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Isoroku Yamamoto (山本 五十六 Yamamoto Isoroku, April 4, 1884 – April 18, 1943) was a Japanese Marshal Admiral of the Navy and the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet during World War II until his death.
Yamamoto held several important posts in the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), and undertook many of its changes and reorganizations, especially its development of naval aviation. He was the commander-in-chief during the early years of the Pacific War and oversaw major engagements including the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway. He was killed when American code breakers identified his flight plans, enabling the Army Air Force to shoot down his plane. His death was a major blow to Japanese military morale during World War II.[3][4]
Yamamoto held several important posts in the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), and undertook many of its changes and reorganizations, especially its development of naval aviation. He was the commander-in-chief during the early years of the Pacific War and oversaw major engagements including the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway. He was killed when American code breakers identified his flight plans, enabling the Army Air Force to shoot down his plane. His death was a major blow to Japanese military morale during World War II.[3][4]
Isoroku Yamamoto - Wikipedia
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Birthday
World History
WWII World War Two
Japan
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War in the Pacific / Admiral Yamamoto & Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy
5:22 20:45 https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/portsmouth-treaty https://jamesperloff.com/2014/11/06/pearl-harbor-roosevelts-911/ ※the Link of I...
Thank you, my friend Maj Marty Hogan for making us aware that April 3 is the anniversary of the birth of Japanese Marshal Admiral of the Navy and the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet Isoroku Yamamoto during World War II until his death on April 18, 1943.
War in the Pacific / Admiral Yamamoto & Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p0xZFYFxl8M
Background from thoughtco.com/admiral-isoroku-yamamoto-2361141
"Kennedy Hickman
Updated March 14, 2019
Isoroku Yamamoto (1884–1943) was the commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet during World War II. It was Yamamoto who planned and executed the attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Initially against war, Yamamoto nevertheless planned and participated in many of the most important battles of the war. He was finally killed in action in the South Pacific in 1943.
Early Life
Isoroku Takano was born April 4, 1884 in Nagaoka, Japan and was the sixth son of samurai Sadayoshi Takano. His name, an older Japanese term for 56, referenced his father's age the time of his birth. In 1916, following the death of his parents, the 32 year-old Takano was adopted into the Yamamoto family and assumed their name. It was common custom in Japan for families without sons to adopt one so that their name would continue. At age 16, Yamamoto entered the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy at Etajima. Graduating in 1904, and ranked seventh in his class, he was assigned to the cruiser Nisshin.
Early Military Career
While on board, Yamamoto fought in the decisive Battle of Tsushima (May 27/28, 1905). During the engagement, Nisshin served in the Japanese battle line and sustained several hits from Russian warships. In the course of the fighting, Yamamoto fell wounded and lost two fingers on his left hand. This injury led to him earn the nickname "80 sen" as a manicure cost 10 sen per finger at the time. Recognized for his leadership skill, Yamamoto was sent to the Naval Staff College in 1913. Graduating two years later, he received a promotion to lieutenant commander. In 1918, Yamamoto married Reiko Mihashi with whom he would have four children. A year later, he departed for the United States where he spent two years studying the oil industry at Harvard University.
Returning to Japan in 1923, he was promoted to captain and advocated for a strong fleet that would allow Japan to pursue a course of gunboat diplomacy if necessary. This approach was countered by the army which viewed the navy as a force for transporting invasion troops. The following year he changed his specialty from gunnery to naval aviation after taking flying lessons at Kasumigaura. Fascinated by air power, he soon became the school's director and began to produce elite pilots for the navy. In 1926, Yamamoto returned to the United States for a two year tour as the Japanese naval attaché in Washington.
Early 1930s
After returning home in 1928, Yamamoto briefly commanded the light cruiser Isuzu before becoming captain of the aircraft carrier Akagi. Promoted to rear admiral in 1930, he served as a special assistant to the Japanese delegation at the second London Naval Conference and was a key factor in raising the number of ships the Japanese were permitted to build under the treaty. In the years after the conference, Yamamoto continued to advocate for naval aviation and led the First Carrier Division in 1933 and 1934. Due to his performance in 1930, he was sent to the third London Naval Conference in 1934. In late 1936, Yamamoto was made the vice minister of the navy. From this position, he argued strenuously for naval aviation and fought against the construction of new battleships.
Road to War:
Throughout his career, Yamamoto had opposed many of Japan's military adventures, such as the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the subsequent land war with China. In addition, he was vocal in his opposition to any war with the United States and delivered the official apology for the sinking of USS Panay in 1937. These stances, along with his advocating against the Tripartite Pact with German and Italy, made the admiral very unpopular with the pro-war factions in Japan, many of which put bounties on his head. During this period, the army detailed military police to conduct surveillance on Yamamoto under the guise of providing protection from potential assassins. On August 30, 1939, Navy Minister Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa promoted Yamamoto to commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet commenting, "It was the only way to save his life—send him off to sea."
Following the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, Yamamoto warned Premier Fumimaro Konoe that if he were forced to fight the United States he expected to have success for no more than six months to a year. After that time, nothing was guaranteed. With war almost unavoidable, Yamamoto began planning for the fight. Going against traditional Japanese naval strategy, he advocated a quick first strike to cripple the Americans followed by an offensively-minded "decisive" battle. Such an approach, he argued, would increase Japan's chances of victory and might make the Americans willing to negotiate a peace. Promoted to admiral on November 15, 1940, Yamamoto anticipated losing his command with the ascension of General Hideki Tojo to prime minister in October 1941. Though old adversaries, Yamamoto retained his position due to his popularity in the fleet and connections to the imperial family.
Pearl Harbor
As diplomatic relations continued to break down, Yamamoto began planning his strike to destroy the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, HI while also outlining plans for drives into the resource-rich Dutch East Indies and Malaya. Domestically, he continued to push for naval aviation and opposed the construction of the Yamato-class super-battleships as he felt they were a waste of resources. With the Japanese government set on war, six of Yamamoto's carriers sailed for Hawaii on November 26, 1941. Approaching from the north they attacked on December 7, sinking four battleships and damaging an additional four beginning World War II. While the attack was a political disaster for the Japanese due to the United States' desire for revenge, it provided Yamamoto with six months (as he anticipated) to consolidate and expand their territory in the Pacific without American interference.
Midway
Following the triumph at Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto's ships and planes proceeded to mop up Allied forces across the Pacific. Surprised by the speed of the Japanese victories, the Imperial General Staff (IGS) began to ponder competing plans for future operations. While Yamamoto argued in favor of seeking a decisive battle with the American fleet, the IGS preferred to move towards Burma. Following the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo in April 1942, Yamamoto was able to convince the Naval General Staff to let him move against Midway Island, 1,300 miles northwest of Hawaii.
Knowing that Midway was key to the defense of Hawaii, Yamamoto hoped to draw the American fleet out so that it could be destroyed. Moving east with a large force, including four carriers, while also sending a diversionary force to the Aleutians, Yamamoto was unaware that the Americans had broken his codes and were informed about the attack. After bombing the island, his carriers were struck by US Navy aircraft flying from three carriers. The Americans, led by Rear Admirals Frank J. Fletcher and Raymond Spruance, managed to sink all four Japanese carriers (Akagi, Soryu, Kaga, and Hiryu) in exchange for USS Yorktown (CV-5). The defeat at Midway blunted Japanese offensive operations and shifted the initiative to the Americans.
After Midway
Despite the heavy losses at Midway, Yamamoto sought to press forward with operations to take Samoa and Fiji. As a stepping stone for this move, Japanese forces landed on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands and commenced building an airfield. This was countered by American landings on the island in August 1942. Forced to fight for the island, Yamamoto was pulled into a battle of attrition that his fleet could not afford. Having lost face due to the defeat at Midway, Yamamoto was forced to assume the defensive posture preferred by the Naval General Staff.
Death
Through the fall he fought a pair of carrier battles (Eastern Solomons & Santa Cruz) as well as numerous surface engagements in support of the troops on Guadalcanal. Following the fall of Guadalcanal in February 1943, Yamamoto decided to make an inspection tour through the South Pacific to boost morale. Using radio intercepts, American forces were able to isolate the route of the admiral's plane. On the morning of April 18, 1943, P-38 Lightnings from the 339th Fighter Squadron ambushed Yamamoto's plane and its escorts near Bougainville. In the fight that ensued, Yamamoto's plane was hit and went down killing all on board. The kill is generally credited to 1st LieutenantRex T. Barber. Yamamoto was succeeded as commander of the Combined Fleet by Admiral Mineichi Koga."
FYI LTC Stephen C. LTC (Join to see) Lt Col John (Jack) Christensen Lt Col Charlie Brown Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D. Maj William W. "Bill" Price Maj Marty Hogan SCPO Morris Ramsey SFC William Farrell SGT Mark Halmrast Sgt Randy Wilber Sgt John H. SGT Gregory Lawritson CPL Dave Hoover SPC Margaret Higgins SSgt Brian Brakke 1stSgt Eugene Harless SSG William Jones SSG Diane R.
War in the Pacific / Admiral Yamamoto & Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p0xZFYFxl8M
Background from thoughtco.com/admiral-isoroku-yamamoto-2361141
"Kennedy Hickman
Updated March 14, 2019
Isoroku Yamamoto (1884–1943) was the commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet during World War II. It was Yamamoto who planned and executed the attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Initially against war, Yamamoto nevertheless planned and participated in many of the most important battles of the war. He was finally killed in action in the South Pacific in 1943.
Early Life
Isoroku Takano was born April 4, 1884 in Nagaoka, Japan and was the sixth son of samurai Sadayoshi Takano. His name, an older Japanese term for 56, referenced his father's age the time of his birth. In 1916, following the death of his parents, the 32 year-old Takano was adopted into the Yamamoto family and assumed their name. It was common custom in Japan for families without sons to adopt one so that their name would continue. At age 16, Yamamoto entered the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy at Etajima. Graduating in 1904, and ranked seventh in his class, he was assigned to the cruiser Nisshin.
Early Military Career
While on board, Yamamoto fought in the decisive Battle of Tsushima (May 27/28, 1905). During the engagement, Nisshin served in the Japanese battle line and sustained several hits from Russian warships. In the course of the fighting, Yamamoto fell wounded and lost two fingers on his left hand. This injury led to him earn the nickname "80 sen" as a manicure cost 10 sen per finger at the time. Recognized for his leadership skill, Yamamoto was sent to the Naval Staff College in 1913. Graduating two years later, he received a promotion to lieutenant commander. In 1918, Yamamoto married Reiko Mihashi with whom he would have four children. A year later, he departed for the United States where he spent two years studying the oil industry at Harvard University.
Returning to Japan in 1923, he was promoted to captain and advocated for a strong fleet that would allow Japan to pursue a course of gunboat diplomacy if necessary. This approach was countered by the army which viewed the navy as a force for transporting invasion troops. The following year he changed his specialty from gunnery to naval aviation after taking flying lessons at Kasumigaura. Fascinated by air power, he soon became the school's director and began to produce elite pilots for the navy. In 1926, Yamamoto returned to the United States for a two year tour as the Japanese naval attaché in Washington.
Early 1930s
After returning home in 1928, Yamamoto briefly commanded the light cruiser Isuzu before becoming captain of the aircraft carrier Akagi. Promoted to rear admiral in 1930, he served as a special assistant to the Japanese delegation at the second London Naval Conference and was a key factor in raising the number of ships the Japanese were permitted to build under the treaty. In the years after the conference, Yamamoto continued to advocate for naval aviation and led the First Carrier Division in 1933 and 1934. Due to his performance in 1930, he was sent to the third London Naval Conference in 1934. In late 1936, Yamamoto was made the vice minister of the navy. From this position, he argued strenuously for naval aviation and fought against the construction of new battleships.
Road to War:
Throughout his career, Yamamoto had opposed many of Japan's military adventures, such as the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the subsequent land war with China. In addition, he was vocal in his opposition to any war with the United States and delivered the official apology for the sinking of USS Panay in 1937. These stances, along with his advocating against the Tripartite Pact with German and Italy, made the admiral very unpopular with the pro-war factions in Japan, many of which put bounties on his head. During this period, the army detailed military police to conduct surveillance on Yamamoto under the guise of providing protection from potential assassins. On August 30, 1939, Navy Minister Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa promoted Yamamoto to commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet commenting, "It was the only way to save his life—send him off to sea."
Following the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, Yamamoto warned Premier Fumimaro Konoe that if he were forced to fight the United States he expected to have success for no more than six months to a year. After that time, nothing was guaranteed. With war almost unavoidable, Yamamoto began planning for the fight. Going against traditional Japanese naval strategy, he advocated a quick first strike to cripple the Americans followed by an offensively-minded "decisive" battle. Such an approach, he argued, would increase Japan's chances of victory and might make the Americans willing to negotiate a peace. Promoted to admiral on November 15, 1940, Yamamoto anticipated losing his command with the ascension of General Hideki Tojo to prime minister in October 1941. Though old adversaries, Yamamoto retained his position due to his popularity in the fleet and connections to the imperial family.
Pearl Harbor
As diplomatic relations continued to break down, Yamamoto began planning his strike to destroy the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, HI while also outlining plans for drives into the resource-rich Dutch East Indies and Malaya. Domestically, he continued to push for naval aviation and opposed the construction of the Yamato-class super-battleships as he felt they were a waste of resources. With the Japanese government set on war, six of Yamamoto's carriers sailed for Hawaii on November 26, 1941. Approaching from the north they attacked on December 7, sinking four battleships and damaging an additional four beginning World War II. While the attack was a political disaster for the Japanese due to the United States' desire for revenge, it provided Yamamoto with six months (as he anticipated) to consolidate and expand their territory in the Pacific without American interference.
Midway
Following the triumph at Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto's ships and planes proceeded to mop up Allied forces across the Pacific. Surprised by the speed of the Japanese victories, the Imperial General Staff (IGS) began to ponder competing plans for future operations. While Yamamoto argued in favor of seeking a decisive battle with the American fleet, the IGS preferred to move towards Burma. Following the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo in April 1942, Yamamoto was able to convince the Naval General Staff to let him move against Midway Island, 1,300 miles northwest of Hawaii.
Knowing that Midway was key to the defense of Hawaii, Yamamoto hoped to draw the American fleet out so that it could be destroyed. Moving east with a large force, including four carriers, while also sending a diversionary force to the Aleutians, Yamamoto was unaware that the Americans had broken his codes and were informed about the attack. After bombing the island, his carriers were struck by US Navy aircraft flying from three carriers. The Americans, led by Rear Admirals Frank J. Fletcher and Raymond Spruance, managed to sink all four Japanese carriers (Akagi, Soryu, Kaga, and Hiryu) in exchange for USS Yorktown (CV-5). The defeat at Midway blunted Japanese offensive operations and shifted the initiative to the Americans.
After Midway
Despite the heavy losses at Midway, Yamamoto sought to press forward with operations to take Samoa and Fiji. As a stepping stone for this move, Japanese forces landed on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands and commenced building an airfield. This was countered by American landings on the island in August 1942. Forced to fight for the island, Yamamoto was pulled into a battle of attrition that his fleet could not afford. Having lost face due to the defeat at Midway, Yamamoto was forced to assume the defensive posture preferred by the Naval General Staff.
Death
Through the fall he fought a pair of carrier battles (Eastern Solomons & Santa Cruz) as well as numerous surface engagements in support of the troops on Guadalcanal. Following the fall of Guadalcanal in February 1943, Yamamoto decided to make an inspection tour through the South Pacific to boost morale. Using radio intercepts, American forces were able to isolate the route of the admiral's plane. On the morning of April 18, 1943, P-38 Lightnings from the 339th Fighter Squadron ambushed Yamamoto's plane and its escorts near Bougainville. In the fight that ensued, Yamamoto's plane was hit and went down killing all on board. The kill is generally credited to 1st LieutenantRex T. Barber. Yamamoto was succeeded as commander of the Combined Fleet by Admiral Mineichi Koga."
FYI LTC Stephen C. LTC (Join to see) Lt Col John (Jack) Christensen Lt Col Charlie Brown Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D. Maj William W. "Bill" Price Maj Marty Hogan SCPO Morris Ramsey SFC William Farrell SGT Mark Halmrast Sgt Randy Wilber Sgt John H. SGT Gregory Lawritson CPL Dave Hoover SPC Margaret Higgins SSgt Brian Brakke 1stSgt Eugene Harless SSG William Jones SSG Diane R.
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LTC Eugene Chu
Nice quote, but it was from Hollywood
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isoroku_Yamamoto%27s_sleeping_giant_quote
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isoroku_Yamamoto%27s_sleeping_giant_quote
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PO3 Donald Murphy
A little bit of both. The Japanese terminology and slang all lead to something along those lines. For example, in American English I can borrow a dollar from you by saying the slang: "give me a buck." Yet, "buck" can be one of several reasonings. The statement Yamamoto made to general staff (which included both his boss AND the Emperor!) was basically twofold:
1. We will have a string of victories unmatched in modern warfare - but -
2. These victories will not last forever and when America/allies check our advance, it may be as if surprising (or waking) a hidden (or sleeping) "predator."
"Predator" is sometimes listed as "dragon," sometimes as a spiritual entity and other times as a weather event (storm system, natural disaster, etc). Being educated in America and being taught by England, he knew what to say to the Japanese and knew what to say to the Americans/English, but not necessarily how to slang it for both. Like the "buck" example, he would know what a "buck" was, having lived in America but slanging it for a Japanese audience would be different.
Case in point would be the book "Shattered Sword." A simple military task like "take the bomb off of the airplane and replace it with a torpedo" took a sinfully long time in Japanese. An upper officer relayed the order to a junior officer who then had to relay it to inferiors and all making sure to have the correct class-conscious idioms. For example, an "academy grad" officer was addressed differently than a "regular Joe" officer. This is what cause Japan such a major headache at Midway.
Tully's "Shattered Sword" goes into some pretty tasty scenarios and breakdowns of Japanese combat do's and don'ts. Codebreaking was just one of the "miracles" at Midway. Had they been more "blitzkrieg" like in their ops, the Japanese could have eaten us for breakfast. Even WITH us breaking their codes.
1. We will have a string of victories unmatched in modern warfare - but -
2. These victories will not last forever and when America/allies check our advance, it may be as if surprising (or waking) a hidden (or sleeping) "predator."
"Predator" is sometimes listed as "dragon," sometimes as a spiritual entity and other times as a weather event (storm system, natural disaster, etc). Being educated in America and being taught by England, he knew what to say to the Japanese and knew what to say to the Americans/English, but not necessarily how to slang it for both. Like the "buck" example, he would know what a "buck" was, having lived in America but slanging it for a Japanese audience would be different.
Case in point would be the book "Shattered Sword." A simple military task like "take the bomb off of the airplane and replace it with a torpedo" took a sinfully long time in Japanese. An upper officer relayed the order to a junior officer who then had to relay it to inferiors and all making sure to have the correct class-conscious idioms. For example, an "academy grad" officer was addressed differently than a "regular Joe" officer. This is what cause Japan such a major headache at Midway.
Tully's "Shattered Sword" goes into some pretty tasty scenarios and breakdowns of Japanese combat do's and don'ts. Codebreaking was just one of the "miracles" at Midway. Had they been more "blitzkrieg" like in their ops, the Japanese could have eaten us for breakfast. Even WITH us breaking their codes.
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He was kind of like Hitler, in that friendship trumped everything. He wouldn't fire a friend. Even if that friend was costing him the war. Nagumo was the worst possible choice he could have picked for the Pearl Harbor raid. As important as the battle was, he should have lead it himself. Likewise, during the important Guadalcanal campaign, only two of his officers actually carried out his orders.
Had his command been staffed with such officers as Tanaka and Kondo, he'd have gotten his goal of killing "too many" Americans and America might actually have sued for a settlement. After all, look at how the war bond drives were causing apathy.
Had his command been staffed with such officers as Tanaka and Kondo, he'd have gotten his goal of killing "too many" Americans and America might actually have sued for a settlement. After all, look at how the war bond drives were causing apathy.
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