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Inspired by discussions generated in the thread started by SSG(P) (Join to see):
https://www.rallypoint.com/answers/why-weren-t-marines-chosen-for-normandy?urlhash=406436
Particularly some comments by LTC Paul Labrador pointing out that the Army really did execute significant numbers of complex amphibious landings. Given these facts, why did General McArthur, who commanded the campaign in the Philippines in WWII assign an amphibious landing of such critical importance nearly exclusively to Marines? (only involving Army SF and supporting arms, and some follow-on army Armor, and the overall command staff of the X Corps?)
https://www.rallypoint.com/answers/why-weren-t-marines-chosen-for-normandy?urlhash=406436
Particularly some comments by LTC Paul Labrador pointing out that the Army really did execute significant numbers of complex amphibious landings. Given these facts, why did General McArthur, who commanded the campaign in the Philippines in WWII assign an amphibious landing of such critical importance nearly exclusively to Marines? (only involving Army SF and supporting arms, and some follow-on army Armor, and the overall command staff of the X Corps?)
Military History
Korean War
Marine Corps
Edited 10 y ago
Posted 10 y ago
Responses: 11
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I think a big part of it was due to the state of the Post-WW2 Army and who was actually prepared and immediatley available to conduct an Amphibious assault and what else was going on in Korea at the time the landings were conducted. The post WW2 Army was severly gutted and readiness/training of remaining units was not in good repair (see Task Force Smith). Most available Army units in the Far East had already been committed to the Pusan Perimeter and were barely hanging on. If you study the operation, it is interesting that the Marines were not MacArthur's first choice of troops. The original plan was to use 1st Cav Div, the unit that MacArthur relied heavily upon during his landings in WW2, but they were rerouted to holdling the Perimeter. The same happened to 2ID and 7ID (which was in reserve status and would need significant rebuilding) would not be ready in time. Stateside Army units could not be mobilized, trained, equipped and moved fast enough to conduct the operation as the hold on Pusan was tenous and the forces fighting there needed to be relieved ASAP. So who was left that was not already engaged and could realistically pull off this operation on relatively short notice with a good chance of success? The Marines were. So I would hesitate to read into MacArthur's choice of using Marines at Inchon to infer that "it was a job only Marines could do." It is more accurate that MacArthur, begrudgingly because there was still a lot of interservice rivarly happening, used the Marines because that's all he had left available who had the training to conduct Operation Chromite within the time frame needed. This is not taking anything away from the Corps. I've visited the Inchon landing sites on a staff ride. The Marines did a brilliant job of overcoming not only the North Koreans, but the unique geographic challenges of Inchon.
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LTC Paul Labrador
Another thing to bear in mind is the time frame of this part of history. The Korean War started on 25Jun50. Chromite landings commenced on 15Sep50. From the start of the war to the first Marines hitting the "beach" (there really isn't a beach in Inchon) was under 90 days. That is AMAZING. Chromite was a hastly thrown together, ad hoc operation. It is a wonder that MacArthur and his staff were able to pull this off. The only thing going for him was the vast experience his subordinate leaders had amassed during operations in the PTO.
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LTC Paul Labrador
BTW, if anyone ever goes to Korea (PCS or TDY) try to get out to Inchon. It is well worth it. There is also a statue recreating the famous Inchon Landing photo (featuring 1st Lt Lopez going over the sea wall) that Capt Porter posted. For you history buffs. Minutes after the photo was taken 1st Lt Lopez was killed when he jumped on a grenade to save his Marines. He was awarded a MoH for that act.
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Capt Richard I P.
LTC Paul Labrador, your history posts are always great. I think you make some awesome points about the realities of the situation. LTC David S. Chang, ChFC®, CLU® also brought up the fact that MacArthur originally wanted soldiers doing the landing but couldn't afford to weaken the Pusan Perimeter that far. In the end, having a large, un-engaged force that spent the past 5 years doing repeated amphibious landings...it just made too much sense. Operational (deciding when and where to fight and with what units) brilliance on his part, tactical brilliance on that of the Marines.
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LTC Paul Labrador
Capt Richard I P. thanks! I am a military history buff, so I enjoy these kinds of conversations. It was funny, back in ILE, I was having a discussion with our History instructor about something Napoleonic tactics or some such and the physician in my small group was like "how do you know this stuff?"
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SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL
INCHON - OPERATION CHROMITE The amphibious landings of 15 September 1950 at Inchon were General MacArthur's masterstroke. As Eight Army struggled to maintain fighting room in the southeast of Korea, he had his thoughts fixed upon a possible landing in the enemies rear to reverse the war. The biggest logistical challenge was to have all units, their equipment and supplies, as well as transports, landing ships and craft, and other ships, ready in time for D-day.
http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/hermansen/6.html
http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/hermansen/6.html
The United States Military Logistics in the First Part of the Korean War,CHAPTER 6 - INCHON, by...
text/html. Dissertation in HistoryUniversity of Oslo, Spring 2000, Supervisor: Professor Rolf Tamnes
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David Habersham's book "The Coldest Winter; America and the Korean War" goes into this very well. He postulates it was a political move on McArthur's part to bring in support from the Marines, especially related to the Joint Chiefs.
Very complicated relationships and I would have to go back and re-read that section, but if I remember correctly, by bringing in a Marine Division, McArthur could effectively gain support for the mission from another branch (and therefore the Marine Commandant).
I highly recommend this book BTW.
Very complicated relationships and I would have to go back and re-read that section, but if I remember correctly, by bringing in a Marine Division, McArthur could effectively gain support for the mission from another branch (and therefore the Marine Commandant).
I highly recommend this book BTW.
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LTC Paul Labrador
And if you thought interservice rivalries and politics are bad now, you should look how they were back then..... ;o)
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CSM Charles Hayden
@LTC J KEITH P. Army Historian, General S L A Marshall’s book, The River and the Gauntlet was published earlier than Halberstam’s.
GEN Marshall told of Band members of the 2nd ID’s Band fought as Infantry Soldiers, during a retreat early in the Korean War. The problem of frozen M-1 Rifles was solved by urinating on the actions.
There are several copies available at Abebooks.com for less than $10 + shipping. (Sep 14, 2018)
GEN Marshall told of Band members of the 2nd ID’s Band fought as Infantry Soldiers, during a retreat early in the Korean War. The problem of frozen M-1 Rifles was solved by urinating on the actions.
There are several copies available at Abebooks.com for less than $10 + shipping. (Sep 14, 2018)
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