Is the concept of the Infantry Battalion Task Force viable and necessary in the Active Army?

2015-11-25T10:57:54-05:00

As a part of the plan to get the Active Army to 450K, we will be inactivating an Infantry Brigade Combat Team at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska and one at Fort Benning, GA. We will replace these with an "Infantry Battalion Task Force," of just over 1000 Soldiers. Our doctrine is Brigade Combat Team centric. While we have doctrine for the Infantry Battalion (FM 3-21.20), they aren't meant to operate alone. They don't have the logistics to do so for more than 24 hours even though they often do. How does a lone Infantry Battalion do everything it needs to in garrison as well? How will this thing be used in combat?

Response by Sgt Aaron Kennedy, MS made Nov 25 at 2015 11:02 AM

2015-11-25T11:02:29-05:00

Think of it like the Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) as part of the MEU. Sounds like the same concept. We're very BN centric.

Response by COL Vincent Stoneking made Nov 25 at 2015 11:19 AM

2015-11-25T11:19:07-05:00

Poorly.
In our drive to "task force organize" and "modularize" everything, we are losing sight of the fact that there are minimum densities that are needed both for effectiveness AND efficiency. The only way to be truly effective as a SEPARATE IN BN TF is to be in a CONSTANT training cycle as well as have dedicated slices of (what once on a time were) DIV resources - which means you have a great deal of waste in resourcing.

Of course, I said similar things in 2004/5.... So I'm probably wrong...

Response by MAJ Ken Landgren made Nov 25 at 2015 1:44 PM

2015-11-25T13:44:30-05:00

The mere fact the Infantry Battalion needs support means the Infantry and Logisticians need to work out the details for support.

Response by COL James Greer made Dec 1 at 2015 6:43 AM

2015-12-01T06:43:51-05:00

For decades the combat force at SETAF in Italy was a Battalion Task Force. It trained in garrison and deployed independently. Perhaps there are historical records that might be informative.

Response by LTC Robert McKenna made Dec 1 at 2015 10:08 AM

2015-12-01T10:08:04-05:00

This isn't really about capability, as much as it is about retaining the structure (i.e. manpower billets, and officer development opportunities). As COL G states below, we have multiple examples of BN Task Forces over the last thirty/forty years with SETAF being the most widely known. I wouldn't surprise me if this is just an interim step, and at some point the separate BN's will be attached into some higher maneuver HQ.

Response by SFC David Welch made Dec 1 at 2015 10:57 AM

2015-12-01T10:57:24-05:00

as a comparison The firepower of a civil war infantry regiment 3600 men +-,
single shot muzzle loader musket artillery cavalry support
was matched at w2 by an infantry platoon and one tank.
auto loader rifle multi use artillery mortar indirect direct in the 105 howitzer lighter mortars air support well coordinated near the end questionable before
an infantry brigade 5000+- man (combat command) a multi branch force major step to flag
all of the above finely polished
be shrunk back to 1000+- man combat command multi branch

some really interesting stuff is in the pipeline. will take really imaginative ltc's to make it work

your up lets have it.

Response by COL Private RallyPoint Member made Dec 1 at 2015 3:40 PM

2015-12-01T15:40:30-05:00

Necessary, perhaps due to the requirement to downsize; viable no. "Plugging" into a support mechanism is not an easy feat. Support Operations Officers and BCT S4s spend countless hours developing support scenarios that are synchronized in space and time through relationships developed with support BN/SQDN XOs and S4s that take months to build. Acknowledging that they are "not meant to operate alone" implies that they would be supported by someone...if it is a BSB in a BCT, there are already acknowledged resource shortcomings across the board, as you and I discussed at great length back at Lewis; one would assume that there would be an EAB support structure required then to support; but multifunctional sustainment support does not currently exist until LOG 2020 gets fully implemented and the aligned forces are established, C2 is defined, SOPs are developed, and exercised.

Response by MAJ Ken Landgren made Dec 1 at 2015 4:20 PM

2015-12-01T16:20:55-05:00

The complexity increases dramatically when other branches are added to the TF.

Response by SFC David Welch made Dec 1 at 2015 5:56 PM

2015-12-01T17:56:02-05:00

apparently lacking imagination

Response by MAJ Thomas Person made Dec 1 at 2015 7:07 PM

2015-12-01T19:07:55-05:00

Well if we look back to the Regimental Combat teams such as the 5th RCT or the 7th RCT all these Regimental teams had all the slices; sappers, arty, med, etc. They also fought well (see Korean War) killing beau coup Chinese; much to the CHICOM's chagrin I am sure. I digress. What this concept of the BN Team is another Legion of Merit for somebody. The BLUF is: All thru history, the rifle company takes the beating and every commander and his flesh peddler throughout that history has sat around trying to figure out a way to reconstitute the rifle companies. Everyone remembers Eisenhower in 1944 trying to flesh out the rifle battalions at the cost to AAA BN's and even 'cooks". What we have here is an attempt to cover up the fact we do not have enough men with rifles and bayonets. Period. The COS of the Army the last few years has been a disgrace by not offering his resignation publically to the Senate in order for the public to see what is being done to our military. Old Fat Ray has allowed some of the most combat bloodied GO's in our history to be"RETIRED". His company grade officers with patches on the right shoulder and most significantly our hard bitten combat experienced NONCOMS are being shoved to the curb. The BCT I guess it will be called is a pipe dream. As previously mentioned all those slices must train with each other over and over. There is not enough MFP 2 money available. The SENATE probably does not know that MFP 11 money is not for training military aged Syrians...We are all so F word

Response by MAJ Jim Woods made Dec 1 at 2015 8:14 PM

2015-12-01T20:14:58-05:00

This was tried in Vietnam. The Bn. XO and SGM stayed in Base Camps and along with the HHC staff were responsible for getting beans and bullets out to the line companies. The principal S-2/3 were out at the Firebase or LZ with the Bn. CO and Fire Support Battery. Most of the time we were resupplied about once a week. The line Companies were minus the FB or LZ security Company. This allowed only 3 maneuver Companies and they were normally patrolling around the FB/LZ sometimes several klicks out. Logistics was a nightmare. Totally dependent on Division air assets. Not a fan.....

Response by SPC Byron Skinner made Dec 1 at 2015 8:28 PM

2015-12-01T20:28:11-05:00

Sp4 Byron Skinner, Actually sir your are asking two rather very good questions here. The first is don't sweat the Battalion Combat Team. This is a formation that is never intended to go into combat. The Army prior to 1957 was organized around the Regiment. In time of little threat A Regiment was reduced to three Battalions each with a single Company or Troop. When the threat level increased each of the battalions broke up the four platoons of its trained Companies or Troops and called them companies and brought in state militias to fill then out. AIT was generally the new Companies first venture into combat. The system worked, it won wars, so the Army had to screw it up starting in 1957. The current circle j--- is the BCT lead by an 06. The BCT is a very robust unit and often has more then three battalions, I have heard of in one case in iraq of a BCT having eight battalions and another time when a marine battalion was attached to an Army BCT. An enlisted whorehouse is better run then the USArmy. The problem of course there is no command for a Brigadier General in this mess. The Regiment was removed so an 06 now reports directly to an 08. The problem here is that the 1938 triangle division is great for winning a Napoleonic War but for insurgent warfare it is to big and unwieldily. The solution to the problem is to fire all O-9 and O-10's and promote into those slots some O-5 and O- 6's who have seen the elephant and can square things away, like Marshall did. The lack of understanding of fire and maneuver of small units in an insurgent environment is totally absent for the senior members of the Chain of Command. Your other question is the roll of Alaska in the next 20-40 years with the opening of the Northwest Passage. Neither time or space for you second question sir but it is a very intriguing one.

Response by COL John Hudson made Dec 3 at 2015 6:50 AM

2015-12-03T06:50:19-05:00

BLUF? It's a name change. I've spent 68 months of my life in full boots on the ground combat...Vietnam, Balkan, Iraq. The concept of full organizations on the ground ended in Vietnam. Forward thinking was to size any force to the conflict at hand. Reserve forces are trained to a higher standard than anytime in the past to be able to augment such 'light' active component units quickly. All three of the conflicts I've been involved in experienced a reduction in force (RIF) at conclusion. Those who left the active component were given opportunity to continue service in one of three reserve organizations...TPU, IRR/IMA or simply inactive (Troop Program Units being Tier A in nature). "Lone Battalions" are not alone...there are quite a few still left around after any conflict, although they may be part of the Reserve forces instead.

Response by CW4 Raymond Younger made Dec 3 at 2015 1:32 PM

2015-12-03T13:32:31-05:00

Having worked in TRADOC during the BCT development process I am left with deep prejudices regarding Brigade feasibility, let alone a battalion. Plus the inability for the Army to train in all climes and places, with all sorts of technologies, in as many types of environments conceivable, any sort of paring down or specializing/generalizing simply means doom.
This question is best responded by a long history of reporting on the unpreparedness
of various task forces of infantry battalion strength, stemming from both conventional/general purpose and special forces/Ranger concepts. We continue perpetuating a version of this to address past, present and future events. Probably responding to a return on investment vis a vis cost effectiveness (what ever that may mean) solution in austere and constrained periods of our political history.
Such that "Task Force Smith" itself was not a failure because of its own admitted shortcomings, but rather a victim of the US Army knowingly assigning an impossible mission, "failing" because its mission was not achievable by any single infantry battalion where problems rested with senior leadership up and down the chain of command, the Executive Branch, and Congress.
Obscure as it may seem, but these units, such as A Battery/52nd Field Artillery Bn & 1st Bn/21st Infantry Regiment, and its higher the 24th Infantry Division had many shortcomings due to austerity suffered by the US Army post WW II. Again, same parallels as before are manifesting again today. Contrary to perceptions, 1/21st Inf Rgt was one of the most trained and fit units in the US Army; this a testament to LTC Brad Smith and his experiences from WW II. He personally ensured that his unit was trained, cross-trained, and physically fit. To the point where they practiced theater infiltration techniques (ie. Glider-borne operations), vehicle, dismounted, and urban terrain training. Most of those soldiers cross-trained in other facets of warfighting, tactical operations, and enabling functions to ensure not one individual was a single point of failure.
It was the theater commander's intent to utilize a Regimental Combat Team for the type of action in a prelude known as the Korean War; however, he was overruled by the Pentagon and thwarted by the lack of dedicated support from the 24th Infantry Division. Finger pointing continues today who was at fault: MacArthur, MG Dean, LTG Walker, or the US Army in general.
In striking irony, the 34th Infantry Regiment deployed by sea while airlifted TF Smith arrived simultaneously in Pusan on 1 July, except that the 34th Regiment was intact. Alpha Battery, 52nd FA also deployed by sea, able to link up and fight with task force. The TF Smith airlift supposedly met MacArthur's requirement to fly forces into a mission. Semantics to be sure, however TF Smith was given a RCT mission, with not even ten percent of its assets; it was given a mission it could not possibly achieve.
So one artillery battery of 105mm howitzers was sent in lieu of an artillery Battalion of 155mm cannons, two 4.2 mortars instead of a company. Two rifle companies instead of sixteen and zero armor instead of fourteen elements, no forward air controllers, no engineers, no signal, no medical, no air defense, no military police, no signal company, and no reconnaissance capability.
I interviewed LTC Brad Smith, Bill Cole and few others for doctoral research. Their commentary was extremely insightful; a definite learning event for myself other than a real pleasure. Lessons noted, but nothing learned after all these years.

Response by SPC Richard Hansen made Dec 3 at 2015 1:36 PM

2015-12-03T13:36:04-05:00

We(the Infantry), can exist much longer than 24hrs-on our own! If not, you don't have the right soldiers for the job. Anything needed-ammo, food, water-can be airdropped. No combat unit ever passed inspection, and it never should. Political correctness gets you killed. Why so many guys? If you can't take care of business with 150-300 well trained/armed/pissed off grunts, you've got bigger issues. Your creating your own problems the bigger you get. Bigger isn't always better. With CAS, and the longe range on call assets, you can get some pretty good danger close support-IF THEY'LL RELEASE IT! ROE? We don't need no stinking ROE....

Response by CPT Private RallyPoint Member made Dec 3 at 2015 10:28 PM

2015-12-03T22:28:20-05:00

The one in Benning lost all of their Armor and Bradleys. I have a feeling they are going to be a second string to the rest of the BCTs. When they need a small unit for a unique mission I can see these BN TF going. Something like Kosovo or other small unit assignments. It might be more reasonable to use these types of unit than breaking up a BCT when you only need a a BN worth of soldiers.

Response by COL Jason Smallfield, PMP, CFM, CM made Dec 4 at 2015 2:33 PM

2015-12-04T14:33:17-05:00

A few thoughts:
- There are several reasons at the strategic level to do or not do something. All lead to compromise solutions and not optimal solutions. A few examples are below. BLUF is that we should not just be looking at the IN BN TF as a current fight issue. We also need to be looking to the future and what might/will happen.
- Current fight. Argues against an IN BN TF because it is outside the Army's BCT centric doctrine and organization.
- Reversibility. The Army shrinks and grows over the years. We are shrinking now. I can not tell you when we will grow again but history tells me that we will grow again. It is harder to grow a BCT from nothing than it is to grow a BCT from an IN BN TF seed corn. Look to history. How was the 101st Airborne created? Not from scratch but from cadre from the 82nd Airborne. Keeping an IN BN TF in Alaska and Benning therefore allows for today's decision to more easily be reversed in the future.
- Risk. Several ways to look at risk but a few are COCOM perspective, operational domain perspective, and probability and severity perspective. With Russia flexing its muscle again, should the US really not have ground forces in Alaska at this time? If we do not, how does that impact our ability to shape, deter, defeat? Argues for keeping something.
- Hollow Army vs full readiness. Current CSA guidance is to not have a hollow Army and to achieve as much readiness as we can. Not saying this is wrong but there is an argument to be made that we should have less than fully manned organizations that we can use as the seed corn to regrow the Army when, not if, we have to.

Response by COL Private RallyPoint Member made Apr 21 at 2016 3:49 PM

2016-04-21T15:49:09-04:00

An addition to this thread...the Acting Secretary of the Army announced that the Army will keep the Airborne IBCT in Alaska for at least one more year. This stops their conversion to an Infantry Battalion Task Force for now. They would have inactivated in September of 2016, but now will inactivate on September 2017.

Response by MG Private RallyPoint Member made Jun 24 at 2018 10:48 PM

2018-06-24T22:48:22-04:00

The combat in a complex world is being forced to change structures and organizations. All we need is capacities in very low level to face with the furtive enemy.