Nine face discipline for errors that led to U.S. sailors' Iranian arrest

Nine Navy personnel are facing discipline after a high-profile report concluded that shoddy navigation, maintenance shortfalls and a baffling lack of oversight created a maelstrom of errors that led to two U.S. Navy patrol boats being seized at gunpoint in Iranian territorial waters.

The U.S. sailors were not even aware they had entered Iranian waters after deviating from their charted course between Kuwait and Bahrain in January. U.S. diplomats secured the sailors' release unharmed after 16 hours in custody, a crisis that nearly scuttled the Iran nuclear deal.
"Across the Navy, around the globe, hundreds of commanding officers and hundreds of thousands of U.S. sailors are making tough decisions and performing their duties in a way that should make every American proud, and strike fear into anybody who would want to take us on," said Adm. John Richardson, chief of naval operations, in his prepared remarks Thursday before the Pentagon press corps. "Those sailors also clearly know our actions in this incident did not live up to our expectations of our Navy."

The Navy’s five-month investigation, which has been the subject of congressional scrutiny for months, found that the sailors piloting the boats didn’t properly plan the voyage, that the upkeep of the boats declined during the five-month deployment and caused a critical mechanical failure and that the staff ashore failed to properly track the riverine command boats.

The incident became a high-profile embarrassment for the Navy, occurring the day of President Obama's State of the Union speech, and it threatened to derail a multi-national nuclear agreement with Iran that the administration sees as a signature achievement.
In all, nine officers and enlisted are being disciplined for the incident, including three members of the boat crew, the commanding and executive officers of the riverine squadron, the commodore and chief of staff of the group in charge of the riverines and two members of the shore support staff, according to a defense official familiar with the ongoing personnel actions.

The Navy declined to release the names of those not in a command positions like CO and XO, due to privacy concerns.

"Any ongoing administrative action associated with the results of the investigation is part of an independent and ongoing process that we need to respect; we need to respect the privacy of those individuals involved," said Navy spokesman Lt. Loren Terry.
All but the commodore, Capt. Kyle Moses, have been recommended to face non-judicial punishment — a disciplinary measure that can effectively end a career but carries no criminal charges. The CRS 3 commodore at the time of the incident, Cmdr. Gregory Meyer, has also been relieved for cause, the CNO said.

Among the key findings of the investigation:


•The sailors from Coastal Riverine Squadron 3 did not brief or even plan their route from Kuwait to Bahrain. While the original route would have avoided Iran’s territorial waters around Farsi Island, the crew immediately deviated from their original course to make up for a late start.
•The crew did not report to their operational handlers on shore when they sighted land unexpectedly or report the mechanical failure.
•Task Force 56, the riverine squadron’s immediate superior in 5th Fleet, tasked the sailors beyond their capabilities and limitations and fostered a “can do/will do” culture.
•The tactical operations center charged with tracking the transit failed to do so and reacted poorly when things started going wrong.

The investigation faulted the boats' leadership — a junior officer and a senior enlisted crewmember — as well as the shore-side officer in charge in Kuwait.
"When tasked with the transit from Kuwait to Bahrain, the Kuwait detachment Officer-in-Charge and both [riverine command boat] leaders were derelict in their duties in that they failed to meet even the most basic requirements of leadership, planning, and tactical execution," the investigation said.

The investigation also said their lack of situational awareness made their reaction times too slow when the boats were approached by the Iranian Revolution Guard Corps forces, limiting any remaining course to avoid capture.

"Unprepared and unaware, the boat crews were late in responding to the approaching [Iranian Revolutionary Guard] patrol craft, delaying action to establish a heightened security posture," the investigation reads. "Their lack of force protection left them with few realistic options to resist detention."