1961 and offered to work for the U.S. as an informant. [The GRU is the foreign intelligence agency of the Soviet/Russian military.]
Handed off to the CIA and given the codename TOPHAT, Polyakov would serve as a spy for the U.S. for the next twenty-one years. Described by former CIA director James Woolsey as America’s “crown jewel,” Polyakov was the highest ranking Soviet intelligence officer to ever have worked for the U.S., becoming the most important and influential U.S. intelligence asset of the Cold War period. The information that Polykov gave the CIA during his tenure fills twenty-five drawers in the CIA file room.
Here are some of Polyakov’s major revelations:
1. Soviet-collected information on the Vietnamese and Chinese armed forces given to the U.S. during the American involvement in the Vietnam War.
2. Official Soviet documents tracking the split between the Soviet Union and China — information that would be used by Nixon’s Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in forging Nixon’s successful overtures to China in 1972.
3. A list of military technologies sought by Soviet spies in the West — information used by the Reagan administration to press for tighter controls on the sale of Western military technology.
4. Soviet military strategy documents that contained assessments of Soviet military strength and wartime planning [including the Soviet belief that nuclear war was unwinnable.]
Polyakov did this work at incredible personal risk.
While posted in Moscow, Polyakov stole secret, self-destructing camera film from GRU stockrooms and used it to photograph Soviet documents. The film would dissolve unless it was processed in a special way. He also stole hollow, fake rocks that he used to conceal the films in rural dead-drop locations for later pick-up by U.S. officials.
Polyakov would signal his U.S. handlers by riding past the American embassy in Moscow on a public streetcar, transmitting short bursts of encryped information with a special CIA-constructed device hidden in his pocket.
During a posting in India, Polyakov would convey his secret information to his American handlers in face-to-face meetings conducted in dark alleys or along isolated riverbanks, with his information recorded on hidden recording devices.
Polyakov would not accept money for his work. A dedicated sportsman who wrote articles for a Soviet hunting magazine, Polyakov’s U.S. handlers thanked him with gifts of power tools, fishing gear and shotguns. Polyakov’s handlers have said they believe Polyakov’s motivation for spying on behalf of the U.S. grew out of his distaste for the corruption of the Soviet system, which he viewed as a betrayal of the losses the Soviet Union suffered in World War II. Polyakov also feared that, without his help, the Soviets, and not the “naive” Americans, would prevail in the Cold War.
Beginning in 1985, the CIA's Soviet-East European Division, which controlled intelligence assets operating in the Soviet Union, started losing agents. Some of these CIA assets were arrested and others disappeared; and intelligence gathering operations began to fail. Suspecting an American traitor in their midst, the CIA and FBI commenced a joint operation to find the mole who was betraying these assets.
Polyakov would not accept money for his work. A dedicated sportsman who wrote articles for a Soviet hunting magazine, Polyakov’s U.S. handlers thanked him with gifts of power tools, fishing gear and shotguns. Polyakov’s handlers have said they believe Polyakov’s motivation for spying on behalf of the U.S. grew out of his distaste for the corruption of the Soviet system, which he viewed as a betrayal of the losses the Soviet Union suffered in World War II. Polyakov also feared that, without his help, the Soviets, and not the “naive” Americans, would prevail in the Cold War.
Beginning in 1985, the CIA's Soviet-East European Division, which controlled intelligence assets operating in the Soviet Union, started losing agents. Some of these CIA assets were arrested and others disappeared; and intelligence gathering operations began to fail. Suspecting an American traitor in their midst, the CIA and FBI commenced a joint operation to find the mole who was betraying these assets.
Initially, Polyakov’s handlers held out hope that Polyakov, who had since retired from service, had escaped detection. His articles continued to appear in the Soviet sportsman magazine throughout 1985. However this hope ended abruptly in 1986, when Polyakov’s articles stopped appearing in the magazine and his son was recalled to the Soviet Union early from an active duty overseas military posting. Later, a 1990 report in the Soviet newspaper, Pravda, confirmed their fears: Polyakov had been arrested by the KGB in 1986 and put on trial for treason. At trial, Polyakov had been found guilty and sentenced to death. Polyakov was executed in March 1988.
The U.S. mole hunt finally ended in 1994, after a nine-year investigation, with the FBI arrest of CIA officer Aldrich Ames on charges of espionage on behalf of Russia and the former Soviet Union. Later, in 2001, FBI counter-intelligence agent Robert Hanssen was also arrested for espionage. Both Ames and Hanssen acknowledged that they had revealed the activities of Polyakov to the GRU, as well as the identities of other American intelligence assets. Ames and Hanssen also acknowledged they had conducted their espionage on behalf of the Soviets in return for large sums of cash. [At least ten U.S. intelligence assets were killed as a result of their treason, and Polyakov was among them.]
The Stalinist fate for those who betray Russia is to be shot in the back of the head while in a kneeling position. While there is no public information that this is how Polyakov died, Polyakov’s American handlers believe this was Polyakov’s fate. They say that in Russia, some things never change.
One of Polyakov’s long-time handlers has reported that he offered Polyakov exfiltration to the U.S. if he ever felt in danger of detection. Polyakov is reported to have replied that he would never consider such an offer, saying that he was born Russian and would die Russian. Polyakov said that, if he were to be discovered, his fate would be to lie in a “bratskaya mogila” — a common, unmarked grave.
The body of Dmitri Polyakov, this “crown jewel” of U.S. intelligence who was betrayed by Americans for money, remains unaccounted for.
FYI LTC John Shaw 1SG Steven ImermanGySgt Gary CordeiroPO1 H Gene LawrenceSgt Jim BelanusSGM Bill FrazerMSG Tom EarleySGT Michael HearnSGT Randell Rose[SGT Denny EspinosaA1C Riley SandersSSgt Clare MaySSG Robert WebsterCSM Chuck StaffordPFC Craig KarshnerSFC Don VanceSFC Bernard Walko SPC Nancy GreenePVT Mark Zehner
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3H-NJYr9OA
Images:
1. Entryway to the FSB Museum at Lubyanka, Moscow
2. Former senior Central Intelligence Agency officer Aldrich Hazen Ames. in handcuffs.
3. Red Square, morning
4. Red Square, Moscow, 1988
Background from {[https://look.substack.com/p/bratskaya-mogila-a-common-unmarked]}
The enormous intelligence advantages offered by Russian spies and the devastating consequences that flow from their betrayal is best illustrated by the Cold War spy, Dmitri Polyakov. Polyakov, a high-ranking intelligence officer in the Soviet GRU, approached FBI counterintelligence agents in New York in 1961 and offered to work for the U.S. as an informant. [The GRU is the foreign intelligence agency of the Soviet/Russian military.]
Handed off to the CIA and given the codename TOPHAT, Polyakov would serve as a spy for the U.S. for the next twenty-one years. Described by former CIA director James Woolsey as America’s “crown jewel,” Polyakov was the highest ranking Soviet intelligence officer to ever have worked for the U.S., becoming the most important and influential U.S. intelligence asset of the Cold War period. The information that Polykov gave the CIA during his tenure fills twenty-five drawers in the CIA file room.
Here are some of Polyakov’s major revelations:
1. Soviet-collected information on the Vietnamese and Chinese armed forces given to the U.S. during the American involvement in the Vietnam War.
2. Official Soviet documents tracking the split between the Soviet Union and China — information that would be used by Nixon’s Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in forging Nixon’s successful overtures to China in 1972.
3. A list of military technologies sought by Soviet spies in the West — information used by the Reagan administration to press for tighter controls on the sale of Western military technology.
4. Soviet military strategy documents that contained assessments of Soviet military strength and wartime planning [including the Soviet belief that nuclear war was unwinnable.]
Polyakov did this work at incredible personal risk.
While posted in Moscow, Polyakov stole secret, self-destructing camera film from GRU stockrooms and used it to photograph Soviet documents. The film would dissolve unless it was processed in a special way. He also stole hollow, fake rocks that he used to conceal the films in rural dead-drop locations for later pick-up by U.S. officials.
Polyakov would signal his U.S. handlers by riding past the American embassy in Moscow on a public streetcar, transmitting short bursts of encryped information with a special CIA-constructed device hidden in his pocket.
During a posting in India, Polyakov would convey his secret information to his American handlers in face-to-face meetings conducted in dark alleys or along isolated riverbanks, with his information recorded on hidden recording devices.
Polyakov would not accept money for his work. A dedicated sportsman who wrote articles for a Soviet hunting magazine, Polyakov’s U.S. handlers thanked him with gifts of power tools, fishing gear and shotguns. Polyakov’s handlers have said they believe Polyakov’s motivation for spying on behalf of the U.S. grew out of his distaste for the corruption of the Soviet system, which he viewed as a betrayal of the losses the Soviet Union suffered in World War II. Polyakov also feared that, without his help, the Soviets, and not the “naive” Americans, would prevail in the Cold War.
Beginning in 1985, the CIA's Soviet-East European Division, which controlled intelligence assets operating in the Soviet Union, started losing agents. Some of these CIA assets were arrested and others disappeared; and intelligence gathering operations began to fail. Suspecting an American traitor in their midst, the CIA and FBI commenced a joint operation to find the mole who was betraying these assets.
Polyakov would not accept money for his work. A dedicated sportsman who wrote articles for a Soviet hunting magazine, Polyakov’s U.S. handlers thanked him with gifts of power tools, fishing gear and shotguns. Polyakov’s handlers have said they believe Polyakov’s motivation for spying on behalf of the U.S. grew out of his distaste for the corruption of the Soviet system, which he viewed as a betrayal of the losses the Soviet Union suffered in World War II. Polyakov also feared that, without his help, the Soviets, and not the “naive” Americans, would prevail in the Cold War.
Beginning in 1985, the CIA's Soviet-East European Division, which controlled intelligence assets operating in the Soviet Union, started losing agents. Some of these CIA assets were arrested and others disappeared; and intelligence gathering operations began to fail. Suspecting an American traitor in their midst, the CIA and FBI commenced a joint operation to find the mole who was betraying these assets.
Initially, Polyakov’s handlers held out hope that Polyakov, who had since retired from service, had escaped detection. His articles continued to appear in the Soviet sportsman magazine throughout 1985. However this hope ended abruptly in 1986, when Polyakov’s articles stopped appearing in the magazine and his son was recalled to the Soviet Union early from an active duty overseas military posting. Later, a 1990 report in the Soviet newspaper, Pravda, confirmed their fears: Polyakov had been arrested by the KGB in 1986 and put on trial for treason. At trial, Polyakov had been found guilty and sentenced to death. Polyakov was executed in March 1988.
The U.S. mole hunt finally ended in 1994, after a nine-year investigation, with the FBI arrest of CIA officer Aldrich Ames on charges of espionage on behalf of Russia and the former Soviet Union. Later, in 2001, FBI counter-intelligence agent Robert Hanssen was also arrested for espionage. Both Ames and Hanssen acknowledged that they had revealed the activities of Polyakov to the GRU, as well as the identities of other American intelligence assets. Ames and Hanssen also acknowledged they had conducted their espionage on behalf of the Soviets in return for large sums of cash. [At least ten U.S. intelligence assets were killed as a result of their treason, and Polyakov was among them.]
The Stalinist fate for those who betray Russia is to be shot in the back of the head while in a kneeling position. While there is no public information that this is how Polyakov died, Polyakov’s American handlers believe this was Polyakov’s fate. They say that in Russia, some things never change.
One of Polyakov’s long-time handlers has reported that he offered Polyakov exfiltration to the U.S. if he ever felt in danger of detection. Polyakov is reported to have replied that he would never consider such an offer, saying that he was born Russian and would die Russian. Polyakov said that, if he were to be discovered, his fate would be to lie in a “bratskaya mogila” — a common, unmarked grave.
The body of Dmitri Polyakov, this “crown jewel” of U.S. intelligence who was betrayed by Americans for money, remains unaccounted for.
FYI LTC John Shaw 1SG Steven ImermanGySgt Gary CordeiroPO1 H Gene LawrenceSgt Jim BelanusSGM Bill FrazerMSG Tom EarleySGT Michael HearnSGT Randell Rose[SGT Denny EspinosaA1C Riley SandersSSgt Clare MaySSG Robert WebsterCSM Chuck StaffordPFC Craig KarshnerSFC Don VanceSFC Bernard Walko SPC Nancy GreenePVT Mark Zehner
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