Posted on Jun 13, 2017
Greatest Tank Battles - Michael Wittman Waffen SS Tank Commander
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The Battle of Villers-Bocage (June 13, 1944) was an unusual clash between the British and Germans in Normandy, France during World War II.
Early on 13 June, elements of an armoured regiment (the British term "armoured regiment" is equivalent to a tank battalion in other armies) and Motor battalion (mechanized infantry) of 7th Armoured Division approached the town of Villers-Bocage from the northwest. German tank commander Michael Wittmann had a small force of six tanks nearby. In one of the more aggressive small-unit actions of the war, he charged his vehicle into the British column, splitting it and then engaging the British forces at very short range before passing along and across the British line into the village. The other tanks of his small unit added to the British vehicle losses, which were heavy.
The significance of the battle lies in the lost opportunity to take Caen early in the Normandy campaign. Caen had been a D-Day objective of the British 2nd Army. Seizure of Caen, combined with the small bridgeheads across the Orne taken by the British Airborne troops on D-Day, would have given the Allies a much stronger position on the eastern flank in Normandy.
Background
For nearly a week after the June 6, 1944 D-Day landings in Normandy, the Allies had pushed inland in the Battle of Normandy. West of Caen, a strong push towards Caumont-l'Éventé by the U.S. 1st Infantry Division forced the German 352nd Infantry Division back, exposing the flanks of the Panzer Lehr Division. A quick exploitation of this gap presented an opportunity for the Allies to make German defences in Normandy untenable.
Field Marshal Montgomery, conscious of this opportunity, launched Operation Perch, an attempt by the British 7th Armoured Division (the Desert Rats) to circle around the Panzer Lehr Division and make a surprise attack on their rear. The hamlet of Villers-Bocage lay in the path of this movement, sitting at the hub of a road net that led northeast towards Caen; if the town (and the high ground nearby at Point 213) could be taken and held, British armour would be able to push northeast behind the German front, with a possible exploitation to Caen.
The British were unaware that elements of the 2nd Heavy Tank Company of the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 (101st SS Heavy Tank Battalion), led by Michael Wittmann had received orders to take and hold point 213, which was above the crossroads at Villers-Bocage. After having reached it during the night to avoid detection by Allied aircraft, Wittmann's force of five heavy Tiger tanks and a Panzer IV medium tank were sited approximately 150 meters south of RN 175. The British force sent to take Villers-Bocage and Point 213 consisted of a reinforced tank squadron (company) and an infantry company of a Motor battalion; approximately 200 armored vehicles.
Allied Forces
8th King's Royal Irish Hussars
4th County of London Yeomanry (CLY); assigned to capture and hold point 213.
1/7th Bn Queen's Royal Regiment; assigned to secure the Villers-Bocage exits (except that of L'Eglise). HQ located in the bottom of Villers. Company 'A' located in the area around the railroad station. Company 'B' located in the center of town. Company 'C' located in Pasteur and Clémenceau streets. Company 'D' located close to the cemetery.
5th Royal Tank Regiment; assigned to capture and hold the area of Maisoncelles-Pelvy (3 km SW) south of D71 which connects Caumont to Villers and Point 142 which overlooks the city at the bottom of the valley.
5th Royal Horse Artillery; assigned to capture and hold the other exits from the city: Battery of Sextons assigned to take position to the north of D71 and in the small valley where the roads to Coudray and Chouquet Bridge run.
1st The Rifle Brigade, A Cpny.These forces were part of, or attached to, 22nd Armoured Brigade under Brigadier W. R. N. Hinde.
German Forces
2nd Heavy Tank Company (Tigers N° 221, N° 222, N° 223, N° 231, N° 233 and N° 234) of the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101
Later joined by
1st Heavy Tank Company of the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101
Elements of Panzer Lehr
Opening Moves
Villers-Bocage and Point 213 were unoccupied as the battle opened and both sides raced to take the high ground, and thus the tactical advantage. While the British forces arrived in the town of Villers-Bocage first, Wittman's force gained point 213 and could observe the British movements.
The British in the town suffered from poor tactical deployment and were initially crowded by cheering civilians happy about their apparent liberation. The four tanks of the tank squadron's command group parked and the crews dismounted. The men and vehicles of the battle group did not form an all-around defence as doctrine demanded, security was poor and no proper reconnaissance of Point 213 was done. A combined tank and infantry force was finally sent out of the village to take Point 213.
Wittmann watched the column of the 4th County of London Yeomanry leave Villers-Bocage and advance on his tanks on Point 213, nose to tail through a sunken road. The lead squadron halted on the road without deploying into a defensive position, allowing the halftracks and carriers of the accompanying infantry to pass. In the face of unreconnoitered terrain, this was a colossal mistake.
Wittmann saw his opportunity and decided to attack with one tank between Point 213 and Villers-Bocage, cutting off "A" Squadron of the 4th CLY and ordered his accompanying two operational tanks to hold their position. Wittmann counted on the effect of surprise to inflict the greatest possible losses on the British while waiting for reinforcements. Describing his actions Wittmann later said, "I had not been able to gather my company. I had to act very quickly because I must suppose that the enemy has already located us and intends to destroy us at the starting position. I left with my tank. I ordered the two other tanks to move back at once but to hold the terrain."
The Battle
At 0900 Wittmann's Tiger attacked. A few minutes later, in the direction of Caen, he destroyed three tanks; a Sherman Firefly and a Cromwell tank on the right and another tank on the left, proceeding to Villers without pause and attacking the lightly armored vehicles of The Rifle Brigade. During this engagement, he destroyed nine half-track vehicles, four Carden Loyd Carriers, two other carriers, and two 6-pounder anti-tank guns, then destroyed three Stuart light tanks and one half-track vehicle. Entering Villers-Bocage alone, he destroyed three of the four Cromwells in position at the top of the Lemonnier farm.
He followed Clémenceau Street where his tank destroyed two Sherman command tanks of the 5th Royal Horse Artillery before knocking out another scout car and half-track. As Wittmann arrived at the Jeanne d'Arc square, he ended up opposite the Sherman Firefly of Sergeant Lockwood of "B" Squadron. The Firefly, whose 17-pounder was the only Allied main tank gun capable of defeating the frontal armour of a Tiger in most circumstances, fired four shells at Wittman. One hit the hull of the Tiger, which returned fire and knocked down a section of wall on the Sherman. Wittmann then made a half-turn, his tank lightly damaged, and returned down Clémenceau Street. The Cromwell tank of Captain Dyas that had not been destroyed, confronted him, firing two 75 mm shells, failing to harm the Tiger. Wittmann put the Cromwell out of action with one shot.
As Wittmann proceeded on the road leaving Villers-Bocage, his left track was hit by a 6-pdr shell, forcing him to stop on the street in front of the Huet-Godefroy store. Wittman engaged targets in range. Thinking that the Tiger might be salvaged and repaired later, Wittmann and crew abandoned the tank without destroying it, leaving the area on foot but without weapons.
They ended up joining the headquarters of the Panzer Lehr Division, nearly 7 kilometres away. Consequently, 15 Panzer IV's of IInd Battalion of the 130th regiment left Orbois in the direction of Villers-Bocage under the command of Captain Helmut Ritgen with the aim of blocking the exits to the North. Before reaching their objective, they came under the fire of British anti-tank guns and their advance was blocked. Fritz Bayerlein, commander of Panzer Lehr, ordered the Panzer IVs to fall back and regroup at Villers-Bocage. The tanks took the direction of the castle of Parfouru on Odon, where, after repairs were made to the 14 survivors, they attacked under the command of Hannes Philipsen; four tanks from the south and ten by Clémenceau Street. Each of the two groups lost two tanks.
Wittmann was then brought back in his Schwimmwagen to Point 213, where he joined with Karl Mobius, commander of the 1st Company and discussed the second attack that the 101st Abteilung was about to deliver. The tanks of the 1st Company entered the city along the d'Evrecy Road and joined those of Panzer Lehr at the marketplace in order to coordinate their offensive. The forces were distributed so as to occupy the city from the Pasteur Street towards the Jeanne d'Arc square, on Saint-Germain Street, on Emile Samson and towards the crossroads of Jeanne Bacon Street and Joffre Boulevard. However, British resistance was by now organized as the Germans had lost surprise. One 6-pounder anti-tank gun of the 1/7th Queen's, placed in Jeanne Bacon Street, managed to score hits on three Tigers of which only one could be repaired.
Effects
The British units had suffered considerably in the initial attack but had held the town with its vital crossroads. The Germans broke contact, but later managed to execute several strong counterattacks on Villers and the hold of the 7th Armored Division elements was tenuous.
Support for the British was available from several sources. An accompanying US artillery forward observer called in very heavy and accurate artillery fire to break up one German attack. Several uncommitted infantry brigades were available and could have been used to reinforce Villers-Bocage, but the British commander on the scene (Hinde) did not request help. The Division commander George Erskine, could have requested these brigades, but did not. Neither the Corps commander, Gerard Bucknall, nor the Second Army commander Dempsey reinforced the units at Villers-Bocage. At 1600, the acting commanding officer of the 4th CLY ordered a retreat of his forces from the town.
The withdrawal from Villers-Bocage ended British hopes of unhinging the German front south of Caen. Historians feel that a great opportunity had been lost through poor execution of the plan. Dempsey later remarked that "the whole handling of that battle was a disgrace".
Both Erskine and Bucknall were relieved of command in early August, after another failure to capture Villers Bocage and Aunay during Operation Bluecoat. Brigadier Hinde and the Commander, Royal Artillery of 7th Armoured Division were also removed.
Losses
The British losses in the battle were:
8th King's Royal Irish Hussars: a number of Stuarts
4th County of London Yeomanry: 8 Cromwells, 4 Sherman Fireflies, 3 Stuarts, 1 Half-track vehicle, 3 Scout cars,
Rifle Brigade: 9 half-track vehicles, 2 Bren gun-carriers, 4 Carden-Loyd Carriers
5th Royal Horse Artillery: 2 Cromwell, 1 Sherman.On the German side, only 6 Tiger tanks were put out of action (of which 3 were later repaired) and 5 Panzer IVs.
The Propaganda of Villers-Bocage
German propaganda throughout the Second World War tended to elevate individual fighters to 'hero' status. The events at Villers-Bocage were thus ascribed almost entirely to Wittmann who was given credit for 27 of the 30 destroyed British tanks. Postwar, hobbyist interest in Wittman has not waned. It must be pointed out that Wittman's Tiger tank greatly outclassed the British vehicles he faced in firepower and armor. However, it is also true that in the close quarters of this battle, the British 17-pounder was capable of defeating the armour on Wittman's tank. Even the towed 6 pounder and 75 mm guns on the Cromwells and Shermans could under ideal conditions. It may be concluded that the real reason for Wittman's success was not so much technical superiority or individual skill, but poorly executed tactics and battle procedure on the part of the 7th Armoured Division.
http://www.militaryimages.net/forums/showthread.php?t=5550
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Wittmann
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Villers-Bocage
@ col mikel COL Mikel J. Burroughs @ ltc stephen LTC Stephen C. @ ltc stephen LTC Stephen F. @ ltc frank LTC (Join to see) @ ltc john LTC John Mohor @ maj william Maj William W. "Bill" Price @ maj stephen LTC (Join to see) @ capt tom Capt Tom Brown @ capt marty Maj Marty Hogan @ smsgt doc SMSgt Minister Gerald A. "Doc" Thomas @ tsgt joe TSgt Joe C. SrA Christopher Wright @ msg andrew MSG Andrew White @ sgt david SGT (Join to see) @ sgt david SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth @ sp5 mark SP5 Mark Kuzinski SCPO Morris Ramsey @ po1 chip PO1 William "Chip" Nagel Alan K. Cynthia Croft
Early on 13 June, elements of an armoured regiment (the British term "armoured regiment" is equivalent to a tank battalion in other armies) and Motor battalion (mechanized infantry) of 7th Armoured Division approached the town of Villers-Bocage from the northwest. German tank commander Michael Wittmann had a small force of six tanks nearby. In one of the more aggressive small-unit actions of the war, he charged his vehicle into the British column, splitting it and then engaging the British forces at very short range before passing along and across the British line into the village. The other tanks of his small unit added to the British vehicle losses, which were heavy.
The significance of the battle lies in the lost opportunity to take Caen early in the Normandy campaign. Caen had been a D-Day objective of the British 2nd Army. Seizure of Caen, combined with the small bridgeheads across the Orne taken by the British Airborne troops on D-Day, would have given the Allies a much stronger position on the eastern flank in Normandy.
Background
For nearly a week after the June 6, 1944 D-Day landings in Normandy, the Allies had pushed inland in the Battle of Normandy. West of Caen, a strong push towards Caumont-l'Éventé by the U.S. 1st Infantry Division forced the German 352nd Infantry Division back, exposing the flanks of the Panzer Lehr Division. A quick exploitation of this gap presented an opportunity for the Allies to make German defences in Normandy untenable.
Field Marshal Montgomery, conscious of this opportunity, launched Operation Perch, an attempt by the British 7th Armoured Division (the Desert Rats) to circle around the Panzer Lehr Division and make a surprise attack on their rear. The hamlet of Villers-Bocage lay in the path of this movement, sitting at the hub of a road net that led northeast towards Caen; if the town (and the high ground nearby at Point 213) could be taken and held, British armour would be able to push northeast behind the German front, with a possible exploitation to Caen.
The British were unaware that elements of the 2nd Heavy Tank Company of the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 (101st SS Heavy Tank Battalion), led by Michael Wittmann had received orders to take and hold point 213, which was above the crossroads at Villers-Bocage. After having reached it during the night to avoid detection by Allied aircraft, Wittmann's force of five heavy Tiger tanks and a Panzer IV medium tank were sited approximately 150 meters south of RN 175. The British force sent to take Villers-Bocage and Point 213 consisted of a reinforced tank squadron (company) and an infantry company of a Motor battalion; approximately 200 armored vehicles.
Allied Forces
8th King's Royal Irish Hussars
4th County of London Yeomanry (CLY); assigned to capture and hold point 213.
1/7th Bn Queen's Royal Regiment; assigned to secure the Villers-Bocage exits (except that of L'Eglise). HQ located in the bottom of Villers. Company 'A' located in the area around the railroad station. Company 'B' located in the center of town. Company 'C' located in Pasteur and Clémenceau streets. Company 'D' located close to the cemetery.
5th Royal Tank Regiment; assigned to capture and hold the area of Maisoncelles-Pelvy (3 km SW) south of D71 which connects Caumont to Villers and Point 142 which overlooks the city at the bottom of the valley.
5th Royal Horse Artillery; assigned to capture and hold the other exits from the city: Battery of Sextons assigned to take position to the north of D71 and in the small valley where the roads to Coudray and Chouquet Bridge run.
1st The Rifle Brigade, A Cpny.These forces were part of, or attached to, 22nd Armoured Brigade under Brigadier W. R. N. Hinde.
German Forces
2nd Heavy Tank Company (Tigers N° 221, N° 222, N° 223, N° 231, N° 233 and N° 234) of the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101
Later joined by
1st Heavy Tank Company of the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101
Elements of Panzer Lehr
Opening Moves
Villers-Bocage and Point 213 were unoccupied as the battle opened and both sides raced to take the high ground, and thus the tactical advantage. While the British forces arrived in the town of Villers-Bocage first, Wittman's force gained point 213 and could observe the British movements.
The British in the town suffered from poor tactical deployment and were initially crowded by cheering civilians happy about their apparent liberation. The four tanks of the tank squadron's command group parked and the crews dismounted. The men and vehicles of the battle group did not form an all-around defence as doctrine demanded, security was poor and no proper reconnaissance of Point 213 was done. A combined tank and infantry force was finally sent out of the village to take Point 213.
Wittmann watched the column of the 4th County of London Yeomanry leave Villers-Bocage and advance on his tanks on Point 213, nose to tail through a sunken road. The lead squadron halted on the road without deploying into a defensive position, allowing the halftracks and carriers of the accompanying infantry to pass. In the face of unreconnoitered terrain, this was a colossal mistake.
Wittmann saw his opportunity and decided to attack with one tank between Point 213 and Villers-Bocage, cutting off "A" Squadron of the 4th CLY and ordered his accompanying two operational tanks to hold their position. Wittmann counted on the effect of surprise to inflict the greatest possible losses on the British while waiting for reinforcements. Describing his actions Wittmann later said, "I had not been able to gather my company. I had to act very quickly because I must suppose that the enemy has already located us and intends to destroy us at the starting position. I left with my tank. I ordered the two other tanks to move back at once but to hold the terrain."
The Battle
At 0900 Wittmann's Tiger attacked. A few minutes later, in the direction of Caen, he destroyed three tanks; a Sherman Firefly and a Cromwell tank on the right and another tank on the left, proceeding to Villers without pause and attacking the lightly armored vehicles of The Rifle Brigade. During this engagement, he destroyed nine half-track vehicles, four Carden Loyd Carriers, two other carriers, and two 6-pounder anti-tank guns, then destroyed three Stuart light tanks and one half-track vehicle. Entering Villers-Bocage alone, he destroyed three of the four Cromwells in position at the top of the Lemonnier farm.
He followed Clémenceau Street where his tank destroyed two Sherman command tanks of the 5th Royal Horse Artillery before knocking out another scout car and half-track. As Wittmann arrived at the Jeanne d'Arc square, he ended up opposite the Sherman Firefly of Sergeant Lockwood of "B" Squadron. The Firefly, whose 17-pounder was the only Allied main tank gun capable of defeating the frontal armour of a Tiger in most circumstances, fired four shells at Wittman. One hit the hull of the Tiger, which returned fire and knocked down a section of wall on the Sherman. Wittmann then made a half-turn, his tank lightly damaged, and returned down Clémenceau Street. The Cromwell tank of Captain Dyas that had not been destroyed, confronted him, firing two 75 mm shells, failing to harm the Tiger. Wittmann put the Cromwell out of action with one shot.
As Wittmann proceeded on the road leaving Villers-Bocage, his left track was hit by a 6-pdr shell, forcing him to stop on the street in front of the Huet-Godefroy store. Wittman engaged targets in range. Thinking that the Tiger might be salvaged and repaired later, Wittmann and crew abandoned the tank without destroying it, leaving the area on foot but without weapons.
They ended up joining the headquarters of the Panzer Lehr Division, nearly 7 kilometres away. Consequently, 15 Panzer IV's of IInd Battalion of the 130th regiment left Orbois in the direction of Villers-Bocage under the command of Captain Helmut Ritgen with the aim of blocking the exits to the North. Before reaching their objective, they came under the fire of British anti-tank guns and their advance was blocked. Fritz Bayerlein, commander of Panzer Lehr, ordered the Panzer IVs to fall back and regroup at Villers-Bocage. The tanks took the direction of the castle of Parfouru on Odon, where, after repairs were made to the 14 survivors, they attacked under the command of Hannes Philipsen; four tanks from the south and ten by Clémenceau Street. Each of the two groups lost two tanks.
Wittmann was then brought back in his Schwimmwagen to Point 213, where he joined with Karl Mobius, commander of the 1st Company and discussed the second attack that the 101st Abteilung was about to deliver. The tanks of the 1st Company entered the city along the d'Evrecy Road and joined those of Panzer Lehr at the marketplace in order to coordinate their offensive. The forces were distributed so as to occupy the city from the Pasteur Street towards the Jeanne d'Arc square, on Saint-Germain Street, on Emile Samson and towards the crossroads of Jeanne Bacon Street and Joffre Boulevard. However, British resistance was by now organized as the Germans had lost surprise. One 6-pounder anti-tank gun of the 1/7th Queen's, placed in Jeanne Bacon Street, managed to score hits on three Tigers of which only one could be repaired.
Effects
The British units had suffered considerably in the initial attack but had held the town with its vital crossroads. The Germans broke contact, but later managed to execute several strong counterattacks on Villers and the hold of the 7th Armored Division elements was tenuous.
Support for the British was available from several sources. An accompanying US artillery forward observer called in very heavy and accurate artillery fire to break up one German attack. Several uncommitted infantry brigades were available and could have been used to reinforce Villers-Bocage, but the British commander on the scene (Hinde) did not request help. The Division commander George Erskine, could have requested these brigades, but did not. Neither the Corps commander, Gerard Bucknall, nor the Second Army commander Dempsey reinforced the units at Villers-Bocage. At 1600, the acting commanding officer of the 4th CLY ordered a retreat of his forces from the town.
The withdrawal from Villers-Bocage ended British hopes of unhinging the German front south of Caen. Historians feel that a great opportunity had been lost through poor execution of the plan. Dempsey later remarked that "the whole handling of that battle was a disgrace".
Both Erskine and Bucknall were relieved of command in early August, after another failure to capture Villers Bocage and Aunay during Operation Bluecoat. Brigadier Hinde and the Commander, Royal Artillery of 7th Armoured Division were also removed.
Losses
The British losses in the battle were:
8th King's Royal Irish Hussars: a number of Stuarts
4th County of London Yeomanry: 8 Cromwells, 4 Sherman Fireflies, 3 Stuarts, 1 Half-track vehicle, 3 Scout cars,
Rifle Brigade: 9 half-track vehicles, 2 Bren gun-carriers, 4 Carden-Loyd Carriers
5th Royal Horse Artillery: 2 Cromwell, 1 Sherman.On the German side, only 6 Tiger tanks were put out of action (of which 3 were later repaired) and 5 Panzer IVs.
The Propaganda of Villers-Bocage
German propaganda throughout the Second World War tended to elevate individual fighters to 'hero' status. The events at Villers-Bocage were thus ascribed almost entirely to Wittmann who was given credit for 27 of the 30 destroyed British tanks. Postwar, hobbyist interest in Wittman has not waned. It must be pointed out that Wittman's Tiger tank greatly outclassed the British vehicles he faced in firepower and armor. However, it is also true that in the close quarters of this battle, the British 17-pounder was capable of defeating the armour on Wittman's tank. Even the towed 6 pounder and 75 mm guns on the Cromwells and Shermans could under ideal conditions. It may be concluded that the real reason for Wittman's success was not so much technical superiority or individual skill, but poorly executed tactics and battle procedure on the part of the 7th Armoured Division.
http://www.militaryimages.net/forums/showthread.php?t=5550
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Wittmann
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Villers-Bocage
@ col mikel COL Mikel J. Burroughs @ ltc stephen LTC Stephen C. @ ltc stephen LTC Stephen F. @ ltc frank LTC (Join to see) @ ltc john LTC John Mohor @ maj william Maj William W. "Bill" Price @ maj stephen LTC (Join to see) @ capt tom Capt Tom Brown @ capt marty Maj Marty Hogan @ smsgt doc SMSgt Minister Gerald A. "Doc" Thomas @ tsgt joe TSgt Joe C. SrA Christopher Wright @ msg andrew MSG Andrew White @ sgt david SGT (Join to see) @ sgt david SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth @ sp5 mark SP5 Mark Kuzinski SCPO Morris Ramsey @ po1 chip PO1 William "Chip" Nagel Alan K. Cynthia Croft
WWII World War Two
Tanks
Military History
France
World History
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 7
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This is an amazing story, would make a great movie, though I am sure his story has been told. Thanks for posting
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The British tank museum at Bovington has a Tiger exhibit and the gunner who shot Wittman's tank is one of the guest speakers. The exhibit is running for two years and contains the largest collection of working Tigers since WW2. A King Tiger, Jagdtiger, two Tiger I's and an Elephant are in the display as well as working Firefly Sherman's.
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PO3 Donald Murphy
The dance was real. SOP was for two M-4's to distract the Tiger/Panther while a third M-4 circled around and penetrated the thin rear armor, engine deck, etc. The problem is, there was a fourth tank - Fury. That wouldn't have happened. Additionally, Fury was an M-4AE8 "Easy Eight" which had the faster engine/better suspension and longer barrel, high velocity 76mm gun. Unlike the low velocity 75mm gun which was basically for infantry support, the 76mm was the standard US Navy/Army anti-aircraft gun firing a high power shell. From the engagement range of when the "dance" started, Fury would/could easily eat the Tiger for dinner and spit the bones out. Additionally, the Easy 8 outsped the Tiger handily. In the time it took the Tiger to mutter "holy s**t there's a Sherman," the Easy 8 would have already been side by side with the Tiger.
Firefly was actually heavier as it was carrying the 76.2mm/80mm 17pounder gun and needed tons of concrete in the turret bustle to counter balance it. As a result, the FF was slower than an American M-4 but the gun outranged the Germans to Flak 88 ranges and beyond. Also, the FF gun was proof against any angle German armor. Sloped or straight. If you ever get to Aldershot's British Army museum, the original test Sherman that America gave England is there and all the gear that the British used to jury rig the gun so that it would fit in the turret. They had to mount the gun on its side basically!
Firefly was actually heavier as it was carrying the 76.2mm/80mm 17pounder gun and needed tons of concrete in the turret bustle to counter balance it. As a result, the FF was slower than an American M-4 but the gun outranged the Germans to Flak 88 ranges and beyond. Also, the FF gun was proof against any angle German armor. Sloped or straight. If you ever get to Aldershot's British Army museum, the original test Sherman that America gave England is there and all the gear that the British used to jury rig the gun so that it would fit in the turret. They had to mount the gun on its side basically!
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PO3 Donald Murphy
No problem. I used to wonder about all the junk on American tanks. The tanks chosen to be decoy had the spare wheels and tracks littered about in case the German got lucky. The tank that would be "dancing" would remove everything to "lighten the load" ie; increase the speed. Kind of like 25 bombing missions, you would be rotated out after so many "dances" as it was incredibly bad for morale. Once the allied air umbrella became SOP for campaigns, the lifespan of the tankers increased and they could relax. Tho it is noteworthy that Patton used to yell at his men for sand bags, logs and other "debris" as it gave the impression that the tank crew was scared (which they in fact WERE!) and he demanded they remove it. Here he is yelling at a tank crew for too many(!) sand bags.
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SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth
SGT John " Mac " McConnell - a good morning to you also John. Don't work too hard.
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